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A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
MODERN PHILOSOPHY 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO 
DALLAS • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

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THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 



A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
MODERN PHILOSOPHY 



BY 



DR. HAROLD HOFFDING 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE 
UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN 



AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION BY 

CHARLES FINLEY SANDERS 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT PENNSYXVANIA COLLEGE, GETTYSBURG, PA. 

AUTHOR OF THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF JERUSALEM'S 

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 



¥ 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 



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COPTEIQHT, 1912, 

By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



let up and electrotyped. Published September, 1912. 



£CI.A320598 



PREFACE 

Professor Harold Hoffding is already well known to the 
English-speaking world through the translations of his 
Psychology, Ethics, Philosophy of Rehgion, Problems of 
Philosophy and his History of Modem Philosophy (2 
vols.), all published by the Macmillan Company. The 
fact that his works are rapidly finding their way into 
English and other languages is the best evidence of the 
esteem in which his work is held and of his importance as 
a thinker. Bom in 1 843, prof essor of philosophy in Copen- 
hagen since 1883,, Doctor Hoffding has worked over the 
whole field of philosophy with great thoroughness. The 
original (German) edition from which this translation is 
made appeared in 1905. It is therefore the fruit of his 
ripest scholarship. The book is clear, compact and com- 
prehensive. The various schools are analyzed and criti- 
cized, and the thread of continuous development is con- 
stantly kept clearly in view. These features constitute 
the exceptional merit of the book as a text. The student 
is constantly aware that a familiar spirit is safely guiding 
him through the bewildering maze of philosophic problems 
and tentative solutions. 

As a psychologist Doctor Hoffding is an empirical intro- 
spectionist. He is thoroughly modem in his antipathy 
towards metaphysical speculation. He discovers a native 
tendency in man, manifesting itself in the impulse towards 
well-being, the source or further meaning of which is 
beyond our knowledge, which furnishes the basis of ethics. 



Vi PREFACE 

Religion is the reaction of the human mind to the sense of 
value and represents the highest fimction of the htiman 
mind. As a critical empiricist he possesses a peculiar 
advantage in the interpretation of the trend of philosophic 
thought. We ofEer this book to the EngHsh student 
because of its merit, as an efficient gtiide to the vmder- 
standing of modem philosophy. 

C. F. Sanders. 
Gettysburg, Pa. 
July 20, 1912. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Introduction i 

FIRST BOOK 

THR PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

A. The Discovery of the Natural Man 4 

1. Pomponazzi, Machiavelli, Montaigne 4 

2. Vives, Melanchthon, Althusius, Grotius 8 

3. Bodin, Cherbury, Bohme 9 

4. Ramus, Sanchez, Bacon 15 

B. The New Conception of the World 21 

1. Nicholas of Cusa 22 

2. Telesius 24 

3. Copernicus 26 

4. Bruno 28 

C. The New Science 35 

1. Leonardo 36 

2. Kepler 37 

3. Galileo 39 

SECOND BOOK 

THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

1. Descartes 44 

2. Hobbes 58 

3. Spinoza 67 

4. Leibnitz 79 

THIRD BOOK 

ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

1. Locke 91 

2. Newton 96 

vii 



vm- CONTENTS 

PAGE 

3. Berkeley 98 

4. Shaftesbury 102 

5. Hume 106 

6. Smith. 113 

FOURTH BOOK 

PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 

A. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment in France and 

Rousseau 118 

1. Voltaire and the Encyclopedists 118 

2. Rousseau 123 

B. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment in Germany and 

Lessing 132 

1. The German Enlightenment 132 

2. Lessing 135 

FIFTH BOOK 

IMMANUEL KANT AND THE -CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

A. Theoretical Problems 140 

1. The Development of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge 140 

a. First Period. 1 755-1 769 140 

b. Second Period. 1769-17*61 140 

2. Critique of Pure Reason 144 

a. Subjective Deduction 144 

b. Objective Deduction 146 

3. Phenomena and Thing-in-itself 148 

4. Criticism of Speculative Philosophy 150 

B. The Ethico-religious Problem 153 

1. The Historical Development of the Kantian Ethics . 154 

2. The Specifically Kantian Ethics I55 

3. The Religious Problem 156 

4. Speculative Ideas on the Basis of Biology and 

Esthetics 159 

C. Opponents and First Disciples 162 

1. Hamann, Herder, Jacobi '..... 163 

2. Reinhold, Maimon, Schiller 165 



CONTENTS IX 

SIXTH BOOK 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

PAGE 

A. The Speculative Systems 171 

1. Fichte 171; 

2. Schelling 177 

3. Hegel 182 

B. The Critical Romanticists 189 

1. Schleiermacher 189 

2. Schopenhauer 194 

3. Kierkegaard 201 

C. The Under-current of Criticism in the Romantic 

Period 205 

1. Fries 205 

2. Herbart 207 

3. Beneke 211 

D. The Transition from Romanticism to Positivism . .213 

1. The Dissolution of the Hegelian School 213 

2. Feuerbach 214 

SEVENTH BOOK 

POSITIVISM 

A. French Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century before 

CoMTE 219 

(The Authority, the Psychological and the Social Schools.) 

B. AUGUSTE COMTE 224 

C. English Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century before 

John Stuart Mill 231 

D. John Stuart Mill 237 

E. The Philosophy of Evolution 246 

1. Charies Darwin 247 

2. Herbert Spencer 250 



X CONTENTS 

PAGE 

F. Positivism in Germany and Italy 260 

1. Diihring 261 

2. Ardigo 264 

EIGHTH BOOK 

NEW THEORIES OF THE PROBLEM OF BEING UPON A REALISTIC 
BASIS 

Introduction. (Modern ^Materialism) 268 

A. Modern Idealism in Germany 271 

1. Lotze 271 

2. Hartmann 275 

3. Fechner 278 

4. Wundt 280 

B. Modern Idealism in England and France . . . .284 

1. Bradley 284 

2. Fouillee 287 

NINTH BOOK 

NEW THEORIES OF THE PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF VALUE 

A. The Problem of Knowledge 289 

1. German Neokantianism 290 

2. French Criticism and the Philosophy of Discontinuity 292 

3. The Economico-biological Theory of Knowledge . . 296 

1. Maxwell, Mach 298 

2. Avenarius 299 

3. WilUam James 301 

B. The Problem of Value 303 

1. Guyau 3^4 

2. Nietzsche 306 

3. Eucken 310 

4. William James 312 

Chronology of the most Important Works 315 

Index 321 



A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
MODERN PHILOSOPHY 



BEIEF HISTOEY OF MODEM PHILOSOPHY 

INTRODUCTION 

The subject matter of the history of philosophy consists 
of the efforts which individual thinkers have made to 
explain or perchance to solve the ultimate problems of 
knowledge and of being. Modem philosophy — i. e. the 
philosophy of the last three centuries — has been specially 
concerned with four great problems. These problems, 
moreover — as I have shown in my Philosophic Problems 
(Eng. Tr. 1905) — are intimately related to each other, 
and there likewise exists a most significant analogy 
between them, in that the antithesis of continuity and 
discontinuity is of fundamental importance in each of 
them, except that it manifests itself under different forms. 

I. The psychological problem originates from the 
inquiry concerning the essential attributes of psychic 
life. Is the soul a distinct substance, or does its essential 
nature consist of a peculiar activity? Is the soul com- 
posed of a variety of independent elements, or is it 
characterized by unity and totahty? The discussion 
of these questions can be of value only as it is based upon 
a detailed investigation of psychical phenomena and 
fimctions. It will Hkewise appear that the solution of 
these questions has a very important bearing on the 
treatment and the solution of the remaining philosophic 
problems. 

Whilst psychological investigation finds its subject 
matter in the bare facts of psychic life, there are two 



2 INTRODUCTION 

further problems which are conditioned by the antithesis 
of fact and value as it appears in psychic life, the problem 
of knowledge and the problem of evaluation. 

2. The problem of knowledge springs from the inquiry 
into the presuppositions of knowledge and the limits 
within which our thought processes are valid (thus in- 
cluding the sphere of psychological investigation). The 
primary origin of thought is spontaneous, a reaction 
produced by events which are not the result of thought. 
To what extent are we then justified in ascribing real 
meaning to the results of thought? Wherein does the 
truth of knowledge consist? 

3. Whilst the problem of knowledge has special refer- 
ence to the intellect, the problem of evaluation grows out 
of the inquiry into the vaHdity of judgments pertaining 
to human conduct and social institutions — particularly 
those that rest on the processes of will and emotion. 
What constitutes the standard for such a judgment? 
Upon what foundation does the vaHdity of the concepts 
of good and bad rest? And is it possible to apply these 
concepts with logical consistency? The scope of the 
problem becomes increasingly comprehensive the moment 
we test the vaHdity of the judgment, not only as per- 
taining to human conduct and vital forms, but likewise 
to Being and the tiniverse in general. We then pass from 
the problem of ethics to that of religion. 

4. FinaUy we may also inquire concerning the nature 
of Being, of which thinking, feeHng and voHtional being 
are but a single part. This gives rise to the problem of 
Beings i. e. the problem of cosmology or metaphysics. Is 
it possible to elaborate a general world theory according 
to scientific methods? And what would be the nature 
of such a theory? If we organize our experiences and 



INTRODUCTION 3 

infer the ultimate consequences of otu* knowledge, what 
principles will furnish an adequate explanation of the 
universe? 

The nature and method of the treatment of these 
problems will vary with the instruments of knowledge 
and the historical conditions of the different periods. 
And in those problems which lie on the borderland of 
thought even the personality of the thinker will likewise 
have its effect. It is for this reason that a comparative 
treatment of the problems as history presents them is 
of such great importance. The various statements and 
solutions of the problem possess more than a purely 
philosophic interest. They have likewise an important 
bearing on the history of civilization and on psychology. 
They are responses in a great discussion which is pro- 
ceeding through ages. Each response is something more 
than a mere intellectual structure, it is likewise the sign 
of a spiritual current. The history of philosophy there- 
fore bears a direct relation to the general history of 
ciilture and of mind 



FIRST BOOK 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

A. The Discovery of the Natural Man 

BuRCKHARDT, in his famous treatise, Die Kultur der 

Renaissance in Italien, characterizes the Italian renais- 
sance as the discovery of man. The historical conditions 
led to the emancipation of the individual. Man was no 
longer estimated from the mere viewpoint of his relation- 
ship to the Church or to his guild. He now became the 
subject of specialized interest and study. The dis- 
covery of ancient literatiire and art likewise contributed 
to this end. Man found a distinct form of culture out- 
side the Church, with laws and ideals of its own. This 
expansion of the horizon furnished the opportimity for 
comparative study. In the north Protestantism, with 
its emphasis on personal experience and its insistence 
that civil life is independent of the Church, showed a 
similar tendency. In this way it became possible even 
here to develop both a theoretical and a practical interest 
in things which are purely human. Hence, both in the 
north and in the south, we find a number of interesting 
movements in the realm of the mental sciences during 
the period of the Renaissance. 

I. Pietro Pomponazzi^s little book, De immortalitate 
animce (151 6), may be regarded as an introduction to the 
philosophy of the Renaissance. Pomponazzi was bom 
at Mantua in 1462, served with great distinction in the 
capacity of teacher of philosophy in Padua and Bologna, 
and died in the latter city in 1525. His friendship with 



MACmAVELLI 5 

Cardinal Bembo, who enjoyed the favor of Pope Leo X, 
saved him from persecution; but his book was burnt by 
the inquisition. His philosophic significance is due to 
his theory that the various forms and gradations of soul- 
life constitute a continuous natural series, and that ethics 
is self-explanatory. In opposition to the ecclesiastical 
Aristotelians he shows that the immortahty of the soul 
is incapable of philosophic proof. Even in its highest 
forms soul-life is dependent on material conditions and 
its existence after the dissolution of the body cannot be 
demonstrated. There is no occasion moreover to criticize 
this conclusion on ethical grounds. On the contrary, 
man is obHged as well as capable of doing good without 
the hope of immortahty; virtue is its own reward. This 
is the conclusion of the philosophy which is based on 
natural reason. But, according to Pomponazzi, the will 
may transcend reason: man can beHeve things which he 
is incapable of proving; faith proceeds from will, from 
personal impulse. By means of this separation between 
reason and will, between knowledge and faith, Pomponazzi 
conformed his theory with the authorized doctrines of 
the Church. He resorted to the same expedient in rec- 
onciling the reality of the human will with divine om- 
nipotence. The Church rejected this distinction. 

Nicolo da Machiavelli introduced the naturalistic 
method of investigation into politics and ethics in the 
same manner as Pomponazzi had revived the naturalistic 
psychology and ethics of genuine Aristotelianism. De- 
scended from an old Florentine family (b. 1469), he entered 
the diplomatic service of the republican government of 
his native city which furnished him a splendid opportunity 
for studying men and affairs. After the fall of the Repub- 
lic (15 12) he joined the Medici, which brought him the pro- 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

found contempt of his fellow citizens, who refused to accept 
his services after the republican government was again 
restored. He died in 1527. — Political interest made him 
a thinker. The misfortunes of Italy and its consequent 
conditions inspired him with a desire to restore its ancient 
spirit and power. Why should we imitate the splendid 
arts of the ancients and neglect their splendid deeds? But 
the sole possibility of accompHshing anything great re- 
quires us to press forward to the realization of great ideals 
without scruple! There are passages (especially in his 
Principe) in which Machiavelli seems to regard the ideal 
which a man proposes as an indifferent matter, if he only 
pursues it unscrupulously and energetically. But in the 
background of his thought there was constantly but a 
single ideal; the unity and the greatness of Italy. He 
regarded everything right which would contribute towards 
the realization of this ideal. Finding the Italians of his 
age lacking in a proper appreciation of greatness, he 
attributes it to the softening influence of the Church and 
of Christianity. In his Discorsi (Dissertations on the 
first ten books of Livy) he draws comparisons between 
the mind of antiquity and that of his own age, thus laying 
the foundation for a comparative ethics which was highly 
unfavorable to the modern period. Honor, magnanimity 
and physical prowess are not sufficiently appreciated now, 
and this is due to the fact that Christianity places the 
ideal of humanity in a transcendent world. To Machi- 
avelli it is perfectly clear that these attributes possess 
more than secondary value, they are intrinsically meritori- 
ous. Machiavelli reveals the true spirit of the Renaissance 
both by the purely human ideal which he presents to his 
fellow countrymen, as well as by his emulation of power 
for its own sake. 



MONTAIGNE 7 

The spirit of the Renaissance was likewise manifest in 
France. Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), a French 
nobleman, spent his life in his private castle in the neigh- 
borhood of Bordeaux, far removed from the great move- 
ments agitating his age, devoting himself to literary- 
pursuits. His interest in a piirely naturalistic inter- 
pretation of human life, as he knew it from travel, books 
and above all from introspection, reveals his thoroughly 
modern spirit. At the beginning of his essays (which 
appeared 1 580-1 588) he remarks; je suis moy-mesme le 
sujet de mon livre. Closer study however reveals the 
fact that it is the way in which nature manifests itself 
in his own life that really appeals to him. Nature, the 
great Mother of us all, reveals herself in a distinctively 
unique manner in every individual. Every human being 
has his forme maistresse, his ruling passion. It is this 
interest that accounts for Montaigne's own personal 
observations as well as for his thorough study of ancient 
literature. His enthusiasm for nature and his insight 
into the multiplicity of individual peculiarities cause 
him to revolt against all dogmatism, both the rationalistic 
and the theological. He opposes them both on the ground 
of the inexhaustible wealth of experience, which neither 
the faith of reason nor of dogma can satisfy. Our in- 
vestigations constantly lead to the discovery of a greater 
number of differences and variations and thus increase 
the difficulty of reducing them to general laws. And we 
must remember, furthermore, that our knowledge of the 
objective world is through sense perception, and that the 
sense organs as a matter of fact only reveal their own 
state, not the real nature of objects. And finally, if we 
attempt to form a conception of Deity, we imagine Him 
in human form, just as animals would conceive Him in 



8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

animal form, and we presume that this whole universe 
was created and is preserved for the welfare of man alone. 
— But Montaigne is not a sceptic. There are two funda- 
mental ideas, vitally related to each other, to which he 
firmly holds, viz. the idea of the variety of individual 
peculiarities, and the idea of the eternity of nature re- 
veahng itself in every natural event. 

Luis Vives (bom in Valencia 1492, died in Brugge 
1542), a Spanish scholar, whose contributions to philology 
and pedagogy have likewise been of great importance, 
became the forerunner of modem empirical psychology 
through his book De anima vita (1538). He insists that 
experience must be the foimdation of all knowledge and, 
true to this principle, he holds that our chief concern is 
not to know what the soul is, but to know how it acts. 
He therefore undertakes to emancipate psychology from 
metaphysics and theology. He follows the descriptive 
rather than the anal3rtic and explanatory method. His 
description of the various psychical phenomena, especially 
of the emotions, still retains its interest. He regards the 
soul and the vital principle as identical, and he constantly 
seeks to combine physiology, as he imderstands it from 
the works of Galen, with his psychology. He holds 
however that, whilst the souls of plants and of animals 
(the principle of organic life and of sensory experience) 
evolve from matter, God creates the human soul. The 
proof of the divine origin of the soul consists of the fact 
that man is never satisfied with the sensible and finite, 
but is forever striving to realize the infinite. 

Two years after the appearance of Vives' work, Philip 
Melanchthon (149 5- 1560), the reformer and "Preceptor of 
Germany," pubUshed his Liber de anima, a book which 
made a profound impression upon Protestantism. He 



MELANCHTHON 9 

follows Aristotle and theology more closely than Vives and 
his book is therefore of less importance for the history of 
psychology than that of Vives. Melanchthon's mild 
conception of human nature, contrasting sharply with 
that of Luther and the Lutheran zealots, had a wholesome 
influence however. His theory of the "natural light" 
shows this clearly : there are a nimiber of ideas implanted 
in us by God, hence innate (notitiae nobiscum nascentes), 
and these form the basis of all thought and of all value- 
judgments. This "natural light" was darkened by 
the Fall which necessitated the giving of the law at Sinai. 
The content of the ten commandments however is the 
same as the ''natural Hght." It follows therefore that 
ethics may be founded on human nature (naturalistically) . 
But it is powerless to quicken the life of the spirit and 
give peace. (Philosophic moraHs epitome.) 

The doctrine of the natural Hght was taken up enthusiasti- 
cally by the Reformed provinces and appHed most rigor- 
ously, especially with reference to the idea of authority 
and of the state. John Althatis (Althusius, 1 557-1 638), the 
B"urgomaster of Emden, made this theory the basis of 
his idea of popular sovereignty in his Politica methodice 
digesta (1603). Even before him, Jean Bodin (in La 
repuUique, 1577) had conceived and elaborated the idea 
that sovereignty is indivisible and can exist in but a single 
place in the state. Althaus now teaches that it always 
belongs to the people. Rulers come and go, but the 
people constitute the permanent foundation of the state. 
They are the source of all authority because it is their 
welfare that constitutes the cause and purpose of the 
existence of the state. As a matter of history the sover- 
eignty of the people is revealed in the first place by the 
fact that in most states there are a number of officers 



lO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

exercising governmental control by virtue of their appoint- 
ment by the people, and, in the second place, by the fact 
that the people terminate the government of tyrannical 
princes by revolution. From the viewpoint of philosophy, 
on the other hand, the theory of popular .sovereignty is 
demonstrated by the fact that either an expressed or 
tacit contract (pactum expressum vel tacitum) underlies 
the origin and perpetuity of the state; it is by virtue of 
such contract that the people institute organized society 
and submit themselves to governmental authority. 
Althaus therefore maintains that the purpose of this con- 
tract can be nothing else than the welfare of the people. 
He seems to construe this contract more in the form of a 
directive idea than as an historic fact. The state is 
simply the most comprehensive community; its ante- 
cedents being the narrower circles of the family, the 
neighborhood and the corporation. 

The appearance of Hugo Grotius^ De jure belli et pads 
(1625) marks an epoch in the sphere of jurisprudence and 
political theory. Born at Delft in 1583, his great learn- 
ing in the field of jurisprudence and of theology attracted 
attention early in life. Politically he belonged to the 
aristocratic and liberal theological party of Obernbarnevelt. 
He was rescued from the imprisonment into which he was 
cast after the fall of Obernbarnevelt by his wife's cunning. 
Thereafter he lived in Paris, and finally received the 
appointment of ambassador to Sweden (1645). Grotius 
makes war his starting point and inquires how it may be 
aboHshed. There are four kinds of war between states: 
between an individual and the state — between different 
individuals — between the state and the individual. 
I . When states declare war they have no right to abrogate 
the rights of the individual and the obHgations of humanity. 



GROTIUS H 

War must be conducted for the sake of peace, and hence 
not in such a way as to make peace impossible. It is 
through this principle that Grotius became the founder of 
the modern theory of popular sovereignty. 2. When 
the individual declares war against the state it is an 
act of rebellion, and, in evident opposition to AUhauSj 
Grotius denies the right of the people to revolt. 3. War 
between individuals, in a well-regulated state, is limited 
to justifiable self-defense. 4. War of the state against 
the individual takes the form of punishment. The 
state's right to punish must not be construed as the right 
of expiation. Punishment is justified only in case the 
pain imposed on the individual contains the possibility 
of greater good both to the individual himself and to the 
community. — In all of these various contingencies the 
authority of the law is independent of theological grounds. 
It proceeds from human nature (ex principiis homini 
intemis). Human beings congregate and are led to 
organize societies under the influence of a native social 
impulse (appetitus societatis); but the constitution of 
society presupposes certain principles of government — 
above all the inviolability of every promise — and the 
people therefore pledge themselves to the observance 
of these rules either by expressed or tacit contract. The 
obligation to keep promises, according to Grotius, rests 
upon a primitive promise. In direct opposition to 
Althaus, Grotius holds that the people — i. e. after they 
have constituted society on the basis of the primitive 
contract — can renounce its sovereignty absolutely because 
it confers it on a prince or corporation. His theory of 
the relation of the state to religion, on the other hand, 
is more liberal than that of the strictly confessional 
Althaus: The only requirement which the state can make 



12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

of its subjects is the acceptance of general religious ideas 
(the unit}' of Deity, predestination). 

3. The general religious ideas which GroHiis has in 
mind, and which even Melanchtlwn accepted, were elabo- 
rated by a series of thinkers in more or less direct op- 
position to the confessional conception. Similar ideas 
had already been expressed during the period of the older 
Italian Renaissance (especially in the Platonic Academy 
at Florence). Jea^t Bodin (a Frenchman learned in 
law, d. 1596), previously mentioned, in his remarkable 
work called the Dialogue of Seve^i Meti (Colloquium 
Heptaplomeres) describes a conversation between men 
whose religious viewpoints were widely at variance. 
Two of the men, defending natural reHgion — one of them 
dogmatically, the other more critically — engage in con- 
troversy with a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, a Jew, 
and a ^lohammedan. According to Bodin, true reHgion 
consists in the purified soul turning to God, the infinite 
essence. This reHgion can be exercised within any of the 
various reHgions, and the seven men therefore separate 
in charity and peace. 

Bodin' s book was in circulation for a long time in 
nothing but manuscript copies. In 1624, however, the 
EngHsh diplomat, Herbert of Cherhury, pubHshed his book 
De veritate, which remained the text book of natural 
reHgion for a long number of years. Cherbury takes 
issue with those on the one hand who regard confessional 
faith as superior to rational knowledge, and seek to incul- 
cate such faith by threats of future punishment, and those 
on the other hand who pretend to depend whoUy on the 
rational imderstanding, together with those who would 
derive everA'thing from sense experience, conceiving the 
soul as a blank tablet (tabula Rasa) . He holds that there 



BOHME 13 

is an immediate, instinctive sense which guides all men 
to the acceptance of certain truths (notiti® communes). 
This sense is the natural product of the instinct of self- 
preservation, which is another instance of the operation 
of divine predestination. The following propositions 
are instinctive truths of this order: Two contradictory 
propositions cannot both he true; There is a first cause of 
all things; No one should do anything towards another which 
he would be unwilling to sufer in return. According to 
Cherbury, even natural religion rests on an instinctive 
foundation, an inner revelation experienced by every 
human soul. The evidences of this revelation consist of 
the fact that we have capacities and impulses which 
finite objects fail to satisfy. The following five prop- 
ositions contain the essence of all religion: There is a 
Supreme Being; This Being must be worshipped; The truest 
worship consists of virtuous living and a pious disposition; 
Atonement for sin must be made by penitence; There are 
rewards and punishments after the present life. Questions 
which go beyond these five propositions need give us no 
concern. 

Jacob Bohme (15 7 5-1 6 24), the Gorlitz cobbler, and the 
profoundest religious thinker of this period, does not 
intend to oppose positive religion, as is the case with 
Bodin and Cherbury. He means to be a good Lutheran. 
He simply wishes to furnish a philosophy which will har- 
monize with Protestantism. Although a mere artisan, 
the influence of mysticism and natural science gave rise 
to grave doubts in Bohme^s mind. He accepted the 
Copernican astronomy. He could no longer regard the 
earth as the center of the universe. But must it not 
follow therefore that man is but a negligible quantity in 
the universe, and is it not true that the great world proc- 



14 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE RENAISSANCE 

esses must take their course regardless of the fate of 
man? Notwithstanding all this, if we should still pre- 
sume to maintain oiu" faith in God as the author of the 
imiverse, what shall we say in explanation of the evil, 
strife and suffering which everywhere abounds? After 
profoiind spiritual struggles Boh me discovered answers to 
these questions which he pubHshed in his Morgenrote im 
Aufgang (1612). His thought moves in majestic symbols 
drawn from the Bible and the chemistry or alchemy of his 
time. He is however fuUy aware that these symbols 
can express the piire thought relations but very imper- 
fectly. He was also well aware of the fact that his ideas 
went beyond the theolog}' of the church. But he stoutly 
denied the charge that his ideas were heathen. "J write 
like a philosopher J not like a heathen!^' He meets the 
first doubt with the idea of the presence of God's power 
and nature in ever>1:hing — ^in the human body as well as 
in the stellar spheres, and the latter must therefore be 
possessed of a kind of Hf e — ^in human souls and throughout 
infi n ite space. As a matter of fact our bodies reveal the 
same elements as are found in the other objects of nature. 
In objective nature the divine activity is veiled; but in 
the mind of man it is clearly conscious. It foUows there- 
fore that we possess what is highest within ourselves 
and there is no need that we should seek it beyond the 
stars. He solves the second doubt with the idea that 
man must assume an original multipHcity within the 
divine unity, on the ground that multipHcity cannot be 
derived from unity, and moreover because opposition 
and difference are necessary conditions of consciousness: 
''A being incapable of experiencing contrasts could never 
become conscious of its own existence." But multi- 
plicity and contrast ftimish the possibility of disharmony, 



RAMUS 15 

of strife and evil. The origin of evil is explained by the 
fact that a single element of Deity strives to become the 
whole Deity. This accoimts for the profound conflict 
and the intense suffering in the world through which man 
and nature are t© fight their way through to peace. In 
this conflict God is not far off: it is indeed his own inner 
conflict. ^^ Everyone whose heart is filled with love and who 
leads a compassionate and sweet tempered life, fighting 
against evil and pressing through the wrath 0} God into the 
light, lives with God and is of one mind with God, God requires 
no other service. '' 

4. The effort to attain a natural, purely humamstic 
conception likewise affected the logic of the Renaissance, 
as well as the psychology, ethics and philosophy of relig- 
ion. The scholastic logic, by which is meant the logic of 
the middle ages, was primarily the servant of theology and 
of jurisprudence; it was adapted to the single purpose of 
drawing valid conclusions from the presuppositions 
established by authority. But an effort was now being 
made to discover the relation which exists between logical 
rules and natural, spontaneous, informal thought. It 
was with this end in view that Pierre de la Ramee (Petrus 
Ramus) attacked the Aristotelian logic (Institutiones 
Logicice, 1554, French Ed. 1555). He was the son of a 
charcoal burner (bom in northern France 1515), and it 
was by sheer dint of his thirst for knowledge and his in- 
defatigable energy that he forged to the front and enjoyed 
a most successful career as a teacher in the College of 
France. Being a Protestant, he fell a victim to the mas- 
sacre of St. Bartholomew's night (1572). Ranms called 
attention to the fact that the earliest philosophers had 
no formal logic, and that the spontaneous functions of 
thought are not confined to these men, but that they 



1 6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

can be studied in the mathematicians, the statesmen, 
the orators, and the poets as well. These observations 
however still failed to lead Ramus to the founding of a 
psychology of thought. As a Humanist, he rejoices in 
the fact that the classical authors could be of service to 
logic. His own treatment however does not get much 
beyond the theory of inference, in which he differs but 
little from Aristotle. A controversy between the Ramists 
and the Scholastics arose at this time — enlisting France, 
England, Germany and the North — which contributed 
greatly to the development of freedom of thought. 

Franz Sanchez (1562-1632), a Spaniard, professor of 
medicine and philosophy at Montpelier and Toulouse, 
felt the need of substituting a new method for the scholas- 
tic logic. He expresses his dissatisfaction with the 
existing state of knowledge in his book Quod nihil scitur 
(1581). The further he presses his investigations the 
greater are the number of difficulties which he finds. 
Owing to the mutual interdependence of all things, and 
the infinitude of the universe, he has but little hope of 
attaining certainty in knowledge. He insists on obser- 
vation and experiment however, and takes as his motto; 
Go to the facts themselves. But the ultimate ground of 
certainty is nevertheless within the human mind itself: no 
external knowledge can equal the certainty which I have of 
my own states and actions. On the other hand however 
this immediate certainty of inner experience is far in- 
ferior to the knowledge of external objects in point of 
clearness and precision. 

Bacon^s enthusiastic optimism concerning the future 
prospects of science presents a sharp contrast to the 
pessimism of Sanchez. He hoped for great things and 
devised magnificent plans. He anticipated great ad- 



I 



BACON ^ 17 

vancement in culture which was to be brought about by 
the mastery of the forces of nature through the aid of 
natural science, a study which ancient and mediaeval 
thinkers had contemned. The aim and purpose of science 
is the enrichment of human life by means of new dis- 
coveries. Bacon nevertheless bestows high praise on the 
love of contemplation (contemplatio rerum): the vision 
of light is far more glorious than all the various uses of 
light. These sublime hopes furnish an insight into 
Bacon's personal character and his method of doing things. 
He justified the use of every available means in acquiring 
the conditions without which he thought his scientific 
plans impossible, on the plea of their necessity to the 
realization of his great purposes. 

Francis Bacon of Verulam was bom of an excellent 
family in 1 561. In order to acquire the influence and the 
wealth which he regarded as necessary to his purposes, 
he threw himself into politics and gradually rose to promi- 
nent positions; finally attaining to the office of Lord 
Chancellor. But he gained this promotion by dishonor- 
able compromises with the despotic caprice of Elizabeth 
and James the First. Under the charge of bribery and 
the violation of the law, parliament deposed him in 1621. 
His last years were spent in retirement engaged in scien- 
tific pursuits. He died in 1626. His political activities 
had not prevented him from continuing his studies and 
the production of important works. The tragedy of 
his life consisted in the fact that ulterior demands claimed 
his attention to so great an extent that not only his- real 
purpose but even his personal character had to suffer 
under it. 

Bacon describes himself as a herald (buccinator) who 
announces the approach of the new era without par- 



l8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

ticipating in it himself. He insists on quitting fruitless 
speculation and introducing the method of experience, 
induction, in every department of knowledge, — ^in 
the mental sciences as well as in the natural sciences. 
In the Novum Organon (1620) he examines the reasons 
why the sciences are inadequate and describes the in- 
ductive method. In the De Dignitate et Augmentis 
Scientiarum (1623) he presents a sketch of the actual 
state of the sciences and proceeds to show, frequently in 
a most brilliant manner, the gaps which stiU remain to 
be filled. 

If a man wotild understand nature correctly, he must 
first of aU reduce himself to a blank tablet. No one can 
enter the kingdom of natiu'e except as a little child. But 
we are all hindered to a greater or less degree by various 
illusions, both native and acquired (Idola mentis) . These 
may be divided into four classes. The first class, having 
its origin in human nature, is common to aU mankind 
(Idola tribus). This is why we are constantly disposed 
to regard things from the viewpoint of their relation and 
their similarity to ourselves, rather than from the view- 
point of their true place in the general order of the uni- 
verse — ex analogia hominis instead of ex analogia universi. 
We assume a greater degree of order and simplicity in 
things than the facts justify. We discover teleologic 
causes in nature because oiu- own actions reveal such 
causes. The second class rests on individual peculiarity 
(Idola specus; every one interprets nature from the view- 
point of his own cave) . This accounts for the fact that some 
minds are more impressed by the differences of things, 
whilst others are disposed to emphasize their resem- 
blances. Some are constantly striving to analyze and 
reduce things to their elements; others are engrossed with 



BACON 19 

totalities. The third class is due to the influence of 
language upon thought (Idola fori). The formulation 
of words is governed by the needs of practical life, but 
exact thought frequently requires distinctions and com- 
binations which differ widely from those of common 
speech. In certain cases there is a superabundance of 
words, in others there are too few. The fourth class 
(Idola theatri) is ascribed to the influence of traditional 
theories. 

We must get rid of all these illusions. Bacon makes 
no attempt to show how this may be accomplished. The 
conception of the idola tribus contains a profound prob- 
lem which Bacon failed to see, a problem however which 
acquired vast importance at a later period; we are obliged 
in every case to interpret reality from the human stand- 
point (ex analogia hominis) ; but in that case the question 
arises as to how our knowledge of the world can possess 
objective validity. 

Bacon takes exception to the prevalent method of induc- 
tion on the ground of its being limited to positive cases 
(as an induction per enumerationem simplicem). He 
insists that we must likewise take note of results in cases 
where the phenomenon under consideration is absent. He 
demands furthermore that we investigate the modifica- 
tions of phenomena under varying conditions. After 
sufficient material has been gathered by these methods — 
and in order to avoid being overwhelmed by the confused 
mass of facts (for, citius emergit Veritas ex errore quam ex 
confusione) — it is necessary to formulate a tentative 
hypothesis and examine the cases which seem to establish 
or refute the hypothesis. Bacon's method is therefore 
not a pure induction. He has a presentiment of the 
profound mutual dependence of induction and deduction. 



20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

His depreciation of the quantitative method however 
prevents him from attaining the true method of natural 
science as we jSmd it in his contemporaries, Kepler and 
Galileo. 

According to Bacon, the method of induction gives us 
an insight into the ^'Forms'' of things. The Baconian 
"Forms," from one point of view, bear a close resemblance 
to the Platonic ideas, and from another they are analogous 
to the laws of natural science. The latter conception 
he frequently emphasizes very strongly. He says, e. g. 
"If the Forms are not regarded as principles of activity, 
they are nothing more than fictions of the human mind." 
Generally speaking. Bacon occupies a unique position 
in the transition from the ancient and scholastic world 
view to that of the modem period. This is clearly mani- 
fest in his effort to acquire a mechanical theory of nature. 
We never understand an object until we are in position 
to explain its origin, and the genetic processes of nature 
are brought about by means of minute variations (per 
minima) which elude our senses. But science uncovers 
the secret process (latens processus) and thus reveals the 
inherent relation and continuity of events. We do not* 
discover, e. g. that the "Form" of heat is motion through 
sense perception; nor do the senses reveal the fact that 
the simi total of matter remains constant throughout all 
the changes of nature. 

Bacon makes a sharp distinction between science and 
religion. The former rests upon sense perception, the 
latter upon supematiural inspiration. In philosophy 
the first principles must be submitted to the test of in- 
duction; in reHgion, on the other hand, the first principles 
are estabHshed by authority. Reverence towards God 
increases in direct proportion to the absurdity and in- 



BRUNO 35 

of pain increase with the height of the aim. But the 
heroic man finds his joy in the fact that a noble fire has 
been kindled in his breast — even though the goal should 
be impossible of reaHzation and his soul should be con- 
sumed by its profound yearning. This coiu*ageous wis- 
dom typifies Bruno's character as it appears in his life 
and in his heroic death at the stake. 

C. The New Science 

Without any disparagement of the tremendous im- 
portance of the free investigations in the sphere of mental 
science, or even the radical change in the general theory 
of the universe, the fact nevertheless remains that the 
founding of modem natural science had a far profounder 
influence upon human life. The contributions of an- 
tiquity are likewise in evidence here, particularly the study 
of the writings of Archimedes. The real cause however 
must be traced to the increasing interest in the industries, 
mechanics and engineering operations, especially in the 
Italian cities. Galileo makes mention of this fact at the 
opening of his chief work. It was but natural therefore 
that this should give rise to a desire to imderstand the 
laws and principles by which to promote these operations. 
Then followed a transition from the achievements of man 
to the majestic products of nature, because man depends, 
more or less consciously, on the analogy between human 
mechanics and the efficiency of nature. 

Modem natural science created a new method. It 
substituted observation and experiment together with 
analysis and computation for speculation and dogmatic 
construction on the one hand and the mere collection of 
facts on the other. The human mind evolved new func- 
tions, whose nature and value necessarily suggested new 



36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

problems in the philosophy of knowledge. Owing to the 
fact that the new method was applied almost exclusively 
to the realm of matter, the concept of matter naturally 
came to the foreground. And as a matter of fact it was 
not imtil then that the problem of the relation of mind and 
matter could be sharply and definitely stated. Ethics and 
the philosophy of religion likewise received their comple- 
ment of new data. The self-sufficiency of man was mag- 
nified. New forms of social life were evolved, especially 
through the progressive division of labor made possible 
and necessary through the mechanical inventions. The 
growing conviction of the prevalence of fixed natural laws 
required a restatement and a more precise definition of the 
problem of religion. Man's general attitude to the uni- 
verse, both in its theoretical and its practical aspects, un- 
derwent a most remarkable change. 

We shall mention three men as the real founders of 
modem science. 

I. Leonardo da Vinci (145 2-1 5 19), the famous artist, 
whose varied talents made him one of the most remarkable 
characters of the Renaissance period, is known to us 
through several fragments in natiural science and philos- 
ophy which are of great importance. His manuscripts 
became scattered and none were published until late in 
the nineteenth century. {H. P, Richter has pubHshed a 
good collection. London, 1883. A German translation 
of the most important fragments was pubHshed by M. 
Eerzfeld, Leipzig, 1904.) 

Experience is the common mother of all knowledge. 
But we cannot stop on the plane of mere observation. 
We must find the internal bond of nature (freno e regula 
interna) which explains the vital relation of things and 
events. And the only possible method of doing this is 



CUSANUS 23 

All knowledge consists of a process of combination 
and assimilation. Even sense perception combines vari- 
ous impressions into unitary wholes and these are in 
turn reduced to ideas and the ideas finally to concepts. 
In this way the intellect (intelligentia) is forever striving 
for imity — but it invariably requires an antithesis, some- 
thing ''other than" (alteritas) itself to effect its develop- 
ment. Finally, in order to transcend the antitheses, 
thought undertakes to conceive them as the extremes of 
a continuous series. In this way maximum and minimum 
are united by a continuous series of magnitudes. But 
we are unable to reconcile all antitheses: thought cul- 
minates in antitheses, i. e. there always remains an un- 
assimilated increment beyond itself. It is as impossible 
for our thought to comprehend the Absolute as it is to 
describe a circle of pure polygons, even though we may 
constantly approach it more closely. Although we are 
incapable of conceiving the Absolute, Deity, we never- 
theless understand (such is the nature of the intellect) 
our incapacity, and the ignorance in which our thought 
culminates, as a matter of fact, is a scientific ignorance 
(docta ignorantia). (One of the most interesting of the 
works of Cusanus is entitled De docta ignorantia.) 

This fundamental peculiarity of our knowledge is like- 
wise of importance in the study of nature. We are con- 
stantly striving to form continuous series from given 
points, but without being able to arrive anywhere. Thus, 
e. g. we can divide our idea of matter to infinity, in ex- 
perience we must always be satisfied with a finite division, 
and the atom concept therefore always remains relative. 
It is the same with the idea of motion: an everlasting, 
perpetual motion were only possible in case there were 
no resistance. Here Cusanus anticipates the principle of 



24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

inertia. And the same thing applies even to the deter- 
minations of locality: we always regard the objects of 
the universe from a given place which is, for the time 
being, the center of the universe for us; the universe as 
such, however, can have neither center nor circumference, 
and all motion is relative. The theory that the earth is 
at the center of the universe is therefore false. However 
if it is not at the center of the universe, it cannot be at 
rest; it must be in motion even though we do not perceive 
it. There is no ground therefore for the assumption that 
the processes of origin and decay should be confined to 
the sublunar sphere; we must rather assume that all 
world bodies are subject to similar conditions to those 
of the earth. According to Cusanus, therefore, the same 
principle which precludes our knowledge of Deity like- 
wise demonstrates that the world can neither be limited 
nor stationary as was hitherto believed. 

2. It was characteristic of the ancient, aesthetic con- 
ception of nature to emphasize the opposition of Form 
and Matter. The "Forms" of natural phenomena like- 
wise contained their explanation. Bernardino Telesius 
(i 508-1 588) introduces the concept of Force (principium 
agens) instead of Form (in his work De rerum natura, 
1 565-1 587), as the opposite of Matter. He believes that 
this conforms more closely with the facts of experience. 
The "Forms" were mere qualities, which explain nothing. 
He rejected the traditional theory of the "natural places" 
and the qualitative distinction of the elements. There 
are as a matter of fact but two fundamental forces; the 
one expands (heat), the other contracts (cold), and the 
various "Forms" which Matter, in itself unchanging 
and quantitatively constant, assumes must find their 
explanation by reference to the interaction of these two 



TELESIUS 25 

forces. There are no ''natural places, " for space is every- 
where the same. Different places in space do not of 
themselves involve any qualitative differences. 

Telesius was born at Cosenza in the vicinity of Naples. 
His circumstances were sufficiently comfortable to provide 
him the opportunity to devote himself to science. He 
taught in the University of Naples and founded an 
Academy in his native city. He had planned to sub- 
stitute a new theory, based on experience, for Aristotelian 
Scholasticism. But his critical equipment was inadequate 
to the accomplishment of this ideal. His general princi- 
ples however mark an important advance. The details 
of his natural philosophy are no longer of interest. But 
his ideas on the psychology of knowledge still continue 
to be of considerable importance. He tries to bring 
thought and sensation into the closest possible relation. 
Should an object which has once been perceived in the 
totality of its parts and attributes recur at some later 
time with certain of its parts and attributes lacking, we 
can supply the parts which are lacking and imagine the 
object as a totality notwithstanding the fact that we 
perceive it but in part. We can imagine fire, e. g. with 
all its attributes, even though we only see its light, without 
perceiving its heat and its consuming energy. Intellection 
(intellegere) is the process of construing our fragmentary 
experience into such a totality. Even the highest and 
most perfect knowledge simply consists of the ability 
to discover the unknown attributes and conditions of 
phenomena by means of their similarity to other cases 
known as a totality. Inference simply means the rec- 
ognition of the absent attributes by this method. The 
simplest sensory impressions are therefore related through 
a large nvimber of intervening degrees to the highest 



26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

product of scientific thought, and there is no ground for 
attempting to deduce our knowledge from two different 
sources or faculties. The problem as to whether similarity 
is a sensory quahty like color and tone remains imsolved, 
as even Patrizzi, a contemporary of Telesius, charged 
against him. 

Telesius is inclined to ascribe sensitivity to all matter, 
just as, on the other hand, he regards the soul as material 
(with this exception, he postiilated a supernatural part 
in the soul on theological grounds which he regarded as a 
forma superaddita) . Every himian soul, like everything 
else, possesses a native impulse towards self-preservation, 
which constitutes the foundation of ethics. Himian 
virtues represent the various attributes which are favor- 
able to the preservation of the individual. Wisdom is 
an indispensable condition which must therefore co- 
operate with all the other virtues (as virtus universalis). 
The social virtues, which are comprehended under the 
concept humanitas, are of great importance, because 
intimate association with others is a necessary condition 
of self-preservation. The climax of all virtue however 
is magnanimity (sublimitas), which finds its sufficient 
satisfaction in its own personal integrity and diligence. 
Telesius conceived his ethics in the spirit of the Renais- 
sance, and it produced a lasting impression. His natural 
philosophy and his psychology were likewise very influ- 
ential, especially over Bacon and Bruno. 

3. Nicholas Copernicus (Coppemick), the founder of 
the modem theory of the universe, was bom at Thorn 
(1473), studied at Cracow and at various Italian Uni- 
versities and was prebendary at Frauenburg, partly as 
Administrator, devoting part of his time to his studies. 
He took no part in the great controversies agitating his 



COPERNICUS 27 

age. But he seems to have had a measure of S3rmpathy 
with the reHgious movement, and he fell into discredit 
during his latter years on account of his liberal, humanistic 
tendency. He began the elaboration of his astronomical 
theory already in 1506, but he was hesitant about its 
publication, and the first printed copy of his work De 
revoluHonibus orbium coelestium only appeared shortly 
before his death (1543). The matter which specially 
concerns us is the epistemological presuppositions which 
form the basis of this work. Two of its presuppositions 
must claim our attention. 

Nature always takes the simplest course. The theory of 
the whole imiverse revolving around so small a body as 
the earth is inconsistent with this principle. And the 
case is similar with the theory that the planetary orbits 
should not be simple circles but a very complicated system 
of epicycles. On the other hand, if we regard the sun as 
the center of the universe, and the earth and the planets 
as revolving around it, we have a very simple theory of 
the universe. 

The second presupposition is the principle of the rel- 
ativity of motion previously suggested by Cusanus, The 
perception of motion is not adequately explained by the 
mere reference to the fact that a perceived object has 
really changed its position in space. It may Hkewise 
be due to the fact that the perceiving subject has moved. 
If we therefore assume that the earth, from which we 
observe the motion of the heavenly bodies, is itself in 
motion (around its axis and around the sun), we will 
be in position to explain the phenomenon quite as well 
(only more simply) as the traditional theory. 

Copernicus still adhered to the idea of a finite universe 
and regarded the firmament of the fixed stars, the boun- 



28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

dary of the universe, as motionless. He believed the 
planets to be enclosed in a series of concentric permanent 
spheres. But notwithstanding this he prepared the way 
for a radical change in the theory of the universe. Facts 
which apparently rested on the direct evidence of sense 
perception and were supported by the most famous 
authorities must now be regarded as discredited! We 
must awaken to the fact that the system of things 
which constitutes the tmiverse admits of a different 
interpretation from the apparent demands of sense 
perception. 

4. Giordano Bruno (i 548-1600) is at once the most 
profound and the most courageous thinker of the renais- 
sance period. Strongly influenced by the philosophy of 
antiquity and accepting the theories discovered by 
Cusanus and TelesiuSj he found a real foundation for his 
theory of the universe in the new astronomy, as elabo- 
rated by Copernicus and later by Tycho Brake. 

Born at Nola in southern Italy, Bruno entered the 
Dominican order in his early youth. He was soon charged 
with heresy. His active mind and restive spirit could 
not endure the rigid monastic discipline. He fled the 
cloister, discarded the monastic garb and began a wander- 
ing career of study and travel, which took him to Switzer- 
land, France, England and Germany. He appears in 
tlie capacity of teacher in Toulouse, Paris, Oxford and 
Wittenburg; but nowhere did he find a permanent position. 
This was due in part to the opposition of the traditional 
schools, and in part to his restless disposition. But 
despite, his wanderings he found time to write his in- 
genious works, among which the Italian dialogues, pub- 
lished in London 1584, deserve special mention. He 
never regarded reconciliation with the Catholic church 



BRUNO 29 

as impossible, and even cherished the hope of retiiming 
to Italy and, without re-entering the cloister, continuing 
his literary activities. He felt that his career north of 
the Alps was a failure and Protestantism, with its many 
little popes, was more reprehensible to him than the 
ancient church with its single Pope. He finally returned 
therefore, but was arrested by the Inquisition at Venice 
(1592) and, after a long imprisonment, bxtmt as a heretic 
at Rome in 1600. He died like a hero. 

Bruno held Copernicus in high esteem because of his 
lofty mind. It was he who had lifted him above the 
illusory testimony of the senses to which the vast majority 
remained enchained. But notwithstanding his unstinted 
admiration for the man, he nevertheless regarded the 
Copemican theory as inadequate because of its conception 
of the universe as bounded by the sphere of the fixed 
stars. The basis of Bruno's opposition to this theory- 
was two-fold, its failure to accord with his theory of 
knowledge together with his rehgio-philosophical views. 

a. The sensory evidence of an absolute world-center 
and an absolute world-boundary is merely apparent. The 
moment we change our viewpoint we attain a new center 
and a new boundary. Every point in the universe can 
therefore be regarded at once as both central and periph- 
eral. Abstract thought and sentiency agree in this; 
namely, that we may add number to nimiber, idea to 
idea, ad infinitum, without ever approaching an absolute 
boundary. The possibilities of progress in knowledge 
are therefore unlimited, and it is from this characteristic 
of knowledge (la conditione del modo nostro de intendere) 
that Bruno conceives the character of the universe: abso- 
lute boundaries are as inconceivable of the universe as 
of knowledge. 



30 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE RENAISSANCE 

It follows therefore that there are no absolute positions. 
Every position is determined by its relation to other 
positions. One and the same point may be either center, 
pole, zenith or nadir — depending entirely on the point 
from which it is observed (respectu diversorum). There 
can therefore be no absolute motion and no absolute 
time. The ancients based their theory of absolute time 
on the absolute regularity of the motions of the fixed 
stars; but since the motions observed from any particular 
star differ from that of another star there are as many, 
times as there are stars. And, finally, the traditional 
theory of absolute heaviness and Hghtness is likewise an 
error; its tenability was based on the presupposition of an 
absolute center of the universe. Heaviness and lightness 
must therefore be understood with reference to the various 
world-bodies. Sun particles are heavy in relation to 
the sun, earth particles in relation to the earth. Accord- 
ing to Bruno, heaviness is the expression of a natural 
impulse within the parts to rettu-n to the greater whole 
to which they belong. 

The principle of relativity is closely connected with 
the theory that nature is everywhere essentially the same. 
We can infer the conditions in other parts of the universe 
from the conditions about us here on the earth. We 
observe e. g. that ships, when seen at a distance, appear 
to be motionless, whilst as a matter of fact they are 
moving very rapidly, and thus by analogy we may assume 
that the fixed stars appear to be motionless by reason 
of their great distance from us. There is no justification 
for maintaining the fixity of the firmament dogmatically 
as the ancients and even Copernicus had done. 

Bruno therefore challenged the dogmatic principles 
which Copernicus had still accepted. He saw very clearly 



BRUNO 31 

however that the matter cannot be definitely determined 
by mere speculative generalizations; genuine proof can 
only come from the discovery of new facts of experience. 
And he believes furthermore, and rightly so, that no one 
can investigate the matter without prejudice who adheres 
dogmatically to the traditional hypothesis. — At one 
important point he was able to appeal to well-defined 
facts. He rejected the theory, still accepted by Coper- 
nicus, that the stars are enclosed in permanent spheres: 
If the earth can move freely in space, why should it be im- 
possible for the stars to do the same? And he found his 
conclusion verified by Tycho Brahe^s investigation of 
comets, which as a matter of fact pass diagonally through 
the "Spheres" whose crystal masses were supposed to 
separate the various parts of the imiverse! It follows 
therefore that the contrast of heaven and earth, of perma- 
nent and changeable parts of the universe, is iintenable. 

b. In his philosophy of religion Bruno starts with the 
infinitude of the Deity. But if the cause or principle of 
the universe is infinite it must follow that the tmiverse 
itself is Hkewise infinite! We are unable to believe that 
the divine fullness could find expression in a finite uni- 
verse; nothing short of an infinite number of creatures 
and worlds would be an adequate display of such full- 
ness. 

Bruno elaborated his theory of the infinity of the uni- 
verse in two dialogues, the Cena de la ceneri and DeV 
infinito universo e mondi (1584), and in the Latin didactic 
poem De immenso (1591). These works are of epochal 
importance in the history of the human mind. Just as 
this wide expanse inspired in Bruno a feeling akin to 
deliverance from the confines of a narrow cell, so the 
human mind is now presented with a boimdless 



32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

prospect forever promising new experiences and new 
problems. 

c. Bruno elaborated his general philosophical princi- 
ples, which were naturally closely related to the new 
world theory, in the dialogue De la causa, principio e uno 

(1584). 

Inasmuch as the new world theory annulled the op- 
position between heaven and earth, Bruno imdertakes 
the task of annulling all oppositions by means of a pro- 
founder speculation. Sharp antitheses originate in the 
human mind and there is no ground for ascribing them 
to nature. Plato and Aristotle e. g. had no warrant in 
objective fact for assuming a distinction between Form 
and Matter. There is no absolute Matter, just as there 
is no absolute position and no absolute time. Absolute 
Matter must necessarily be absolutely passive, in which 
case it could acquire form and development only through 
some external agency. But in the nattiral world Forms 
are not introduced into Matter from without, after the 
manner of a human artist; they originate from within 
by an evolution of nature's own inherent energy. Matter 
is no less divine than Form and it persists in constant 
change even as the ancient Atomists had observed. Na- 
ture reveals a constant cycle — from inorganic matter 
through the organic processes and back again to the 
inorganic. According to Bruno's own statement, he was 
so profoundly impressed with this idea for a while that 
he was inchned to regard Forms and the spiritual factor 
in the universe as unessential and ephemeral. Later on 
however he perceived that Form and Spirit, no less than 
Matter, must have their ground in the infinite Principle. 
He admitted that everything must contain a spiritual 
principle, at least potentially (secondo la sostanza), even 



BRUNO 33 

if not always actually (secondo Tatto). The tiltimate 
source of all tilings consists of a Being which transcends 
the antitheses of Matter and Form, potentiality and 
reaHty, body and mind. In so far as this ultimate soiu"ce 
is conceived as something distinct from the universe it 
is called "Cause," in so far as it is conceived as actively 
present in natural phenomena it is called "Principle." 
The Deity is not a far distant being; it reveals its presence 
in the impulse towards self-preservation and it is more 
intimately related to us than we are to ourselves. It 
is the soul of our soul, just as it is the soul of nature in 
general, which accounts for the all-pervasive interaction 
throughout universal space. 

The culmination of thought likewise marks its limit, 
because we are incapable of thinking without antitheses. 
Every conceptual definition imposes certain limitations; 
the infinite Principle is therefore incapable of definition. 
Theology must forever remain a negative science, i. e. a 
science which eliminates the limitations and antitheses 
from the concept of Deity. The only significance which 
positive theology can have, i. e. a theology which under- 
takes to express the infinite Principle by definite pred- 
icates, is practical, didactic and pedagogic. It must 
address itself to those who are incapable of rising to a 
theoretical contemplation of the universe. God is indeed 
more highly honored by silence than by speech. 

d. The ideas described above are characteristic of the 
most important period of Bruno's philosophical develop- 
ment. It is possible however (with Felice To ceo, in 
•his valuable treatise Opera latine de G. Bruno, 1889) to 
distinguish an earlier and a later period in his development. 
During the first period Bruno's philosophy had somewhat 
of a Platonic character, in that he regarded general ideas 



34 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE RENAISSANCE 

as the highest object of knowledge and the universe as an 
emanation from Deity {De umhris idearum, 1582). But 
his ideas apparently mean something different from the 
universal concepts (as in Plato). He seems rather to 
regard them as laws which describe an actual relationship 
(e. g. between the different parts of the body). — The 
last period, as is evident from the De triplici minimo 
(1591), is noteworthy for its emphasis on the individual 
elements of being between which this actual relationship 
obtains. Sensory objects consist of parts notwith- 
standing the apparent continuity perceived through sense 
perception. Bruno calls the ultimate, irreducible (or 
first) parts atoms, minima or monads. There are various 
classes of monads, and he even calls the tmiverse and 
God monads, when speaking of them as imits. 

The distinctions between Bruno'' s three points of view — 
the theory of Ideas, the theory of Substance, and the 
theory of Monads — however are simply matters of degree. 

e. Bruno's ethics conforms with his general theory 
of the universe. His Spaccio de la bestia trionfanta (1584) 
evaluates human virtues according to a new standard. 
Its dominant characteristic is the prominence given to the 
desire for truth and to honest toil. Every correct evalua- 
tion presupposes truth, and toil is the natural consequence 
of the task imposed upon man, not merely to follow na- 
ture, but to bring forth a new, higher order of nature, 
that he may become lord of the earth. In the DegU 
eroici furori (1585) Bruno describes the heroic man as 
one who is aware that the highest good can only be realized 
through strife and suffering, but who never despairs, 
because pain and danger are evils only from the view- 
point of the world of sense, not from the viewpoint of 
eternity (ne I'occhio del etemitade). The possibilities 



BACON 21 

credibility of the divine mysteries accepted. Bacon how- 
ever beheves in the possibiHty of a purely natural theology. 
The very uniformity of natural causation reveals the 
existence of deity. 

In ethics Bacon makes a distinction between the theory 
of the moral idea (de exemplari) and the theory of the 
development of the will (de cultura anima). The former 
he finds thoroughly elaborated by the ancients; but the 
latter has received but very little attention hitherto. 

B. The New Conception of the World 

The middle ages developed its theory of nature as 
well as that of the spiritual life on the foundation of 
Greek antiquity — except where its ideas were derived 
from the Bible and Christian tradition. — They received 
their theory of medicine from Galen, their astronomy 
from Ptolemy, their philosophy from Aristotle. Their 
world view was a combination of the theories of Aris- 
totle and Ptolemy with the Biblical doctrines: the earth 
is stationary and forms the center of the universe; 
the sun, moon, planets and the fixed stars, attached to 
firm but transparent spheres, revolve around it. The 
sub-lunar world, i. e. the earth and the space intervening 
between the earth and the moon, is the realm of change 
and death. Here the four elements (Earth, Water, Air, 
Fire) are in a state of constant motion. Each seeks its 
* ' natural place . ' ' Weight consists of the natural tendency 
to descend, lightness consists of the tendency to ascend. 
Beyond this moon-sphere is the realm of ether, consisting 
of matter which has no "natural place," which is therefore 
capable of continuing its motion eternally with absolute 
regularity. The motions of the heavenly bodies — due 
to this absolute regularity — are a direct copy of the nature 



22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

of Deity. They move in circles because the circle is the 
most perfect figure; it invariably returns into itself! 
The universe is bounded by the sphere of the fixed stars 
which is moved by the Deity himself, whilst the lower 
spheres are moved by various ethereal spirits. 

This world theory seemed to be in harmony with the 
authorities of the age, Aristotle and the Bible, and at the 
same time to be in accord with the direct evidence of 
sense perception. This is why it required such a severe 
struggle to supplant it. It not only required the re- 
pudiation of venerable authorities, but even the most 
familiar sensory impressions. It was this profound 
revolution that constituted the stupendous task of the 
great Copernicus. The epistemological foundations of 
the ancient world view were unsettled by two men who 
had no acquaintance with its doctrine. 

I. Nicholas Cusanus (i 401 -1464), a profound thinker 
with Neoplatonic and mystical tendencies, had even in 
the fifteenth century gone beyond the traditional view of 
a limited and stationary universe. Born in Cues (near 
Trier), he was educated by the "Brothers of the Common 
Life." He afterwards continued his studies in Italy. 
He attained to high ecclesiastical positions and his phi- 
losophy has its starting point in theological speculations. 
In his doctrine of the Trinity he regards the Spirit as the 
uniting principle which combines the oppositions implied 
in the characters of Father and Son; spiritus sanctus est 
nexus infinitus. He afterwards discovers analogous 
principles in human knowledge and in nature generally. — 
Falckenberg^s Grungzuge der Philosophie des Nicholas 
Cusanus (Breslau, 1880) and M. JacoWs Das Welte- 
gebaude des Kardinals Nicholas von Cues (1904) are 
splendid memoirs of this remarkable man. 



KEPLER 37 

by the aid of mathematics. Mathematical deduction is 
the only method of discovering the unknown from the 
given facts of nature. We thus find even here a clear ex- 
pression of all the characteristics of modem method, viz. 
the proper coordination of induction and deduction. — 
Certain statements of Leonardo's indicate a sturdy natu- 
ralism. The only thing we can know about the soul is the 
nature of its functions and its activity as an organic prin- 
ciple; whoever cares to know more must inquire of the 
Monks! Nature consists of a majestic cycle between the 
inorganic and the organic, and between the animate and 
the inanimate. Nature always takes the simplest course. 
There is reason therefore to hope for a great future with 
respect to the knowledge of nature. — Leonardo suggested 
a number of interesting anticipations of the principle of 
inertia and of energy. He stands solitary and alone in 
his own age. It was not until a century later that any 
advancements were made along the lines which he indi- 
cated. 

b. John Kepler (1571-1630), the famous astronomer, 
is an interesting example of the evolution of an exact scien- 
tific conception of nature from a mystic-contemplative 
starting-point. His first treatise (Mysterium cosmograph- 
icunif 1597) is based on theological and Pythagorean prin- 
ciples. The universe is the manifestation of God. The 
paths and motions of the heavenly bodies must therefore 
reveal certain harmonious and simple geometrical rela- 
tions. The Holy Ghost is revealed in the harmonious ratio 
of magnitudes of stellar phenomena, and Kepler thinks it 
possible to construe this magnitudinal ratio. Later on 
however he simply maintained the general belief that cer- 
tain quantitative ratios must exist between the motions 
of the planets and formulated the results deduced from 



38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

Tycho Brake's observations in the laws which bear his 
name. He afterwards demonstrated the quantitative 
ratios on the basis of the facts of experience. Here his 
method involved the combination of the experimental 
with the mathematical method. Just as he had at first 
established the principle that nature conforms to mathe- 
matical laws by the theological method, so he further be- 
lieves that the planets are guided in their course by sepa- 
rate planetary souls, even as the entire world-system is 
directed by the world-soul which dwells in the sun. His 
explanation of nature therefore was thoroughly animistic 
or mythological. Later on in life he held that science must 
make no assumptions except such as can be actually de- 
duced from experience. He calls such causes vera causa. 
He also rejected the idea of planetary souls which as a 
matter of fact are never actually given in experience. In 
his Astronomia nova s. physica coelestis (1609) he makes the 
transition from theology and animism to piure natiu-al 
science. He defends his belief in the importance and 
truth of the quantitative method psychologically and em- 
pirically as well as theologically. Mathematical knowl- 
edge is the clearest and the most certain knowledge which 
we possess and it becomes us therefore to apply it as widely 
as possible. The processes of nature are quahtatively 
modified by our subjective states (pro habitudine subjecti). 
Perfect certainty and objectivity can only be attained by 
the quantitative method. And, finally, experience reveals 
the fact that all material phenomena have quantitative, 
especially geometrical, attributes; "the method of meas- 
urement can be applied wherever there is matter" (ubi 
materia, ibi geometria). As a matter of fact the universe 
participates in quantity (mundus participat quantitate). 
Kepler elaborates his general conception of scientific 



GALILEO 39 

method in his Apologia Tychonis. All science is based on 
hypotheses. But hypotheses are by no means to be re- 
garded as arbitrary notions. They must vindicate their 
title by the harmony of their logical consequences with 
the given facts and the consistency of their implications. 
Science begins with the observation of facts, uses these 
data for the formulation of hypotheses and finally seeks 
to discover the causes which account for the uniformity 
of events. 

c. Galileo Galilei (i 564-1 642) is the real founder of 
modern science, because he shows the clearest under- 
standing of modern methods — the method of induction 
and deduction as mutually complementary. 

If induction demanded the examination of every pos- 
sible case, inductive inference would be impossible. But 
it is possible to examine a number of characteristic cases, 
and formulate a hypothetical principle by an analysis of. 
these cases, and finally prove that the consequences de- 
duced from this principle are in accord with experience. 
In order to make this deduction and show its agreement 
with the facts correctly we must be in position to state our 
facts in quantitative terms. We are therefore under 
necessity of measuring phenomena exactly. Galileo 
raised the watchword; Measure everything which is measur- 
able and reduce the things which will not admit of direct meas- 
urement to indirect measurement, 

Kepler had previously shown that matter cannot 01 it- 
self pass from rest to motion. Galileo advances a step 
farther. According to the principle of simplicity, — 
which, like Copernicus^ Bruno and Kepler, he regarded as a 
universal law — he maintained that a body tends to remain 
in its given state so long as it is unaffected by external in- 
fluences. A body can therefore of itself neither change its 



40 THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE RENAISSANCE 

motion nor pass from motion to rest. In tiie absence of 
all external influences a moving body wotild continue its 
motion indefinitely at the speed originall}" given. This as 
a matter of course represents an ideal case, since absolutely 
empty space is unrealizable, but Galileo showed by the 
experiment of rolling a ball in a parchment groove that 
the length of time the ball continued in its course was in 
direct proportion to its own smoothness and the smooth- 
ness of the parchment. In this way he proved the prin- 
ciple of inertia. But Galileo likewise thought that circular 
motion, which he also regarded as simple and natural, as 
well as motion in a straight line, would be continuous if all 
external obstacles could be eliminated. In his investiga- 
tions of the motion of falHng bodies he likewise starts with 
the principle of simphcity, with a view to showing later 
that it is verified by obser\''ation and experiment. "// 
a sto7ie, falling from a given position at considerable height, 
accelerates its speed, why should I tiot regard the acceleration 
as due to its simplest explanation? And there is no simpler 
explanatiofi of acceleration than that of a continuously 
uniform hicrease.^^ — It follows further from the principle 
of inertia and the law of falHng bodies that we must take 
accoimt of the energ}^ or the impetus of motion (energia, 
momento, impetu) present at each moment as weU as the 
actual sensible motion. 

Galileo elaborated the modem theory of motion, which 
forms the basis of physics, in his Discorsi della nouve scienze 
(1638). — His Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo 
(1632) draws a comparison between the Ptolemaic and 
Copemican world-s^^stems, without, as he thought, taking 
sides, but in such a way as to leave no doubt as to his real 
opinion. This brought on the catastrophe of his life. He 
had even previously (after the discovery of the moons of 



GALILEO 4X 

Jupiter and of sun-spots) expressed himself publicly as 
favoring the Copemican system. When the College of 
the Inquisition, therefore, in the year 1616, placed Coper- 
nicus^ book on the Index, he is said to have promised Car- 
dinal Bellarmin that he would neither defend nor dissem- 
inate the Copemican theory. He denied that the Dialogo 
was a violation of this promise on the groimd that he had 
expressed himself hypothetically. But the book was for- 
bidden, and the old man of seventy was required — ^imder 
threat of torture — to solemnly abjure "the false doctrine," 
that the earth is not the center of the universe and that it 
moves. The Inquisition held him under suspicion for the 
rest of his life and he was forced to have his works pub- 
lished in foreign countries. 

It has already been observed that the Copemican theory 
beautifully illustrates the unwisdom of accepting our 
ideas as the expression of reality without further question. 
Galileo emphasized this phase of the new theory very 
strongly; ^^ Think of the earth as having vanished, and there 
will he neither sun-rise nor sun-set, no horizon even and 
no meridian, no day and no night! ^^ Later on he expanded 
this idea so as to include the whole of physical nature. In 
the Dialogue he takes occasion to observe that he had 
never been able to understand the possibility of the 
transubstantiation of substances. When a body really 
acquires attributes which were previously lacking, it 
must be explained by such a rearrangement of its parts as 
would neither destroy nor originate an3rthing. This 
clearly asserts the principle that qualitative changes can 
only be understood when referred to quantitative changes. 
Galileo had already stated this view even more strongly in 
one of his earlier works {II saggiatore, 1632). Form, mag- 
nitude, motion and rest constitute all that can be said of 



42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE 

things; they are the primary and real attributes of things 
(primi e reali accidenti). Otir disposition to regard taste, 
smell, color, heat, etc., as the absolute attributes of things, 
on the other hand, is due to sense-prejudice. We give 
these names to things when they furnish the occasion of 
certain sensations, but these sensations take place within 
our bodies. They do not inhere in things. They would 
vanish if the corpo sensitivo were to vanish. — This doc- 
trine, which contains the principle of the mechanical con- 
ception of nature, acquired vast importance in the in- 
vestigations into the theory of knowledge in the following 
period. 



SECOND BOOK 

THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

The new interests, viewpoints, and discoveries of the 
Renaissance naturally gave rise to a desire to elaborate a 
new world-theory, one which would be inherently con- 
sistent and at the same time conform to the new thought. 
It was but natural that men should be anxious to follow 
the new ideas to their ultimate consequences. The human 
mind always shows a certain tendency, more or less pro- 
nounced, towards the systematization of knowledge into a 
unitary theory, and the more peaceful period which fol- 
lowed the turmoil and strife of the Renaissance furnished 
a splendid opportunity for the development of this ten- 
dency. It assumed the task of combining the new world- 
view and the new science with the philosophy of mind or 
spirit. Here Bruno had prepared the way. He had not 
however completely grasped the new scientific method. 
He was unable to apply the mechanical conception — 
by means of which a multitude of problems can be 
stated with far greater precision — to the statement of his 
problem. 

Of the four fimdamental problems of philosophy, the 
problem of Being now takes first rank. Compared with 
this, other problems, despite the fact of their frequent and 
perplexing obtrusiveness, fall into the background. The 
constructive method was coiirageously applied to the solu- 
tion of the profoundest problems of human thought. 
Descartes, the first of the group of the great systematizers, 
both in his preliminary essays as well as in the later more 
positive statement of his theory, still reveals a distinct 

43 



44 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

effort to pave the way for speculative construction by- 
means of exhaustive analysis. But with Hohhes and 
Spinoza the constructive element is predominant. The 
onl}' way we can discover the facts and analyses by which 
these thinkers estabHshed their definitions and axioms is 
by a less direct method. In Leibnitz, the fourth and last 
of the group, the analytic method becomes more promi- 
nent again. He marks the transition to the eighteenth 
century, in which the problems of knowledge and of values 
acquire an exceptionally prominent place. 

The increasing favor of the constructive method of this 
period is closely paralleled by the dogmatic character of 
these intellectual efforts. The principles of the mechan- 
ical theory^ of nature were regarded as absolute, objective 
truths. Leibniz likewise shows some divergence from his 
predecessors on this point, by the fact that he subjects 
even these '^ primary and real" attributes of things, which 
were regarded as absolute data in the mechanical theory 
of nature, to a critical analysis. 

a, Rene Descartes (i 596-1650) may be called the real 
founder of modem philosophy. He was the first to in- 
quire after the ultimate presuppositions of knowledge, and 
his iheoTv was the first to take explicit account of the me- 
chanical explanation of nature in the statement of the 
problem. He applies the analytic method in searching 
for ultimate principles, but he quickly abandons it for the 
constructive method, because he beHeves it possible to 
demonstrate the necessity and rationality of the principles 
of the mechanical theor}^ of nature. He regards the idea 
of God, the vaHdity of which he demonstrates by the spec- 
ulative method, as an absolute terminus of reflective 
thought. Descartes thus presents a peculiar combination 
of keen analysis and dogmatic assertion. 



DESCARTES 45 

Descartes was the son of a French nobleman, and his 
economic independence furnished him the opportunity of 
devoting himself wholly to meditation and scientific re- 
search. His Discours de la methode (1637) is an interesting 
philosophical autobiography. He received his education 
at a Jesuit College, but, notwithstanding the fact that he 
had among his tutors the best teachers of his age, he was 
very much dissatisfied with his acquirements when he 
had finished his studies. He knew^ many things, but a con- 
sistent system and clear fimdamental principles were lack- 
ing. He was particularly fond of mathematics but it 
seemed to be nothing more than a fiction of the human 
brain. He finally plunged into public Hfe, trying one 
thing after another, but was invariably driven back to 
his solitude by his insatiable thirst for knowledge. He 
finally resolved to make a first hand study of practical Hfe 
in the army and the coiirts of the nobility. But at every 
venture he returned again to quiet meditation. During 
the winter of 161 9, w^hile in camp with the army of the 
Elector of Bavaria, he experienced a scientific awakening. 
In a moment of intellectual enthusiasm a plain way of 
escape from his doubt appeared to him. If w^e begin with 
the simplest and clearest ideas and pass step by step to 
the more complex problems, the confusing multiplicity of 
our ideas will vanish. We can then arrange oiu" thoughts 
in such an orderly manner that the successive steps can 
always be deduced from their antecedents. He followed 
this principle both in his mathematical and in his philo- 
sophical investigations. After several years of study in 
Paris he returned to Holland, where he believed he could 
pursue his investigations with less danger of disturbance. 
There is no doubt however that the severe injtmctions 
against antischolastic theory formed part of his motive 



46 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

for leaving France. But even in Holland he became in- 
volved in controversies, because both Protestant and 
Roman Catholic theologians regarded his philosophy with 
suspicion. At the invitation of Queen Christina he spent 
his last years in Sweden. 

I. Descartes, who was a great mathematician himself 
(founder of Analytical Geometry), attributed the dis- 
tinction between geometry and philosophy to the fact that 
the former is based upon principles concerning which there 
could be no room for doubt, whilst the controversies in 
philosophy pertain to these very principles. The dis- 
covery and establishment of first principles require the 
use of the analytic method, i. e. we must proceed from the 
given or the provisionally established to its presuppositions. 
Analysis finally leads to simple intuitions, and these in turn 
originate directly through experience. The subjective 
movements of intellect are of this sort, e. g. that a triangle 
is bounded by three lines — that a thing cannot both be 
and not be at the same time, — that everything has a cause, 
— that the effect cannot be greater than its cause, — that 
I must exist if I think {Regies pour la direction de Vesprit, 
evidently written 1628-1629). He called these processes 
simple intuitions, and afterwards made the last one men- 
tioned the basis of his theory (in the Discours and in 
the Meditationes which appeared in 1641). It is pos- 
sible to doubt every idea or object of knowledge; all our 
perceptions or postulates might be illusory. But doubt 
has a definite limit. Even the most radical doubt pre- 
supposes thought. Thought is a reaUty even though all 
of its conclusions should be illusory. Descartes takes the 
word thought in its broadest sense : thought is everything 
which goes on in consciousness. When, in the language 
of his famous proposition, he says : Je pense, done je suisf 



DESCARTES 47 

(Cogito, ergo sum!) he might as well have said: Je sens^ 
je veux, done je suis! — The word ''therefore" {done, er^o) 
is inexact ; for Descartes does not regard the proposition as 
a logical deduction, but as an immediate intuition, a sim- 
ple intellectual step, through which we become conscious 
that we are conscious. — The clearness and distinctness of 
this intuition, according to Deseartes, furnish the crite- 
rion by which to test other propositions. There are two 
more intuitions however which he thinks are just as clear 
and self-evident as this first one, namely the proposition 
that everything has a cause, and that the effect cannot 
be greater than the cause. 

If we examine our different ideas, we find that some of 
them can be attributed to external and finite causes, and 
that others are produced by ourselves, but that there is one 
idea which presupposes an infinite cause — namely the idea 
of God. I am myself (which is proved by the fact that I 
can doubt) a finite, imperfect being, and I cannot there- 
fore have formed the idea of an infinite, perfect being. 
This idea must have its origin in an infinite being. This 
is the only possible explanation of the fact that my in- 
tellect, as soon as it has attained mature development, 
forms this idea. It is "innate," not indeed as if it were 
consciously present at the very beginning of life, but in 
the sense that there is a disposition to form it in the very 
nature of the intellect. — Deseartes however has another 
proof of the existence of God: God, the perfect Being, must 
exist; for existence is perfection, hence the denial of the 
existence of God would be self -contradictory. This is the 
so-called ontological proof, which finds the warrant for 
the existence of God in the concept. 

It is only after Descartes has established the validity of 
the idea of God (assuming the principle of causality as a 



48 THE GREAT SYSTEilS 

matter of course) that he has a secure foundation for the 
validitA" of knowledge in general: for a perfect being can- 
not deceive. 

Descartes bases the knowledge of reaHty on the idea of 
God, just as Kepler had explained the conformity of nature 
to mathematical principles on theological groimds. But, 
in that case, God is merely an explanation of the subhme 
uniformity of natmral phenomena, rather than a speciii- 
caUy religious concept. Thus, e. g. in the sixth meditation, 
he says, ^^By nature in getter al {natura generaliter spectata) 
I simply mean God himself or the order afid disposition in- 
stituted {coordinatio) by Him in created thingsJ^ Every- 
thing which is to be accepted as true must fit into this 
great system. The criterion by which we are able to 
distinguish between dream and wakeful consciousness 
consists in the fact that the various experiences of wake- 
ful life can be coordinated with our total experiences and 
recoUections without a break in the system. — Descartes 
had not obsen^ed that this criterion was already contained 
in the causal principle, so that he might have spared him- 
sel: the indirect route through the idea of God. The es- 
tabHshment of this criterion furnished the basis of a new 
conception of truth, according to which truth consists of 
the internal relation of perceptions and ideas, instead of 
their harmony with something unperceived. 

Descartes is fully aware that the idea of God, which he 
makes the foundation of ah science, is not the popular one. 
He says that when God is conceived as a finite being, re- 
ceiving honor from men, it is not strange that His exist- 
ence should be denied. God is however the absolute 
Substance, i. e. a being, which exists through itself {per 
se), requires no other being, in order to exist. It is true, 
Descartes Hkewise employs the concept of substance in 



DESCARTES 49 

reference to finite things (e. g. matter and the soul); he 
says however that the concept cannot be used univocally 
(univoce) of infinite and finite being, because finite beings 
are always dependent and the term substance is therefore 
applied to them inexactly. According to the broader, 
inexact linguistic usage, '^ Substance" means the same as 
thing or being, the subject or matter or substrate of given 
attributes. 

2. The idea of God not only guarantees the reality of 
things, but it is likewise the source of the fundamental 
principles of natural science. {Principia PhilosophicBy 
1644.) 

Our sense impressions serve the purpose of guiding us 
in practical activities. In order to do this they need not 
be like the things themselves, if only they correspond to 
them. When we come to think of the real natiu-e of things 
apart from oiu: sensations, there are only three attributes 
which are incontrovertible: extension, divisibility and mo- 
bility. We cannot even in imagination think these attri- 
butes away. And these three attributes furnish the basis 
of the simplest and clearest understanding of everything 
that takes place in the material universe, whilst qualities 
merely furnish illusory explanations. All the attributes 
of nature may therefore be referred to extension, divisi- 
bility and motion. Qualities however are simply to be 
ascribed to the perceiving subject. — Descartes thus delib- 
erately systematizes the mechanical conception of nature. 
He seems to have been led to this conclusion by his studies 
in natural science during the years 162 0-1629, independent 
of Galileo, although perhaps influenced by Kepler, 

He derives the first principles of the mechanical con- 
ception of nature from the concept of God. As perfect 
being God must be immutable. The idea of anything 



so THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

which He has created being capable of changing its state 
without some external cause contradicts this immutability. 
Material things cannot therefore on their own account 
{sua sponte) without external interference (of another 
material thing) pass from motion to rest or vice versa. 
{Descartes nevertheless makes a reservation in the interest 
of his spiritualistic psychology, namely that it is perhaps 
possible for souls or angels to act on matter.) Besides 
inertia, Descartes likewise deduces the constancy of mo- 
tion (an imperfect antecedent to the persistence of motion) 
from the unchangeableness of Deity. Conservation 
(which, according to Descartes^ consists of an incessant 
continuance of creative activity) impHes that the sum 
total of motion implanted in matter at creation must re- 
main unchanged. The distribution of motion among the 
various parts of the universe may vary, but no motion can 
be lost and no absolutely new motion arise. 

Descartes regards the teleological explanation of nature, 
which accounts for natural phenomena from the viewpoint 
of ends, as inappHcable. He bases his rejection of final 
causes on theological grounds. Since God is an infinite 
being, he must have purposes beyond our power to con- 
jecture, and it were therefore presumption on our part to 
suppose it possible to discover the purposes of natural 
phenomena. There are Hkewise many things in the 
finite universe which do not affect us in the least, — what 
sense could we therefore ascribe to their having been 
created on our account! — The teleological explanation is 
therefore rejected, because it is too narrow. 

Descartes undertakes a detailed explanation of nature 
on the basis of the principles thus established. He differs 
from Bacon at this point in the importance which he at- 
taches to deduction, and from Galileo (whose importance 



DESCARTES 5 1 

he decidedly tinderestimates) in his inability to combine 
deduction and induction in the investigation of the facts 
of experience. He regards experience as nothing more 
than occasional, because he thinks that science can only 
give the possible, not the real, explanation of phenomena. 
He aims to restrict himself to hypotheses, and he does 
not even attempt to verify these hypotheses. His natural 
philosophy thus assimies an abstract and arbitrary char- 
acter. His importance rests on the ideal of natural science 
which he proposed: namely, to deduce phenomena from 
their causes with mathematical necessity. He therefore 
took no accoimt of anything but the geometrical attri- 
butes of things, and he treated the concepts of matter and 
extension as identical. He substituted this ideal of knowl- 
edge for the prevalent scholastic method of explanation, 
based on quahties and hidden causes. 

Descartes attempted to explain the existing state of the 
Universe by mechanical processes of development. He 
assumes a primitive condition in which the particles of 
matter exist in whirling eddies (vortices) with fixed cen- 
ters. The smaller particles, resulting from the mutual 
friction of the larger particles, were compelled to congre- 
gate around these centers, and thus formed the various 
world-bodies. Some of these bodies, like the earth, have 
lost their independence, because they are carried along 
by the more powerful cycles in w^hich the great world- 
bodies are found. Weight consists of the pressure due to 
the rotary motion, which drives the smaller particles into 
close proximity to the larger bodies. — In suggesting this 
theory, imperfect as it is, Descartes anticipated Kant and 
LaPlace. 

Organisms, as well as the World-all, are to be regarded 
as machines. If physiology is to become a science, it must 



52 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

be mechanics. The organism must be subject to the 
general law of matter. Harvey's discovery of the circula- 
tion of the blood (1628) strengthened Descartes' conviction. 
Descartes did much to suppress the fruitless theory of vital- 
ism which explained organic phenomena by the assimiption 
of a specific vital energy. In the department of nerve 
physiology, like Harvey in the doctrine of the circtilation 
of the blood, he is a pioneer because he was the first to de- 
scribe what is now called reflex action, i. e. muscular activ- 
ity resulting directly from an objective stimulus without 
the intervention of any attendant consciousness. Des- 
cartes ascribed consciousness to man alone; he regarded 
animals as mere machines. 

The human soul interacts with the brain, or, to be more 
exact, with a distinct part of the brain (the pineal gland, 
glandula pinealis), which, in Descartes' opinion, was 
centrally located, and it does not consist of pairs, like the 
other parts of the brain. The "vital spirits" (the delicate 
fluid, which, according to the physiology of the age, in- 
herited from antiquity, pours through the nerves) strike 
this pineal gland and the impact translates it to the soul, 
thus giving rise to sensations. If the soul on the other 
hand strikes the pineal gland it can produce changes in 
the tendencies of the "vital spirits" and thus give rise to 
muscular activity. — Here Descartes contradicts his own 
doctrine of the persistence of motion; for if the pineal 
gland strikes the soul, a loss of motion must result, and, 
conversely, if the soul excites motion in the pineal 
gland, new motion must arise. He of coiu-se limits 
the action of the soul to the mere matter of pro- 
ducing a change of tendency; but this requires him 
to postulate an arbitrary exception to the principle 
of inertia. 



DESCARTES 53 

Descartes places great stress on the distinction in defining 
the soul as thinking being, and matter as extended being. 
Their fiindamental attributes are so different that they 
must be called two different substances, and moreover in 
the full sense of the word, since it must be possible for the 
one to exist without the other. But, in that case, their 
interaction becomes an impossibility; for Substance, 
strictly speaking, cannot be acted on from without. 

In his special psychology (particularly in his interesting 
treatise on the emotions, published 'n his Traite des pas- 
siojis, 1649) he endeavors — in harmony with his dualistic 
theory — ^to furnish a separate definition for the mental 
phenomena which have a psycho-physical basis from 
those which are purely psychical. Hence he makes a 
distinction between sensation and judgment, sensory and 
mental recollection, imagination and intellection, desire 
and will, affections (passions) and emotions {emotions 
inter eures) . His precision at this point is rarely equalled 
even by spiritualists. 

Descartes^ ethics bears an interesting relation to his 
world theory. He elaborated the details of this phase of 
his theory in his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth 
Christina of Sweden, and Chanut the French ambassador 
to Sweden. — He emphasizes the cultivation of the sub- 
jective emotions, rather than the "passions" which de- 
pend on external influences. But improvement in knowl- 
edge is likewise of great value : we discover that ever3rthing 
depends on a Perfect Being; we find that we are but in- 
finitesimal parts of an infinite world, which cannot have 
been created on our account. We finally come to regard 
ourselves as parts of a human society (Family, State), 
whose interests take precedence over our private interests. 
It is important above all else to distinguish between what 



54 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

is within our power and what is not. The highest virtues 
are magnanimity (generosite) and intellectual love towards 
God {amor intellectualis dei). The latter is capable of 
governing our whole life, even though in the eyes of the 
theologians it should perhaps be regarded as insufficient 
for salvation. 

Cartesianism was the first form in which the thought of 
the new age became accessible to wider circles. Not- 
withstanding his hypotheses, which were frequently un- 
fortunate, his rigid insistence on a mechanical explanation 
of natiH-e marks a distinct advance, and his labors inspired 
a vigorous movement in the department of natural science. 
His spiritualism and his attempt to combine theology and 
science developed a sympathetic attitude towards religion, 
notwithstanding the fact that many theologians, to whom 
a criticism of scholasticism was identical with a challenge 
of faith, were fanatically opposed to him. The clearness 
with which he expressed his views admitted of easy popu- 
larization, and, after the first opposition subsided, he ac- 
quired a large following in France, Holland and Germany. 

Descartes however bequeathed profound problems to 
his successors. How can the existence of an absolute 
Substance be reconciled with the independent existence of 
particular things (souls and bodies)? And how shall we 
conceive the interaction of spirit and matter if both are 
to be regarded as independent beings (Substance), and 
this moreover if the principle of the persistence of motion 
is Hkewise to be maintained! 

Occasionalism, so called, which had a tendency to refer 
all true causality to the absolute essence, so that the states 
of finite beings merely furnished the ''Occasions" for God 
to interpose, was the logical result of these problems. This 
principle was at first only applied to the relation of spirit 



GEULINCX 55 

and matter: what takes place in the body furnishes God 
the occasion to permit a change to take place in the soul, 
and vice versa. It soon became evident however that, if 
there is an absolute substance, it is impossible for a finite 
being to be a cause at all. How can anything produce an 
effect beyond its own being in some other thing? Not 
only the interaction between spirit and matter but all 
interaction between finite beings is impossible, and divine 
causality alone remains possible. In this way first the 
psycho-physical problem and then the problem of causality 
conceived as a whole came to be regarded as insoluble and 
philosophy resolved itself into theology. 

After a number of Cartesians had prepared the way for 
this conception, it was clearly and definitely elaborated by 
Arnold Geulincx (1623-166Q) and Nicholas Malehranche 
(1648-1715). 

Geulincx, originally a Catholic (he was bom at Louvain), 
but later a convert to Protestantism, experienced a vigor- 
ous opposition both from Protestant as weU as from 
CathoHc scholasticism on account of his Cartesianism. 
During his latter years he occupied the chair of philosophy 
at the university of Leyden. His most characteristic work 
is his ethics (1665, complete 1675). In order to do right, 
man must learn to understand his position in the world; 
self-examination (inspectio sui) is therefore the foundation 
of ethics. It reveals the fact that intellect and will are all 
that really belongs to my Self. My body on the other 
hand is a part of the material universe where I can accom- 
pHsh nothing. For I am only responsible for the things 
of which I can know the origin, and this knowledge is Hm- 
ited to my intellect and will. My activity cannot tran- 
scend my essential nature (i. e. my intellect and will). It 
is utterly impossible for a thing to produce changes be- 



56 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

yond itself and its own states. If the changes of one being 
(e. g. the soiil) correspond to the changes in another being 
(e. g. the body), it can only be explained by the fact that 
their common author forever adapts them to each 
other — ^like two clocks which a clockmaker is con- 
stantly regulating in successive order (a figure used 
already by the Cartesian Cordemoy). — The ethical 
system which Geulincx elaborates on this foundation 
consistently assumes the character of resignation, and 
its chief virtue is humility. For, where I am unable to 
do an3rthing, it is sheer folly that I should desire {uhi 
nihil vales, nihil velisi). 

Malebranche, a member of the Oratory, gives the mystic 
phase of occasionalism still greater prominence. His 
philosophic inspiration came from one of Descartes' books, 
and it permeated his entire life, which was spent in the 
cloister. The senses — as appears in his Recherche de la 
verite (16743) — are given us for practical ptirposes and they 
are unable to discover the real nature of things. The 
senses deceive us every time we are misled into ascribing 
sensible qualities to things themselves. Whence there- 
fore do we get knowledge of things? The understanding 
is quite as incapable as sensibility to teach us anything 
about things which exist independently of us. Neither 
we ourselves nor things can produce knowledge, for no 
finite being can create anything new. Causation is a 
divine thing, and it is pagan to ascribe causality to finite 
beings. Finite beings forever remain simply causes OC' 
casionelles. We can neither regard the motions of matter 
nor the thoughts of men as causes. God could not even 
give a finite being the power to be a cause, for God cannot 
create gods. Our knowledge is entirely the work of God; 
we see everything in Him. It is only through his inter- 



GL ANVIL 57 

position that we get ideas of material things. Each idea 
is really a limitation of the idea of God. 

Joseph Glanvil (1636-1680), of England, had even prior 
to this defined the problem of causality in his Scepsis 
Scientifica (1665), a book which was influenced by the 
philosophy and the natural science of Descartes, The 
greater the difference between cause and effect the less 
do we understand their connection. Causality cannot 
as a matter of fact be conceived at all (causality itself is 
insensible). Our perception is invariably limited to the 
fact that two things succeed each other. 

Glanvil and the Occasionalists are the antecedents of 
Hume. There are two additional thinkers who are 
strongly influenced by Descartes, who however, each in his 
own way, are radically opposed to him, and in fact chal- 
lenge every attempt to solve ultimate problems with the 
aid of reason . 

Blaise Pascal (16 23-1 66 2) is closely related to Descartes 
in his conception of scientific method, and he likewise ac- 
cepts his concise distinction between mind and matter. 
He makes frequent reference to these ideas in his Pensees. 
But philosophy could not wholly satisfy him. His heart 
longed for a living God, finally even for a God of flesh and 
blood, despite the fact that faith in such a God was repul- 
sive to the understanding. He required such a faith as 
this to subdue the fear which the thought of the eternity 
of the world had kindled within him. The ideas of Bruno 
and Bohme failed to give him peace. Knowledge is un- 
certain, and the learned are at variance. Reason refutes 
the dogmatic philosophers, nature the sceptical philos- 
ophers. As a matter of fact in the last analysis the scep- 
tics are right; otherwise were revelation unnecessary. In 
reply to those who find it difficult to subordinate reason 



58 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

to faith, Pascal applies the Cartesian psychology and says : 
We are machines as well as mind; begin with the machine, 
accustom yourself to the ceremonies, and your mind will also 
finally yield. 

Pierre Bayle (i 647-1 706) was rather a man of letters 
than a philosopher. His interest consisted in explaining 
and interpreting literary productions and speculative 
opinions in their manifold variety. But his desire for 
clearness impelled him to distinguish sharply between 
the various standpoints and to emphasize the crux of the 
problems rather than any illusory solution. {Dictionnaire 
historique et critique, 1695 ff.) He was particularly opposed 
to all efforts to reconcile faith and knowledge, theology 
and philosophy. He regarded the problem of evil as the 
great rock of offense. If we resolutely follow reason, it is 
impossible to reconcile the reality of evil with the omnipo- 
tence and goodness of God, and the only consistent solu- 
tion that remains is the Manichaean assumption of two 
world principles, one evil, the other good. We are obliged 
to choose between reason and faith. {Dictionnaire Art. 
Manicheisme. — Response aux questions d'un provincial.) 
He nevertheless believes in a natural basis for ethics, and, 
furthermore, because the actions of men are determined 
more by their nature than by their religious opinions, he 
was in position to defend toleration and religious freedom 
with great zeal. (Pensees diver ses a r occasion de la comete.) 

2. Thomas Hobbes (i 588-1679) made the first indepen- 
dent attempt to treat the new mechanical theory of nature 
as the only science, to maintain its viewpoints as the only 
ones from which reality is to be conceived. Energetic as 
a thinker and controversialist, mild and timid in his mode 
of life, Hobbes, like Descartes, was dissatisfied with his 
scholastic training, and hence devoted himself to literary 



HOBBES 59 

pursuits, — e. g. he published a translation of Thucydides. 
The unsettled conditions in England aroused his interest in 
political and ethical questions, which soon led, especially 
after he became acquainted with the new viewpoints of 
natural science, to general philosophical investigations. 
For a while he was private tutor and afterwards an inti- 
mate friend of the noble family Cavendish. While travel- 
ling in Italy he made the acquaintance of Galileo, and in 
France he became a friend of Pierre Gassendi (i 592-1655), 
hkewise an admirer of Galileo, who, having resigned his 
clerical position, was then Hving in Paris as professor 
of mathematics. In his philosophical thought Gassendi 
reveals a philosophical tendency similar to that of Hobbes 
(Opera Omnia, Lugd., 1658). His revival of the Epicurean 
atomic theory became a matter of signal importance, for 
it was from the writings of Gassendi that Newton became 
acquainted with this doctrine, and Dalton, the chemist, 
afterwards received it from the writings of Newton and 
adapted it to chemistry. Gassendi insisted that all the 
changes in nature must be explained by the motions of 
atoms. Following Galileo, Gassendi teaches (what Des- 
cartes had overlooked) that energy (impetus) is not dis- 
sipated by actual motion. 

Nevertheless, Hobbes seems to have arrived at the con- 
clusion that all change is motion independently. It was 
during a discussion with several friends of what con- 
stitutes sensation that the thought occurred to him that 
if everything in nature were motionless or in uniform mo- 
tion there would be no sensation. A change of motion 
(diversitas motuum) is therefore the condition of sensation. 
For sensing unceasingly one and the same thing and 
sensing nothing at all amoimts to the same thing. This 
principle, which Hobbes makes the basis of his psycliology, 



6o THE GSEAT !>*¥!i; 'ir»;:ms 

occtirred to h i'm eaxly in Hfe, and tlie conviction tliat all 
change consists of motion, and that sense-qualities are 
purely subjective^ probably occurred about the same time 
(ca. 1630), at any rate before his acquaintance with 
Galileo and Gassendi. 

At the outbreak of the revolution Hohhes left England 
and spent a number of years in France, where for a time 
he was tutor to the fugitive king Charles II. He returned 
under Cromwell^ devoting himself privately to literary 
pursuits, occupied with studies and polemics until his 
death at the venerable age of ninety-one years. The 
series of articles and the splendid volume in Fromann's 
PMlasopische EJassiker by Ferdinand Tonnies have con- 
tributed much towards a clear understanding of Hobhes' 
development and his philosophical sig ni frcance. 

Mobhes' chief works are: Elements of Law (1640), De 
cive (1642), Leviathan (16 51), De cor pore (1655), De 
homine (1658). 

a, Eobbes' first concern in the systematic presentation 
of his theory given in the De cor pore is to establish the 
fundamental principles of investigation. He is certain 
that these principles must be discovered by a process of 
fl.-naTy h'ral regression from the given to that which ex- 
plains it {a sensum ad inve-ntionem principiorum) , just as 
be had previously in fact arrived at the doctrine of mo- 
tion by a similar regression from sensation. But, on the 
other hand, he strongly emphasized the fact that the as- 
sumption of principles is purely an arbitrary matter, and 
must necessarily consist of a choice. He does not there- 
fore regard such an analjrsis as a demonstration; deduction 
is the only method of demonstration, and this is impossible 
m. the case of first principles. — Eobbes described the arbi- 
trary act with which science begins more precisely as an 



HOBBES 6l 

act of naming. But this act is subject to certain condi- 
tions even from its very beginning; it is not permissible 
therefore to give two contradictory names to one and the 
same thing. 

That all change consists of motion {mutationem in motu 
consistere) is therefore the most general principle of science. 
Hobbes thinks that, if we should only rid ourselves of all 
prejudices, the proof of this principle is wholly superfluous. 
He assumes several other, purely dogmatic, principles, 
without inquiring more closely into their respective con- 
ditions; the law of causation, the principle of inertia, the 
principle that only motion can be the cause of motion, and 
that only motion can be the result, and the principle of 
the persistence of matter. 

If these principles are to explain all existence, then 
everything must be motion. The classifications of the 
system are therefore based on a classification of motion. 
First in order comes the theory concerning the Corpus 
(body in general); here he treats of the geometrical, 
mechanical and physical laws of motion. The second 
part contains the theory of the Homo, i. e. the motions 
which take place in Man; here the physiological and psy- 
chological motions are treated. The third part is the 
doctrine of the Gives, i. e. of the motions in men which con- 
dition their mutual relations and their association. 

Hobbes was unable to complete his system by purely 
deductive processes. He was forced to concede the neces- 
sity of introducing new presuppositions at a number of 
points. Thus, e. g. when we pass from geometry to me- 
chanics: Hobbes grants, that a pure geometrical explana- 
tion rests on an abstraction, and that we must assume the 
concept of energy (conatus, impetus) at the beginning of 
mechanics. The same is true when we pass from mechan- 



62 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

ics to physics : the sensible attributes of body (color, tone, 
etc.) are discovered only by means of sense perception, 
which involves a new inductive beginning at this point. 
And the last two main divisions of the system, the theories 
of the Homo and the Gives, we can establish by direct 
(psychological and historical) experience, without goings 
through the first main division. Eobbes also wrote his \ 
psychological and poHtical works {Elements of Law, De , 
cive, Leviathan) before he had completed his theory of the 
Corpus. 

If everything is motion, all reality must be corporeal. 
An incorporeal thing is a chimera (Unding). It follows 
therefore that science can only investigate finite things, 
since only finite things can be in motion. It is impos- 
sible to have any knowledge of the universe as a complete 
whole. All questions concerning the universe as a totality 
lead into the inconceivable and can only be determined by 
faith, not by knowledge. Science can tell us nothing 
concerning either the origin, extent or destiny of the uni- 
verse. The highest science, the firstlings of wisdom 
(primitia sapientice), Eobbes remarks ironically, are re- 
served to the theologians, just as in Israel the firstlings of 
the harvest were sacrificed to the priests. 

b. Eobbes started with sensation; from it he derived the 
principle of change, and thence the principle of motion. 
If everything is motion, therefore, sensation must likewise 
be motion. "Sensation is nothing more than a motion 
among the particles of the sensing body." And this ap- 
plies to consciousness in general. In his criticism of 
Descartes^ Meditations Eobbes says "Consciousness 
{mens) is nothing more than a motion in certain parts of 
an organic body." Motion is the reality, consciousness is 
only the form imder which it becomes apparent (appari- 



HOBBES 63 

tion) . The feeling of pleasure, e. g. , is really only a motion 
in the heart, thought only a motion in the head. The 
psychology of Hobbes is therefore merely a part of his 
general theory of motion. His materialistic tendency 
which is apparent at this point is modified by his clear in- 
sight into the subjective conditions of knowledge. In a 
remarkable passage {De cor pore, xxv, i) he says: "The very 
fact that anything can become a phenomenon {id ipsum) 
{to q)aiye(Dcpai) is indeed the most wonderful of all phe- 
nomena." The fact that motion can be conceived, sensed, 
known, is therefore more wonderful than that it exists. 
The conception, the "apparition," then cannot itself be 
motion, but must be an evidence that there is still some- 
thing else in the universe besides motion. 

Sensation, memory and comxparison are intimately re- 
lated to each other. If the sensory stimtdus vanishes, 
instantly, there is in fact no sensation (sensio) , but only a 
vague impression (phantasma). Real sensation presup- 
poses a distinction and comparison of such impressions. 
The sensory stimuH must therefore vary, in order to make 
sensation possible. — Memories follow certain laws: they 
reappear in the same order of sequence as the original sen- 
sations, unless disarranged by the feelings and impulses. 
All order and every definite relation governing our ideas 
(except our temporal order of sequence) are conditioned 
by the fact that we are actuated by a purpose and seek 
the means for the realization of that purpose. The con- 
stant fixation of our purpose {frequens ad jinem respectio) 
brings system into our thoughts. The capriciousness of 
dream-ideas is explained by the absence of a constant pur- 
pose during sleep. 

He derives all individual feelings and volitional experi- 
ences from the impulse of self-preservation. Pleasure and 



64 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

pain arise according as our organic life is fostered or sup- 
pressed. Every movement and every idea which is favor- 
able to the persistence and advancement of life is con- 
served; detrimental motions and ideas are suppressed. 
Here again we are confronted with the idea of change as a 
condition of soul-life. There can be no feeling and no 
will without distinctions in experience. An absolute goal, 
attainable once for all, is unthinkable. If it were at- 
tained, the possibility of a wish or of effort would no longer 
exist and feeling would likewise be impossible. The 
greatest good can consist only in an unhindered progress 
towards ever higher goals. 

The various forms of feeling and of desire appear as 
expressions of a feeling of power or of weakness. That is 
to say whether I feel pleasure or pain depends upon 
whether I am conscious of having the means of continued 
existence, development and satisfaction, and, as a matter 
of fact, it is through a consciousness of this sort that the 
feehng of power is conditioned by its opposite, the feeling 
of weakness (which can also be a dependence upon re- 
ceiving help from friends or from God). Here the com- 
parison with other men plays an important part, for my 
self-preservation is quite frequently favored as well as 
hindered by others (and their impulse to self-preserva- 
tion). Life is a great race. Whenever we surpass others 
we rejoice, but we feel humbled when we fall behind; 
while we are making the best progress we are filled with 
hope, but doubt as we grow weary; we become angry when 
we see an unexpected obstacle, but we are proud when we 
have surmounted a serious difficulty; we laugh when we 
see another fall, but weep when we fall ourselves; we have 
a sense of sympathy when some one whom v/e wish well 
falls behind, indignation when some one whom we wish ill 



HOBBES 6$ 

succeeds; love when we can assist another in the race, 
happiness when we are constantly overtaking those ahead 
of us, unhappiness when we are constantly falHng behind. 
And the race ends only in death. 

c. The human impulses of self-preservation are not ' 
primarily in mutual harmony: this is clearly manifested 
in the experiences of the great world-struggle. Strife 
will arise, and encroachments are always to be feared. 
The state of nature, i. e. the state of human life as it would 
be without state control, is a war of all against all {helium 
omnium contra omnes). The sole governing principle at 
this stage is the unrestrained impulse and power of the 
individual, and fear, hatred, and the restless himian pas- 
sions are supreme. But in calmer moments (sedato animo) 
men perceive that greater advantage can be attained by 
cooperation and association than by strife. This gives 
rise to the moral principle : Strive for peace, but if peace is 
impossible, warfare must be organized! This principle 
gives rise to the special virtues and duties; fidelity, grati- 
tude, complaisance, forbearance, justice and self-control 
are necessary if peace and society are to be possible. 
Hence the general rule, that one must not do to others what 
he would not suffer from them, likewise follows from this 
principle. But Hobbes likewise suggests that to be just 
towards others and to be able to give them aid (animi 
magni opus proprium est auxiliari) is a sign of strength and 
magnanimity. 

But the efficient execution and maintenance of these 
laws, and rules require a strong poHtical organization. 
The freedom of the state of nature must be surrendered. 
This is accomplished either by an expressed or tacit con- 
tract, by which each individual at once renounces the 
right of his unconditioned impulse to self-preservation 



66 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

and pledges unqualified obedience to an established au- 
thority (a prince or a convention). — ^Whilst AUhusius and 
Grotius made a distinction between the contract through 
which society originates and that upon which the author- 
ity of the state is foimded, with Hobbes both coincide. He 
beheves that, if the war of all against all is to be brought 
under control, the opposition between the governing power 
and the individual must be absolute, and he cannot there- 
fore imagine that a people could exist without govern- 
ment. The governing power must therefore originally 
proceed from a decision of the people. Eobbes is the 
naturalistic exponent of absolute sovereignty. Every 
limitation (by class, parhament or church) would involve 
a division of power, and consequent retrogression to the 
state of nature. The will of the sovereign executes the will 
of the people and he alone (to whom indeed the natural rights 
of every individual are transferred in the original contract). 

The sovereign must decide all questions touching re- 
ligion and morahty. He shall above all determine the 
manner in which God shall be worshipped: otherwise the 
worship of one would be blasphemy to another, resulting 
in a source of constant strife and disintegration. For the 
same reason, the ultimate definitions of good and evil must 
be fixed by the decree of the sovereign. The first prin-^ 
dples of ethics and poHtics rest upon arbitrary enactment 
(in this case by the authority of the state) . 

Theoretically Hobbes anticipates the rationalistic des- 
potism of the eighteenth century. He opposes hierarchy 
and class government and bases the hope of an enHghtened 
political authority , through which the will of the intelligent 
public will receive recognition, on the prospect of a pro- 
gressive educational development of the people {paulatim 
eruditur vulgisl). 



SPINOZA 67 

3. Baruch Spinoza's (163 2-1 6 7 7) chief work (Ethica 
ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677) represents the most 
profound effort of this period to elaborate the fundamental 
principles of the new conception of nature into a general 
world theory. This work, despite its abstract form, is 
by no means impersonal and purely theoretical. With 
Spinoza, thought and life are identical. Clear thinking 
was for him the way to spiritual freedom, the highest form 
of personal life. He aims to regard all the various aspects 
and forms of existence from the viewpoint of internal har- 
mony. The majesty of his thought consists, first of all, in 
the resolute consistency with which he elaborates the vari- 
ous intellectual processes, each of which, in itself, expresses 
.an essential characteristic of reality; every essential view- 
point must receive due recognition, without prejudice and 
without compromise; and, secondly, in the proof that every 
system of thought which is inherently self -consistent and 
complete nevertheless signifies nothing more than a single 
aspect or form of infinite Being. In this way he seeks to 
maintain unity and multiplicity, mind and matter, eternity 
and time, value and reality in their inner identity. Each 
of these fundamental concepts is in itself an expression of 
the total reality and can therefore be carried out ab- 
solutely. 

In his chief work, mentioned above, he elaborates this 
theory deductively or synthetically. Beginning with defi- 
nitions and axioms we advance through a series of doc- 
trinal propositions. Owing to this method of treatment 
Spinoza failed to give his own ideas their true force. Their 
content is not adapted to this mode of treatment, and his 
proofs are therefore frequently untenable. Nor does the 
method piirsued in his treatment correspond with the 
method by which he discovered his theory. The unfin- 



68 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

ished treatise De emendatione intellectus is the chief source 
of information concerning this method. Here he begins 
autobiographically after the manner of Descartes in his 
Discours. Experience has taught him that neither enjoy- 
ment, nor wealth, nor honor can be the highest good. He 
finds it, on the contrary, in the knowledge of the relatio; 
existing between our mind and nature as a whole. The 
pleasures of knowledge became his highest and strongest 
ambition, his ruHng passion, and the glory conferred on 
existence through the possibility of participating in this 
joy is what made Hfe worth living to him. It is for this 
very reason however that he institutes the inquiry as to 
the possibility of reaHzing this end, and he then indicates 
how he arrived at the definitions and axioms with which 
the "Ethics" begins. 

Spinoza, the son of a Jewish merchant of Amsterdam, 
began his career as a Jewish theologian, inspiring great 
hopes among his brethren in the faith. He however grad- 
ually became increasingly critical of the ancestral ideas of 
faith and was finally ceremonially excommunicated from 
the synagogue. Thereafter he Hved in the country for 
a while, moving thence to Rh3msberg, in the vicinity of 
Leyden, and finally to The Hague, occupied with study 
and the writing of his books. He provided a scanty Hving 
by grinding lenses. He enjoyed the active intellectual 
fellowship of a circle of young friends who studied his 
ethics, even while it only existed in manuscript. His life 
is a splendid example of happy resignation and inner de- 
votion to intellectual labor. 

The essay. Von Gott, Menschen und dessen Glilck, written 
in his youth, is Spinoza's first attempt to bring what he 
regarded as essential in religious ideas into inner harmony 
with the scientific conception of nature. Later on he 



SPINOZA 69 

wrote an exposition of the Cartesian philosophy for one of 
his pupils ; although strongly influenced by the writings of 
Descartes (together with Jewish theology and the works of 
scholasticism, and perhaps also by the works of Bruno) he 
was never a Cartesian, He likewise studied and used the 
works of Bacon and Hohhes. — In his Tractatus theologico- 
politicus (1670) he advocates religious Hberty and makes 
some interesting contributions to the historical criticism of 
the various books of the Bible. 

a. Our knowledge originates in incidental experience 
{experientia vaga). On this plane we arrange phenomena 
according to laws which are apparently mechanical, and 
we are satisfied so long as there is no exception. Science 
{ratio) however institutes exact comparisons of the given 
phenomena. It begins with experience, and then seeks 
to discover what belongs to nature as a whole as weU as 
to its various parts — the imiversal laws, which prevail 
everywhere. Spinoza illustrates this by reference to the 
laws of motion in the realm of matter and the laws of the 
association of ideas in the realm of mind. It is only in 
these laws that our thought processes culminate, whilst 
the series of particular phenomena continue to infinity, 
because that which is cause in one relation is effect in 
another relation and vice versa. The only absolute which 
can satisfy intellect is the law which governs the causal 
series, not its supposed beginning or end. Spinoza calls 
this absolute Substance ; that which exists in itself and is to 
he understood through itself, so that its concept presupposes 
no other concepts. Spinoza^s Substance, the terminus of 
all thought, is therefore the principle of the uniformity of 
Nature. 

Spinoza^s discussion of the vaHdity of knowledge is 
somewhat vacillating. At times he seems to hold the 



70 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

popular and scholastic definition of truth as the agreement 
of thought with its object. But when he examines the 
problem more closely he concludes that the perfection of 
knowledge consists of complete elaboration and internal 
consistency. He always regards error as negative, as due 
to the limitation of our experience and thought. Error 
is resolved by observing strict logical consistency; we even- 
tually discover that we were regarding a part for the whole. 
Thus error finds its explanation in the truth: Veritas est 
norma sui et falsi. Hence the norm of truth lies in the 
ven' nature of our thought, not in its relation to something 
external. 

Knowledge of the laws of nature is however not the 
highest kind of knowledge. Spinoza places intuition 
above experientia vaga and reason. The former appre- 
hends particular events and the latter discovers general 
principles, but in intuitive knowledge {scientia intuUvoa) 
the particular phenomenon is immediately apprehended 
as a characteristic member of the whole system of nature, 
the particular being in its relation to the whole of Sub- 
stance. This higher intuition is only acquired after we 
have passed through the stages of experience and science. 
Spinoza even says that he himself understood but very 
Httle in this highest manner. It appears to be more like 
an artificial intuition than a pure scientific conception. 

We regard things from the standpoint of eternity {sub 
specie cBierni) in the second as weU as in the third form of 
knowledge; i. e. not in their isolation and contingency, 
but as members of a more comprehensive system. 

b. Following Descartes and H abbes , Spinoza bases his 
entire philosophy on the principle of causality, the validity 
of which, for him as for them, is self-evident. In his ex- 
position of the law of causation he takes special pains to 



SPINOZA 71 

emphasize that cause and effect cannot be things which 
differ in kind. He says, e. g., that ''If two things have 
nothing in common, the one cannot be the cause of the 
other; for then there would be nothing in the effect, which 
had also been in the cause, and ever3rthing in the effect 
would then have originated from nothing." According 
to Spinoza the fact that two things are related as cause 
and effect signifies that the concept of the one admits of 
a ptirely logical derivation from that of the other. He 
does not distinguish between cause and ground. He iden- 
tifies the relation of cause and effect with the relation of 
premises and conclusion. The fact that cause precedes 
effect in time, as well as in thought, finds no place in his 
theory. "From the standpoint of eternity" time dis- 
appears. 

The cause of an event may therefore exist in the event 
itself or in something else. That which has its cause 
within itself is Substance. Substance is that which exists 
in itself and is understood through itself, so that its con- 
cept does not presuppose any other concept. We have 
already observed that Spinoza^s fundamental principle is 
revealed in the uniformity of nature. It is therefore the 
ftmdamental presupposition of all existence and efficiency. 
It foUows from his definition, that it exists necessarily: 
it contains its cause within itself, and hence nothing can 
prevent its existence! Only one Substance is possible: 
for, if there were several, they would limit each other, in 
which case neither one could be understood from itself. 
It is likewise self-evident that Substance can neither have 
beginning nor come to an end, neither be divided nor lim- 
ited. 

This concept, which is Spinoza's inner terminus of all 
thought, is at once identical with the concept of God and 



72 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

the concept of Nature. These concepts must then how- 
ever be conceived of in a different manner than usual. 
Natiu"e is the inherent energy which is active in every- 
thing which exists {natura naturans), not the mere sum of 
all existence {natura naturata). "/ have an opinion about 
God and Nature,^^ says Spinoza, "which is different from 
that commonly held by modern Christians. I hold that God 
is the internal, not the external, cause of all things. That is, 
I hold, with St. Paul, that all things live and move in GodJ^ 
Another divergence from the ordinary concept of God is 
contained in the fact that Spinoza does not think that hu- 
man attributes, such as understanding and will, can be 
ascribed to the Deity; for understanding presupposes given 
experiences which shall be understood, and will presup- 
poses that there are ideals which are as yet unrealized, each 
of which would contradict the absolute perfection of God. 

Spinoza calls the things which do not contain their cause 
within themselves Modi (phenomena, individual things). 
The Modus is caused by something other than itself, 
through which alone it can be understood. The real 
cause of the Modi is contained in Substance, of which they 
are the particular manifestations. Externally they stand 
in a causal relation to each other, but the total aggregate 
of the Modi, the total series of causes and effects given in 
experience (the total natura naturata) , is a revelation of 
Substance, which constitutes the vital relation of the whole 
series of phenomena. 

c. According to Spinoza real existence can only be 
ascribed to Substance. Phenomena are its particular 
Forms. Everj^thing which exists (Substance and its 
Modi), therefore, comes into experience under two attri- 
butes (fundamental characters or fundamental forms): 
thought and extension (mind and matter). As an infinite 



SPINOZA 73 

and perfect being Substance must have an infinite number 
of Attributes; but we know only two, because experience 
reveals no more to us. An attribute is what thought con- 
ceives of Substance as constituting its essence {essentiam 
substanticB constituens) . This definition implies that the 
whole nature of Substance must be present in every At- 
tribute, in every fundamental form; each individual at- 
tribute must therefore, like Substance itself, be understood 
through itself, and its concept cannot be derived from any 
other concept. Everything which pertains to a given 
Attribute must be explained by means of this attribute 
alone, without reference to any other Attributes; thoughts 
must therefore be explained only by means of thoughts, 
material phenomena only by means of material phenom- 
ena. Not only Substance as such, but each of its phe- 
nomena, each Modus, e. g. man, can be regarded and ex- 
plained completely under each Attribute. The nature of 
reality is revealed in the realm of matter as well as in the 
realm of mind, and the one form of manifestation cannot be 
derived from the other. Mind and matter (soul and body) ' 
are one and the same, only viewed from different sides. — 
Spinoza holds, in opposition to Descartes, that two irredu- 
cible attributes do not necessarily require two different 
natures, but that they can very easily pertain to one and 
the same nature. He differs from Hobbes in that he does 
not regard mind as a mere effect or form of matter, but sees 
in it an aspect of being quite as distinctive and primary as 
matter. — Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza represent the 
three leading hypotheses concerning the relation of mind 
and matter. 

Spinoza elaborates his theory of mind and matter 
(which in recent times has frequently been described by 
the unfortunate term parallelism, or the identity hy- 



74 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

pothesis) according to the deductive method, because he 
derives it from his definitions of Substance, Attribute and 
Modi. We have however ahready called attention to the 
fact that he discovered his definitions by means of the 
analysis of experience and of knowledge. The definition 
of Attribute presupposes the fundamental principle of the 
identity of cause and effect, previously mentioned; from 
this presupposition the relation between the Attributes 
follows in the same manner as the relation between 
Substance and Modi. That everything which pertains 
to a given Attribute must be explained by reference to 
that attribute is really nothing more than a metaphysical 
paraphrase of the principle that material phenomena can 
only be explained by means of ma'terial phenomena. 
Kepler's vera causa makes the same demand. That this 
is really what Spinoza meant becomes quite apparent 
from the following expression: ''If any one should say 
that this or that bodily activity proceeds from the soul, 
he knows not what he is talking about, and really grants 
that we do not know the cause of such activity." — He 
nevertheless likewise calls attention to the fact that the 
development of the soul advances proportionately with 
the development of the body, and that we have no right 
to set arbitrary limits to the material uniformity of 
nature. 

Spinoza does not regard the hypothesis of identity 
as a mere psychophysical theory. He likewise gives it 
an epistemological significance in that he speaks of an 
identity of thought with its object. Here he confuses 
the relation of subject and object with the relation of 
soul and body. This is the more remarkable, since he 
holds that the validity of knowledge depends on its 
logical consistency rather than on the agreement with its 



SPINOZA 75 

objects. But he is also somewhat vacillating on this last 
point, which is an after-effect of the scholastic studies of 
his youth. 

Criticism of this most rationalistic of all systems of 
philosophy must first of all be directed against the 
central proposition of the homogeneity (or really identity) 
of cause and effect. Should this proposition prove 
untenable or even be incapable of consistent elaboration, 
it must follow that, in the last analysis, Being is not, as 
Spinoza believed, absolutely rational. We shall find this 
problem discussed by the English empiricists and by the 
critical philosophers. 

d. Spinoza teaches, in harmony with this theory of 
error, that every idea is regarded as true, so long as it is 
not supplanted by another. Our theory of reality is 
developed through the rivalry of ideas. The most com- 
prehensive and most consistent theory is the truest. 

Spinoza ^s elaboration of the psychology of the emotions 
as given in his "Ethics" is unsurpassed in its excellence. 
Like Hohles he starts from the impulse of self-preser- 
vation. But he bases it on the consistency of his system. 
The infinite Substance is actively present in every> indi- 
vidual being {modus) \ the effort towards self-preser- 
vation of each individual being is therefore a part of the 
divine activity. Hence whenever effort is successful, it 
produces pleasure, and conversely pain. But this only 
occurs in case of a transition to a more perfect or less per- 
fect state; an absolutely changeless state would neither 
give rise to pleasure nor pain. — The various emotional 
qualities result from the association of ideas. We love 
what produces pleasure, and hate what produces pain. 
We love whatever contributes to our love, and hate what 
constrains it. When a being similar to ourselves ex- 



76 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

periences pleasure or pain, the same emotion involun- 
tarily arises in us. But this moreover not only gives 
rise to sympathetic joy and sorrow, but it may also 
inspire envy and pleasure at the misfortune of others, 
i. e. if we ourselves wish to enjoy another's pleasures, 
or if we are previously filled with hatred towards the 
unfortunate. — Just as pleasure becomes love by means of 
the idea of its cause, so mere appetite {appetitus, co- 
natus) becomes desire {cupidUas)^ when joined with the 
idea of its object. 

In Spinoza^ s description of emotional and volitional 
life we discover a degree of vacillation between a purely 
intellectualistic and a more realistic (or voluntaristic) 
theory. In several passages he describes the emotions 
as confused and inadequate ideas {idecB confuses, et 
inadequatce) , which vanish as soon as the idea becomes 
perfectly clear. But there are other passages in which 
the emotions are regarded as real, positive states, which 
can only be displaced by other real states. The same 
thing occurs with the concept of the will. In several 
passages volition is treated as one with the activity of 
thought; will and understanding are identical. But 
in other passages the will is identical with the impulse 
of self-preservation, and all ideas of value and value- 
judgments are dependent on it; "We seek, choose, 
desire and wish for a thing, not because we think it is 
good, but, inversely, we think a thing is good, because 
we seek, choose, desire and wish for it." In this case 
therefore he asserts the priority of the will. — This vac- 
illation is evidently (in agreement with F. Tonnies in 
Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie, VII) 
to be explained from the fact that, during the prepara- 
tion of the Ethics f Spinoza's older, intellectualistic con- 



SPINOZA 77 

ception was supplanted by a more realistic conception 
under the influence of Hobbes without a thoroughgoing 
application of the logical consequences of the new con- 
ception. 

e. Spinoza bases his ethics on the instinct of self- 
preservation. — Man is conditioned by the fact of being 
one among many individual beings, and obstacles con- 
stantly thwart his instincts. As a member of the total 
series of causes and effects man does not contain his 
cause within himself, he is not active, but passive, not 
free, but necessitated. The sense of dependence enables 
man to strive for freedom and independence. He then 
imagines an ideal of human Hfe {idea hominis, tanquam 
naturcB humane^ examplar), as it would be under con- 
ditions of perfect freedom and independence. This 
fiunishes a standard of judgment: whatever contributes 
towards the realization of that ideal is good; whatever 
prevents it is evil. The predicates "good'' and "evil'* 
which are meaningless when applied to absolute Being, 
Substance, become significant from the viewpoint of 
temporal experience and finite development. Sub specie 
(Bterni there is no ethics; all antitheses and differences, 
and moreover all valuation, disappear when so con-' 
sidered. 

A desire can be subdued only by another desire, and 
hence, if the ideal is to govern our Hfe, it must either give 
rise to or become a desire. Duty then becomes a matter 
of making this desire as strong as possible. Social life 
is a means to this end. Men can make better provision 
for self-preservation by uniting their energies. Spiritual 
goods, especially knowledge, which furnishes the only 
possible means to perfect freedom and activity, can only 
be acquired imder conditions which guarantee the external 



78 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

means of subsistence and this is more readily obtained in 
organized society than otherwise. Spiritual, unlike ma- 
terial, goods, which only one or a few can possess, are not 
the occasion of strife; they are rather the common pos- 
session of everyone, and here the individual can assist 
others without sustaining any loss to himself. The cour- 
ageous instinct of self-preservation {fortitudo), which 
constitutes virtue, appears therefore not only in the form 
of vital energy {animositas), i.e. as power to impress the 
influence of one's personality, but also in generosity 
(generositas) , i. e. power to lend spiritual and material 
assistance to others. — But the acme of spiritual freedom 
can nevertheless only be attained through a perfect under- 
standing of ourselves, in our real identity with that which 
is most essential and highest in Being, because we con- 
ceive oiu: own energy as a part of infinite energy and we 
are filled with an intellectual love for Deity brought 
about by the joy of knowledge {amor intellectualis dei). 
We then see ourselves sub specie (Bternitatis . 

In his theory of the state, contained partly in the 
Tractatus theologico-politicus, partly in the unfinished 
Tractatus Politicus, Spinoza, like HobbeSj draws a sharp 
distinction between the state of nattire and life within 
the state ; but he likewise holds that it is the duty of the 
state to secure a greater degree of freedom and indepen- 
dence than would be possible in a state of nature. The 
individual does not surrender his liberty when he becomes 
a member of the state. The state is not supposed to 
reduce men to animals or machines, but to provide the 
conditions for the development of man's spiritual and 
bodily ftmctions. It would therefore contradict its 
ofiice if it failed to maintain liberty of thought and 
speech and to guarantee complete religious liberty. 



LEIBNITZ 79 

4. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-17 16), like his 
three predecessors, Descartes^ Hobbes and Spinoza, is 
convinced of the importance of the mechanical explanation 
of natiire . His three predecessors regarded the mechanical 
principles as self-evident and as given once for all, and 
assimied the task of . interpreting the various elements 
of reality in harmony with the principle of mechanical 
causality. Leibnitz however subjects the principle of 
causality to a profounder analysis by inquiring into its 
presuppositions and seeking to refer it back to something 
still more fundamental. It is only after he has succeeded 
in this that he proceeds to the definition of the relation 
between matter and mind. The motive for this investi- 
gation was in part purely theoretical, due to the fact that 
Leibnitz discovered gaps and inconsistencies in his pre- 
decessors, in part practical, due to his desire to bring the 
modern explanation of nature into more perfect harmony 
with his religious presuppositions. He attempted to 
accomplish both at a single stroke, by means of a single 
idea, the idea of continuity. 

Even as a boy, in the library of his father, who was a 
professor in Leipzig, Leibnitz had become familiar with 
the writings of Scholasticism. When he afterwards 
became acquainted with the natural science and philos- 
ophy of his own day he felt as if ''transported into another 
world. '^ He saw that the new ideas could not be refuted, 
but neither could he surrender the conviction that nature 
is ultimately regulated by prescience, that is to say, 
that the mechanism must be grounded in teleology. His 
mathematical ideas were influenced profoundly by the 
physicist Huygens during a visit in Paris, and he after- 
wards likewise drew personally close to Spinoza. From 
1676 onwards he lived at Hannover as councillor and 



8o THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

librarian, occupied with philosophy, mathematics, history 
and jurisprudence. His broadly comprehensive mind 
was capable of engaging productively in a wide range of 
subjects to their material advancement. He was every- 
where affected by the controlling idea of continuity, 
which can only be rigorously carried through by the 
continual discovery of more numerous and finer distinc- 
tions and nuances of thought. 

a. Leibnitz discovered a difficulty in Descartes^ and 
Spinoza^ s theory that the stun total of motion in the 
universe always remains constant, namely, that it fails 
to explain how to account for motion and rest respectively 
in the various parts of the universe: They exist as 
antithetical states! Continuity can be established only 
through the concept of Force (or tendency, conatus). 
If motion has ceased at a given point in the universe, the 
Force still remains and can be revived again. Motion 
and rest are only relatively opposed to each other. 
Instead of the persistence of motion we should speak of 
the persistence of Force. Force is the factor in any given 
circumstance which contains the possibiHty of future 
change. We first discover a imiform relation between two 
states and we afterwards call the factor in the first state 
which makes the second state possible Force. The 
concept of Force therefore rests on the concept of law, 
the ultimate presupposition of which is the uniform con- 
sistency of changing states. Leibnitz calls this pre- 
supposition the principle of sufficient reason. 

But how shall we account for the persistence of energy? 
According to Leibnitz this question can be answered only 
teleologically. If the energy of a cause were not preserved 
in the effect, nature would retrograde, which contradicts 
divine wisdom. Leibnitz thus finds a basis for his faith 



LEIBNITZ 8l 

in prescience in the corrected basal principle of mechanical 
natiiral science. In explaining partictilar facts he would 
apply the strict mechanical method, but the principle 
of mechanism itself requires the principle of teleology 
for its explanation. 

b. Leibnitz carries his analysis further than his pre- 
decessors at still another point. They had regarded 
extension as a fundamental attribute of Being. Leibnitz 
challenges this assiunption. Extended things are always 
manifold and complex, and the true reaHties are the 
elements which constitute things. If there were no 
absolute units (which cannot be extended), there would be 
no real existence. It is only these ultimate units that 
can be regarded as Substance (in its strict significance). 
Inasmuch therefore as Force persists, it foUows that this 
persistent Substance must likewise be Force; it would 
be utterly impossible for activity to originate from Sub- 
stances in a state of absolute rest. Leibnitz calls 
these substantial imits, whose objective manifestation 
constitutes matter. Monads. Each Monad is a little 
universe; its nature is revealed in the laws which govern 
its inner successive changes. 

What then, as a matter of fact, are these Monads? 
Leibnitz answers: Our souls alone furnish us with an 
immediate example of a unitary being, whose inner states 
foUow a uniform law. We mast think of all Monads after 
this analogy, because we presuppose something in aU of 
them analogous to our sensations and activities. Since, 
according to the principle of continuity, we permit no 
leaps in nature, we must postulate innumerable grades 
and degrees of soul life in the universe. And this enables 
us to understand the origin of human consciousness. Here 
the Cartesians, just as in the case of the transition from 



82 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

rest to motion, were confronted by a riddle; for con- 
sciousness like motion cannot come into being all at once. 
The relation of the imconscious to consciousness is 
analogous to the relation of rest and motion. In order 
to vindicate the continuity of soul-life, Leibnitz directs 
attention to the fine nuances and changes of consciousness 
which are frequently overlooked. We are likewise 
obliged to postulate such minimal elements (petites per- 
ceptions) in the unconscious. 

Leibnitz first elaborated this, his so-called theory of 
Monads, in a short essay in 1685 (Petit discours de meta- 
physique) and in his correspondence with Arnauld during 
the following year, but not until he had prepared the way 
for it by a nimiber of earHer essays. He afterwards 
pubHshed several expositions of the theory especially 
in the Systeme nouveau (1695) and in the Monadologie 
(17 14). — Leibnitz approaches his system first by the 
method of analysis, and then by the method of analogy. 
He seeks the ultimate presuppositions of science and then 
explains these presuppositions by means of analogy. Here 
he made a very important discovery, in showing that 
analogy is the only method by which to construct a 
positive metaphysics. Every mythology, rehgion and 
metaphysical system had used this method; but 
Leibnitz is the first to understand the principle which 
forms its basis. His system, the first attempt at a meta- 
physical ideaHsm (i. e. the theory that the fundamental 
principle of reaUty is spiritual) since Plato and the pattern 
of aU later idealistic attempts, has, to say nothing of its 
content, a permanent interest just because of this clear 
consciousness of its source. However if we should ask 
him why he uses the principle of analogy with so much 
assurance, he would answer: Because its help offers 



LEIBNITZ 83 

the only possibility of comprehending reality and because 
reahty — on the basis of the principle of sufficient reason 
— ^must be comprehensible. 

c. It was Leibnitz^ intention that his doctrine of 
Monads should form the complete antithesis to Spinozism. 
Whilst Spinoza recognized only one Substance, Leibnitz 
postulated an infinite number, each of which forms a 
universe of its own, or, to invert the expression, constitutes 
a separate view of the universe. Each Monad develops 
by virtue of an inner necessity, just like Spinoza^ s Sub- 
stance. Leibnitz^ theory thus appears to be an absolute 
pluralism in contrast with an equally absolute monism. 
Leibnitz ' only explanation of the ultimate correspondence 
and harmony of the Monads however, without which 
they could not constitute a universe, involves the reference 
to their common origin in God. The Monads issue or 
radiate from God, in a manner similar to the way in which 
Substance, according to Spinoza, impelled by the instinct 
of self-preservation, produced the Modes. But at this 
point — the conception of unity and multiplicity — 
Leibnitz encounters a difficulty which is even greater than 
that of Spinoza, since even God — just as every reality — 
must likewise be a Monad together with the other Monads, 
whilst Spinoza^ s Substance maintains vital relation with 
the Modes. 

Leibnitz also approaches very close to Spinoza in his 
conception of the relation of mind and matter. He 
insists on the continuity of all material processes and can 
therefore neither accept any transition from matter to 
mind nor any influence of mind upon matter. Extension 
is only the external sensible form of psychical states : that 
which takes place in the soul finds its material expression 
in the body and vice versa. Leibnitz therefore defends 



84 TKE GREAT SYSTEMS 

the hypothesis of identity just as Spinoza had done. He 
however gives it an idealistic cast, since he regarded the 
absolute reaHty as psychical, and denied the Spinozistic 
coordination of the two attributes. 

d. A perfect continuity pervades the separate Monads, 
i. e. the individual life of the soul, just as the Monads 
among themselves form a complete continuous series. 
Every conceivable degree of soiil-life exists, unconscious 
as well as conscious. Leibnitz developed his views on 
psychology and the theory of knowledge, as a polemic 
directed against Locke, in his Nouveaux Essais (which only 
appeared long after his death). He criticizes the assertion 
that the soul is originally a blank tablet. The obscure 
impulses of the soul must not be ignored. Just in pro- 
portion as the distinction and contrast between our 
sensations are small, the less a single element is distinguish- 
able from the remaining content of the soul, or, more 
briefly, the more obscure the psychical states are, so 
much the more readily is their existence denied. But 
there are no absolute divisions, but rather every possible 
degree of variation between obscurity and clearness. 
Leibnitz calls the obscure changes within ourselves, 
which do not really rise to consciousness, perceptions; 
they correspond to the phantasmata of Hobbes. The 
lowest forms of being, the Monads of the lowest degree, 
never rise above such perceptions. We approach a 
higher level when perceptions are combined with memory 
and consequently possess more than mere momentary 
significance; consciousness is then present (sentiment, 
cf. Hobbes^ sensio). The highest degree is characterized 
by attention to its own states; here Leibnitz uses the 
terms apperception and conscience; conscience is 
connaissance reflexive de I'etat interieur.i. e. self-conscious- 



LEIBNITZ 85 

ness, not consciousness in general. The fact that the 
Cartesians attributed psychical Hfe to human beings 
alone was due, according to Leibnitz, to their failure 
to observe the innumerable gradations of psychical life. 
Here, even as in material nature, the clear and sensibly 
apparent is a resultant, an integration of small magni- 
tudes. The apparent evanescence of psychical life is 
merely a transmutation into more obscure, more element- 
ary forms. The minute distinctions escape observation, 
and yet we are never wholly indifferent to them (just as 
in material nature there is no such thing as absolute rest) . 
It is only when the distinctions become great and sharp 
that we are clearly aware of ourselves and feel the contrast 
between the self and the rest of the universe. 

Leibnitz applies the principle of continuity consistently 
throughout, both in psychology and in the philosophy of 
nature, on the basis of the concept of minute differentia. 
As a mathematician the same thought process led him 
to the discovery of the integral calculus. His ''differentials" 
are infinitely small magnitudes (or changes of magnitude), 
but they eventually constitute a finite magnitude through 
simmiation (integration). His great mind was occupied 
with problems in widely different fields of knowledge, 
but the general type of his thought was everywhere the 
same. 

In referring all the distinctions of mental life to dis- 
tinctions of obscurity and clearness, he is a forerunner of 
the century of enlightenment. But we must not over- 
look the fact that the obscure states have an infinite 
content, for each Monad is a mirror of the whole universe, 
even though it is conscious of only a part of it. A finite 
being is therefore incapable of complete and perfect 
enlightenment; its sole prospect consists of continuous 



86 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

effort. Leibnitz likewise discovers a tendency (appetit- 
tendance) in the soul, to pass from the single ''percep- 
tions" to new perceptions. This is an element which 
presupposes other distinctions than obscurity and clear- 
ness. Both Spinoza and Leibnitz contain suggestions 
of a profounder theory of will, which is suppressed by 
their intellectualistic tendency. 

e. Although Leibnitz, in opposition to Locke, maintains 
the involuntary and unconscious foimdation of knowl- 
edge, and objected to the idea of a tabula rasa, he 
is still in agreement with Lockers criticism of "innate 
ideas" in requiring a proof for all truths, even the ' ' innate," 
that are not identical propositions. To prove a prop- 
osition means to trace it back to an identical proposition. 
According to him logic culminates in the principle of 
identity whilst the AristoteHans and Scholastics base 
their theory on the principle of contradiction. He had 
sketched an outline of logic in which each judgment is 
stated in the form of an identical proposition. But this 
sketch was tmknown until 1840 (in /. E. Erdmann^s 
Opera philosophica Leibnitii), and the logical investi- 
gations of Boole and Jevons, which reveal a similar 
tendency, were the first to direct attention to them. 

Just as the principle of identity is the criterion of truth 
in the realm of pure thought, so is the principle of suffi- 
cient reason in the realm of experience. Leibnitz how- 
ever, even as Spinoza, never made a clear distinction 
between groimd and cause (ratio and causa). He re- 
garded this principle not only as a principle of scientific 
investigation, but as a universal law. — The difference 
between truths of experience (** contingent" truths) 
and truths of pure thought ("necessary" truths) is 
only a matter of degree: the former can be reduced to 



LEIBNITZ 87 

identical propositions by a finite, the latter by an infinite 
analysis. The relation is similar to that which obtains 
between rational and irrational numbers. 

f . The whole of the Leibnizian philosophy is character- 
ized by a harmonizing and conciliatory tendency. He 
is especially anxious to combine mechanism with teleol- 
ogy, but without compromising the integrity of either. 
Teleology is simply to be another way of construing 
mechanism. He says that ''everything in nature can 
be explained by final causes (causae finales) quite as well 
as by efficient causes (causae efficientes)." 

But he is not satisfied to stop with this piirely philo- 
sophical theory, notwithstanding the fact that its em- 
pirical verification contained an abundance of problems. 
He was also anxious to effect a reconciliation between 
ecclesiastical theology and philosophy. He wrote the 
Theodicee in refutation of Bayle, just as he had written 
the Nouveaux Essais in refutation of Locke. Here 
he employs the distinction between ^' necessary*^ and 
*' contingent^' truths: nothing can contradict the 
former; but since "contingent" truths can never be 
reduced to a final analysis, such as the principle of suffi- 
cient reason requires, we are compelled to go beyond the 
series of actual causes (extra seriem) and postulate a 
first cause, which is self -caused. The universe, actually 
created by this first cause, was not the only one possible ; 
— according to the principle of sufficient reason — it must 
have been given the preference only because it was the 
best possible. Before the creation of the world the 
various possibilities presented a conflict in the Divine 
mind. This world was given the preference because 
it offered the greatest harmony together with the greatest 
multiplicity. But even such a world cannot be entirely 



88 THE GREAT SYSTEMS 

free from fault. It is impossible for the Divine Nature 
to reveal itself in finite nature without encountering nu- 
merous obstacles and limitations. Suffering (''physical 
evil") and sin ("moral evil") are consequences of these 
obstacles ("metaphysical evil"). — This reminds us 
of the mythology of Jacob Bohme. Leibnitz must con- 
cede to Bayle that the world is governed by two prin- 
ciples, with this modification, namely, that he ascribes 
the one to the divine will, which reduces evil to a minimtim, 
the other to the divine understanding, which determines 
the various possible world forms. 

But these are not the only argimients which Leibnitz 
adduces. He cites the infinitude of the universe, as 
admitting the possibility that the evil which we experi- 
ence in oiH" part of the universe (which is perhaps the 
worst part!) may be insignificant as compared with the 
world as a whole. This argtmient is new. It had only 
become possible through the new world-theory^ of Coper- 
nicus and Bruno, On the other hand, Leibnitz employs 
an old argument when he says that evil and sin were 
necessary in order that the good and the beautiful might 
be rendered conspicuous by contrast. This view occurs 
already in Plotinus and Augustine. It is rather sesthetic 
than moral. And moreover the sacrifice of single parts 
of the universe, i. e. single Monads, for the good of others, 
conflicts with Leibnitz^ own theory. 

Leibnitz bases his ethical ideas on the longing for 
perfection, i. e. for a higher degree of energy and greater 
spiritual harmony. The sense of pleasure is correlated 
with an abundance and harmony of energies. The 
individual is spontaneously impelled to strive not only 
for his own happiness, but likewise for the happiness 
of others. In the controversy between Bossuet and 



LEIBNITZ 89 

Fenelon on the question of ''disinterested love," Leibnitz 
agrees with Fenelon, affirming the reaHty and the value 
of such love ; he however emphasizes the fact that the 
happiness of others likewise affects us by way of reaction. 
He regards justice, conceived as the harmony of love and 
wisdom (caritas sapientis), as the highest virtue. Love 
is the end, and wisdom discovers the means. — Leibnitz^ 
theory, which he elaborated in two small dissertations, 
Von der Gluckseligkeit and De nutionihus juris et justi- 
ti(Bj is closely related to that of Shaftesbury, with which 
we shall become acquainted in the next division. Even 
Leibnitz himself referred to their similarity. 



THIRD BOOK. 

ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The great system btdlders did indeed begin with 
analysis, but the foundations upon which they built -were 
concepts and presuppositions just the same, and these 
were not carefully investigated. This is specially true 
of the principle of causation and several of the principles 
of natural science, which were regarded as self-evident. 
The method of using presuppositions without inquiring 
into their validity has, since the time of Kant, been called 
dogmatism. It is the great merit of English philosophy 
that it instituted an investigation of the presuppositions 
of knowledge. It investigates the psychological processes 
which give rise to these presuppositions, as weU as the 
methods of demonstrating their validity. The problem of 
psychology and the theory of knowledge thus come into 
the foreground, and the problem of being gradually 
recedes into the background. 

The consequences of this transposition of problems 
were of great importance in other departments as weU 
as in the specific domain of philosophy. People began to 
demand a definite account, not only of scientific presup- 
positions, but also of the principles which were regarded 
as fimdamental in politics, religion and education. Au- 
thorities, which had hitherto been accepted without hesi- 
tation, must now give an account of their origin and their 
trustworthiness. Stated in philosophical terms this 
means that the problem of evaluation now became more 
prominent than formerly. This is a matter that can 
neither be solved by an appeal to authority nor by a mere 

90 



LOCKE 91 

deduction from theoretical principles, but requires a 
method of treatment peculiarly its own. The foundation 
of ethics likewise receives independent treatment more 
frequently than hitherto. 

I. John Locke (163 2-1 704) devotes his chief work, 
the Essay Concerning the Human Understanding 
(1690), to the investigation of the natiire and validity 
of human knowledge. The first draft of this pioneer 
work was brought about by a discussion of moral and 
religious subjects. When it became evident how difficult 
it is to arrive at definite conclusions, the thought occurred 
to Locke that they must first of all examine the faculty 
of knowledge, in order to see what subjects it is capable 
of treating, and moreover what things are beyond its 
powers. In the first book Locke criticizes the doctrine 
of innate ideas, especially in the form in which it was held 
by Herbert of Cherhury; in the second book he shows that 
all ideas come from experience, and reduces compound 
ideas to their simple elements; in the third book he 
investigates the influence of language on thought; and 
in the fourth he examines the different kinds of 
knowledge and defines its Hmits. 

John Locke received a splendid education from his 
father. He pays a beautiful tribute to his father in 
his splendid essay On Education (1692). But the for- 
mal grammatical discipline and the scholastic instruction 
received at school and the tmiversity were repulsive to 
him. His philosophical development was influenced 
chiefly by the study of Descartes, Gassendi and Hobbes. 
Being unable to subscribe to the 39 Articles, he had to 
relinquish his original plan of becoming a clerg3niian. He 
afterwards studied medicine, but soon entered the service 
of the Earl of Shaftesbury j with whose family he remained 



92 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

connected for two generations, as tutor, secretary and 
friend. At the fall of the Earl, Locke went to Holland, 
where he composed his most important works and 
likewise participated in the preparations for the revolution. 
He retvimed to England with William of Orange, and helped 
to formulate the policies of the new administration. He 
spent his last years in rural solitude. 

a. In Lockers terminology idea represents everything 
with which we are occupied when engaged in thought. 
Some have supposed that certain ideas, especially the idea 
of God and the logical and moral principles, are innate, but 
experience shows that children, primitive races and the 
illiterate possess nothing more than particular and sen- 
sible ideas. There are men Y<fh.o have no idea of God and 
no real ideas of morality. Some of our ideas are natural, 
i. e. such as have been acquired through experience by 
means of our native faculty; but even these are not 
innate. Locke attributes the doctrine of innate ideas to 
human indolence, which shrinks from the labor involved 
in exploring the origin of ideas. 

All ideas, all the elements of consciousness originate 
from two sources: external experience (sensation) and 
internal experience (reflection). In external experience 
a physical impression produces a sensation (perception) 
in the soul; in internal experience we observe the activity 
of our own mind in elaborating the sensations received 
from without. 

In the acquisition of simple ideas consciousness is for 
the most part passive. Simple external ideas are of two 
kinds: ideas of primary and of secondary qualities. 
The primary qualities can be attributed to the external 
objects themselves ; such are solidity, extension, figure, 
mobility. Secondary qualities belong only to our ideas, 



LOCKE 93 

they are not attributes of the things themselves; they 
are the results of the influences of primary qualities on 
us. Such secondary ideas are light, sound, smell, taste, 
&c. — We have previously met with this distinction in 
Galileo^ Descartes and Hohhes. Locke adopted it from 
Boyle, the noted chemist, who is the author of the terms 
*' primary and secondary qualities." 

Whilst we are largely passive in acquiring simple ideas, 
we are active in forming from them, first, complex ideas, 
second, ideas of relations, third and finally, abstract ideas. 
Hence there are three forms of activity: composition, 
association and abstraction. We combine simple ideas 
into a single idea whenever we form ideas of attributes 
(modes), such as space and time, energy and motion. 
The ideas of such attributes as sensation, memory and 
attention are formed in inner experience. We form our 
ideas of things or substances by combining ideas of 
modes. But here a mystery confronts us. We know the 
single modes by themselves, but we are imable to tell 
what substance, which presumably supports the modes, 
really is. — ^We may likewise place two ideas in juxtaposi- 
tion, without forming a compound idea. We do this in 
all cases of ideas of relation, such as cause and effect, 
time and space relations, identity and difference. — 
Finally we are active also when we abstract or isolate an 
idea from its original connection. This happens when 
we form an idea of a color in general, or the idea of space 
without reference to its content. 

b. Touching the matter of validity, Locke holds that 
there can be no question in the case of simple ideas 
because they are the direct effect of external objects. 
Even secondary qualities, which do not represent objects, 
are nevertheless the direct results of objective impressions. 



94 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

The matter stands quite differently however when we come 
to consider the validity of the ideas which we ourselves 
produce (in the three ways noted above) ! They cannot 
of course be copies or impressions ! We use them however 
as archetypes, or patterns, with which to make comparisons. 
In this case, therefore, we estimate objects from the 
viewpoint of their agreement or disagreement with the 
patterns of our own construction. But compound, 
relative and abstract ideas furnish no information what- 
ever as to the real nature of things. It is in this sense 
that we use figures in mathematics, and moral ideals in 
ethics. The proofs of mathematics and moral philos- 
ophy are wholly independent of the existence of the 
things to which they refer. But such is not the case 
with the idea of substance, which is expressly intended 
to indicate an external object. The validity of ideaSi 
of this kind can only be established therefore on the 
basis of a complex of attributes given in experience, or 
if, as in the case of the idea of God, we are in position to 
offer a separate proof for its validity. 

In agreement with Descartes, Locke distinguishes 
between intuition and demonstration. Intuition merely 
furnishes us knowledge of self and of the simplest relations 
between our ideas. The combination of a series of 
intuitions results in demonstration. These two kinds 
of knowledge alone are fully certain; sense experience 
is always only probable. — Locke proves the existence of 
God by appealing to the principle of causality: The 
world must have a cause, and, since matter cannot 
produce spirit, the cause of the universe must be a spiritual 
being. He regards our knowledge of the causal principle 
itself as an intuition, i.e. as self-evident. At this point 
he agrees with the dogmatic systematizers. Hence he 



LOCKE 95 

likewise employs this principle complaisantly both in 
his proof of the validity of simple ideas and of the existence 
of God. But the causal idea on the other hand 'belongs 
to the class of relative ideas, which is therefore a sub- 
jective construction albeit on the basis of sense-percep- 
tion. Locke is rather ambiguous at this point (as also 
on the idea of substance). The profound problems 
involved in these ideas were not discovered until Lockers 
successors {Berkeley and Hume) came upon them. 

c. In the philosophy of law, Locke (in the Essay on 
Government, 1689) makes a sharp distinction between 
political and patriarchal authority. Political authority 
consists in the authority to prescribe laws, to enforce the 
laws which are prescribed, and to protect society against 
foreign enemies. Such authority can be established only 
by unconstrained agreement, which may however be 
tacitly concluded. It is the duty of the state to secure 
liberty, which, in a state of nature, is constantly in danger 
of being lost. If the government proves unfaithful to 
its trust, the people have the right to overthrow it. 

In his philosophy of religion {The Reasonableness of 
Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures, 1695) Locke 
conceives revealed religion as a more developed form of 
natural religion. Whether or not anything is revelation 
must be decided by reason. Revelation is necessary, 
however, on account of the fact that man has not used 
his reason properly and has consequently fallen into 
superstition. An elaborate system of doctrine is unneces- 
sary. The illiterate and the poor, whose lives are spent 
in bitter toil, readily understand the example and teachings 
of Christ. — The English Free-thinkers (the so-called 
Deists) developed Lockers philosophy of religion more 
fully in the direction of a more pronotmced rationalism. 



96 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

The most important representative of this tendency was 
John Toland (1670-17 20), who says, in his Christianity 
Not Mysterious (1696), that there is nothing in the Gospel 
which either transcends or conflicts with reason; but 
that priests and philosophers had transformed Christian- 
ity into a mystery. In his Pantheisticon (1720) he 
describes pantheism as the private theory of a society of 
enlightened gentlemen, who conceive God as the efficient 
energy of the universe. His most important book is 
the Letters to Serena (1704), in which he says, against the 
Cartesian and Spinozistic conception of nature, that 
motion is an attribute of matter which is equally primary 
with extension. Motion persists ever3rwhere in nature, 
and all rest is only apparent. 

2. Neither Locke nor the great systematizers of the 
seventeenth century had fully accepted the sublime 
ideal of knowledge proposed by Kepler and Galileo. They 
still regarded experience and reason as mutually exclusive. 
It was all the more significant therefore that Sir Isaac 
Newton (1642-17 2 7), in his Principia PhilosophicB 
Naturalis Mathematica (1684), should furnish the most 
famous product of exact empirical science by means of 
a combination of induction and deduction. This work 
had a decisive influence on the further development of 
philosophy. But this is not the only ground for making 
reference to Newton in the history of philosophy. He is 
likewise the author of certain characteristic philosophic 
ideas. 

Starting from the fact that weight is greater in the valley 
than on the mountain tops, and that all bodies which are 
tossed upward drop to the earth, Newton formulated 
the hypothesis that the heavenly bodies are also heavy 
and that they deviate from the direction implied by the 



NEWTON 97 

law of inertia according to a ratio which corresponds to 
the law of falling bodies at the earth's surface. He then 
deduces the mathematical consequences of this idea and 
finally shows that the results of this deduction agree with 
the facts as actually observed. From this he concludes 
that the motion of the heavenly bodies is governed by the 
same law as falling bodies. He calls the energy which 
manifests itself in this law attraction (attractio). He 
does not introduce any mystical energy. By attraction 
he means only an energy which acts according to the 
well-known law of falling bodies — which likewise con- 
stitutes the energy. — ^As a matter of fact he was later 
inclined, and his disciples even more so, to regard attraction 
as an original energy proceeding directly from God. 

The expositions of Newton's masterpiece likewise in- 
volve presuppositions and speculative ideas which are of 
philosophical importance. — He makes a distinction between 
* 'absolute, true, and mathematical space" and sensible 
spaces. Absolute motion occurs in the former alone, 
because it contains absolute places (loca primaria), 
places which are at once places for themselves (sine 
relatione ad externum quodvis) as well as for other things. 
Following Copernicus and Kepler, Newton defends the 
ancient theory of absolute space. He does not simply 
regard the mathematical method of interpretation as 
a way of looking at things, which may be regarded as 
mathematically fundamental, but rather as the true 
method of interpretation in contrast with the popular 
or common-sense method. And he even connects this 
with religious ideas : Space is the sensorium dei, the instru- 
ment of the divine omnipresence. 

Newton proves the existence of God from the purposeful 
and harmonious arrangement of the universe, which is 



gS ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

peoiliarly revealed in the simple and uniform arrangement 
of the solar system. He asserts most emphatically that 
the wonderfid structure (elegantissima compages) of the 
solar system — the orbital motions of the planets around 
the sun, which are concentric with the orbit of the sun 
and lie almost in the same plane — ^is inexpHcable on the 
basis of natural law. The orbital motion can only be ex- 
plained by reference to supernatural energies. Left to 
themselves, the planets would fall into the sim! — The 
remarkable structure, the organs and the instincts of 
animals fiirnish additional evidence of the supernatural! 
(Besides the Scholium generale contained in the Prin- 
cipia Newton expressed himself on these matters in 
his Optics^ Queries 28-29, and in his letters to Bentley.) 
— But Newton did not think that the mechanism of the 
imi verse was finished once for all. God must interpose 
as an active regulator from time to time. This problem 
was the occasion of a very interesting discussion between 
Leibnitz and Clarke, one of Newton's disciples. 

3. George Berkeley (1685-1753) occupies a place in 
empirical philosophy similar to that of Leibnitz in the 
group of systematizers. He represents a reaction against 
Locke and Newton similar to that of Leibnitz against 
Descartes, Eobbes and Spinoza, and, like Leibnitz, Berkeley 
not only represents a reaction, but an advance and further 
development. He aimed to refute the conclusions of the 
new science which were hostile to religion, and he hoped to 
accomplish this by a criticism of the abstract concepts 
and by a return to immediate experience and intuition. 
Childlike piety and acute critical analysis have rarely 
been so intimately united as in this clear mind. At the 
University of Dublin he occupied himself with the study 
of Locke, Boyle and Newton, and his chief works were 



BERKELEY 99 

composed while he was yet but a young man. He 
afterwards entered the Anglican church and participated 
in the controversy against the Free-thinkers. His 
missionary zeal inspired an interest in America, and 
he conceived a plan of foimding a college in America. 
The sublime ambition to which he devoted the best 
years of his life comprehended not only the conversion 
of the Indians, but likewise the regeneration of science 
and art in the western hemisphere. He was forced to 
give up his plan however after a three years' sojourn in 
America. He afterwards served as Bishop of Cloyne 
in Ireland, equally zealous as pastor, philanthropist and 
patriot. 

In his chief work. The Principles of Human Knowl- 
edge (17 10), Berkeley shows that, strictly speaking, 
we cannot form any general ideas. His criticism is 
directed particularly against Locke 's theory of "abstract " 
ideas. We can form an idea of part of an object without 
its remaining parts, but we are unable to form new 
separate ideas which are supposed to contain that which 
is common to several qualities, e. g. an idea of color in 
general, which should contain that which is common to 
red, green, yellow, &c. If I wish to have an idea which 
may be applied to a whole series of things which are 
qualitatively different, I must either use a sign, e. g. 
a word, or, what amounts to the same thing, regard a 
simple member of the series as representative or typical. 

The idea of matter conceived as a general idea is falla- 
cious. Matter is supposed to be the basis of sensible 
attributes. Suppose we grant that secondary attributes 
have only subjective significance: it must follow that 
matter can only be described by means of its primary 
attributes. But how can we have an idea whose content 



lOO ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

is nothing more than extension, mobility, divisibility and 
solidity? The objects which are really given in experience, 
and which we are able to perceive, always appear under 
secondary attributes, they can be seen, heard, touched, &c. 
The primary attributes are never given independent of the 
secondary attributes. And moreover an investigation 
of our conception of space, which Berkeley made in 
his Theory of Vision (1709), reveals the fact that we 
form our ideas of space in part by means of the sense of 
vision, and in part by means of the sense of touch 
(with which Berkeley also includes the so-called 
sense of motion). Our idea of space, particularly of 
distance and magnitude, is formed by a fixed combination 
of ideas of vision and touch, because the visual image 
invariably suggests a certain idea of touch. We discover 
that we can also touch the things which we see, on the 
single condition that we perform the necessary movements. 
Hence we suppose that we sense distance and size im- 
mediately. Space as such cannot be perceived any more 
than color as such. Which of the two spaces which we 
actually know — ^visual or touch space — shall we regard 
as "absolute" space? We are unable to form an 
idea of anything which is common to these two spaces. — 
And matter, being chiefly characterized by the attribute 
of extension, must therefore share the same fate as space. 
By this radical method Berkeley annihilates materialism. 
But he denies most emphatically that this abolishes the 
distinction between illusion and reality or destroys the 
possibility of natural science. Our knowledge of reality 
depends on distinguishing sensation from imagination, 
and the criteria for this distinction are very definite; 
sensations are generally more intense and more distinct 
than images. They take place in an invariable and 



BERKELEY lOI 

uniform order, whilst images are fitful and irregular; and 
we are conscious of not having produced the sensations 
ourselves. The problem of natural science therefore 
consists in discovering the exact uniform relation which 
obtains between our sensations, so that the presence of 
a sensation shall indicate to us what other sensation we 
may expect. The interpretation of nature therefore 
simply means the discovery of the laws which govern 
the relations of our sensations. With matter in general, 
that indefinite something which is supposed to under- 
lie all sensations, science has nothing whatever to do. 

Berkeley nevertheless thinks that sensations necessarily 
require a cause which is distinct from ourselves. In 
attempting to formulate an idea of this cause, he starts 
from an analogy with our own activity. Our own faculty 
of producing and changing ideas is the only activity of 
which we have knowledge. Berkeley calls this faculty 
the will and regards the will as the essence of the soul: 
the soul is the will {Commonplace Book). He also con- 
ceives the causes of our sensations after the analogy of 
this will: these are produced immediately by God. 
Thus Berkeley's philosophy passes over into theology. 
This immediate relationship with God satisfies his re- 
ligious feelings. He regards the idea that God should 
first have created matter and then ordained that it 
should influence our minds as unnecessarily circuitous. 
— The divine will is not only evident in the separate 
sensations, but likewise in their uniform sequence, and the 
teleology of phenomena reveals the divine prescience. 

Berkeley elaborates his philosophical ideas in popular 
form and in polemical controversy against the Free- 
thinkers in two beautiful and ingenious dialogues {Dialogues 
between Hylas and Philonous, 171 2, and Alciphron, 1732). 



I02 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

4. Anthony Ashley Shaftesbury (1671-1713) introduced 
a new tendency in the moral pidlosophy of the modern 
period. During the period of reaction against the 
Middle Ages the custom of basing ethics on individualism 
— the emphasis of the rights of the individual — ^was 
almost universal. Magnanimity and sublimity of thought 
were regarded as the highest attributes of character. 
Such was the case with TelesiuSj Bruno, Descartes, Hobbes 
and Spinoza. Shaftesbury, on the contrary, emphasized 
spontaneous emotion, the instinctive impulse to complete 
devotion. — He was a grandson of the famous statesman 
of the same name, the patron of Locke, and Locke had 
been his tutor. But he had also been introduced to the 
classical languages and liter attire at an early age, and he 
was profoundly affected by the ancient ideas of harmony, 
especially as developed in later stoicism. Both from 
taste and on account of feeble health he lived quietly, 
devoting himself to his Hterary pursuits, or to travel. 

According to Shaftesbury there is no absolute opposition 
between nature and culture or between self-assertion and 
devotion or loyalty. An involuntary impidse unites the 
individual with the whole race, just as naturally as the 
instincts lead to the propagation of the species and care 
for the young. — But thought, deliberate reflection, 
however is not superfluous on this account. It is through 
reflection that we become conscious of a spontaneous 
impulse and as a matter of fact this is the only way in 
which affections, such as the admiration of nobility of 
character and contempt for the ignoble, can possibly 
arise — affections which bear a close relation to the 
appreciation of beauty except that they bear more of 
an active character. But such an affection (reflex affection, 
moral sense) is nevertheless natural because it is evolved 



SHAFTESBURY I03 

from natural instincts. The conditions of hitman life 
are such that we are working for our own interests when- 
ever we are concerned for the common welfare, and the 
happiness which we procure for others returns upon 
ourselves. The problem that remains is the further 
development of this harmony between self-assertion and 
devotion. Whatever is conducive to social harmony 
likewise produces harmony in the soul of the individual 
and this subjective beauty has an inherent value which 
renders egoistic awards and theological sanctions super- 
fluous. A splendid harmony likewise pervades the uni- 
verse in general, but due to our limited vision we some- 
times fail to discern it. Shaftesbury collected his most 
important writings under the title Characteristics of Men, 
Manners, Opinions and Times (1711). Rand has recently 
(1900) published one of Shaftesbury's essays. Philosoph- 
ical Regimen, which was hitherto unknown. The back- 
ground of his ethical ideas, formed by his faith in the 
harmony of the universe, receives even greater em- 
phasis in this than in his other writings. 

The ideas advanced by Shaftesbury received a more 
systematic treatment at the hands of Francis Hutcheson 
( 1 694-1 747). Hutcheson was professor of moral philos- 
ophy at the University of Glasgow and his ideas were 
thus introduced into the Scottish Universities. He 
too places the chief emphasis upon immediate feeling. 
Reason is a faculty whose function it is to discover the 
means for the realization of our purposes. Indispensable 
though it is to the moral feelings, if these are not to act 
blindly, it is nevertheless not the final court of appeal in 
matters pertaining to morality. Experience is likewise 
a necessary condition for the successful operation of 
moral feeling; this can only take place on the basis 



I04 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

of clear observations. Nevertheless moral feeling does 
not therefore proceed entirely from experience. But 
under the guidance of reason and experience it ascribes 
the highest value to such actions as produce the highest 
degree of happiness to the greatest number of men. (The 
importance of the personages may however supplant 
the number.) Thus Hutcheson was the first to propoimd 
(in his Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 1725) 
the famous principle of "the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number." Like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson was 
strongly influenced by the ethics of the Greeks, especially 
as it appears in the later Stoics. This whole trend in 
modem ethics is, on the whole, an interesting form of the 
renaissance movement. W. R. Scott 's recent monograph 
on Hutcheson contains a suggestive treatment of the 
whole movement. 

According to Hutcheson, moral feeling is divinely im- 
planted. But its operation is not limited to those who 
believe in God. Ethics therefore is wholly independent 
of theology. — The sense of duty arises when moral feeling 
is momentarily in abeyance but we are at the same time 
conscious that a proposed act would bring us into con- 
flict with human love and thus rob us of inner peace 
(serenity) of mind. — Hutcheson '5 System of Moral Philos- 
ophy contains a comprehensive elaboration of his ethical 
theories. 

Bishop Joseph Butler (169 2-1 7 5 2), in deliberate oppo- 
sition to the optimism and theory of harmony advocated 
by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, emphasizes the distinction 
between moral feeling, which he prefers to call conscience, 
and the other human elements and impulses. Conscience, 
as a matter of course, acts directly and is combined with 
a sense of inner satisfaction, as in the case of obedience 



BUTLER 105 

to a profound impulse. We require a religious sanction 
(Sermons, 1726), however, in order to resist doubt and the 
questions which arise in otu" calmer moods. Whilst 
Shaftesbury bases his optimism on Being or Nature as a 
whole and assails Christianity on account of its incon- 
ceivability and its inhumanity, Butler maintains that 
the view of natvue in which so many rudimentary am- 
bitions must perish and the innocent so frequently suffer 
instead of the guilty violates the belief in a universal 
harmony, and that the criticisms charged against Chris- 
tianity must likewise apply to the natural religion which 
Shaftesbury professes. {Analogy of Religion, natural and 
revealed, to the constitution and coiu"se of natiu-e, 1737.) 

The Frenchman, Bernard de Mandeville (c. 1 670-1 733), 
who was born in Holland and lived in London as a prac- 
ticing physician, likewise opposed Shaftesbury '5 optimism. 
In The Fable of the Bees (1705) and in the notes which he 
afterwards appended to this story he says that private 
virtues are of no benefit whatever, either from the view- 
point of culttire or the general welfare of society. On 
the contrary, the desire for pleasure, impatience and 
egoism are motives which inspire effort, cultiure and 
social organization. It is the duty of statesmen to 
strengthen society by a skillful manipulation of the 
egoistic interests of men. We are naturally disposed, 
on the other hand, to set ourselves against the public 
interests when these would suppress egoism and the 
desire for pleasure. We must therefore choose between 
morality and culture. — Owing to the fact that this theory 
apparently supported the doctrine of human depravity 
and the consequent need of divine revelation, Mandeville 
fared better at the hands of ecclesiastical polemics than 
the outspoken pagan, Shaftesbury. 



Io6 ENGLISH EiEPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

5. David Hu7ne (1711-1776) brought the critical anal- 
ysis of the process of human knowledge to a pro\-isional 
conclusion, especially through his investigation of the 
two concepts which had played such an important part 
in the seventeenth-centiir}- s^'stems of thought, the 
concepts of substance and causality. In order to under- 
stand the significance of his criticism we must remember 
that the concepts just named are the presuppositions 
which are tacitly understood as forming the basis of 
natural science, of rehgious thought, and of ordinary 
conversation. Hume^s problem strikes at the root of 
all human thought. He stated a problem which still 
continues to bid for solution and of which a final solution 
is perhaps impossible. Hume is a past master in stating 
problems. With this he likewise combines a profound 
psychological talent which enables him, when considering 
the actual evolution of ideas, to throw light on those 
points also in which their objective vaHdity remains 
problematical. This twofold gift is valuable to Hume 
both in the investigation of the problem of knowledge, 
as well as in the investigation of the problems of ethics 
and rehgion. 

Hume was the son of a landlord in southern Scotland. 
His zeal and aptness for learning and reflection showed 
themselves at an early age. After several vain attempts 
to enter some practical vocation he withdrew into retire- 
ment and wrote his chief work, the Treatise 07i Human 
Nature, during a residence in France (i 739-1 740). A 
little later he devoted himself to historical and economic 
investigations and wrote a histor}^ of England, one of 
the first historical works which takes accoimt of every 
phase of cultural evolution. His Essays (1748 ff.), 
besides important treatises on economic subjects, include 



HUME 107 

two monographs {Enquiry Concerning Human Under- 
standing and Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals) 
in which the most important problems of his masterpiece 
are presented in briefer form. He treats the problems of 
religion from the historico-psychological viewpoint in 
his Natural History of Religion (1757). The Dialogues 
on Natural Religion^ written in 1751, but not published 
until after his death, are a critical study of the problem 
of religion. — After having held several public offices, Hume 
spent his last years at Edinboro in scholarly retirement. 
Whilst Locke made a sharp distinction between the 
problem concerning the origin of our ideas and that of 
their validity, for Hume the two problems, so far as they 
pertain to ideas in the more restricted sense (ideas as 
distinguished from perceptions or impressions, i. e. sen- 
sations), are identical. He starts with the assumption 
that an idea can be valid only when it is based on a sensa- 
tion (perception, impression) . He makes no investigation 
into the origin of sensations because this problem has no 
epistemological significance: the question whether they 
proceed from external objects or from God or from the 
innate powers of the mind has no bearing on the problem 
of their validity. Hume likewise excludes that division 
of knowledge which is wholly confined to the matter of 
defining and developing the relations of our ideas — pure 
logic and mathematics — from his critical investigations 
entirely. The sole problem of his investigations pertains 
to the validity of the ideas by means of which we presimie 
to be justified in assuming knowledge beyond what is 
given in sense-perceptions. The problem growing out 
of the application of mathematics to empirical science 
was not formulated until later. This was done by Kant 
on the basis of his studies of Newton. 



I08 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

The concept of substance (both in its broader and 
narrow significance) transcends all sense-perception. 
We never sense anything beyond single attributes in 
var\-ing degrees of relationship to each other ; but things 
or substances are never sensed. We sense color, hardness, 
tone, &c., but sensation never gives us anything possessing 
these attributes. We perceive within ourselves a multi- 
tude of ever-varj-ing sensations, ideas and feelings, but 
we never sense a soul or an Ego. That is to say we 
never discover a constant element which is alwa^^s 
present and to which we are justi&ed in ascribing the 
name Ego. — The concept of causaHty presents a similar 
case. We perceive distinct phenomena succeeding each 
other in time; but we do not sense any internal nexus, 
any necessary connection. CausaHt}" is not an object 
of experience or of perception. {Hume regards the con- 
cepts of experience and perception as identical.) It is 
impossible in this instance to appeal to immediate certainty 
(intuition), for such procedure is permissible onl^^ in 
cases where the' simple relation of equaht}^ and ineqiiality 
can be shown to apply. It is just as impossible, finther- 
more, to demonstrate causality by the method of in- 
ference, for all phenomena and occurrences become 
matters of experience in the form of independent facts, 
and it is never possible to infer from the concept of the 
given fact that the concept of another fact necessarily 
follows. The motion of a ball, e. g., is something alto- 
gether different from the motion of another baU; the 
one motion can very readily be conceived without the 
other. — The same method of argimient appHes to the 
concept of being as to the concepts of substance and 
causaHty; no single sensation ever gives us the concept. 
To take thought about something and to think of it as 



HUME 109 

existing are not two distinct processes. Things acqtiire 
no new attribute by our thinking of them as existent. 

b. We nevertheless employ all these concepts — sub- 
stance or thing, cause, being I Hume imdertakes to 
explain how this happens, by means of three distinct 
psychological factors. — Consciousness naturally tends to 
continue the processes which have been produced by an 
intense impression even after the impression ceases. 
The faculty of imagination continues to be active even 
though experience is unable to follow. This gives rise 
to ideal representations, e. g. representations of perfect 
similarity and perfectly accurate figures, whilst experience 
only furnishes suggestions and degrees of approach 
towards the perfect. This is likewise the way in which 
the representations of absolute substances and absolute 
being are formed. The faculty of imagination expands 
the relative constancy, which we perceive, into absolute 
constancy. 

Another peculiarity of consciousness is the tendency 
to combine representations which have frequently been 
experienced together. When anything happens we are 
accustomed to find that something else either precedes 
or follows it; hence, when ami:hing occurs, we expect 
to find a ^^cause'^ and an "effect.'' But this is nothing 
more than a habit which has become instinctive. It is 
impossible to estabhsh the vaHdity of the causal concept 
on this basis. This principle of association, which gives 
rise to this habit, is likewise an example of causality and 
just for this ver\^ reason Hume says, it, too, is inexpHcable. 
Obser\'ation never discovers more than the separate ele- 
ments of the content of consciousness, never any '' 'imiting 
principle, principle of connection." The problem of 
explaining the permanent connection of these elements, 



no ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

which are absolutely distinct, Hume says, is a difficiilty 
Tvhich transcends the powers of my understanding. 

Consciousness, in the third place, tends to regard its 
own states as external, objective phenomena. This is 
the reason for our regarding sensory quahties as objective 
attributes. And this is why we regard the mental im- 
pulse to pass from a sensation to an idea associated with 
it as due to an objective necessity. We are here 
guided by instinct, not by reason. — The foundation of 
science is beHef, not knowledge. And the construction 
of this foundation takes place, as we have seen, by 
virtue of the expansive, the associative and the objecti- 
fying tendencies of consciousness. 

c. Hume did not confine himself to the psychology of 
knowledge. He has likewise treated the psychology of 
the passions with the same degree of thoroughness. His 
exposition in many respects reminds us of Spinoza, He 
attaches great importance to the manner in which a 
passion may be combined with another passion by means 
of the association of the ideas of their respective objects. 
He asserts, furthermore, that a passion can only be 
inhibited by another passion, not by pure reason. Reason 
is the faculty of comparison and reflection and it can only 
affect the coiirse of the passions indirectly. 

Hume's psychology of the passions forms the basis of 
his ethics. In ethics he sympathizes with the school of 
Shaftesbury and Hutches on. — Reason cannot furnish the 
basis of ethics because it establishes only relations or 
facts. But good and evil are qualities which are ascribed 
to human actions and characters according to their 
effect upon the feeHngs. The fact that we call actions 
and characters good which are of no benefit to us proves 
that the passion which forms the basis of approbation 



HUME III 

cannot be regarded as selfish. In cases of approbation 
or reproach our viewpoint is social rather than private. 
If, e. g., we regard justice as a good attribute, it must be 
due to the fact that we take a sympathetic attitude to- 
wards human life as a whole. It may perhaps be that we 
at first admire justice solely on account of interest in our 
own security ; but this does not furnish the motive for 
the appreciation of justice in all those cases which bear 
no relation to our private welfare. S3niipathy or fellow- 
feeling is therefore the fundamental motive of ethical 
evaluation. 

Hume likewise opposes the intellectualistic conception 
in the philosophy of religion, just as he does in ethics. 
He instituted a twofold investigation into the problem 
of knowledge and he likewise follows the same plan in the 
matter of religion ; i. e. he investigates both the psycho- 
logical origin of religion and the validity of religious 
ideas. 

Religion does not originate from purely intellectual 
motives, but from fear and hope, and from the disposition 
to think of all other beings after human analogy. Primi- 
tive man represents the beings to which he takes refuge 
in the fearful moments of his life in very imperfect form. 
But the native disposition to expand and idealize is also 
in evidence here, and man gradually recognizes that his 
God must be an infinite being and that there can be but 
one God. Parallel with this idealizing tendency, which 
has the effect of elevating Deity far above anything 
human and placing Him at a great distance from the 
finite world, there is another counter tendency which 
endeavors to represent Deity as near at hand, present 
and intuitively perceivable, and religion reveals a 
constant tendency to oscillate between these two extremes. 



112 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

Hume investigates the validity of religious ideas in 
his Dialogues, which is a very important document in 
the philosophy of religion of the modern period. He 
adduces several different viewpoints: that of a specu- 
lative Supernaturalist, a rationahstic Deist and a skep- 
tical Naturalist. Although the naturaHst finally courte- 
ously withdraws, it is neverthless clear that Hume regarded 
his arguments as the most important and most conclusive. 
He denies the right to infer the existence of God from the 
order and teleology of the universe: Why could the 
teleology (so far as it really exists !) not have arisen from 
natural causes and gradual adaptation? We explain the 
partictilar phenomena of nature by referring them to 
natural causes, and the whole series is explained in the 
explanation of its several parts. At any rate it is im- 
possible to infer, from a world which reveals so many 
imperfections together with its teleology, the existence 
of an absolutely perfect being. Fiirthermore, if we 
should wish to attribute the origin of the universe to a 
divine idea, we must not forget that this idea is nowhere 
given in experience except as a phenomenon combined 
with other phenomena: with what right therefore can 
we deduce all the other parts from this single part? — 
If the natiu-alist still gets no farther than to discover 
difficulties in each of the various viewpoints, it is certainly 
not enough that we regard it merely as a matter of caution, 
but rather as the expression of Rumens constant effort 
to state the problems clearly and to keep them open. 

6. Burners clear statement of the problem of knowl- 
edge did not call forth any profound reply immediately. 
England has not even furnished such a reply. — On the 
contrary the English Hterature of the latter half of the 
i8th century consists of a series of philosophic efforts 



SMITH 113 

which in part continue and supplement and in part 
oppose Hume. 

Adam Smith (17 23-1 790), a professor at Glasgow and 
a friend of Hume, elaborated his ethical theory more fully. 
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) he describes the 
moral sense in its evolution from the mere instinct of ^ym- 
pathy. A spontaneous impulse of imitation causes us to 
put ourselves in the place of others, and our feelings and 
judgments are therefore primarily determined by environ- 
ment. But, on the other hand, if the feelings and judg- 
ments of others are not of the same kind and intensity 
as those which arise in our own minds in their stead, or 
would naturally arise, we then experience a feeling of 
disapprobation. Again, we approve their feelings and 
their judgments (as well as their conduct) whenever, 
according to our own experience, they seem to stand in 
a fitting relation to the causes which give rise to them, — 
and whenever our sympathy for them, for the objects 
of their judgments and conduct, is not abnormal. To 
illustrate, we cease to approve of acts of revenge whenever 
the revenge seems to be too cruel for the circumstances 
and the subject. A standard is thus gradually evolved 
which is wholly free from any reference to utility. And 
we likewise apply this standard to ourselves. We dis- 
cover that we are criticized by others and not only criti- 
cizing others ourselves. We divide ourselves, so to speak, 
into two persons, of whom the one criticizes the other in 
the capacity of an impartial witness. We unconsciously 
idealize this witness ; that is we ascribe to him a far more 
comprehensive knowledge than it is possible for man to 
attain. 

It has frequently been observed that Smithes ethics 
radically contradicts his famous work in economics, 



114 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

The Wealth of Nations (1776). But, on the other hand, 
the fact that both works were originally parts of one and 
the same course of lectures does not harmonize with this 
view. Moreover the fact has been overlooked, that in 
his political economy Smith assumes the attitude of an 
^^ impartial witness'' of industrial life: his demand for 
unconditional Hberty in commerce and industry rests 
upon the principle that this is the only way in which 
capacity can be properly developed and the best methods 
and instruments of production and of trading be dis- 
covered. It frequently happens that the individual 
serves the community best when he is most concerned 
about his own interests; he, at the same time, serves a 
purpose which he has not proposed as if guided by an 
unseen hand. Sympathy with human life in every phase 
forms the basis of Smith's political economy; it covers 
the effort of laborers to secure better wages, as well as 
the effort of employers to increase production. His 
ethics is therefore in internal harmony with his economics. 
It is admitted, as a matter of course, that he did not 
fully appreciate the social problem in its entire scope. 
His contention was directed against the trusteeship of the 
reactionary governments, and his optimism led him to 
expect a large measure of social harmony, even a 
harmony between ethics and economics, if we should only 
permit evolution to have free course. 

The association of ideas had a profound influence on 
Hume's theory of knowledge. The physician, David 
Hartley (i 705-1 757), supplemented his theory on this 
point. He endeavored to explain all the higher mental 
phenomena by means of the association of simple sen- 
sations and ideas. According to Hartley ^ the laws of 
association are the highest spiritual laws of nature 



HARTLEY II5 

(Observation on Man, 1749). The physiological correlate 
of association is the combination of various oscillations 
of particles of the brain. The significance of association 
manifests itself in three specific forms: it is possible for 
ideas to so unite internally as to form a new idea with 
new attributes; conscious activities may, by repetition, 
be performed entirely automatically; the vividness of an 
idea may be transferred to the idea which is associated 
with it. Consciousness can assume an entirely different 
character from its original by means of these three 
processes. The most radical metamorphoses become 
possible in this way, as e. g. when an egoist lapses into 
complete mystical self-forgetfulness through a series of 
degrees. — These theories were popularized through the 
writings of Joseph Priestley (i 733-1804), the noted chemist. 
And Erasmus Darwin (i 731-1802) afterwards went a 
step farther, and proposed the hypothesis of the trans- 
missibility of such acquired characters (Zoonomia, 1794). 

Hume was opposed by what has been called, in the 
narrower sense, the Scottish School. These thinkers aim 
to quit theorizing and return to the mere description of 
mental phenomena. As against the results of analyt- 
ical philosophy they appeal to common sense, Thomas 
Reid (171 0-179 6), Professor at Aberdeen and Glasgow, 
is the most famous representative of this school. His 
most important work, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the 
Principles of Common Sense (1764), was written against 
HumCj whom he regarded as the destroyer of all science, 
religion and virtue. 

According to Reid, there are certain instinctive pre- 
suppositions at the basis of all knowledge, which are 
unassailable by doubt. These principles of common 
sense are older than philosophy and proceed from the 



Il6 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 

hand of God. Thus, e. g. every sensation by natural 
suggestion gives rise to the beHef in an external object, 
as also in an ego as the subject of the sensation. In this 
way the causal instinct also leads us to the presupposition 
that the combinations of phenomena which we have per- 
ceived will likewise take place in the same way in the 
future. We likewise have such intuitive evidence in 
the sphere of morals ; we judge a given act good, another 
evil, intuitively and spontaneously. — Reid overlooked the 
fact that Hume had expressly recognized common sense; 
but Hume discovered a profound problem in case one 
should wish to investigate the foundation of common 
sense. Kayit afterwards remarked very pertinently, 
that instead of making use of common sense as authority, 
it should rather be used in refutation of objections. 



FOURTH BOOK 

THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN FRANCE 
AND GERMANY 

The great philosophical systems and Enghsh empiri- 
cism affected a comparatively small circle of thinkers. 
But about the middle of the eighteenth century an effort 
was made to popularize the ideas of these solitary thinkers. 
This movement, which is generally spoken of as the en- 
lightenment, assumed a more definite form in France and 
Germany than in England. In France, Locke's fimda- 
mental principle, that all ideas proceed from experience, 
furnished the basis for criticizing the existing order of 
things both in Church and State. The opinion generally 
prevailed that man had attained the climax of enlighten- 
ment and that he was now in possession of adequate pre- 
suppositions for the final solution of all the old problems 
or to dismiss them definitely as groundless. A new dog- 
matism arose, which was perhaps necessary in order to 
destroy the old form of dogmatism. In Germany the 
popularization of the Leibnitzian philosophy, with its re- 
duction of all mental distinctions to the distinction be- 
tween obscurity and clearness, was particularly influential, 
and the inference was drawn that enlightenment, and noth- 
ing but enlightenment, is the one thing needful. But 
there were minds both in France and in Germany whose 
thoughts were centered on the profounder presuppositions 
of mental life, of which neither the protagonists of the new 
nor the exponents of the old had the least suspicion. In 
this respect Rousseau in France and Lessing in Germany 
occupied middle ground between the opposing views — 
and at the same time above them. 

117 



Il8 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

A. The French Philosophy of the Enlightenment 
AND Rousseau 

I. In France the agitation produced by the enlighten- 
ment assumed a decidedly revolutionary character. This 
was due more particularly to the fact that the old order of 
things had here reached a greater degree of definiteness and 
had assumed an attitude of contempt for the new thought 
to a greater extent than in England and Germany, and that 
at the same time it was more shallow and corrupt than in 
the other countries. France was revolutionized by Eng- 
Hsh ideas. The visit of Voltaire and Montesquieu to Eng- 
land at the close of the third decade of the century^ became 
a matter of epochal importance. It was not until then 
that the EngHsh philosophical, religious, aesthetic and 
poHtical ideas became known in France and on the con- 
tinent generally. Voltaire's Lettres sur les Anglais (1734) 
marks the beginning of a new period in French thought. 
Voltaire (1694-1778) was not an original thinker. But 
he possessed the happy faculty of stating scientific ideas 
and theories with brevity and clearness, and at the same 
time aggressively. He pubHshed a most excellent exposi- 
tion of Newton's natural philosophy, and he used Locke 
with splendid eSect in his philosophical works. With 
Locke's principle, that all our ideas proceed from experi- 
ence, and Newton's discovery of the imiformity of nature 
as his basis, he criticized the theolog}^ of the Chturch. He 
does not confine himself in the controversy to logical argu- 
ment, but likewise employs sarcasm and ridicule and — 
especially when attacking spiritual and physical oppression 
and intolerance — profound indignation. — The following are 
his most important philosophical works: Dictionnaire pJiilo- 
sophique portatif (1764) and Le philosophe ignorant (1766). 



MONTESQUIEU II9 

All ideas proceed from sensations and sensations in turn 
proceed from matter. What is matter? We do not know, 
— we are quite as ignorant on this point as on the question 
concerning the nature of the soul. The Creator endowed 
us with understanding to the end that we might thereby 
govern our actions, not for the purpose of penetrating into 
the nature of things. The eternity of matter represents 
the limit of our knowledge; and this rests upon the uni- 
versally accepted principle that nothing can proceed from 
nothing. The teleology of nature is proof of the existence 
of God. But the presence of sin and evil in the world 
(facts which Voltaire describes with rare acumen in his 
Poeme sur le desastre de Lisbonne) makes it impossible to 
believe in the omnipotence of God if we wish to retain 
our belief in His goodness. Voltaire espouses natural re- 
ligion, but opposes revealed religion by every available 
means (frequently of course indirectly and secretly). 
Voltaire now applies the principle of simplicity to the ex- 
planation of the supernatural in the same way as the think- 
ers of the Renaissance applied it to the natural world. He 
refers everything which transcends natural religion to 
stupidity and deception. Stupidity gives rise to the idea 
of the supernatural and deceivers afterwards take ad- 
vantage of this stupidity in order to gain control over men 
by means of their superstition. The best religion is 
the one that contains a large measure of ethical culture, 
but few dogmas. 

Montesquieu (1689-17 5 5) is of greater historical signifi- 
cance than Voltaire. In his Esprit de lois (1748) he ad- 
vocates the mutual dependence of institutions and of laws 
upon the natural and moral conditions of the nations. A 
constitution cannot therefore be transferred from one 
nation to another without modification. The historical 



I20 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

and comparative methods enabled Montesquieu to criticize 
the existing social conditions incisively and systematically. 
His over-rapid generalizations however are tinhistorical. 
He proposes an ideal form of the EngHsh constitution, 
without observing that the long period of the poHtical 
development of the English people by means of self- 
government in smaller groups was its historical presup- 
position. 

Condillac (17 15-1780) attempted a simplification of 
Lockers theory of knowledge in his Traite des sensations 
(1754), by means of referring the whole of our conscious 
experience to absolutely passive sensations. Attention is 
nothing more than an intense sensation, which precludes 
the possibility of another sensation arising; memory is 
simply a secondary effect of sensation, and comparison con- 
sists of nothing more than the concomitant appearance of 
two sensations. The comparison of pleasure and pain 
gives rise to desires and impulses. — Notwithstanding his 
endeavor to eliminate every form of activity from psychol- 
ogy, Condillac still adheres to the Cartesian theory of the 
soul and the body as two distinct entities. Sensation 
cannot be identified with motion, and our ability to make 
comparisons (i. e., to be conscious of two sensations at the 
same moment) definitely proves that the vehicle of sen- 
sations is a simple substance. Condillac, who was a Cath- 
olic ecclesiastic, was thus able to harmonize his psychology 
with his theology. But the spiritualistic element of Con- 
dillac' s theory was devoid of influence. His followers in- 
sisted on reducing all psychical phenomena to passive 
sensations. 

La Mettrie (1702-17 51), a physician, had even before 
this time substituted a thorough-going materialism for the 
Cartesian duaHsm in his famous work, Vhomme machine 



VON HOLBACH 121 

(1748). The rise of temperature under the influence of 
enthusiasm and the mental agitation produced by fevers 
can only be explained on the theory that what we call the 
soul consists of pure matter. Sensation is an attribute of 
matter, just like extension and motion. The real nature 
of matter however transcends the power of our tmder- 
standing. — Besides these materiaHstic theories, La Mel- 
trie's works (Systeme d^ Epicure; Uhomme planta) contain 
interesting anticipations and suggestions of a theory of 
evolution. The various forms of life evolve from eternal 
organic germs under the influence of environment. Desire 
and need are the forms of energy which make for progress, 
and beings without needs lack the attribute of mind. 
Man is the highest being, because he is conscious of the 
greatest amount of needs. 

Von Eolhach (172 3- 178 9), a German baron living in 
Paris, published a purely dogmatic and systematic elab- 
oration of materialism. In his Systeme de la nature (1770) 
he contends that materialism is the only consistent ex- 
planation of the facts of natural science. If motion is a 
primary property of matter (as Toland had affirmed) , and 
if material phenomena are only explainable by reference 
to material causes, it foUows that it is unnecessary to as- 
sume either one or many minds distinct from matter. An 
appeal to mind is only a sign of ignorance. Thought or 
consciousness is simply the agitation of the particles of 
matter, a motion which is similar to fermentation, which 
is the common basis of all nourishment and growth, mo- 
tions which are indeed imperceptible, but which are in- 
ferred from what is evident to the senses. There is but 
one science, physics, i. e. the theory of motion. The as- 
sumption of two kinds of nature, spiritual and material, 
is not only imnecessary, btit positively harmful. It is 



122 PHILOSOPHY OP THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

conducive of superstition and thereby leads back again 
to the authority of priestcraft. Even the so-called natu- 
ral religion is dangerous; for reHgion, no matter what the 
form, must necessarily have a form of worship, and the in- 
stitution of forms of worship involves submission to the 
authority of priests. The formation of the concepts of 
deity is the product of a profound politics on the part of 
the theologians, those fabricateurs de la divinite! 

Eelvetius^ (1715-1771) theory of the original equality 
of all men, as respects nature and talent, is in a certain 
sense closely related to Condillac^s doctrine of the passivity 
of all psychic Hfe. All distinctions are due to external 
causes, to education in its widest sense, i. e. to all the in- 
fluences which affect us. Education is responsible for the 
tendency which claims our interest and attention. No 
two men ever receive precisely the same kind of education. 
The only motive is self-interest, and whether it shall be 
actuated by great or small ideas depends entirely upon 
education {De V esprit, 1758). Helvetius' posthimious 
work De Vhomme (1773) is a polemic, based on the fore- 
going presuppositions, against the distinction between 
private and public interests, a distinction which is favored 
by despotic forms of government, and to which he attrib- 
utes the misfortune of his native land. This last ob- 
servation is of fundamental importance for the under- 
standing of Helvetius. He was a tender-hearted, patriotic 
spirit, who devoted his vast fortune, acquired as Farmer- 
general, to the service of literature and philanthropy. 

The profoundest thinker of this whole group was Denis 
Diderot (17 13-1784), renowned as the energetic editor of 
the great Encyclopedia on account of which the French 
philosophers of the Enlightenment were called Encyclo- 
pedists. Diderot could only express his own ideas in- 



ROUSSEAU 123 

directly in the Encyclopedia. In the Interpretation de 
la nature (1754) we find ideas concerning the continuous 
evolution of Hfe on the earth which are very similar to 
those of La Mettrie. He was profoundly influenced by 
Leibnitz, especially in the matter of his emphasis of the 
concepts of continuity and force. The two dialogues, writ- 
ten in 1769, but not published imtil 1830, Entretien entre 
d'Alembert et Diderot and Reve d'Alembert, contain his most 
ingenious ideas. In direct contradiction of La Mettrie and 
Holbach, Diderot denies that the psychical processes can 
be adequately explained as a mere effect of the interaction 
of material elements. A transposition of atoms can never 
produce consciousness. The only possible explanation of 
the origin of psychic life is on the presupposition of the 
presence of germs or dispositions in the lower orders which 
can be developed to conscious life in the higher orders by 
means of a process of progressive integration. Diderot 
attributes sensibility to everything in nature, but he 
makes a distinction between potential and actual sensibil- 
ity {sensibilite inerte, sensibilite active). He Hkewise em- 
phasizes the difficulty of conceiving how a unitary con- 
sciousness could be constructed from a great variety of 
psychical elements. He does not solve the problem. 
But he seems inclined to adhere so tenaciously to the idea 
of continuity, as to leave no room for any actually distinct 
elements. 

2. Jean Jacques Rousseau (171 2-1778) was intimately 
associated with the Encyclopedists for a while. His rup- 
ture with them — to which, besides their fundamental dif- 
ferences, personal motives certainly contributed not a 
little — was an event in the history of civilization, a sign 
that a new problem was forcing its way to the surface. 
Just as Hunters problem pertained to the possibility of 



124 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

science, so Rousseau's problem raised the question con- 
cerning the value of civilization. 

Rousseau was born in Geneva. His restless spirit, chaf- 
ing under the restraints of social custom, impelled him to 
a life of romantic travel and adventure, turning up in Paris 
in the year 1741, where he became a friend of Diderot and 
Holbach. The thought of the contradiction between na- 
ture and culture (Kultur), containing the principles of 
far-reaching consequences, caused him to leave Paris in 
order that he might live in the country, and the rupture 
with his Encyclopedist friends soon followed. His writ- 
ings made him a fugitive and vagabond. He was not even 
able to find a permanent residence in Switzerland. Dur- 
ing his latter years his suspicions and illusion of persecution 
developed a decidedly morbid character. He spent his 
last years in seclusion in France. 

a. His first essays (Discours sur les sciences et les nrtSj 
1750, and Discours sur Vorigine et les fondements de Vin- 
egalite parmi les hommes, 1755) draw a sharp contrast 
between nature and culture. Several different classes of 
ideas are vaguely combined in Rousseau's earlier theories 
of nature, but his ideas are gradually clarified by constant 
reflection, so that his theory of nature as it appears in his 
masterpiece, Emile (1762), is very clear. In the third 
dialogue of the remarkable essay entitled Rousseau juge 
de Jean Jacques he calls attention to the fact that his 
works form a connected series, which leads back step by 
step to certain fundamental principles. Whoever would 
wish to read him synthetically, he says, must therefore 
begin with Emile. His object in the first essays was to 
criticize the existing state of culture and to remove the 
obstacles which impede natural development. The direct 
and positive elaboration of his principles must necessarily 



ROUSSEAU 125 

come later. The paradoxes to which his introductory 
theories had led would likewise then be removed by the 
positive presentation. 

Three distinct classes of ideas (as may be seen from the 
preface to the Discours de rinegalite) influenced Rousseau 
from the first in the formation of his theory of nature: a 
theological, a zoological and a psychological. Nature is 
a divine product, but civilization is a human product. 
The state of nature is therefore a state of perfection, of 
"heavenly and majestic simplicity." We are here re- 
minded of the Garden of Eden. But other passages de- 
scribe the state of nature as a life of pure instinct, in which 
no needs beyond the purely physical exist, and in which 
reflection and imagination are wholly undeveloped. 
Rousseau passes from the department of theology to that 
of zoology without being aware of it. The real source of 
his theory of nature however is psychological. As a mat- 
ter of fact Rousseau is not concerned about any far distant 
past, but with a matter which he was able to discover 
within his own soiil. ' * Nature ' ' consists of the immediate, 
total energy of life, spontaneous development, rather than 
the restraint and complexity which civilization so readily 
brings with it. Man has a natural tendency to assert him^ 
self, to develop aptitudes and impiilses. And this spon- 
taneous tendency is so powerful, the hidden source of life 
is so rich, that self-assertion in itself in nowise contradicts 
sympathy, or resignation and self-denial. The individual 
originally made no distinction between himself and others. 
The stream which issues from within extends to all beings 
which are similarly constituted to the individual himself : 
La force d^une ame expansive mHdentifie avec mon semhlaUe. 
Kindness and love are therefore natural. Even religious 
emotion — ^in the form of gratitude, admiration and rever- 



126 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

ence — ^is a nattiral consequence of this spontaneous ex- 
pansion. 

However when the distinction between individuals 
makes itself felt, due to the rise of comparative reflection, 
self-assertion {amour de soi)^ ii itself free and noble, be- 
comes egoism {amour propre). Dependence, discontent, 
vanity, envy and lust for power manifest themselves. 
And to this must be added the division of labor which so- 
cial life evolves. Faculties and accomplishments are 
specialized and the perfect, harmonious and all-round 
development of personality is suppressed. Mental life 
is broken to pieces and rendered artificial. With Rous- 
seau the demand to retiurn to nature is therefore identical 
with the demand that man shall once more become a unit; 
Rendez Vhomme un! — This sense of completeness and unity, 
experienced in the freedom of nature with which he became 
so well acquainted during the vagabond journeys of his 
youth, grew upon Rousseau with an extraordinary power 
and freshness. He is the first to have given enthusiastic 
expression to the genuine joy to be found in the solitude of 
nature and in the appreciation of the beauties of nattire. 

The more profoundly he reflected upon his ideas the 
clearer it became to Rousseau (as had also been the case 
with Shaftesbury before him) that the contradiction be- 
tween nature and culture could be only a matter of degree. 
When he declaims against science and art, he really means 
only the science and art of his own age which was so utterly 
devoid of originality, whilst he praised the great investi- 
gators of the Renaissance and the seventeenth century. 
Even genius is likewise a form of spontaneous develop- 
ment, rather than the product of imitation or discipline. 
Culture is a good thing and nattu-al in itself, so long as it 
harmonizes with the stage of human development; indeed 



ROUSSEAU 127 

it then even becomes a means to the proper development 
of natural powers. A given type of culture however can 
never be transferred from one people to another without 
modification. There is no culture which is adapted to all 
men, to all ages and in all places. Rousseau vigorously 
opposes the opinion that the Parisian enlightenment and 
culture of the middle of the eighteenth century should be 
regarded as typical of culture in general; and it was ex- 
ceedingly vexatious to him that Voltaire and the Encyclo- 
pedists were endeavoring to introduce this culture into his 
beloved Switzerland. (The author of this text-book has 
endeavored to elaborate this conception of Rousseau's 
theory of nature more fully in his book entitled Rousseau 
und seine Philosophie.) 

b. The psychology then in vogue still retained, in ad- 
herence to Aristotle, the twofold division of psychical ele- 
ments into intelligence and will, the theoretical and the 
practical faculties. The question of a different division 
of the mental functions was agitated to a certain extent 
by Spinoza and the English psychologists of the eighteenth 
century {Shaftesbury and his disciples). But the real 
credit for securing the recognition of feeling as manifesting 
a distinct phase of psychic life nevertheless belongs to 
Rousseau. As a matter of fact, feeling possesses the 
character of immediacy and expansion which Rousseau 
regards pecuHar to nature, whilst cognition consists of 
comparison, volition of preference or choice. It is feeling, 
furthermore, according to Rousseau, that constitutes the 
real value of human life. It is almost wholly independent 
of knowledge; in its climaxes, when it rises to ecstasies, it 
excludes clear ideas entirely. And it changes less rapidly 
than knowledge. (See, besides Emile: Reveries d'un 
promeneur solitaire.) 



128 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

c. Rousseau makes a strong defense for Nature in his 
pedagogy. He decidedly prefers to leave education to 
nature, because he has implicit confidence in the growth 
and the natural improvement of the various organs and 
faculties. The fact however that children are constantly 
exposed to external social influence imposes the necessity 
of protecting them against harmful impressions, so as to 
give free course to nature. Education should be pre- 
dominantly negative, i. e. it should rather consist in the 
removal of obstacles than in the making of positive im- 
pressions. His splendid apology for Emile, — Lettre a 
Beaumont, archeveque de Paris, — contains a full develop- 
ment of this idea of a negative pedagog\^ Its supreme 
necessity rests upon the fact that we are utterly ignorant 
of the nature of the child at the beginning of its career. 
We cannot begin positive discipline until after we have 
become acquainted with the disposition of the child by 
means of observation. The period of infancy is quite as 
distinct and important a part of life as the later periods 
and it should be regarded as more than a mere preparation 
for the latter. The child should therefore be as free from 
restraint as possible, giving itself to the joy of life without 
reser\^e. It were decidedly the best if the child could ac- 
quire all of its knowledge independently, discover all the 
estabhshed truths for itself. 

The negative period of discipline is an exceedingly diiE- 
ctdt task. It requires the pedagogue to be observant, 
alert, inspiring and yet reserved and self-denying, all at 
the same time: tout faire, en ne faisant rient — This idea 
represents one of the most important modifications in the 
history of pedagogy. 

d. In his attitude towards religion Rousseau presents 
a very peculiar contrast to Voltaire^ even though both 



ROUSSEAU 129 

practically agree in their religious ideas, — the dogmas of 
** Natural Religion." In agreement with Voltaire, Rous- 
seau believes in a personal God, who is good, but not om- 
nipotent; and he likewise explains the fact of evil and sin 
by reference to the resistance of matter. Like Voltaire, 
he also repudiates the materialism of La Mettrie and 
Holhach. But he nevertheless experienced a profound 
antipathy towards Voltaire^ s position. For him, the roots 
of religion are to be found entirely within the realm of the 
emotions. As we have observed, it springs from the 
yearning for self-assertion and self -development. This 
yearning is capable of such intensity as to transcend the 
possibility of satisfaction by any finite object. It is espe- 
cially true in the solitude of nature that, according to 
Rousseau, this yearning rises to an affection, to an ecstasy 
of love, of admiration, of superabundant life. No idea 
is commensurate with religion; it transcends every con- 
ceivable object, every effort of expression. J'etouffle dans 
I'univers, says Rousseau (in a letter to Malesherbes) . The 
fact that religion proceeds from the "deeper emotions": 
j'ai laisse la la raison, et j'ai consulte la nature, c'est-a-dire 
le sentiment interieur qui dirige ma croyance (Letter to 
V ernes) . 

However, even though religion has its origin in a source 
which is independent of reason, according to Rousseau, 
it is still not in conflict with reason. He is convinced that 
the fundamental truths of natural religion can be estab- 
lished by rational proofs. He regards materialism absurd 
because neither motion, nor the uniformity of nature, nor 
the origin of psychic life is capable of explanation from 
mere matter. In his philosophy Rousseau is a Cartesian. 
But he does not believe in a creation out of nothing. 
Nothing can come into being through a sheer act of will. 



130 PHILOSOPHY or THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

And the only way of explaining the evil and the sin in the 
world is on the assumption of a constant resistance to the 
divine purposes; i. e. the eternity of matter. 

Rousseau objects to the positive rehgions on the ground 
that they set up authorities and books between man and 
God, and that they detract from the dignity of the divine 
relationship by their "climisy worship." He regards 
himself a Christian, even though he cannot accept the 
dogmas and miracles. 

Rousseau elaborates his reHgious ideas in fullest detail 
in the Emile, in the famous section entitled " Profession 
de f oi du Vicaire Savoyard. ' ' He would postpone rehgious 
instruction until the adolescent period, because children 
should not accept ideas which are incomprehensible to 
them. And the aim of religious instruction should be 
above all else to satisfy the needs of the heart. ''What 
does it matter to me whether the world is eternal or 
created?" In the Contrat Social he advocates natural 
reHgion as the state rehgion. Here, speaking from the 
viewpoint of the state, he takes strong ground against 
Christianity, because it regards man's highest duty and 
his highest aim to pertain to the next world and thus para- 
lyzes the energy which the state ni'.^t require of its citi- 
zens. 

e. Rousseau elaborated his political ideas in the Contrat 
Social (1762). He advocates popular sovereignty with an 
enthusiasm unknown since the days of AUhusius. The 
imiversal will (la volente generale, rather than la volente 
de tous) must be the final court of appeal. It represents 
the inner yearning, the governing tendency of the people 
which is concerned for the common interests, the welfare 
of the whole as well as the individual in the constantly 
changing generations. It finds expression in the senti- 



ROUSSEAU 131 

ment of patriotism and is analogous to the desire for self- 
assertion (amour de soi) in the individual. Subjection to 
it does not involve any limitation of liberty, because it 
combines the wills of all the individuals: each individual 
is membre du souverain. 

Rousseau distinguishes between the form of the state 
and the form of the government, just as Bodin and AUhu- 
sius had done. The former can be only one, since sov- 
ereignty always belongs to the people; but the forms of 
government vary with the stage of culture and the char- 
acter of the people. Rousseau had a decided preference 
for small states, for the simple reason that in them, custom 
and popular usage, the spontaneous expression of the pop- 
ular will, could shape the course of public policies without 
conscious interference and without formal legislation. 
These offer the most favorable conditions for the develop- 
ment of sympathy and humanity. They furnish a larger 
degree of liberty and it is unnecessary that governmental 
authority should be so rigid. Furthermore, the 
citizens can here maintain their control of the affairs 
of the government more easily than in a larger state. 
The only way a great nation can maintain its 
freedom is by forming a union of a number of smaller 
states. 

The unlimited division of labor is detrimental to society 
as a whole. This, as we have observed, is the real source 
of the problem of civilization, which, for Rousseau, is iden- 
tical with the social problem. He was the first to form a 
clear conception of the social problem. The division of 
labor results in a one-sided development of the individual, 
producing a state of unnatural dependence on others. 
Rousseau extols rural life because the division of labor is 
much farther advanced in the cities, and the country like- 



132 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

wise brings one closer to nature. He regards the country- 
folk as really constituting the nation and looks with grave 
apprehension on the strong drift from the country to the 
city. 

B. The German Philosophy of the Enlightenment 

AND LeSSING 

I. Christian Wolf (1679-1754) was the first to give a 
detailed exposition of modern philosophy in the German 
language. He popularized the philosophy of Leibnitz. 
The wide range of his systematic writings drove scholasti- 
cism out of the advanced schools of Germany. However, 
it was not metaphysical idealism and the doctrine of 
monads that was prominent in his system, but the theo- 
logically more acceptable theory of preestabHshed har- 
mony. But even this doctrine made him a martyr. 
King Frederick William I dismissed him from his professor- 
ship at Halle on account of his apparent fatalism, and even 
drove him into exile on the short notice of forty-eight 
hours. He went to Marburg, but was recalled to Halle 
during the first year of Frederick II. — His Vernunftige 
Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, der Seele der Menschen, auch 
alien Dingen Uberhaupt (1719) contains a general outline 
of his philosophy. His attempt to derive the principle of 
sufiicient reason from the principle of contradiction — 
because he thinks that origin from nothing involves a con- 
tradiction — brings the dogmatico-rationalistic philosophy 
to its cuhnination in him. Many of his disciples never- 
theless tried to accord due recognition to experience. This 
led to a combination of the Lockian and Wolffian phi- 
losophies in a more W less eclectic fashion. They were 
especially disposed to place great emphasis on empirical 
psychology (in which indeed Wolf himself was a famous 



MENDELSSOHN I33 

example). In relation to psychology metaphysics fell 
more and more into the background. 

The psychology of the enlightenment, in its more char- 
acteristic development, held that the clearness or obscurity 
of ideas is all that it is possible to assert. In Germany 
however, like Shaftesbury in England and Rousseau in 
France, Sulzer (in the Essays of the Berlin Academy , 
1 75 1-2) and Mendelssohn {Brief e tiber die Empfindungen, 
1755) held that the sentiments (above all the aesthetic 
sentiment) possess an independent significance and that 
they cannot be resolved into purely intellectual elements. 
Kant (in his writings during the sixties) and Tetens {Philo- 
sophische Versuche uber die menschlische Natur und ihre 
Entwickelung, 1777) likewise adopt this view. 

The eighteenth century was not only the century of 
enlightenment, but likewise the century of sentimentality. 
The natural sentiments demand satisfaction just as well 
as the natural understanding. And it frequently hap- 
pened that these two tendencies came into conflict with 
each other, just as in the '^ storm and stress period,^' the 
period of ferment, whence the most brilliant products of 
art and of science were ultimately destined to proceed. 
On the other hand, however, the ferment did not permeate 
public life there as it had done in France. Neither were 
the religious antitheses so sharply drawn in GeiTnany as 
in France. Protestantism had already departed from 
barren orthodoxy through the influence of pietism, and 
adherents to rationalism were even found within the 
church itself. Influential churchmen accepted the Wolff- 
ian philosophy, frequently (as e. g. at Konigsberg) in its 
characteristic combination with pietism. 

Moses Mendelssohn (172 2-1 786), a Jewish author noted 
for clearness and elegance of style, a disciple of Woljf and 



134 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

Locke, who defended the doctrine of immortalit}^ {Phddon, 
1767) and the existence of God {Morgenstunden, 1786) on 
rational grounds, exerted a profound influence on the 
worldly classes. Mendelssohn is con\dnced that the dog- 
matics of Judaism contain nothing which transcends natu- 
ral rehgion {Jerusalem, 1783). Man}^ Protestant theolo- 
gians likewise held similar views with reference to Chris- 
tianity. It was only in exceptional and isolated cases that 
the relation between natural and positive rehgion became 
more hostile. Thus, for example, /. Chr. Edelmann (1698- 
1767), who has given an interesting account of his doc- 
trinal evolution in his Autobiography (pubHshed 1849), 
passed from orthodoxy to pietism and finally to a Spino- 
zistic type of rationaHsm. He translated "Logos'' at the 
beginning of the Gospel of John "Reason," and, hke 
Spinoza, he regarded God only as the immanent, not as 
the transcendent cause of the world. The only way in 
which he could find true rehgiosity in the bibHcal writings 
was by historical criticism and S37mbohc interpretation. 
Professor Reimarus (i 694-1 768) of Hamburg, the author 
of the Wolfenbiittel Fragments pubHshed by Lessing, was 
unable to conceive this relation so simply and harmo- 
niously. He thinks that the human understanding and 
conscience are in irreconcilable conflict with the content 
of the Scriptures. Revelation is a physical and moral 
impossibility. The only possible explanation of the origin 
of the bibhcal traditions is on the hypothesis of a series of 
self-deceptions. 

The German philosophy of the enlightenment did not 
confine itself to psychology and the philosoph}^ of religion, 
but was likewise active in the department of epistemology. 
C A. Crusius (17 12-17 7 5) showed that the distinction 
between sense-perception and pure thought is not identical 



LESSING 135 

with the distinction between obscure and clear conception ; 
sense-perception can likewise be perfectly clear. He 
makes a sharp distinction between the ground of cognition 
and the ground of reality, and criticizes Wolffs attempt to 
establish the principle of causaHty by purely logical 
methods. He also exposes the error at the root of the 
ontological argiiment (Entwurf der notwendigen Vernunft- 
wahrheiten, 1745). In the problem of methods, /. H. 
Lambert (1728-1771) drew a sharp and clear distinction 
between the analytical and the constructive methods in 
philosophy {Neues Organum, 1764). /. N. Tetens (1736- 
1805) (in the work mentioned above) finally demonstrated 
that every act of the intellect, just as every act of atten- 
tion, at once assumes a relation of difference or similarity. 
— These three investigators are Kant's immediate prede- 
cessors. Tetens may even have had access to Kant's 
earlier writings. 

2. It is evident from the foregoing presentation that 
the so-called philosophy of the enlightenment contains 
many implications which transcend its essential doctrines. 
But Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) stands out 
especially as the thinker of the German enlightenment 
who projects himself beyond the conflicting antitheses of 
the age. Despite his wide divergence from Rousseau as 
respects character and talent, his position in the history 
of thought is nevertheless analogous. As a matter of fact, 
he was not a productive writer himself, but he had a keen 
and fine sense for originality in thought as well as for that 
internal consistency, which can never be exhausted in the 
definitely expressed forms of life. His attitude towards 
both the rationalists and the orthodox was therefore that 
of a critic. As a theological critic he appealed to primitive 
Christianity which is older than the much discussed Bible 



136 PHILOSOPHY or THE ENLIGHTENMENT 

{Uher den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft). He likewise 
places the everlasting search for truth upon a higher plane 
than the slothful possession of it (Duplik). The continu- 
ity of spiritual evolution does not consist in results and 
dogmas, but in the inner strivings to which the former 
owe their origin. — In aesthetics he is likewise guided by the 
sense for the original and characteristic. In his Hamburg- 
ischen Dramaturgie — contrary to the dominant classicism 
— he refers to Shakespeare as the unrivalled model of dra- 
matic poetry, and in his Laokoon he attempted to define 
the sphere of sculpture and poetry. 

Lessing^s own religious attitude is best described by the 
statement that it is impossible to base our knowledge of the 
eternal uniformity of reality upon particular historical 
events. The various positive religions must be under- 
stood as stages of human spiritual evolution, or, as Lessing 
expresses it figuratively, as disciplinary forces. Revela- 
tion bears a relation to the human race similar to that of 
education to the individual. The Old and New Testa- 
ments are ^^the primers of the human race." The time will 
come when such books will be unnecessary. For the 
present it is important that the pupil should regard his 
Primer as the highest science, — but the third kingdom, the 
new everlasting Gospel will come {Erziehung des Mensch- 
engeschlechts, — Gesprdche iiber die Freimaurer). 

From the purely philosophical point of view Lessing 
(according to Jacobi's account in his Brief e iiber die Lehre 
des Spinoza) is closely related to Spinoza; if he were to 
name himself after anyone, he knows of no one else 
more suitable. He wanted a purely natural theory 
of the universe and of life, free from any transcen- 
dental leaps. (Cf. Chr. Schrempf: Lessing als Philosoph., 
1906.) 



FIFTH BOOK 

IMMANUEL KANT AND THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

We have found investigations into the nature of knowl- 
edge as early as the philosophers of the Renaissance and 
in the great system builders. But they were nevertheless 
decidedly under the spell of the constructive tendency. 
As a result of the English empirical philosophy regarding 
the investigation of knowledge as the distinctive problem 
of philosophy, we have the extreme statement of the prob- 
lem by Hume. It was this statement of the problem that 
furnished the occasion which led Kant to undertake a 
comprehensive investigation of the conditions and pre- 
suppositions of our knowledge and of our mental functions 
in general. Such an investigation constitutes the task of 
what he has called the Critical Philosophy, The critical 
philosophy has nothing to do with a theory of the evolu- 
tion of knowledge, in the modern sense of the word. Its 
distinctive task is to discover the necessary principles 
which must be presupposed — ^howsoever human nature 
may be constituted — if a mental function, no matter 
whether it be cognition, aesthetic or ethical evaluation, or 
religious trust, is to attain any valid results. It investi- 
gates the conditions of the validity of knowledge, not those 
of its origin. The success of and the purely scientific 
element contained in this philosophy consists in its pene- 
trating beneath the finished products and results of the 
human mind to their efficient causes. Just as we can only 
understand a man's real nature by penetrating beneath his 
outward acts to his real character, so likewise the only way 

137 



138 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

to understand the phenomena of mental life is to pene- 
trate to its original sources. — By founding the critical phi- 
losophy, in this understanding of the term, Kant defined 
the problem and method of the science of mind. The 
entire product of the nineteenth century in the department 
of the mental sciences is based upon the view-points which 
he has marked out. 

According to Kant's theory, primitive human thought 
is dogmatic. Man begins with an implicit confidence in 
his intellect and he believes himself capable of solving all 
problems. He wishes to comprehend and coordinate 
everything. It is this desire that leads to the dogmatic 
systems, which proceed from the demand for unity so 
deeply imbedded in human nature. But eventually, when 
disillusionment supervenes, and the systems are found to 
contradict each other, there arises a tendency towards 
sceptical reflection. The third step however is the specific 
investigation of knowledge or the understanding, i. e. 
critical reflection. It is this endeavor, at once the sign 
of philosophic mattirity and self-liinitation, that Kant 
wishes to introduce. 

The life of the thinker who bequeathed this profound 
thought to the world was confined within narrow circles, 
but it is a life of simple majesty. Immanuel Kant was 
bom of poor artizan parents at Konigsberg on the 2 2d of 
April, 1724. His parents were moderate pietists, and the 
mother especially exerted a profound influence upon the 
son. At the University in Konigsberg he studied the 
Wolffian philosophy and the Newtonian physics. Through 
the former he became acquainted with the dogmatic 
method of philosophy, and in the latter he discovered a 
pattern of exact empirical science. After having spent 
several years in various families of the nobility in East 



KANT 139 

Prussia as private tutor, he habilitated as Privatdozent at 
the University, in which capacity he labored for a long 
period with pronounced success. Not until 1770 did he 
receive an ordinary professorship. He never left his 
native province of East Prussia. He devoted his whole 
life to the elaboration of his works and to his academic 
instruction. Notwithstanding this hov/ever he partici- 
pated actively in the social life of Konigsberg and had the 
reputation of being a most agreeable companion. He 
belongs to the period of the enlightenment, but he regarded 
^' enlightenment^ as a process, a problem, rather than as a 
finished product. And finally, when his critical principle 
led him into profound depths, unknown to the ordinary 
enlightenment, he possessed a sense for the sublime in 
harmony with the conception of the aesthetic, ethical and 
religious which furnished the guiding principle of his 
mental life. In his old age, under the clerical reaction 
which followed the death of Frederick the Great, he suffered 
persecution. The publication of an essay on religious 
philosophy in 1793 brought forth a royal rescript against 
him with a threat of severer measures in case he persisted 
in the same tendency. Kant replied with the declaration 
that he would thenceforth neither speak nor write any- 
thing whatsoever on religious matters. He did not renew 
his activities in the philosophy of religion until the begin- 
ning of a new administration when he published the whole 
of the controversial proceeding (in the preface to the Sireit 
der Facultdten, 1798). His last years present a case oflhe 
gradual disintegration of a mighty spirit. He apparditly 
became a victim of dementia senilis. Isolated mc^Bpts 
of mental brilliance are the only reminders flphis 
former greatness. He died on the 12th of February, 
1804. 



I40 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

A. The Theoretical Problem 

I. Kanfs philosophical reflections matured very 
slowly. There are two distinct periods of development, 
in his theoretical writings, before the appearance of his 
masterpiece; the first extends from 1755 (the year of 
Kanfs habilitation) to 1769, the second from 1769 to 1781 
(in which latter year his masterpiece appeared). — In 
describing the historical development of the Kantian phi- 
losophy (both as respects the theoretical as well as the 
practical problems) the author of this text book follows his 
essay on Die Kontinuitdt im philosophischen Entwicklungs- 
gange Kant's (Archiv fur Gesch. der Philos., VII, 1894). 

a. The dominant characteristic of Kant's first period 
is the firm conviction that an all-pervasive uniformity of 
nattire rigidly determines the phenomenal universe. His 
famous hypothesis of the evolution of our solar system is 
elaborated in his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie 
des Himmels (1755). Newton had declared that a scien- 
tific explanation of the origin of the solar system is im- 
possible. But Kant now shows that such an explanation 
is possible. He starts with the assumption of a rotating 
nebulous sphere, and then deduces the logical conse- 
quences according to the known laws of nattire. He fur- 
thermore regards the denial of nature's capacity to evolve 
order and purpose from its own inherent laws as an erro- 
neous presupposition. He discovers the proof of deity 
in the very fact of the uniformity of nature itself. — Kant 
elaborated this theory more fully in the essay Einzig 
moglicher Beweisgrimd einer Demonstration Gottes. Whilst 
he had even then already lost confidence in the validity of 
the traditional '^proofs'' of the existence of God, he at the 
same time found a basis for his religious conviction in the 



KANT 141 

ultimate postulate of all real science — the postulate of the 
uniformity of nature. He stood quite close to Spinoza in 
this respect without being aware of it. 

Kant's mind was likewise occupied with various other 
problems during this period. His conclusion concerning 
the distinction between philosophy and mathematics is 
noteworthy, namely, that philosophy cannot create its 
concepts as mathematics does. It derives its concepts 
from experience. Hence, inasmuch as experience is never 
universal, philosophy is limited to imperfect concepts. 
The concept of soul, for example, is an imperfect concept; 
experience fiimishes no warrant for speaking of a psychical 
substance. In the ingenious brochure, Traume eines 
Geistersehers, erlautert durch Traume der Metaphysik (1766), 
Kant shows, partly in satire, how easy it is to construct a 
system of the supersensible world. The only requirement 
is a naive implicit confidence in our concepts as complete 
and final. 

The concept of causality is another example of an in- 
complete concept. How can the analysis of a given phe- 
nomenon reveal the necessity of another phenomenon? 
But the concept of causality assumes precisely this neces- 
sity! Kant therefore (even in the essay: Ver such den 
Begrif der negativen Grosse in die Weltweisheit einzufiihrenj 
1762) approaches the problem of causality in precisely 
the same form in which it had been stated by Hume. 
Kant's later remark that it was David Hume that roused 
him from his dogmatic slumbers, with its evident reference 
to Hume's criticism of the concept of causality, would in- 
dicate that this awakening took place as early as 1762. 
(Students of Kant differ widely on this point however.) 
It is impossible to describe the years in which Kant was 
occupied with the study of the causal concept and 



142 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

The Dreams of a Ghost-seer ^ as spent in ''dogmatic 
slumber." 

b. Kant is led to the first step from his inquiring, 
sceptical attitude towards criticism by the discovery that 
space and time, with which the exact natiu-al sciences 
operate, are not real objects or attributes in the absolute 
sense; but schemata (schemata coordinandi) which are 
abstracted from the forms in which our sensations are ar- 
ranged. Space, which Newton regarded a divine sense, 
thus becomes a human sense {De mundi sensibilis atque 
intelligihilis forma et principiis, 1770). He makes the 
discovery that many propositions which we regard as ob- 
jective only express the conditions under which we per- 
ceive or conceive the objects. For the time being he ap- 
plies this observation only to space and time as the forms of 
sense-perception. This was nevertheless the discovery 
of the fundamental thought of the critical philosophy. 
Kant had thus already discovered the theoretical method 
which he afterwards called the Copernican method. Just 
as our perception of the rotation of the firmament around 
the earth is due to our position in the universe, so, accord- 
ing to Kant, it is likewise due to our method of sense per- 
ception that we apprehend things under the relations of 
time and space. This explains therefore — and this is the 
essential matter so far as Kant is concerned — how it hap- 
pens that pure mathematics, which is after all a purely 
intellectual science, can be valid for every possible sense- 
perception. We experience everything in time and space, 
and everything must therefore conform to the mathemat- 
ical laws of time and space. 

Kant was still of the opinion that the understanding 
could grasp the absolute nature of things. But he soon 
saw that the Copernican principle must likewise apply to 



KANT 143 

the understanding. His letters and notes enable us to 
follow the gradual development of this deeper insight. 
We are active in the operations of our own thought, i. e. 
we act in a manner peculiar to oiu" mind; but how can the 
products of our own mental activity retain their validity 
when applied to the perceptions which are objectively pro- 
duced? — ^As to the nature of this mental activity, an in- 
vestigation of the fundamental concepts of oiur under- 
standing, especially the causal concept, reveals the fact 
that the understanding is likewise a uniting, synthetizing 
faculty like sense-perception. The uniting principle 
{Hume's), which was the stimibling-block of Kant's Eng- 
lish predecessor, now became Kant's fundamental pre- 
supposition of knowledge. He could now say of the 
fundamental concepts of the understanding {categories) , 
after the analogy of what he had previously said of the 
forms of intuition: Knowledge exists only when what is 
given (the matter) in the forms of our thought is united. The 
concept of synthesis, is therefore the fundamental concept 
of all knowledge and the profoimdest thought of the 
Kantian philosophy. This constitutes Kant's real dis- 
covery, which will justify its value, even if Kant's par- 
ticular theories are to a considerable degree subject to 
criticism. We must apply his own method in the study 
of Kant. We must penetrate the finished forms in which 
his philosophy is cast and discover their primary princi- 
ples — realities. 

According to his own statement, Kant wrote out the 
results of his reflections covering a period of twelve years 
quite hastily. His chief work, Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
(1781), is therefore a very difficult book. — In presenting 
its contents we shall follow a clearer order than that given 
by Kant himself. 



144 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

2. Kant distinguishes a subjective and an objective 
deduction in his investigation of the problem of knowl- 
edge. 

a. It is the business of subjective deduction to discover 
the forms of our intuition and reflection. ' These forms 
represent what is constant and universal, — that which is 
capable of maintaining its identity, even though the quali- 
tative content, the matter, changes. They are dis- 
covered by a psychological analysis which distinguishes 
between the changeable and the permanent. In this way 
we discover extension (space) and succession (time) as 
constant elements of sensory intuition, magnitude and 
causality as constant elements of thought. The Forms 
of intuition are forms of otir receptivity. As a matter of 
fact they too are a kind of synthesis, a combining together; 
but at this stage our own activity does not yet attain the 
prominence that it does in thought; here the only concern 
is the arrangement of the sensations in immediate intui- 
tion. We develop a higher level of activity whenever we 
place these intuitional images in relation to each other. 
This function is more fully conscious than the involuntary 
process of intuition. Kant calls it apperception. When- 
ever we pass from a given spacial or temporal intuition to 
another, we are trying to affect our own inner unity, in 
the fact that we combine together the antecedent and con- 
sequent in a definite manner. Thus, e. g. I know a line 
only when I draw it, i. e. when I combine its several parts 
according to a definite law. Or, e. g. I know a fact, e. g. 
the freezing of water, only when I am in position to com- 
bine the antecedent state (the water in liquid form) with 
its consequent according to a definite law. 

Kant believes that he has thus discovered a method 
which proves the necessity of a certain nimiber of con- 



KANT 145 

cepts of the understanding (categories). He says the 
function of the understanding is judgment; every judg- 
ment consists of a combination of concepts. There must 
therefore be as many different categories as there are kinds 
of judgments! — He thus discovers, on the basis of the 
traditional logic (of course somewhat modified by him- 
self), twelve categories, neither more nor less. This was 
certainly a profound illusion. For the customary classi- 
fication of judgments is logically untenable, it is at least 
impossible to justify the inference from them to different 
kinds of fundamental categories. 

Kant divides the twelve categories, which we will not 
here repeat, into two classes: mathematical and dynamic; 
the concept of magnitude and the concept of causality 
might be regarded as representative of these two classes. 
All our judgments express either a relation of magnitude 
(greater or less) or a relation of real dependence (cause 
and effect). The concept of continuity is common to 
both relations: all magnitudes arise continuously from 
smaller magnitudes, and cause passes continuously into 
effect. 

We have thus far discovered two groups of forms: the 
forms of intuition and of the categories. But there is still 
a third group. We are not satisfied with simply arranging 
sensations in space and time, and afterwards arranging 
the intuitional forms which have thus arisen according to 
their relations of magnitude and cause. The synthetic 
impulse, the combining activity, is so deeply. imbedded in 
our nature that we are constantly in search of higher uni- 
ties and totalities and finally demand an absolute comple- 
tion of the synthesis. This is the sphere of ideas, the 
forms, in which man attempts to conceive absolute uni- 
ties and totalities. Kant calls the ideational faculty 



146 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

reason in its narrower significance. (In its broader sig- 
nificance -understanding and intuition likewise belong to 
reason.) Those synthetic impiilses together with these 
ideational faculties give rise to the dogmatic systems 
which deal with the ideas of God (as the absolute being), 
the soul (as substance) and the world (as absolute total- 
ity) . Kant attempts to prove, by a very artificial method, 
that these three are the only ideas : they are to correspond 
with the three forms of inference of the traditional logic. 

b. Objective deduction investigates the right of apply- 
ing oin- cognitive forms to given sensations. The fact 
that we are able to become conscious of the content of our 
intuitions and concepts does not constitute the problem. 
Neither does the fact that we can' deduce new content 
from experience constitute a problem. But Kanfs prob- 
lem rather consists in this, namely, the fact that we are 
able to use our intuitional forms and categories in such a 
way as to form, with their help, vahd judgments which are 
not foimd in experience. He expresses it in his own lan- 
guage as follows: How are synthetic judgments a priori 
possible? By anal3^ical propositions we become aware 
of the content of our intuitions and reflections; by syn- 
thetical propositions a posteriori we include new content 
derived from experience; but synthetic propositions a 
priori extend our knowledge independently of our experi- 
ence. The following are examples of such propositions: 
every perception has extensive and intensive values, and 
every event has a cause (or better: every change takes 
place according to the law of the connection between 
cause and effect). 

According to Kant the vahdity of such judgments rests 
upon the fact that experience — ^in the sense of the fixed and 
necessary relations of phenomena — is possible only in 



KANT 147 

case the mathematical laws and the concepts of magnitude 
and causality are valid for all perceptions. Only such ab- 
stract propositions as formulate the very conditions of 
experience are synthetic propositions a priori. Whenever 
we are able to discover and express the conditions of ex- 
perience we come upon propositions which are propositions 
of piu-e reason, because they are based on the pure forms 
of our knowledge, and which must nevertheless be valid 
for all experience. 

The whole content of experience is conceived in space 
and time. Hence since pure mathematics really does 
nothing more than develop the laws of space and time, it 
must be valid for every possible content of experience, 
every possible perception. But this demonstration like- 
wise involves a limitation: namely, mathematics is valid 
only for phenomena, i. e. only for things as we conceive 
them, not for things-in-themselves. We have no right 
to make the conditions of our conception the conditions 
of things-in-themselves. Time and space can be con- 
ceived only from the view-point of man. 

Experience not only implies that we conceive something 
in space and time, but likewise that we are able to combine 
what is given in space and time in a definite way, i. e. as 
indicated in the concepts of magnitude and causality. 
This is the only means of distinguishing between experi- 
ence and mere representation or imagination. All ex- 
tensive and intensive changes must proceed continuously, 
i. e. through every possible degree of extension and in- 
tensity, otherwise we could never be certain of having any 
real experience. Gaps and breaks must be impossible 
(non datur hiatus non datur saltus). The origin of each 
particular phenomenon moreover must be conditioned by 
certain other phenomena, — analogous to the way in which 



148 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

the conclusion of a syllogism is conditioned by the prem- 
ises. In any purely subjective representations or in 
dreams, images may be combined in every variety of ways; 
we have experience however only when it is impossible to 
permit the members of a series of perceptions to exchange 
their places or to pass from one perception to another by 
means of a leap. In my mind I can at will, e. g. conceive 
of a house being built from the roof downward or from the 
foundation upward; but in the case of the actual construc- 
tion of a house there is but a single possible order of suc- 
cession. Wherever there appear to be gaps in the series 
of perceptions we assume that further investigation will 
discover the intervening members. This demonstration 
of the validity of the categories of magnitude and causality 
likewise involves a limitation: The validity of the cate- 
gories can only be affirmed within the range of possible 
experience; they cannot be applied to things which from 
their very nature cannot become objects of experience. 
Experience is the empirical synthesis which furnishes valid- 
ity to every other synthesis. 

The principles of demonstration by which we obtain our 
results when dealing with the forms of intuition and the 
categories are inapplicable to the realm of ideas. The 
ideas demand an unconditionality, a totality, finality; but 
experience, which is always limited, never furnishes any: 
such thing. Neither God, nor the soul (as substance), nor; 
the universe (as an absolute whole) can be given in experi-J 
ence. There is here no possibility of an objective deduc- 
tion. It is impossible to construct a science of ideas. 

When Kant bases the real significance of the rational 
sciences upon an analysis of the conditions of experience, 
it must of course be remembered that he uses the concept 
of experience in its strict sense. Experience consists of 



KANT 149 

the fixed and necessary relation of perceptions. But in 
this sense experience is an idea (in Kanfs meaning of the 
term) or an ideal. We can approach this ideal to infinity, 
but it was a piece of dogmatism when Kant here failed to 
distinguish between the ideal and reality. Kant had not, 
as he believed, solved the problem propoimded by Hume; 
for the thing concerning which Hume was skeptical was 
just the matter as to whether any experience in the strict 
sense of the term really exists. — This dogmatic tendency 
is peculiarly prominent in KanVs special works, especially 
in his Metaphysische Anfangsgrilnden der Naturwissen- 
schaft (17S6). — Kanfs chief merit consists in referring all 
knowledge to synthesis and continuity. These funda- 
mental principles enable us to anticipate experience. But 
all anticipations are only hypotheses. 

3. As we have observed, the demonstration of the real 
validity of abstract knowledge (of pure reason) is closely 
related to the limitation of this validity. Kant states this 
as follows: We know only experiences, but not tJiings-in- 
themselves. Whenever he expresses himself concisely, he 
calls the concept of the thing-in-itself an ultimate concept 
or a negative concept. In this way he gives expression to 
the permanently irrational element of knowledge. Speak- 
ing exactly, the concept of the thing-in-itself indicates that 
we cannot deduce the matter of our knowledge from its 
form. For Kant however the concept of the thing-in-itself 
imperceptibly assumes a positive character. The thing-in- 
itself is regarded as the cause of phenomena (especially in 
reference to the matter, but likewise also in reference to 
the form). Here (as F. H. Jacohi was the first to show) 
Kant falls into a peculiar contradiction; he has limited the 
real validity of the concept of causality to the realm of 
experience (in which the thing-in-itself can never be pres- 



150 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

ent) and then conceives the thing-in-itself as cause! — 
Here again we discover a remnant of dogmatism in Kant. 
4. Kant proves the impossibility of constructing a 
science of ^' Ideas,'' both by the fact that ideas contain 
none of the conditions of experience (as is the case with the 
forms of intuition and the categories), and by means of a 
criticism of the attempts which have been made to estab- 
lish such a science. 

a. Criticism of speculative {spiritualistic) psychology. 
There is no justification for concluding from the unity of 
psychic life, which manifests itself in synthesis, the funda- 
mental form of consciousness, that the soul is a being which 
is distinct from the body or a substance. Synthesis is 
only a form, which we are not permitted to regard as a 
separate substance. It is impossible for psychology to 
be more than a science of experience. There is no ground 
for interpreting the distinction between psychical and 
physical phenomena as a distinction between two en- 
tities : It is possible indeed that one and the same essence 
should form the basis of both kinds of phenomena. 

b. Criticism of speculative cosmology. Every attempt 
at a scientific theory of the universe conceived as a totality 
is ever and anon confronted with contradictions. -Our 
thought here culminates in antinomies; the universe must 
have a beginning (in space and time), else it were not a 
totality. But it is impossible to conceive the beginning 
or the end of space and of time, because every place (in 
space and in time) is thought in relation to other places.-^ 
Furthermore the world must consist of parts (atoms or 
monads) which are not further divisible, otherwise the 
summation of the parts could never be complete. But 
everything conceivable is divisible; we can think of every 
body as divided into smaller bodies. — The series of causes 



KANT 151 

must have a first member if the universe is to be regarded 
as a complete system, and if a complete causal explanation 
of particular phenomena shall be possible. But the as- 
simiption of a first cause is in conflict with the law of 
causality, for this cause would itself have no cause, and at 
what moment should it begin its operation? 

According to Kant the only way to avoid these antin- 
omies is to distinguish between phenomenon and the 
thing-in-itself and limit the validity of our knowledge to 
phenomena. We meet with contradictions the moment 
we attempt to apply our concepts to the things which 
transcend our circumscribed experience. Kant therefore 
regards the antinomies as a demonstration of his theory 
of knowledge. 

c. Criticism of speculative theology. Reflective thought 
aims to find in the concept of God an absolute resting- 
place for all its effort. This concept is supposed to con- 
tain the ground of the concepts of soul and universe. In 
it knowledge would attain its ideal: all ideas would be re- 
ferred to a single idea which in turn contains the ground 
of its existence within itself and hence implies nothing be- 
yond it! According to Kant the concept of God is fully 
justified as an ideal; but we must not confuse an ideal of 
knowledge with knowledge actually attained. The tradi- 
tional arguments for the existence of God however rest 
upon such a confusion of terms. 

The most popular argument rests upon the adaptation 
of nature and thence infers the existence of an all-wise, 
all-loving and all-powerful Creator (the physico-theological 
argument) . — But by what right do we presuppose that the 
order and adaptation of nature should not be explainable 
as the effects of natural causes operating according to natu- 
ral laws? And at any rate this argument can only lead to 



152 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

the assumption of an architect or governor of the universe, 
not to that of a creator. 

The cosmological argument goes into the matter more 
profoundly: the universe must have a cause (both as to its 
matter as well as to its plan). — But the law of causahty 
leads only from one member of the causal series to another 
— ^it only furnishes causes which are in turn conditioned, 
i. e. effects, and hence never estabHshes the assumption 
of an unconditioned, necessan,' being. In the case of every 
existing thing, even the highest, it always remains not only 
possible but necessary to inquire: Whence doth it come? 

The ontological argument, if it were tenable, is the only 
one that would lead to the desired goal. It is also the 
tacit presupposition of aU the other argtiments. This 
argimient proceeds as follows: to think of God as non- 
existent were a contradiction, because He is the perfect 
being and existence belongs to perfection! — But existence 
or being is a predicate which differs from ah other predi- 
cates. The concept of a thing does not change because 
the particular thing does not exist. My concept of a hun- 
dred doUars is the same, no matter whether I possess them 
or only think of them. The problem of existence is inde- 
pendent of the problem of the perfection of the concept. 
And, as the investigation of the categories has shown, we 
have but a single criterion of existence or reahty: namely, 
the systematic uniformity of experience. 

B. The Ethico-Religious Problem 

I. There is a sense in which Kant's ethical ideas de- 
velop along parallel Hnes with his ideas of theoretical 
knowledge. Rousseau's influence evidently affected him 
on this point at two different periods with teUing effect. 
Kant declares, in an interesting fragment, that Rousseau 



KANT 153 

taught him reverence for mankind, to ascribe a certain 
dignity to all men which is not merely based on the degree 
of their intellectual culture. He had previously been an 
optimist whose basis was an intellectual and spiritual aris- 
tocracy. And in addition to Rousseau, Shaftesbury, Hume 
and especially Hutches on likewise influenced him at this 
period. During the sixties Kant bases his ethics on the 
sentiment of beauty and the dignity of human natiu-e. 
{Beobachtungen iiber das Gefuhl des Schonen und des 
Erhabenen, 1764.) Even here Ka7it already emphasizes 
the necessity of fundamental principles of morality; they 
are however only the intellectual expressions of the con- 
tent of the sentiments: '' The fundamental principles are not 
abstract laws, but the consciousness of an affection that dwells 
in every human breast . . . of the beauty and dignity of 
human nattire." 

Kant afterwards abandoned this identification of ethics 
with the psychology of the affections. In his Essay of 
1770 he declared that it is utterly impossible to base moral 
principles on sentiment, i. e. empirically. It is also evi- 
dent, from a fragment discovered by Reicke, that at the 
period during which he was engaged with the Critique of 
Pure Reason he based the ethical impulse on the self- 
activity which we exercise in our striving for happiness. 
The matter of happiness is empirical, but its form is in- 
tellectual, and the only possibility of realizing our freedom 
and independence rests upon maintaining the constant 
harmony of our will with itself. Morality is liberty under 
a universal law which expresses our self-consistency. 
Even here Kanfs ethics attains that purely formal char- 
acter which is so peculiar to it. In ethics as in epistemol- 
ogy he regards the form as the constant factor in contrast 
with its ever-varying content. 



154 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

But in ttie fragment just cited Kanfs ethics was still 
individualistic: The moral law demands only that the in- 
dividual be in harmony with himself. The specifically 
Kantian ethics springs from an expansion of this principle. 
He elaborates it in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten (1785) and the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 
(1788). Here he formulates the moral law as follows: 
Act according to the maxim that you could at the same time 
will that it might become a universal law! — The viewpoint is 
therefore no longer individualistic, but social. His elab- 
oration of the theory of knowledge evidently affected his 
ethics at this point. The fundamental moral law must be 
quite as universal and objective as the theoretical funda- 
mental principles, as e. g. the principle of causality! But 
there are other theoretical motives likewise here in evi- 
dence. 

In the interval between the fragment just cited (1780) 
and the first draft of the ethics (1785) another noteworthy 
essay appeared, namely. Idee zu einer allgemeinen Ge- 
schichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht (1784), in which Kant 
shows that the only viewpoint from which history is com- 
prehensible and of any value is from that of the human race 
as a whole, but not from that of the individual citizen. 
Reason is an evolutional product of the process of history. 
The antagonism of interests brings the capacities of man to 
maturity, imtil he finally organizes a society in which free- 
dom under universal laws is possible. And it is only then 
that genuine morality becomes possible! Kant observes 
that Rousseau was not wholly in error in preferring the 
state of nature, so long as this stage has not been reached. 
— It is evident that, from the viewpoint of history, the 
moral law which Kant formulated in 1785 contains a sub- 
limxC anticipation. The individual citizen is expected to 



KANT 



155 



regulate his actions here and now, precisely as all actions 
shall finally be regulated in that ideal society. Morality, 
Hke history, is likewise incomprehensible from the view- 
point of the individual. — Kant returns to this theory two 
years later (1786 in the essay on Muthmas slicker Anfang 
der Menschengeschichte). Civilization and nature are con- 
tradictory principles (so far Rousseau was right) ''until 
perfect art becomes nature once more, which is the final 
aim of the moral determination of the human race." Kant 
therefore arrived at this definitive ethical theory by the 
historical or social-psychological method, and Rousseau^s 
conception of the problem of civilization influenced him 
at this point, just as it did at an earlier stage of his ethical 
reflection. — But in the mind of Kant that sublime antici- 
pation appears with such ideality and absoluteness that 
he regarded the fundamental moral law as a manifestation 
from a super-empirical world and he forgot his historical 
and psychological basis. (Cf. the author's essay: Rous- 
seau'' s Einfluss auf die definitive Form der Kanfschen Ethik, 
in Kantstudien, II, 1898.) 

2. In the first draft of his ethics (1785) Kant discovers 
the fundamental moral law by means of an analysis of the 
practical moral consciousness. That action alone is good 
which springs from pure regard for the moral law. Neither 
authority nor experience can be the source of this sense. 
Moral principles reveal the inmost, supersensible nature of 
our volition, and neither psychology nor theology can here 
furnish the basis. The fact is the more evident in that 
there are elements in human nature which impel us in 
directions which are contrary to the moral law. The 
moral law manifests itself in opposition to these empirical 
and egoistic tendencies in the form of duty, an uncondi- 
tional command, a categorical imperative. The distinc- 



156 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

tively moral element appears most clearly in cases where 
duty and inclination stand out in sharp contrast. Kant 
even says in a certain place that a state of mind in which 
I follow duty even though it is in conflict with my pur- 
poses is the only one which is really good in itself. 

The moral law must be purely formal. Every real con- 
tent, every purpose would degrade it to the level of the 
empirical and hence to the material. The moral law can 
do nothing more than indicate the form of the fundamental 
principles which our actions are intended to express, — 
that is to say, that these fundamental principles are 
capable of being based on a universal principle of legisla- 
tion in such manner as to enable all rational beings to obey 
them under similar circumstances. I must, e. g. retiu-n 
borrowed property even though no one knows that it does 
not belong to me; because the contrary course will not 
admit of generalization, and in that case no one would make 
a loan to another. Kant however here clearly presupposes 
that man is a member of society. This maxim is therefore 
not purely a priori. He likewise realizes the need of a 
more realistic formulation of the maxim and the necessity 
of a real object of human action. The highest object can 
be given only through the moral law, and Kant discovers 
this object in the very dignity which every man possesses 
in the fact of being capable of becoming conscious of the 
moral law. From this he deduces the principle: ''Act so 
as to treat humanity, in thyself or any other, as an end always, 
and never merely as a means! ^^ 

The moral law is not objective, but deeply imbedded in 
the natiu-e of man and identical with the essential nature 
of volition. Law and liberty are not separate concepts. 
They express only the autonomy of man viewed from op- 
posite sides. As an empirical being man is subject to 



KANT 157 

psychological laws, but as a rational being he is elevated 
above all empirical conditions and capable of originating 
a series of changes absolutely. But man possesses this 
capacity only as an ^^intelligible character/^ as a ''thing-in- 
itself . " And since things-in-themselves can never be given 
in experience, it is impossible for intelligible liberty and 
empirical necessity ever to conflict with each other. Kant 
here introduces a positive use of the concept of the thing- 
in-itself. 

Kant elaborated the special problems of ethics in his 
Rechtslehre and his Tugendlehre. Both works appeared in 
1797 and bear the impress of old age. — Right, according 
to Kant, consists of the aggregate conditions under which 
the will of the individual can be united with the will of 
another according to a universal principle of liberty. As 
a matter of fact man's only original right is liberty, i. e. 
immunity from the arbitrary demands of every other in- 
dividual in so far as it can obtain together with the liberty 
of others according to a universal law. Even though 
Kant makes a sharp distinction between the Right and the 
Moral (Legality and Morality), he nevertheless regards 
our obligation to regulate society as far as possible accord- 
ing to principles of Right to rest upon a categorical im- 
perative. 

In the Theory of Virtue he finds the highest duty in the 
realization of the dignity of man, which is based on auton- 
omy and consists in the complete development of personal 
qualities. To be useless and superfluous is to dishonor 
humanity in our own person. Besides personal perfection 
the happiness of others is a matter of fundamental impor- 
tance. The perfection of others on the other hand can only 
be realized through their own efforts; and we provide for 
our own happiness even through a natural instinct. 



158 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

3. Kant aimed to establish the pure autonomy and 
spontaneity of the moral sense, and especially as inde- 
pendent of all theological presuppositions. But he was 
nevertheless convinced that rehgion and moraHty are 
vitally related. He finds the transition from morality to 
religion to rest on the fact that man is destined to reaHze 
the unconditional moral law in the empirical world, i. e. 
in the world of finitude, limitation and conditionality. 
Ideal and reaHty here appear in sharp contrast to each 
other, which gives rise to a demand for harmony between 
liberty and nature, virtue and happiness, and it is just 
because experience offers no guarantee, that rehgious pos- 
tulates, which contain the conditions of such a harmony, 
are formulated. Besides the freedom of the will pre- 
viously cited, there are according to Kant two additional 
postulates: viz. the immortality of the soul and the exist- 
ence of God. Kant is convinced that these postulates re- 
veal a universal himian need. Faith is the natural con- 
sequence of the sentiment of morality, even though faith 
is not a duty. 

The possibility of faith rests upon the fact that knowl- 
edge is limited to phenomena. The native element of the 
dogmas of faith is the thing-in-itself . But these dogmas 
add nothing to our knowledge. This follows even from 
the fact that our intellectual and -intuitional forms do not 
pertain to the thing-in-itself. Rehgious ideas are nothing 
more than analogies or figures of speech. Kant even goes 
so far as to say that if the anthropomorphisms are care- 
fully discarded from the psychological attributes ascribed 
to God, nothing remains but the empty word. 

This fact, which even applies to the ideas of natural 
rehgion, is still mere pertinent to the ideas of positive re- 
ligion. In his treatise on Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der 



KANT 159 

hlossen Vernunft (1793) Kant shows that important ethi- 
cal ideas are hidden "within the Christian dogmas. In the 
dogma concerning sin he discovers the experience of an in- 
cHnation, deeply imbedded in human nattire, which strives 
against the moral law; which he calls ''radical evil. " Kant 
regards the Bible story of the Fall as a subjective experi- 
ence on the part of each individual, not as an historical 
event. So is the Bible story of the suffering Christ like- 
wise experienced by every serious human being; regard for 
the moral law gives rise to a new man who must endure 
the suffering due to the constant opposition of the old 
man of sensual inclination. — The significance of a purely 
historical or " statutory ^^ faith is only provisional; but we 
respect ''the form which has served the purpose of bring- 
ing a doctrine, the acceptance of which rests on tradition, 
— ^which is irrevocably preserved in every soul and re- 
quires no miracle, — into general influence." 

4. Kant maintains a sharp antithesis between the 
world of experience and things-in-themselves both in his 
theory of knowledge and in his ethics. In fact, his whole 
philosophy is characterized by these sharp antitheses. 
This was necessary to his purpose, if he would demonstrate 
the validity of knowledge and the unconditionality of 
ethical ideals. But the question must natiirally arise — 
even in consequence of the critical philosophy — Must not 
even these distinctions and antitheses be ascribed to the 
method of our human understanding? The fact that this 
point also occurred to his mind with more or less definite- 
ness is a splendid testimony to Kanfs profound critical 
acumen. He felt the need before concluding his reflec- 
tions, of investigating whether there might not be view- 
points which — ^more directly than the religious postulates 
— ^would transcend these profound antitheses. He thus 



l6o THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

discovers certain facts which show us how existence by 
virtue of its own laws and even our ethical ideals become 
matters of our knowledge. There are two such facts : the 
one is of an esthetic nature, the other biological {Kritik 
der Urtheilskraft, 1790). 

In the phenomena which we call beautiful and sublime 
the object inspires in us a sense of disinterested satisfac- 
tion. In the case of the beautiful this rests on the fact 
that our intuitional faculty or our understanding is in- 
duced to harmonious cooperation, in that the parts of a 
phenomenon are readily and naturally combined into a 
single unit. Ka7it places special emphasis on the pure 
immediacy and involuntariness of the impression of 
beauty, — ^what he calls free beauty (e. g. the beauty of a 
flower, of an arabesque, of a musical fantasy). He does 
not regard the "secondary" beauty presupposed in the 
concept of an object (e. g. the beaut}^ of man as such) as 
real beauty. — In contemplating the sublime our faculty 
of comprehension is overwhelmed and the sense of self 
subdued in the consciousness of being confronted by the 
immensity, the immeasurable in content and energ\'; but 
even in this very vanquishment, the consciousness of an 
energy superior to all sensible limitations arises in out con- 
sciousness: the consciousness of ideas and of the moral 
law as transcending aU experience. The really sublime, 
according to Kant, is not the object, but the sentiment to 
which it gives rise. 

Just as we behold the activity of Being in harmony with 
our spiritual dispositions in the beautiful and the sublime, 
even so the genius acts his part as involuntarily as a process 
of nature, and nevertheless produces works which have the 
value of patterns or t3^pes. Genius is a talent by means of 
which nature furnishes rules of art, — ^it is typical originality. 



KANT l6l 

Organic life presents an analogy to the beautiful, the 
sublime, and the ingenious. Nature employs a method 
in the organic realm for which we really have no concept. 
Here we do not discover a being originated by the mechan- 
ical articulation and interaction of parts ; nor have we the 
right, scientifically, to assume an antecedent plan accord- 
ing to which the parts are afterwards combined (as in the 
case of human architecture). The organism is therefore 
unexplainable either teleologically or mechanically. But 
perhaps the antithesis between the mechanical and the 
teleological explanations of nature rests merely on the 
peculiarity of our knowledge. Our understanding pro- 
ceeds disciu-sively, i. e. it proceeds from the parts to the 
whole, and if the parts are to be regarded as defined from 
the viewpoint of the whole, we are obliged to apply the 
anthropomorphic analogy with human purposes. But in 
pure being the same regulation which provides for the 
causal unity of things might perhaps also account for the 
possibiHty of the origin of organic forms capable of adap- 
tation. It might be that the principles of mechanism and 
of teleology are after all identical in the unknown grounds 
of nature. 

The same might be true also of the antithesis 
of piure reason which formulates natiural laws, and 
the practical reason which propounds ethical ideals. 
Such being the case it would follow that it is one 
and the same principle which is revealed in 
the laws of natiu-e and in the principles of 
ethics ! 

Here Kant reverts at the conclusion of his career, to a 
theory which had engaged him considerably during his 
early life {Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des 
Himmels. Einzig moglicher Beweisgrund), and which cer- 



l62 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

tainly had never left him. He suggests the possibility of 
a monistic theory, which, according to his conviction, was 
incapable of scientific elaboration. 

C. Opponents and First Disciples 

If Kant himself felt that the stupendous critical task 
made it necessary to appeal to a fundamental imity be- 
hind the variety of distinctions, such demand must neces- 
sarily become even more insistent to independent thinkers 
who assimied a critical attitude to his own investigations. 
Independent disciples, if they had seriously studied the 
doctrines of the master, must likewise have felt the need 
of a greater unity and harmony. The difference between 
the opponents and the disciples consists in the fact that the 
former assumed a purely polemical attitude, whilst the 
latter endeavored to forge ahead to new viewpoints on the 
basis of the critical philosophy; the former oppose the 
necessary totaHty of life and faith to philosophical analy- 
sis, whilst the latter seek to realize a new idea of totaHty 
by means of a thorough analysis. 

I. Foremost among the opponents, stands John 
George Hamann (1730-1788), ^^The Wise Man of the 
North,^^ who was one of Kanfs personal friends. After 
a restless youth he settled in Konigsberg in the office of 
Superintendent of Customs. His external ciromistances 
were poor and he experienced profound mental struggles. 
He was a foe to every kind of analysis because of a morbid 
demand in his own nature for a complete, vital and un- 
divided spiritual reality. He finds the ground of religion 
in our total being and it is far more comprehensive than 
the sphere of knowledge. The life of pure thought is the 
most abstract form of existence. Hamann refers to Hume 
as not having been refuted by Kant (the Prussian Hume). 



HERDER 163 

In harmony with Giordano Bruno he thinks existence 
consists of a coincidence of opposites (coincidentia opposi- 
torum), which are compatible with Hfe, but in reflective 
thought remain forever incompatible. This explains the 
futility of analysis. In direct antithesis to Kant he holds 
(in the posthumous treatise Metakritik uber den Purismus 
der reinen Vernunft) that reason, apart from tradition, 
faith and experience, is utterly helpless. He directs his 
attack more particularly against Kant's distinction be- 
tween matter and form, intuition and reflection. What 
nature has joined together man must not put asunder! 

John Gottfried Herder (i 744-1803) likewise emphasizes 
the helplessness of reason: It is a product, not an original 
principle. He makes the racial character of poetry and 
religion prominent, regarding them as the immediate prod- 
ucts of the htmian mind, in contrast to clear conception 
and volitional conduct. He extols the ages in which the 
mental faculties operated in unison rather than in isolation 
from each other, in which poetry, philosophy and religion 
were one. He aimed to penetrate behind the division of 
labor in the realm of mind. During the sixties he was an 
enthusiastic student of Kant, whom he attacks rather in- 
directly in the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der 
Menschheit (i 784-1791), which is his most important work, 
more directly in his later, less significant treatises {Meta- 
kritik ^ 1799, Kalligone, 1800). As opposed to Kant, he 
denies the opposition between the individual and society. 
The individual is identified with the entire race by in- 
nimierable unconscious influences, and his inmost being 
is modified by historical development. On the other hand 
the goal of history is not alone determined by the race as 
a whole but likewise by the individual. Herder was no 
less opposed to the distinction between mind and nature. 



l64 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

God and the world, than to the sharp distinction between 
the individual and society, or between the conscious and 
the unconscious. God can no more exist apart from the 
world than the world can exist apart from God, and, like 
his friend Goethe, he was an admirer and exponent of 
Spinoza, to which Lesnng referred in the famous conver- 
sation with Jacohi. His ecclesiastical position did not pre- 
vent him from expressing his thoughts freely and coura- 
geously. {Gott, 1787.) On this point he disagreed with 
his friends Hamann and Jacohi, notwithstanding their 
common emphasis of the total and indivisible life. 

Friedrich Heinrich Jacooi (i 743-1819), the third mem- 
ber of this group, as already observed, exposed the con- 
tradiction resulting from the Kantian theory of the 
" thing-in-itself " {David Hume ilher den Glatiben, oder 
Idealismus und Realismus, 1787). Like Hamann and 
Herder, he likewise fails to find in the Kantian philosophy, 
and in all philosophy for that matter, the complete, total, 
undivided unity v/hich can only be found in life and in 
unmediated faith. He contends that philosophy, if it is 
to be consistent, must annul all distinctions, combine 
everything into a single series of causes and effects, and 
thus not only the perfect and the vital, but even all orig- 
inality and individuality, would be annulled. He used 
this argument in his Brief en ilher Spinoza (1785) against 
the philosophy of the enlightenment. In his David 
Hume he used the same argument against Kant, and 
later he made similar objections to Fichte (Jakohi an 
Fichte, 1799) and Schelling {Von den gottlichen Dingen, 
181 1). He regards even direct perception a miracle, 
since it is utterly impossible to furnish any demonstrative 
proof of the reality of the objective world. We are bom 
into faith. Jacohi defends the rio^hts of the individual 



REINHOLD 165 

both in the reahn of morals and of religion. It is perfectly 
right for a beautiful soul to be guided by the affections, 
even though it should thus contradict abstract moral law. 

2. The Kantian philosophy was first introduced into 
wider circles through the Brieje uher die kantische Philos- 
ophie (1786) by Karl Leonhard Reinhold (i 758-1823). 
Reinhold had become a monk in his early youth; but 
when the conflict between his rationalistic philosophy 
and the CathoHc faith became too strong, he fled the clois- 
ter, became acquainted with the Kantian philosophy at 
Weimar and was shortly afterwards called to a Professor- 
ship at Jena (later at Kiel) . Jena now became the center 
of the philosophical movement inspired by Kant. In 
contrast to Kant's multipHcity of distinctions and forms 
Reinhold proposed the derivation of everything from a 
single principle as the true ideal of philosophy (Versuch 
einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsver- 
mogens, 1789). He deduced this principle from the pos- 
tulate that every idea sustains a twofold relation, to a 
subject as well as to an object. Consciousness, as a mat- 
ter of fact, consists of suoh a relationship. That which 
Kant called Form is that element of an idea by means of 
which it is related to the subject. It is necessary to as- 
sume a thing-in-itself , because it is impossible for the sub- 
ject to produce the object. The fact that he conceived 
the thing-in-itself as something entirely distinct from con- 
sciousness subjected Reinhold to a contradiction similar 
to that of his master. This contradiction is clearly elab- 
orated in G. E. Schultze's Aenesidemus (1792). 

The clearest exposition of the error resulting from pos- 
tulating the thing-in-itself as a positive concept however 
is by Salomon Maimoit (17 54-1800). The thing-in-itself 
is intended to be the cause of the matter of our knowledge, 



l66 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

■ — but we never discover any absolute, i. e. entirely 
unformed matter, in otir consciousness, and it would 
therefore be impossible even to inquire concerning 
the cause of the matter! The pure matter (pure 
sensation) is an "idea" Hke the ptue form, the piire 
subject. 

Maimon, the Lithuanian Jew, following the example of 
Reinhold in quitting the CathoHc cloister, abandoned his 
native village with its limitations and povert}^ in order to 
satisfy his intellectual hunger in Germany. Kant ad- 
mitted that Maimo7t was the man who best understood 
him; but the venerable master was nevertheless dissatis- 
fied with the criticisms and corrections offered by his 
brilliant disciple. 

Maimon saw clearly that the mere reference to the con- 
ditions of experience is not the solution of Hume's prob- 
lem: for what Kant calls experience, the permanent, neces- 
sary coherence of impressions, is the very thing that Hmne 
denies. By experience Hume understands nothing more 
than impressions. That which is given in experience is 
never anything more than a succession of impressions, and 
it is useless to appeal to the categories, for they are nothing 
but rules or ideas used in our investigations. The 
concept of causaHty, e. g., enables us to attain the 
highest possible degree of continmty in the series of otir 
impressions. 

It is not reason that impels us to transcend experience, 
but the imagination and the desire for completeness. 
These are the motives that give rise to the ideas (in the 
Kantian sense), to which we afterwards ascribe objective 
reahty. It is not the objects which are believed to exist 
on these grounds, but rather the constant striving after 
totaHty — which is the source of faith — that constitutes 



SCHILLER 167 

the highest reality. (Versuch einer Transcendentalphilos- 
ophie, 1790. Philosophisches Worterbuch, 1791. Versuch 
einer neuen Logik, 1794.) 

There is a close analogy between Reinhold, Maimon and 
Friedrich Schiller (i 759-1 805). Schiller, like the others, 
ran away from his cramping environment (the Military 
school at Stuttgart). And then, after the writing of his 
first sentimental essays, he devoted himself more thor- 
oughly to the Kantian Hterature. He greatly admired 
Kant's indefatigable research and the exalted, ideal char- 
acter of his ethics. But from his point of view Kant had 
nevertheless over-emphasized the antitheses of human 
nature, and severed the moral nature too completely from 
the actual development and ambitions of men. Duty ap- 
peared to be a kind of compelling force which man's higher 
nature exercises over his lower nature. Schiller therefore 
asserts that harmony is the highest criterion in life as well 
as in art. All the elements in the nature of man must 
cooperate in his actions. In order to be good, an act must 
not only bear the badge of dignity, but likewise of grace- 
fulness. MoraHty is slavish as long as it consists of self- 
command (Uber Anmut und Wiirde, 1793). Schiller 
elaborates this theory more fully in his Briefen tiber 
aesthetische Erziehung (1795) which shows a decided agree- 
ment with Rousseau's problem of civilization (which like- 
wise exerted a profound influence on the reflections of 
Kant). The important thing is to surcharge the spon- 
taneous fullness of the natural life with the independence 
and freedom of human hfe, the devotion to ever- 
changing circimistances with the unity of personality, 
the matter-impulse with the form-impulse. The 
solution of this problem is found in play, which is 
the beginning and prototype of art. It is only in 



l68 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

the free play of his energies that man acts as a 
totahty. The esthetic state is therefore the highest 
perfection of culture: it is at once the end and the 
means of development, which transcends all coarseness 
and all harmony. 



SIXTH BOOK. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM. 

The history of philosophy, from the Renaissance onward, 
has revealed the fact that philosophy is not an exclusive 
world. It was in fact the new theory of nature and the 
new methods of natural science that, in aU essential 
respects, determined the problems and the character of 
modem philosophy; to these must be added the new 
humanistic movements. And later on Kant was not 
only influenced by the opposition between Wolf and 
Hume, but likewise by the Newtonian natural science 
and Rousseau's problem of civilization. The develop- 
ment which followed during the first decades after Kant 
furnishes a new type of thought, — the romantic tendency 
of thought at the transition to the nineteenth century 
exercised a profound, in part even a fatal, influence on 
philosophy. Philosophy here reveals an undue suscepti- 
bility to the influences of other departments of thought. 
Otherwise the philosophy of Romanticism would have 
been unable to supplant the critical philosophy. 

Kant had indeed aroused a profound enthusiasm, and he 
had a large following in his own age. But this was largely 
due to the seriousness and the depth of his fundamental 
principles of ethics. The new age was consciously op- 
posed to the eighteenth century, the period of the Enlight- 
enment, to which Kant, despite his profounder conception, 
nevertheless belonged. It now became necessary to 
institute a profound investigation of nature and history 
directly. Men were anxious to enjoy spiritual life in its 
tinity and totality. Science, poetry and rehgion were 

169 



lyo THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

no longer to be regarded as distinct or even hostile 
forces, but merely as different forms of a single life. No- 
valis proclaimed this gospel with fervent zeal. All 
antitheses must be transcended. Kant's philosophy 
aboimded in antitheses; the profound antithesis between 
thought and being especially now became a rock of 
offense. Kanfs suggestion of a imity at the basis of all 
antitheses was taken as the starting-point. According to 
Kant this conception represented one of the boimdaries 
of thought; but now this was to furnish the starting- 
point whence all else is derived. Reinhold had already 
made the start. He proposed the ideal of knowledge 
assumed by Romanticism. No one inquired whether such 
an ideal were logically tenable: does not every inference 
in fact presuppose at least two premises! The intensity 
of their enthusiasm led men to believe that they could 
dispense with the traditional methods of thought and 
of science. As Goethe's Faust (this work appeared just 
at this time and the Romanticists were the first to ap- 
plaud it), dissatisfied with everything which previously 
passed for knowledge, resorted to magic, in the hope of 
thus attaining an explanation of ''the secret which 
maintains the imiverse in harmony," so the philosophers 
of Romanticism believed it possible to discover a new 
avenue to absolute truth. They resorted to intellectual 
magic. An attempt was made to sever the relationship 
which had existed between nattiral science and philos- 
ophy since the days of Bruno and Descartes. Despite 
the intense enthusiasm, the sublime sentiment and the 
profound ideas of the Romantic school, it nevertheless 
represents a vain attempt to discover the Philosopher's 
Stone. But just as the ancient Alchemists were not only 
energetic students, but in their effort to produce gold 



FICHTE 171 

likewise acquired important ideas and experiences, so 
the significance of German idealism must not be estimated 
alone by the results of its keen speculation. The fact is 
indeed patent, that profound ideas neither stand nor 
fall with the demonstration which men seek to give them. 
The kernel may persist even though the husk decays. 
The persistence of values is no more identical with the 
persistence of certain special forms in the realm of thought 
than in the realm of energy. 

A. The Speculative Systems. 

I. John Gottlieb Fichte (i 762-1814), the son of a 
Saxon peasant, took an enthusiastic interest, during 
his school period, in the spiritual struggles of Lessing, 
and later, after struggling with extreme poverty during 
his university life, was led to philosophy by the writings 
of Kant. His service at the University of Jena met with 
great success, not only because of his intellectual keen- 
ness and his eloquence, but likewise on account 
of the impression made by his moral earnestness. 
Having been dismissed on account of his religious 
views he went to Berlin, where he afterwards received an 
appointment. He takes first rank among those who, 
in the disastrous period following the battle of Jena, 
labored for the preservation of the sentiment of patriot- 
ism and of hope, especially by his Addresses to the 
German Nation, delivered during the winter of 1808-9, 
while Berlin was still in the hands of the French. 

a. Fichte' s philosophy is inspired by the criticism of 
the Kantian theory of the thing-in-itself in which Jacobi, 
Schulze and Maimon were already engaged. The motives 
at the root of Fichte '5 reflections however were not purely 
theoretical. Action constituted his profoundest motive 



172 THE PHILOSOPHY OP ROMANTICISM 

from the very beginning, and lie even regarded thought 
as action. It was perfectly consistent therefore for him 
to say, in the clearest exposition of his doctrine which 
he has given {Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, 
1797), that a man^s philosophy depends primarily on his 
character. Fichte contends that there are two funda- 
mental divisions in philosophy: Idealism^ which takes 
the subject, the ego, as its starting-point, and Dogmatism, 
which takes the object, the non-ego, as its starting-point. 
This follows from the nature of the problem of philosophy, 
i. e. the explanation of experience. But experience con- 
sists of the knowledge of objects. And this admits of 
but two alternatives, either to explain objects (things) 
from the standpoint of knowledge (the ego), or knowl- 
edge (the ego) from the standpoint of objects (things). 
Persons of an active and independent nature will be 
disposed to choose the former method, whilst those of 
a passive and dependent natiire will adopt the latter 
method. But even then idealism, from the purely 
theoretical point of view, has the advantage of dogmatism 
(which is liable, either as Materialism, SpirituaHsm or 
Spinozism, in all three cases to resolve itself into a theory 
of substance or things). Because it is impossible to 
deduce knowledge, thought, the ego, from things (i. e. 
regarded either as material, spiritual or neutral). But 
idealism makes knowledge, thought, the ego, its point of 
departure and then proceeds to show how experience, 
i. e. certain definite forms of knowledge, arises. The 
ego can contain nothing (known or thought) which is 
not posited by the activity of the ego. 

In his chief work {Grundlage der gesammten Wissen- 
schaftslehre, 1794) Fichte starts with the activity of the 
ego. The non-ego exists for us only by virtue of an 



riCHTE 173 

activity of the ego; but the ego posits itself. Every idea 
involves this presupposition in a peculiar and special 
form. But the only method of discovering it is by 
abstract reflection, for immediate consciousness reveals 
nothing more than its products. We are never directly 
conscious of our volitions and activities; we take note 
of our limitations, but never of the thing which is thus 
limited. Free, unconstrained activity, which transcends 
the antitheses between subject and object, can only be 
conceived through a higher order of comprehension, 
through intellectual intuition. That is to say, it tran- 
scends every concept because every concept presupposes 
an antithesis. 

But it is impossible to deduce definite, particular ob- 
jects from this free activity, i. e. from the pure ego. In 
addition to the presupposition of self -activity by means 
of which the ego posits itself, we must therefore postulate 
a second presupposition: The ego posits a non-ego. 
Both propositions, notwithstanding their opposition, 
must be combined, and thus by thesis and antithesis we 
arrive at synthesis ; so that our third proposition must be 
stated thus: The ego posits a Hmited ego in antithesis 
to a limited non-ego. This finally brings us to 
the level of experience. The limited ego is the 
empirical ego, which is constantly placed in antith- 
esis to objects and must constantly overcome limita- 
tions. 

Fichte moreover seeks to deduce the universal forms 
of experience (the Kantian intuitional forms and cate- 
gories) from these fundamental principles. Thus, e. g. 
time is a necessary form whenever several acts of the ego 
are to be arranged in a definite order with reference to 
each other, and causality comes under the third funda- 



174 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

mental principle (conceming the mutual limitation, i. e. 
the reciprocity between the ego and the non-ego). All 
such forms are forms of the activity of the pure, un- 
limited ego, which forms the basis of the empirical 
antithesis between ego and non-ego, but which can never 
manifest itself in experience. 

But how is it possible to deduce this antithesis of an 
empirical ego and a non-ego from the pure ego? How 
does it happen that this unlimited activity is resisted and 
broken? — These questions are theoretically unanswerable 
according to Fichte. Whence this opposition, whence this 
impetus comes we do not know, but it is necessary to the 
explanation of actual (empirical) consciousness. And 
the Hmitation, as a matter of fact, does not even concern 
us theoretically, it pertains only to the practical reason! 
*'An object possesses independent reaHty only in so far 
as it refers to the practical capacity of the ego.'* The 
only explanation of the existence of a world of non-egos 
is that we are intended to act: activity and effort as a 
matter of fact presuppose opposition (resistance) and 
limitation. Our task consists in reaHzing our Hberty 
and independence through the successive transcendence 
of limitations. But the ultimate presupposition forever 
remains that pure activity which is revealed in us under 
the form of an impulse to act for action's sake. This 
presupposition furnishes the only possible explanation of 
the imqualified obHgation which Kant expressed in the 
categorical imperative. 

This complete subordination of the theoretical to the 
practical resulted in a complete refutation of fataHsm. 
For the dependence of the whole system of our ideas 
rests far more profotmdly on our volition than our 
activity on our ideas. 



FICHTE 175 

b. The empirical ego is dependent even as limited. It 
experiences an impulse to transcend the objects in order to 
transform them into means of pleasiire. Activity reveals 
itself at first as mere natural impulse. But the impulse 
to act for action's sake can never be satisfied by a finite 
object, and hence consciousness will forever strive to 
transcend what is merely given. Man gradually learns 
to regard things merely as means towards his own self- 
development. It follows therefore that the highest 
moral obligation is expressed in the law: realize the pure 
ego! And this realization comes to pass by virtue of 
the fact that each particular act belongs to a series which 
leads to perfect spiritual liberty. {Sittenlehre, 1798.) 

Radical evil consists of the indolence which holds fast 
to existing conditions and resists progress. And more- 
over it leads to cowardice and treachery. The first 
impulse in the development towards liberty comes from 
men in whom natural impulse and liberty are in equi- 
librium, and who are consequently regarded as types. 
The spontaneous respect and admiration accorded 
to such typical characters is the primitive form of 
moral affection. The man who is still incapable of 
self-respect may nevertheless perhaps respect superior 
natures. Fichte elaborated this idea in considerable 
detail in his famous Reden an die deutsche Nation (1808) 
as the foundation of a theory of national education. 
The spontaneous adoption or creation of ideal types 
forms the middle term between passive admiration and 
perfect liberty. 

According to Fichte the religious consciousness is 
really implied in the moral consciousness. For the very 
fact that I strive to realize my highest ideal assumes at 
the same time that the realization of this ideal by my 



176 THE PHILOSOPHY OP ROMANTICISM 

own activity is possible. I mtist therefore presuppose a 
world-order in which conduct based on moral sentiment 
can be construed consistently. Religion furnishes an 
immediate validation of the confidence in such a world- 
order. It is not necessary that I should collect the 
experiences which reveal my relation to this world-order 
and formulate from them the concept of that unique 
being which I call God; and ascribing sensible attributes 
to this Being and making Him the object of servile and 
egoistic reverence, may even be positively harmful. 
This were indeed real and actual atheism. The fact that 
I conceive of God as a particular Being is a consequence 
of my finitude. The act of conceiving involves limitation 
and every supposed concept of a God is the concept of 
an idol! {IJher den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine 
gottliche Weltregierung, 1798. Appellation an das Publicum 
gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, 1799.) 

c. Fichte was never satisfied with the expositions 
which he had given of his theory. He was constantly 
trying to attain greater clearness both for himself and for 
his readers. He modified his theory unconsciously by 
these repeated restatements. In his later drafts he 
discarded the scholastic method of proof which he had 
employed in the first exposition of the Science of Knowl- 
edge, He then placed more stress on the immediate 
states and facts of consciousness. But the more he 
delved into the inexpressible ideas of absolute reality 
and no longer conceived this reality as active and infinite, 
but as at rest and superior to all effort and activity, the 
more his theory likewise assumed a mystical character. 
His religion was no longer mere practical confidence, but 
it now became a matter of devotion, of absolute self- 
surrender. This idea is quite prominent in his Anweis- 



SCHELLING 177 

ung zum seligen Leben (1806). Gmndzilge des gegen- 
wdrtigen Zeitalters (1806) is likewise of vast importance on 
account of the incisive polemics against the eighteenth 
century as ^^the age of enlightenment and impoverishment'^ 
{Auf-und Auskldrung). Here we find a clear statement 
of the antithesis which was later (in the school of St. 
Simon) described as the antithesis between the organic 
and critical age. 

2. Friedrich William Schelling (i 775-1854) is the 
typical philosopher of Romanticism. Having no critical 
prejudices whatever, in this youthful treatises which 
constitute the exclusive basis of his philosophical signif- 
icance, he proclaims a new science which is intended to 
transcend all the antitheses still confronting the traditional 
science. He labored first at Jena, afterwards at Stuttgart, 
Munich and Erlangen. His youth was characterized by 
great productiveness, which was however followed by 
a remarkable period of stagnation in his productivity. 
After the death of Hegel, when nearly seventy, he was 
called to Berlin by Frederick William IV, for the purpose 
of counteracting the radical tendencies arising from the 
Hegelian philosophy. His lectures at Berlin, which had 
aroused great anticipations, were however a complete 
disappointment . 

a. Schelling began his philosophical career as a col- 
laborator of Fichte. His first essays constitute a further 
development of the Fichtean science of knowledge. But 
he could not accept the subordinate position ascribed 
'4o nature in Fichte^ s philosophy (as mere limitation 
and means). He undertakes to show in his Ideen zu 
einer Philosophie der Natur (1797) and in various essays 
in natiiral philosophy, that it is impossible that nature 
shoiild assume such a mechanical relation to mental life. 



178 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

He states his problems very clearly; the romantic 
character consists in the treatment and the solution. 
Whilst the natural scientist lives in the midst of natiu-e 
as in the immediate presence of reality, the philosopher of 
nature inquires how it is possible to know nature : ' ' How 
nature and the experience of it is possible, this is the 
problem with which philosophy arose." Or as it has also 
been expressed: ^^The phenomenality of sensibility is the 
borderland of all empirical phenomena." (Erster Ent- 
wurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1799.) This 
setting of the problem recalls the observation of Hobbes, 
namely, that the most remarkable of all phenomena is 
the fact that phenomena do exist. The realist and the 
romanticist agree in the statement of the problem, how- 
ever widely they differ in their respective solutions. 
Schelling wishes to explain nature from the viewpoint of 
mind and thus substitute a new science instead of the 
natural science founded by Galileo and Newton. The 
natural scientist cannot explain how nature can be 
known. The natural philosopher explains it by con- 
struing nature as unconscious mind. Fichte had even 
distinguished a twofold tendency in consciousness: 
an infinite, unconditioned activity (the piire 
ego) and Hmitation (by the non-ego). Hence 
if there is to be any possible way of imderstanding the 
origin of mind from the forces of nature, it follows that 
these two tendencies must already be manifest in nature, 
only in lower degrees, or, as Schelling puts it, in lower 
potentiaHties. And since nature differs from mind only 
as a matter of degree, in which the tension of those ten- 
dencies, the polarity of opposites, as Schelling calls them, 
is manifested, it follows that the various phenomena of 
nature Hkewise show only quantitative differences. 



SCHELLING 179 

Gravity, light and the organism represent the various levels 
through which nature ascends to mind. The relation of 
contraction and expansion varies on the different 
levels; in the organism they coexist in inner unity, and 
as a matter of fact we are then likewise already at the 
threshold of consciousness. Whilst mechanical natural 
science, with its atoms and laws of motion, reveals to us 
only the external aspect 'of nature, as lifeless objectivity, 
it is the business of natural philosophy to explain nature 
as it really is in its inmost essence, whereby it at the same 
time appears as the preliminary step to mind. On the 
lower levels the objective element predominates, on the 
higher levels the subjective element. These three levels 
of nature correspond to knowledge, action and art in the 
realm of mind {System des trans cendentalen Idealismus, 
1800). Art portrays directly and concretely what phi- 
losophy can describe only abstractly. Here therefore the 
two tendencies of being manifest themselves in perfect 
unity. Schelling could no longer regard the Absolute 
as pure ego because the relation of the latter to the non- 
ego was wholly external. The distinction between the 
subjective and the objective vanishes entirely in the 
Absolute; it is pure identity. Antitheses exist only for 
finite mind. 

Schelling^ s Philosophy of Nature is really nothing more 
than a symbolic interpretation of nature, not an expla- 
nation of nature. He is even conscious of this fact him- 
self. In one of his best essays (Methode des akademis- 
chen Studiums, 1803) he remarks: *^ Empiricism con- 
templates being as an object apart from its meaning, 
because the nature of a symbol is such as to possess its own 
peculiar life within itself. In this isolation it can ap- 
pear only as a finite object, in an absolute negation of 



l8o THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

the infinite." That is to say the natural scientists are 
not aware of the fact that nature is a symbol , hut they 
regard it as a thin g-in-its elf. The Philosopher alone 
understands (because he starts from within or from 
above) the symbolic significance. But then Schelling's 
philosophy Hkewise really amounts to nothing more 
than a system of analogies and allegories which are 
very arbitrarily apphed. It is not without justification 
that the term "Philosophy of Nature^' has acquired a 
suspicious sound in scientific ears. 

Notwithstanding the fact that Schelling speaks of levels 
and transitions, he is nevertheless not an evolutionist 
in the modem significance of the term. He does not 
accept any real development in time, but regards 
nature as a magnificent system which reveals at once 
the profound antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity 
in the greatest variety of nuances and degrees, whilst 
none of these differences pertain to the absolute groimd 
of his system. Time is nothing more than a finite form. — 
Schelling^ s ideas have nevertheless contributed much 
towards producing the conviction of the inner identity 
of the forces and forms of nature. 

b. Schelling^ s philosophy, with various modifications 
which we cannot here discuss, bore the character of 
"Philosophy of Nature'^ throughout its first period 
(until 1803). But a problem now arises which all specu- 
lative philosophy must eventually take up: namely, if 
the Absolute is to be regarded as an absolute imity or 
indifference, how shall we explain the origin of differences, 
of levels or (as Schelling likewise remarks) of potencies? 
How can they have their ground in an absolute imity? 
He treats this problem in his essay on Philosophic und 
Religion (1804), which forms the transition from Schelling's 



SCHELLING iSl 

period of the philosophy of natiire to that of the phi- 
losophy of religion. If experience reveals not only 
differences, but even antitheses which cannot be 
harmonized, it must mean that a fall from the 
eternal harmony must have taken place. Historical 
evolution implies the mastery of disharmonies and 
the restoration of harmonious unity. Just as he had made 
nature the preliminary of mind in the Philosophy of 
Nature, he now Hkewise construes history as a series of 
stages; not only the former but the latter is likewise an 
Odyssey of the soul. 

Schelling elaborated this idea more fully in the treatise 
Philosophische Untersuchungen iiber das Wesen der 
menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhdngenden 
Gegenstdnde (1809). Schelling' s philosophy of rehgion 
was considerably influenced by the writings of Jacob 
Bohme, as this treatise in particular shows. Schelling 
seeks to prove that the only way God can be conceived 
as a personal being is to assimie in Him an obscure 
principle of nature which can be clarified and harmonized 
by the unfolding of the divine life. The infinite person- 
ality must contain the antithesis within itself, 
whilst the finite personalities discover their antitheses 
outside themselves. But without opposition and resist- 
ance there can be no life and no personality. Hence 
God could not be God if there were not something within 
him which is not yet God. 

Just as Schelling had read mind into nature in his 
Philosophy of Nature, so he reads nature into the absolute 
mind in his Philosophy of Religion. But that obscure 
principle contains the possibility of evil, according to 
Schelling even as for Bohme. That which was merely 
intended to be principle and matter may separate, i. e. 



l82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

isolate itself. We can thus understand egoism, the sin 
and evil in nature, the irrational in general, which 
refuses to conform with ideas. 

Thus Schelling passes into m3rthical mysticism. He 
elaborated his philosophy of reHgion in greater detail 
in works which appeared after his death, and wliich con- 
stituted the content of his BerHn lectures {Philosophie 
der Mythologie and Philosophie der Ofenharung). He 
regarded the history of religion as a great struggle with 
the Titanic elements which had been isolated by the Fall. 
This struggle takes place in the religious consciousness 
of mankind, which ascends through the various mythol- 
ogies to Christianity, and finally through the development 
of Christianity to the religion of pure spirit. — In addition 
to brilliant ideas and points of view, we find here also, 
just as in the Philosophy of Nature, a large measure of 
fantasy and arbitrariness. 

3. George William Frederick Hegel (i 770-1831) is the 
S3^stematizer of Romanticism, just as Fichte was its moralist 
and Schelling its mystic. He too labored at the Univer- 
sity of Jena in his youth. Later on he went to Bavaria, 
first as an editor and afterwards as the director of a g^^m- 
nasium. He appeared again in the capacity of university 
professor at Heidelberg, but soon accepted a call to Ber- 
lin where he founded a large and influential school. 

a. Hegel undertook to construe the ideas which, ac- 
cording to his conception, express the essence of the various 
phases of existence in a progressive series based on logical 
necessity. What he called the dialectical method con- 
sisted in the discovery of the inherent necessity with which 
one concept leads on to another concept imtil at last all 
the concepts constitute one great system. Notwith- 
standing this however, this purely logical character, which 



^s^-Z^\ 



HEGEL 183 

is so prominent because of the severely systematic form of 
Hegel's works, is not the fundamental characteristic of 
Hegelian thought. Hegel was naturally a realist. His 
supreme ambition consisted in penetrating into the real 
forces of being, and abstract ideas were intended to ex- 
press only the forms of this content. He was of course con- 
vinced that the elements of reality in every sphere are 
essentially related to each other in the same way as ideas 
are in the mind. In this way the twofold character of his 
philosophy as realistic penetration and logical system be- 
comes clear. Epistemologically this might be stated as 
follows: namely, that he once more annuls the distinction 
between ground and cause {ratio and causa) which Hume and 
Kant had insisted on so strongly. To this extent he returns 
to pre-critical dogmatism. "^ 

The realistic character is still quite dominant in HegeVs 
earlier works, with which we are acquainted through his 
manuscripts which have been used by a number of in- 
vestigators. During his youth he was much occupied with 
historical studies and reflections, especially those of a relig- 
ious nature. He paid high tribute of praise to the periods 
in which men dwelt in natural fellowship, because the in- 
dividual still constituted an actual part of the whole, and 
had not yet asserted itself with subjective reflection and 
criticism as is the case in modem times. Even Chris- 
tianity appeared to him as a sign of disintegration because 
it was a matter of individual concern, whilst on the other 
hand he regarded classical antiquity as fortunately situ- 
ated because the individual Hved and wrought completely 
and spontaneously within the whole. Like Fichte (in the 
Grundziige des gegenwdrtigen Zeitalters) Hegel likewise 
experienced a profoimd sense of antagonism towards the 
enlightenment, notwithstanding the fact that he too be- 



154 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

longed to this period. But it was not EegeVs affair to 
revel in ecstasies over the ideals of the past. According 
to him ideal and reality, reason and actuality, are not real 
opposites. 

He stood qmte close to Schelling for a considerable 
period., during which time they published a paper in part- 
nership. But important differences gradually arose and 
Hegel assails his former colleague openly in the preface to 
his first important treatise, Phdnomenologie des Geistes 
(1807). He admits of course that Schelling tmderstood 
that the problem consists in discovering the harmony be- 
tween the antitheses. But he operates with a mere 
schema (subject -object), which he applies to everything 
mechanically, instead of showing how the one member of 
the antithesis effects the transition to the other by an in- 
herent necessity, and how a higher unity of both is then 
formed. The absolute cannot be an immobile indiffer- 
ence; it is process, life, mind. — He showed, even in this 
book, how ordinary, practical consciousness rises to specu- 
lative consciousness through a series of steps, each of 
which leads to its successor by means of the contradictions 
discovered within itself. The reader is thus brought to 
the point from which he may grasp the pure system of 
ideas. This evolution takes place in the individual as 
well as in the human race as a whole; the Phenomenol- 
ogy is both a psychology and a history of civiHzation. 
The same law pertains to both realms, the same progres- 
sive dialectic. 

b. According to Hegel dialectic is not only character- 
istic of thought, but it is likewise a fundamental law of 
being, because one form of existence always implies 
another and things are members of one grand totality. 

No single idea is capable of expressing the totality of 



HEGEL 185 

being. Each idea leads to its own negative, because it 
reveals itself as limited and to that extent untrue. Nega- 
tion then brings a new concept into existence. But since 
this one is likewise determined by the first, the necessity 
of a higher unity is evident, a unity within which both find 
their explanation, because they are "annulled'' in a two- 
fold significance, — ^namely, negated in their isolation and' 
at the same time affirmed as moments of the higher unity. 
Hence, according to the dialectical method, thought pro- 
ceeds in triads, and the system of all these triads constitutes 
truth. Truth can never be particular, hut must always be 
totality. 

The fact that dialectic constitutes the process of being 
is revealed by the fact that every phenomenon of nature 
and of history leads beyond itself and exists only as an 
element of a totality. It is evident that Hegel here con- 
strues all being after the analogy of consciousness; the 
things which constitute the universe are supposed to sus- 
tain the same relations among themselves as ideas sustain 
in our minds. But he likewise makes use of other anal- 
ogies. The effects of contrast show how the antitheses 
may oscillate from one to the other. And organic growth 
shows how it is possible for the earlier stages to determine 
the later and to continue their existence in them. Hegel 
constructs his theory of universal dialectic upon such anal- 
ogies without being clearly conscious of the fact himself. 
Everything perishes and yet there is nothing lost. The 
memory of the universal mind preserves everything. And 
it is because of its inherent identity with the universal 
mind that the human intellect is capable of evolving the 
pure forms of the universal dialectic. Kant's doctrine of 
the categories is transformed into a world-system {Wissen- 
schaft der Logik, 181 2-1 8 16). 



1 86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

Piire logic however is only the first part of the system. 
This follows from the fact that the piire forms of logic 
constitute the antithesis to real nature. We are led from 
logic to the philosophy of nature (likewise the profoundest 
problem in EegeVs system), i. e. to the doctrine of the 
phenomena which occur in time and space, by a dialectical 
necessity. As a matter of fact we have here to deal with 
Schelling^s "Fall." HegeVs exposition of the philosophy 
of nature is, so far as particulars are concerned, quite as 
arbitrary and fantastic as that of SchelUng. He likewise 
regards nature as a series of levels: we approach physics 
through mechanics, and thence to the organic sciences, but 
always under an ^^ inherent necessity. " Hegel has no more 
room for a real development in time than SchelUng. — 
The philosophy of nature brings us to the philosophy of 
mind, the "higher unity" of the first two parts of the sys- 
tem. The struggle incident to the objective distraction of 
space and time matures the abstract idea and it now re- 
turns within itself. Dialectic likewise leads through a 
series of steps in this case. Subjective mind (in a series 
of steps known as soul, consciousness and reason), the 
mental life of the particular individual, leads to objective 
mind, which is manifested in the triad of right, individual 
morality (conscience) and social morality (social and 
political life). The higher unity of subjective and object- 
ive mind is absolute mind, the totality of mental life, in 
which the antithesis of subject and object is annulled. 
Absolute mind is revealed in art, religion and philosophy 
(Encyclopddie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1817). 

c. We shall discuss two divisions of the philosophy of 
mind somewhat more in detail; the doctrine of objective 
mind, which Hegel elaborated in his Philosophie des Rechts 
(18 21), and the Philosophy of Religion as treated in the 



HEGEL 187 

Vorlesungen tiher die Philosophie der Religion, published 
posthumously. 

Although Eegel no longer refers to the ancient charac- 
ter of the state with the same romantic fervor that char- 
acterized his early youth, his theory of the state neverthe- 
less assumes an antique character. Actual morahty 
appears in the life of the family, pohtical society and the 
state, and not only forms an antithesis to abstract and ob- 
jective right, but also to *' morality," to subjective con- 
science in its isolation from the historical forms of society. 
The good exists in moral association and does not depend 
upon individual caprice and contingency. The moral 
world reveals the activity of something which is superior 
to the consciousness of the individual. The individual can 
only realize the highest type of development by a life in 
and for society. '' The moral substance " is the mind which 
governs the family, the poHtical society, and above all the 
state. The state is the complete actuality of the moral 
idea: the fact that the state exists is the witness of God's 
course in the world. The constitution of the state is a 
necessary consequence of its nature, and individual con- 
struction is here quite as much out of place as individual 
criticism. The modem state as a matter of fact is an 
organization of liberty; but this does not imply that the 
individual can participate in the government accord- 
ing to his individual caprice. The wise shall rule. Gov- 
ernmental authority belongs to the enlightened, the scien- 
tifically educated b-ureaucracy. The fact that the system- 
atic development of the Hegelian philosophy of right 
shows a striking correspondence with the constitution of 
Prussia at that time (as far as it may be called a constitu- 
tion) is not to be explained as a mere accommodation, 
but it was rather a consequence of Hegel's realism. Hegel 



1 88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

thinks the divine idea is not so feeble as to be unable to 
permeate reality — of the state as well as of nature — and 
it is not the business of philosophy to contrive new ideals, 
but to discover the ideahty of the vital forms realized 
hitherto. 

The contrast between formalism and realism in the 
Hegelian philosophy appears perhaps most clearly in the 
sphere of religion. Here too it is HegeVs sole purpose to 
penetrate the facts; even here the sole business of philos- 
ophy consists in understanding what is actually given. 
He was convinced that philosophy which is developed to 
perfect clearness has the same content as religion. Philos- 
ophy indeed seeks the unity of being through all antitheses 
and at every step, — and religion teaches that everything 
has its origin in the One God. The only difference is this: 
that what pkilosophy expresses in the form of the concept, 
religion expresses in the form of idea, of imagination. Phi- 
losophy states in the language of abstract eternal concepts 
what religion proclaims concretely and enthusiastically in 
subhme S3rmbols. The relation (as Hegel remarks, bor- 
rowing an illustration from Hamann) is like that between 
the closed fist and the open palm. Religion, e. g., speaks of 
the creation of the world as a definite act in time, accom- 
plished once for all, whilst philosophy conceives the re- 
lation between God and the world as eternal and timeless 
(like that of ground and consequence). In the religious 
doctrine of reconciliation God becomes incarnate, lives as 
a man, suffers and dies on the cross: according to philos- 
ophy this too is an eternal relationship : the incommensu- 
rability of the finite and the infinite which must constantly 
be annulled in consequence of its finite form, if it is to de- 
scribe an infinite result. — In the fervency of his zeal Hegel 
failed to see that this distinction of form might be of de- 



SCHLEIERMACHER 189 

cisive importance. He describes the distinction between 
two world theories — the theory of monism or immanence 
and the theory of duaHsm or transcendence. Eegel re- 
veals his romanticism in the naive conviction that values 
are never destroyed by transposition into new forms. The 
problem which he thus neglected, as we shall presently 
see, was very clearly defined by his disciples. 

B. Critical Romanticists 

The critical philosophy was not wholly suppressed dur- 
ing the romantic period. There were certain thinkers, 
who, whilst profoundly affected by the romantic tendency, 
had nevertheless not rejected the results of the critical 
pliilosophy. Although critics in epistem±ology, they en- 
deavored at the same time by various methods to secure a 
theory of life which would transcend the limitations of 
science. Among these we mention Schleiermacher, Schopen- 
hauer and Kierkegaard. 

I. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (i 768-1 834) 
completed his first courses of study at a Moravian institu- 
tion, and even there already laid the foimdation of his dis- 
tinctive theory of life. The desire for a broader and more 
critical training took him to the imiversity at Halle, where 
he later, after serving a nimiber of years in a pastorate, 
became professor of theology. After the battle of Jena 
he went to Berhn, where, as professor and preacher, he 
labored not only on behalf of science and the church, but 
in the interest of pubHc questions and the affairs of the 
nation. 

He came to the conclusion early in life that the real 
characteristic feature of human life, its real nature, has its 
seat in the affections, and that in them alone man experi- 
ences the totaHty of his personal self. In addition to this 



IQO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

he acquired, both by independent reflection and by the 
study of the works of Kant, a clear insight into the Hmits 
of human knowledge. He did not join the circle of 
romanticists until later. Dilthey has described this course 
of the development of the critical romanticist in his Lehen 
Schleiermachers. Schleiermacher^s position in the history 
of philosophy is characterized by the fact that he keeps the 
spirit of the critical philosophy alive within the ranks of 
romanticism. His Socratic personality, in which the capac- 
ity of complete inner devotion was united with a remark- 
able degree of calm discretion, furnished the basis for the 
combination of romanticism and criticism. According to 
his view the things which criticism destroyed and would 
no longer regard as objectively true did not necessarily 
lose their reHgious value if they could be supported as the 
symbolic expression of an affective personal experience. 
Schleiermacher reveals his romanticism especially in the 
fact that he does not distinguish sharply between S3nnbol 
and dogma. He failed to see that as a matter of fact he 
assigned to religion a different position in the spiritual life 
than that which the church could accept. In his Reden 
uber die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verdchtern 
(1799) he defined immediate intuition and feeling, by 
which man is enabled to experience the infinite and the 
eternal, as the psychological basis of reHgion. Here every 
antithesis is annulled, whilst knowledge must forever 
move from idea to idea and volition from task to task. 
The only method by which intellectual, aesthetic and 
moral cultiu-e can attain their completion is by finally 
resting on subjective concentration such as is given in 
feeling alone. Hence Schleiermacher defines religion from 
the standpoint of himian nattu-e, not vice versa. He seeks 
to show the value of religion for Hfe. 



SCHLEIERMACHER IQI 

Schleiermacher^s philosophical labors cover the depart- 
ments of epistemology, ethics and the philosophy of religion. 

a. He investigates the presuppositions of knowledge 
in his Dialectik (which was published only after his death) . 
KJQOwledge exists only in the case where every single idea 
is not only necessarily combined with all other ideas, but 
where an actual reality likewise corresponds to the par- 
ticular ideas. The relations between ideas must corre- 
spond with the relations between things. Particularly 
does the causal relation of objective reality correspond to 
the combination of concepts expressed in judgments. 
Here Schleiermacher presents a mixture of criticism and 
dogmatism. He forgets that the only knowledge we have 
of reahty is by means of our thoughts, and furthermore 
that reality and thought forever remain incomparable. 
He nevertheless assumes that the identity of thought and 
being is a presupposition of knowledge, but not in itself 
knowledge. He thus opposes Schelling, for whom in fact 
that very identity constituted the highest kind of knowl- 
edge. But, according to Schleiermacher, Schelling offers 
nothing more than abstract schemata. — The pathway 
from that presupposition, which forms the starting-point 
of knowledge, to the idea of a complete totality of all exist- 
ence, which would be the consummation of all knowledge — 
or, as it may likewise be expressed, from the idea of God to 
the idea of the universe — is a long one, and it can never be 
compassed by human knowledge. Knowledge is only 
provisional. We are always somewhere between the be- 
ginning and the end of knowledge and neither the one nor 
the other can be transformed into actual knowledge. But 
beyond the confines of knowledge the unity of being can 
be directly experienced in the affections and expressed in 
Sirmbols. Here dialectic justifies every symbol which 



192 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

maintains the inseparability of the beginning and the end 
(God and the world). It is impossible to construe either 
of these from the standpoint of the other. But dialectic 
insists, in opposition to the religious method of represen- 
tation, on the symbolic character of all expressions which 
are supposed to describe God, the world, and their respec- 
tive relationship. Thus, e. g. the term " person, '' when 
applied to God, is nothing more than a symbol. 

b. Just as knowledge presupposes the unity of thought 
and being, so action likewise presupposes the unity of will 
and being. Action would be impossible if the will were 
absolutely foreign and isolated in the world. The former 
presupposition can no more be a fact of knowledge than 
the latter. We are thus led from dialectics to ethics (cf . 
a series of essays published in Complete Works, III, 2, 
and Philosophische Sittenlehre, published by Schweizer, 
1835). According to Schleiermacher ethics is a theory of 
development in which reason and desire cultivate and 
govern nature. This development would be impossible 
if reason and will were not already present in nature. 
Nature is a kind of ethics of a lower order, a diminutive 
ethics. Will reveals itself by degrees — in the inorganic 
forms, in the life of plants and of animals, and finally in 
human life. There is no absolute beginning of ethical 
development. Here Schleiermacher in direct opposition to 
Kant and Fichte coordinates ethics with nature and history. 
But it is nevertheless only within the realm of humanity 
that he accepts an actual, real development. 

Ethical capacity consists partly of organization, i. e. of 
constructive and formative power, partly symbolizing, 
i. e. expressive and descriptive power. Its organizing 
activity is shown in material culture and in commercial 
and legal business. In its symbolizing activity man ob- 



SCHLEIERMACHER 193 

jectifies his inner experiences in art, science and religion. 
— Whilst in his youth Schleiermacher (Monologe, 1800) 
was impatient with the prominence ascribed to material 
culture, and as a matter of fact wanted to recognize the 
''symbolizing" activity alone as ethical, later on he tried 
to recognize both forms of activity in their distinctive sig- 
nificance. 

He disagreed with Kant and Fichte not only in the mat- 
ter of the intimate relation of ethics to nature, but like- 
wise in his strong emphasis on individuality. The nature 
of the individual is not exhausted in the universal and so- 
cial. The only way an individual can possess any moral 
value is by means of the fact that he expresses what is 
universal in human nature in an individual way. His 
acts must therefore necessarily contain something which 
could not pertain to another individual. The individual 
could not have been fully active in the case of any act of 
his which lacked the distinguishing marks of his individ- 
uality. 

c. In his conception of religion Schleiermacher is in- 
clined both to intellectualism and to moralism. He assigns 
religion to the point where the division of the mental facul- 
ties has not yet become active, and where that which is 
individual is just in process of differentiating itself from 
the universal, without however as yet having attained the 
antithesis of subject and object. This point is given in 
an immediate feeling, which he at first (in the Reden uber 
die Religion) described as a sense of unity, later on (in 
Der christliche Glaube, 182 1) rather as a sense of de- 
pendence. It is the birth-place of personality. In this 
feeling we are at once personal and dependent: it is here 
that we acquire the basis of our personality. The sense 
of dependence becomes a consciousness of God at the mo- 



194 THE PHILOSOPHY OP ROMANTICISM 

metit when reflection begins; the term ''God" implies 
^Hhe source of our susceptible and independent being." 

ReHgious ideas and concepts are all secondary. They 
are deduced by reflection on the immediate states of feel- 
ing in which the essence of religion consists. The demand 
for expression and communion furnishes the impulse to 
clothe the subjective experiences in word and symbol. 
Such words and symbols constitute dogmas, i. e. s^mibol- 
ical expressions of religious states of mind. Each separate 
dogma must bear a direct relation to some feeling, and the 
dogmatician must never deduce a dogma from another 
dogma by purely logical processes. Whenever dogmatic 
statements are taken literally, dogmatics becomes mythology. 
This appertains, e. g. to the ideas of the personaHty of 
God, personal immortality, creation, the first human pair, 
etc. It likewise appHes to the idea of miracle. The in- 
terests of reHgion can never place God and the world in 
opposition to each other. The Christian-religious feeling 
is characterized by the fact that Christians experience a 
purifying and an enlargement of their owm circumscribed 
feelings through the type expressed in the congregation; 
in this way they experience Christ as the Redeemer. 

Schleiermacher^s philosophy marks an important ad- 
vance, especially in its psychological aspect. But he is 
likewise disposed to identify symbolic statement and 
causal explanation in the same way as he identifies dogma 
and symbol. On these points the philosophy of reHgion 
receives further development at the hands of Strauss and 
Feuerbach. 

2. Arthur Schopenhauer (i 788-1860) is a Kantian in 
epistemology, but he claims to have discovered a direct 
revelation of the thing-in-itself . He discovers the solution 
of the riddle of the imiverse with romantic precipitancy 



SCHOPENHAUER 1 95 

by means of an intmtion which instantly drops all Hmita- 
tions. His great importance rests on his psychological 
views and on his philosophy of Hfe which is based on per- 
sonal experience. 

Schopenhauer, the son of a wealthy Dantzig merchant, 
enjoyed a well-rounded education and became acquainted 
with the world early in life by means of travel and a variety 
of social intercourse. His complete independence enabled 
him to devote himself entirely to his studies and to the 
elaboration of his theory of life. After an unsuccessful 
attempt in a professorship at the University of Berhn, he 
withdrew into private life at Frankfort-on-the-Main where 
he spent the rest of his days. From his own inner experi- 
ence he had very early become acquainted with the mys- 
terious, conflicting energies and impulses of life; and the 
things which he saw aroimd him at times aroused his 
anger, and again his sympathy. He concluded from these 
experiences that the beginning of philosophy is not wonder, 
but confusion and despair, and he endeavored to rise above 
them by reflective thought and artistic contemplation. 

a. Schopenhauer elaborated his critical theory already 
in his flrst essay (Uber die vierfachen Wurzeln des Satzes 
voni ziireichendeyi Grunde, 1813). The principle of suffi- 
cient reason receives its four different forms from the fact 
that our ideas may be inter-related in four different ways : 
as grotmd and consequence, as cause and effect, in space 
and time, and as motive and act. Contemporaneously 
with HegeVs attempt to annul the distinction between 
ground and cause, emphasized by Hume and Kant, Scho- 
penhauer shows clearly the importance of this distinction. 

The flrst book of his chief work {Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung, 1819) contains his theory of knowledge. He 
differs from Kant especially on account of the intimate 



196 THE PHILOSOPHY OE ROMANTICISM 

relation between intuition and thought which he main- 
tains. Sensation, which is the correlate of a bodily 
change, is the only thing which is directly given. But 
the faculties of understanding and intuition likewise co- 
operate instinctively; we conceive the cause of sensation 
as an external object, distinct from our body, by an act 
which reveals the theory of causality. Space, time and 
causality cooperate in this projection. Experience never 
modifies this act, which indeed even forms the basis of the 
possibility of experience. 

Cognition (sensation, understanding, intuition) is a 
product of our physical organization. The methods of 
natural science never get beyond materialism. Just as 
we discover the cause of a sensation in a physical object 
distinct from our body, so we likewise find the cause of 
such object, as well as its states, in a third object, etc. The 
law of inertia and the permanence of matter are the direct 
implications of the law of causality. The insufficiency of 
materialism however rests upon the fact that the principle 
of sufficient reason pertains only to the objective correlate 
of the idea; matter itself, which is the cause of the sensa- 
tion and of the idea, is present only as the object of the 
idea. For cognition the world is nothing more than idea. 
We are not concerned with anything beyond the relations 
of ideas to each other. It is impossible, on the basis of 
■feheoretical knowledge, to get beyond this circle. 

But what is being? What really constitutes the aggre- 
gate of these objects of ideas?- Schopenhauer believes that 
he has discovered a method of unveiling the ''thing-in- 
itself . " The principle of sufficient reason appertains only 
to us as cognizing beings. ^4^ volitional beings we ourselves 
are thing-in-itself. An aspiration and yearning, an im- 
pulse towards self-assertion, is active in the profound 



SCHOPENHAUER I97 

depths of otir being, beneath every idea, which is manifest 
in pleasiire and in pain, hope and fear, love and hate, — 
a will, which constitutes our inmost nature, the primary 
phenomenon! We understand the inmost nature of the 
world by our own inmost nature. Thus, with the help of 
analogy, an analogy whose justification, due to his roman- 
tic temper, he never questions, he makes the transition to 
metaphysics. — The fact that all volition is a temporal 
process and that all we know about it is merely phenom- 
enal, of course constitutes a real difficulty. (Herbart called 
attention to this difficulty already in a review in 1820.) 
Schopenhauer concedes this difficulty in the second volume 
of his chief work (which appeared twenty-five years later 
than the first), but thinks that volition is nevertheless the 
phenomenon with which we are really identical. But in 
that case the principle of sufficient reason, which applies to 
all phenomena, must likewise apply to volition, — and then 
the thing-in-itself still remains undiscovered! 

It was a matter of profound importance for the develop- 
ment of psychology that volitional life was emphasized so 
vigorously — and in its details frequently so ingeniously — 
in contrast to the Hegelian intellectualism. — Beyond this 
Schopenhauer is evidently affected by Fichte, not only in 
his theory of will, but likewise in his projection theory 
which forms an essential part of his theory of knowledge 
(especially by Fichte's lectures Uher die Thatsachen des 
Bewusstseins) . 

Our knowledge of will does not rest upon direct intro- 
spection alone. Jt likewise possesses phenomenal form, 
because our whole body is the material expression of will. 
Body and will are one. Schopenhauer could therefore call 
knowledge (the idea and its object) a product of the will 
quite as consistently as a product of the body. The body 



198 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

is the same thing seen objectively (physiccJly) ?:5 the will 
seen subjectively (metaphysically). Thj operation of 
will is manifest throughout the whole of physical nature — 
in organic growth, in the fimctional activity of muscles and 
nerves, in fact in all the forces of nature. Schopenhauer 
endeavors to prove this in detail in his book, Der Wille in 
der Natur (1836), and in the second voltmie of his master- 
piece, because here he likewise operates with analogies. 
We behold the operation of will in nature through a series 
of steps (which are however no more to be regarded as 
temporal, real evolutional steps than in Schelling and 
Hegel). The steps accordingly vary to the degree of 
difference between cause and effect. On the level of 
mechanism cause and effect are equivalent, showing a 
sHght degree of dissimilarity already in chemism, whilst 
in the organic realm the cause dwindles to a mere dis- 
charging stimulus, and where consciousness enters it 
simply furnishes the motive. The dissimilarity is greatest 
when we come to the last step — and here indeed the causal 
relation is revealed as an act of will! 

Will manifests itself ever3rwhere as the will to live — for 
the mere sake of living, of pure existence. Here the ques- 
tion, why, no longer occurs; the principle of sufficient 
reason does not apply to the will itself. The multiplicity 
of forms and energies in nature, the movements which 
are forever renewed, and the everlasting unrest in the 
world reveal the presence of the ever-active energy of the 
impulse of self-assertion. This vague impulse involves 
us in the illusion that Hfe is good and valuable. The will 
employs this illusion as the inducement for us to maintain 
our existence at any cost. Existence understood in its 
real nature, just because it consists essentially in a restless 
and insatiable impulse, is pain, and pleasure or satisfaction 



SCHOPENHAUER I99 

only arises as a contrast-phenomenon, namely, when this 
infernal fire is momentarily quenched. All pleasure is 
illusory, a zero, which only appears to have positive value 
by contrast. In a vivid portrayal of himian and animal 
life Schopenhauer describes the torttire of existence, ''the 
rush and confusion, ", in which Hving beings fight and 
destroy each other, r 

The vast majority are imder the illusion, produced by 
the desire to live, of the value of life. Those of pro- 
founder vision, especially the geniuses, lift the veil of the 
Maya and discover the profound disharmonies. — The 
question arises, is there then no way of escape, no means 
by which we can rescue ourselves from this torture? 

b. He devotes the last two books of his chief work to 
answering these questions. Schopenhauer finds some real 
difficulties on these points: for if will is everything, 
identical with the ''world," whence shall the energy pro- 
ceed by which the will itself is to be annulled? And if the 
will should be annulled, would it not follow that everything 
would then be annihilated? Schopenhauer replies that the 
will is not annihilated by some cause other than itself, 
but that it simply subsides (in such a manner that velle is 
supplanted by nolle). And the state which supervenes 
is merely a relative nothing, i. e. as respects our idea; in 
itself it may quite as readily be a positive reality. It is 
the Nirvana of the Buddhists; were it not for the danger 
of abuse of the term, Schopenhauer would not have 
objected to apply the word "God." 

There are three ways by which the will-to-live may be 
sublated. It is possible to assimie the attitude towards 
life of a mere spectator, in which case he devotes himself 
wholly to aesthetic or intellectual contemplation. If 
e. g. we are completely absorbed in the contemplation of 



20p THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

some work of art, the will is subdued and we forget that 
we are denizens of the world. Art everywhere represents 
the cHmax. The agony of Hfe subsides in the presence of 
the image of Hfe. — This is the course taken by Schopen- 
hauer himself. — In the case of human love, which — ^be- 
cause all Hfe is full of agony — ^necessarily assumes the char- 
acter of S3nxipathy, the individual wiU vanishes from the 
fact that it is lost in its identity with its object. This 
thought forms the basis of Schopenhauer^ s ethics {Die 
beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, 1841). — It is after all 
only the saints, the ascetics, for whom every motive has 
vanished, who are capable of an absolute suppression of 
the wiU. Schopenhauer finds the best practical solutions 
of the riddle of life and of the agony of life in Buddhism, 
in primitive Christianity, and in mysticism, and he has 
the most profoimd regard for the chief representatives of 
asceticism, — the more so, because of the consciousness 
that he was not a saint himself. 

3. The romantic philosophy made a profoimd impres- 
sion in the Scandinavian North, differing according to 
the different character of the northern peoples. — In 
Sweden the romantic opposition to empirical philosophy 
is particularly evident. The fundamental principle of 
the philosophy characteristic of Sweden was this, namely, 
that truth must be a perfect, inherently consistent 
totality, and since experience merely presents fragments, 
and such forsooth as are constantly undergoing change, a 
constant antithesis of ideal and empirical truth must fol- 
low. After this idea had been elaborated by a ntimber of 
thinkers, the most noteworthy of whom are Benjamin 
Eoyer and Eric Gustav Geyer^ the school attained its sys- 
tematic culmination in the philosophy of Christopher Jacob 
Bostrom (i 797-1866), professor of the University of 



SIBBERN 20 1 

Upsala, according to whom time, change and evolution 
are illusions of the senses, whilst true reality consists of a 
world of ideas which differ from Platonism by the fact 
that the ideas are construed as personal beings. — Den- 
mark reveals the influence of Schelling and Hegel to a 
marked degree, especially among the writers in aesthetics 
and the theologians. The more independent thinkers 
however have devoted themselves almost exclusively to 
the problems of psychology, ethics and epistemology and 
assumed an attitude of decided opposition to abstract 
speculation. Frederick Christian Sihhern (i 785-1872), 
who labored at Copenhagen in the capacity of professor 
of philosophy for more than fifty years, — in opposition to 
Hegel and Bostrom — placed great stress on a real evolution 
in time. Experience reveals that evolution has a nimiber 
of starting-points, and the contact of the various evolu- 
tional series with each other gives rise to strife, ''a stu- 
pendous debate of everything with everything/^ which in 
turn accounts for progress. This idea of sporadic evolu- 
tion has likewise an important bearing on the theory of 
knowledge: each cognizing being has the viewpoint of one 
of these beginnings and hence cannot survey the entire 
process. Sihhern devoted himself more particularly to 
psychology, for which he was specially adapted by his 
gift of observation and his enthusiastic interest in human 
Ufe. 

We shall consider Soren Kierkegaard (181 3- 185 5) only 
as a philosopher, leaving out of account his aesthetic and 
religious activities, which have taken such deep hold on 
the life of the North. The author of this text-book 
has given a general description of this thinker in his 
book Soren Kierkegaard, als Philosoph (in Frommann^s 
Klassiker). 



202 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

Kierkegaard is a ''subjective thinker" in the sense in 
which he used that word (in the book Unwissenschaft- 
liche Nachschriftj 1846, Kierkegaard' s chief philosophical 
work). The ideas of the subjective thinker are deter- 
mined by the interplay of all the elements of psychic 
life, — ^by emotion and reflection, by hope and fear, by 
tragic and comic moods. And this thinking takes place in 
the midst of the stream of life, whose boundaries we cannot see 
and whose direction we can never know, at least not in the 
fantastical and impersonal world of abstraction. Kierke- 
gaard is the Danish Pascal, and his position in relation to 
the philosophy of his age possesses a certain analogy to 
Pascal's relation to Cartesianism. — This predominantly 
personal character of his thought however does not pre- 
clude the possibility of his making valuable contributions 
to epistemology and ethics (or better, to a comparative 
philosophy of hfe) as he has actually done. 

Sibbern had already observed that the fruitful ideas of 
Kant had not received their just dues at the hands of his 
successors. Kierkegaard renews the problem of knowledge 
with still greater defirdteness, and declares that Hegel had 
not solved the Kantian problem. We can arrange our 
thoughts in logical order and elaborate a consistent sys- 
tem. It is possible to elaborate a logical system, but a 
finite thinker will never be able to realize a complete 
system of reality. We deduce the fundamental ideas 
from experience and experience remains forever imperfect. 
We understand only what has already taken place; 
knowledge comes after experience. We cognize towards the 
past — but we live towards the future. This opposition 
between the past and the future accounts for the tension 
of life and impresses us with the irrationality of being. 
The denial of the reahty of time by abstract speculation 



KIERKEGAARD 203 

is the thing that constitutes the thorn in the problem of 
knowledge. 

What is thus true of scientific thought is even more so 
in the reflections on the problems of practical life. In 
this case it is personal truth that takes first rank, i. e. the 
important matter to be considered here is the fact that 
the individual has acquired his characteristic ideas by his 
own efforts, and that they constitute an actual expression 
of his personality. Subjectivity constitutes the truth. 
Whoever prays to an idol with his whole heart and soul, 
prays to the true God, whilst he who prays to the true 
God from mere force of habit and without having his 
heart in it, is really worshipping an idol. Kierkegaard 
shows his romanticism in the fact that he sharply con- 
trasts the heart with life as it is actually experienced and 
entirely disregards intellectual integrity, which is an 
essential condition, if personal truth is to escape identifi- 
cation with blindness. 

Kierkegaard outlined a kind of comparative theory of 
life — partly in poetic form {Entweder — Oder; Stadien auj 
dem Lebensweg), partly in philosophical form (in his 
chief philosophical treatise mentioned above). He dis- 
tinguishes various ''Stadia," which however do not con- 
stitute stages in a continuous line of evolution, but 
sharply severed types. The transition from the one to the 
other does not follow with logical necessity, nor by means 
of an evolution explainable by psychological processes, 
but by a leap, an inexpHcable act of will. Kierkegaard 
maintains the qualitative antitheses of life in sharp con- 
trast to the quantitative continuity of the speculative 
systems. 

According to Kierkegaard the principle of evaluation and 
construction of theories of life consists in the degree of 



204 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

opposition wHcli spiritual life is capable of comprehending. 
The particular moment and the totality of life, time and 
eternity, reality and the ideal, nature and God — con- 
stitute such antitheses. The tension of life increases in 
direct proportion to the increasing sharpness of the man- 
ifestation of these antitheses, and the energy which is 
supposed to constitute hfe must therefore likewise be 
correspondingly greater. The professional artist who is 
absorbed in the pleasure of the moment represents the 
lowest degree; the writer of irony already discerns an 
element of the inner life which is incapable of expression 
in a single moment, or in a single act; the morahst develops 
this inner life positively by real influence on the family 
and in the state; the humorist regards all the vicissitudes 
of life as evanescent as compared with eternity and 
assimies an attitude of melancholy resignation, which he 
preferably makes the subject of jest; the devotees of 
rehgion regard the temporal life as a constant pain 
because finite and temporal existence is incommensurable 
with eternal truth; the Christian finally regards this pain 
as the effect of his own sins, and the antithesis of time and 
eternity can only be annulled by the fact that the ever- 
lasting itself is revealed in time and apprehended in the 
paradox of faith. 

Kierkegaard wanted to show by this scale how compre- 
hensive an ideal of life was possible even outside of 
Christianity. He Hkewise wanted to put an end to the 
amalgamation of Christianity and speculation in theology. 
But the anguish occasioned by the tension finally became 
his standard for the sublimity of life, and he had sufficient 
courage of consistency to draw the inference, that the 
sufferings of no one are equal to those endured hy God! — 
This brings him into direct conflict with the romantic 



FRIES AND HERBART 20$ 

theory of the reconciliation of all antitheses in the "higher 
unity," as well as with the accepted conception of Chris- 
tianity. This furnished the motive for the deplorable 
controversy with the state church, which occupied the 
latter years of his life. 

C. The Undercurrents of Critical Philosophy in 
THE Romantic Period. 

It is important for the continuity of the history of 
philosophy that there were philosophers, even in the 
period of romanticism and speculation, who undertook to 
carry out a strictly critical and empirical treatment of 
the fundamental concepts. Two of Fichte^s students at 
Jena deserve mention in this connection as belonging to 
the first rank. These men soon protested that the method 
by which Fichte and his disciples were trying to develop 
the Kantian philosophy was not correct. The signifi- 
cance of Fries and Herbart however does not depend alone 
upon the fact that they are representatives of the critical 
philosophy, but likewise upon their scientific method of 
treating the problem of psychology. This latter fa^t 
makes them, especially Herbart, the forerunner of modem 
psychology. Beneke, who had been considerably affected 
by the English school, likewise joins them. 

I. Jacob Friedrich Fries (17 7 5-1 843), like Schleier- 
macher, was educated at a Moravian college, and, despite 
the fact that a native impulse for untrammelled science 
had carried him far beyond the ideas of his early teachers, 
he nevertheless continued his adherence to them to the 
end, especially in the matter of the emphasis which he 
placed on the emotions. While professor at Jena, Fries 
participated in the Wartburg celebration, on account of 
which he was forbidden to continue his lectures in philos- 



2o6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

ophy. The fact that he was then able to accept a pro- 
fessorship in physics was a tribute to the breadth of his 
scholarship. 

According to Kant the critical philosophy must consist 
of self-knowledge; Fries deplored the lack of a psycholog- 
ical foundation for such knowledge. According to him 
the problem of psychology consisted in discovering and 
describing the spontaneous forms with which our knowl- 
edge operates. Those fundamental concepts which con- 
stitute the scientific expression of these forms must then 
be deduced from psychological experience by the method 
of abstract analysis. Notwithstanding the fact that 
Fries clearly saw that we can have no guarantee that the 
fundamental concepts discovered by this empirico- 
analytic method are adequate, he was nevertheless con- 
vinced that Kant had succeeded in enimierating all of the 
fundamental concepts (categories). He accepted Kanfs 
table of categories and of ideas. — On the other hand how- 
ever he departs from Kant on one important point, 
namely, on the matter of establishing the objective 
validity of knowledge. Here he agrees with Maimon 
that Kant had failed to establish the right to apply the 
categories. Kant only answered the qucestio facti, not 
the qucestio juri. Truth can only consist in th-e agree- 
ment of mediate knowledge (of reason) with immediate 
(of perception), and beyond this it is impossible for us to 
transcend the subjective demonstration of knowledge. 
Fries regards the denial of this situation as the cause of 
the ultra-speculative tendency of the Romanticists 
(Neue Kritik der Vernunft, 1806-7). 

According to Fries the real problem of philosophy con- 
sists in the application of the regressive, analytical 
method, which seeks to discover the fundamental con- 



FRIES 207 

cepts, which condition all understanding from the facts 
of experience. The method is more important than the 
system. This analytic method demands a strictly scien- 
tific treatment of the problems of psychology. Psy- 
chology must be a strictly causal science, whose corre- 
late constitutes an exact science of the corporeal side 
of nature. This standpoint of Fries is Spinozistic. 
He presumes, by way of analogy, that all existence 
everywhere possesses an inner, spiritual phase as well 
as an external, material phase (Psychische Anthropologic^ 
1820-1). 

Even the most consistent causal method only leads 
from the finite to the finite. There is no scientific path 
to the infinite and the eternal. But the same reality 
which the natiiral sciences regard as the world of phe- 
nomena, faith construes as supported by an eternal 
principle. But the only way we can describe this prin- 
ciple is negatively. Whenever faith makes use of positive 
expressions, it must be understood that these can only 
have symbolical significance. Fries carries out the idea 
of symbolism far more purely and consistently than Kant 
and Schleiermacher {Handbuch der Philosophie der Re- 
ligion, 1832). 

2. John Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), who was an 
instructor in the universities of Konigsberg and Gottingen, 
calls himself a "Kantian of 1828." He thus described 
both his relation to Kant as well as his critical advance 
beyond him. He would start from experience — but he 
regards it impossible to remain on the empirical basis. 
For experience contains contradictions which — owing to 
the logical principle of identity — ^must be corrected: 
things change but they are nevertheless supposed to 
remain the same things! One and the same thing 



2o8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

possesses a variety of attributes! And the concept of the 
ego, which Fichte endeavored to make the basis of the 
speculative philosophy, contains both contradictions: 
the ego develops and is nevertheless supposed to remain 
identical with itself, and the ego is supposed to be a unity, 
but it nevertheless possesses a manifold content! — The 
correction of contradictory experience should however 
adhere to experience as closely as possible; for we are 
obliged to maintain the principle: every phenomenon con- 
tains its proportionate implication of reality! {Haupt- 
punkte der Metaphysik, 1808). The contradictions vanish 
whenever we assume a manifold of existing entities 
(realities): when a thing changes it must be explained 
from the fact that it is being observed in relation to 
different things (different realities) than before; when a 
thing possesses a number of attributes it must be explained 
from the fact that is being observed in relation to different 
things (realities). Thus experience is corrected by "the 
method of relations.^' But the relations do not pertain 
to things as such; they are wholly contingent, and the 
method of relations can therefore likewise be called "the 
method of contingent views J' Each particular Real con- 
stitutes an absolute position, independent from all other 
Reals. — The peculiarity of the Herbartian philosophy 
is expressed in two propositions: i. In the realm of 
being there are no events. 2. Every continuum is excluded 
from reality {Allgemeine Metaphysik, 1828). 

What then do we know about the Reals? Herbart, in 
opposition to metaphysical idealism, holds that, if it is 
possible to form an idea of the Real, the experiences in the 
realm of spiritual nature have no prerogatives above the 
experiences in the realm of material nature. But when he 
calls the identity of a Real "self-preservation^^ notwith- 



HERBART 209 

standing its relation to other Reals, and since the only 
example of self-preservation of which we can have any 
knowledge is contained in our own sensations, he never- 
theless likewise really makes use of the analogy with our 
psychical experiences in the same manner as the meta- 
physical idealists. 

Even the soul is Real. Ideas arise in the soul as forms 
of self-preservation in distinction from other Reals. 
And since, according to Herbart, the Real which supports 
psychical phenomena must be different from the Real 
which supports material phenomena, he attains a spiritual- 
ism which differs from the Cartesian by the fact that the 
interaction does not take place between dissimilar entities, 
but between similars. Herbart therefore partly bases his 
psychology on his metaphysics {Psychologic als Wissen- 
schaftj neu gegrilndet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und 
Mathematik, 1824-5). But he bases the necessity of 
assuming a psychical Real largely upon the fact that our 
ideas present a mutual interaction and combination. 
Sometimes they blend (by assimilation), i. e. wheai^they 
are internally related; sometimes they combine into 
groups (aggregations), i. e. when they are heterogeneous 
(as colors and tones) but still occur coincidently; some- 
times they inhibit or obscure each other, i. e. when they 
are homogeneous without however being able to blend. 
That which we call our ego is the controlling group of 
ideas, which is formed by assimilation and aggregation, 
and upon which the determination of what shall have 
psychological permanence depends; for only that can 
persist which can be blended with the controlling ideas 
(i. e. be apperceived). — Herbart here recalls the Eng- 
lish associational psychology fotmded by Hume and 
Hartley, 



2IO THE PHILOSOPHY OP ROMANTICISM 

But Herbart would not only base his psychology on 
metaphysics and experience, but likewise upon mathe- 
matics. He discovered the possibility of this in the fact 
of inhibition. Mathematical psychology aims to discover 
definite laws governing the reciprocal inhibition of ideas. 
Psychical energies cannot be measured by movements in 
space like those of physics; but Herbart thought it possible 
to start from the fact that, inasmuch as all ideas strive 
to preserve themselves, the sum of inhibition in any 
given moment must be the least possible. The problem 
therefore consists in determining how to divide the inhibi- 
tion among the various coincident or aspiring ideas. — 
This presupposition rests upon Herbarfs metaphysical 
theories, according to which every idea is a self -preserva- 
tive act of the psychical Real. Herbart failed to attain 
clear results and such as could be harmonized with experi- 
ence on the basis of this presupposition by the method 
of calculation, and his significance as a psychologist does 
not rest upon this attempt to reduce psychology to an 
exact science. 

Herbart excludes ethics — here he is an out-and-out Kant- 
ian — completely from theoretical philosophy. He is of 
the opinion that there is no scientific principle which can 
at once be subsumed as the explanation of reality and the 
guarantee of value. — Our value judgments are sponta- 
neously and often unconsciously determined by certain 
practical ideas. Such ideas are patterns which hover 
before the mind whenever we judge of the harmonic or 
disharmonic relation between the conviction and the 
actions of a man or between the strivings of a number of 
men in relation to one another. Whenever we discover 
disharmony between a man's conviction and the trend of 
his actual desires, it conflicts with the idea of inner 



BENEKE 211 

freedom; whenever the conviction or its practical execu- 
tion is too feeble, it conflicts with the idea of perfection. 
And the ideas of right, of equity, and of benevolence in 
the mutual relations of a number of men find their appH- 
cation analogously. We discover the practical ideas by 
means of an analysis of our judgments concerning himian 
actions, in cases where the relations are clearly present, 
and where irrelative interests are in abeyance. Herb art 
even refers to Adam Smithes ''disinterested observer '' 
{Allgemeine praktische Philosophie, 1808). 

3. Frederick Edward Beneke (1798-1854) quietly 
fought a hard battle at the University of Berlin for the 
empirical philosophy against the dominant speculative 
philosophy. For a while he was even deprived of the 
privilege of lecturing. Notwithstanding the fact that he 
exercised a profound influence upon the development of 
psychology and pedagogy, he nevertheless regarded his 
effort as useless, and discouragement apparently caused 
his death. 

Beneke is especially influenced by Fries and Schleier- 
macher. He would base his philosophy on psychology, 
i. e. elaborate a psychologism. Here he is radically 
opposed to Herbart, who even endeavored to partly base 
psychology on metaphysics. Beneke approaches closely 
to the English school and even calls himself a disciple 
of Locke. His psychology has a biological character. 
He describes the development of consciousness as a 
growth of innate germs or rudiments, which he calls 
original facilities; these are the faculties of sensation and 
of motion. The original faculties are conjoined with a 
tendency; the objective stimuh through which the original 
faculties are enabled to attain a complete development 
are sought out spontaneously. The experiences which are 



212 THE PHILOSOPHY OP ROMANTICISM 

thus acquired leave traces or dispositions behind, which 
furnish the possibiUty of the origination of new, derived 
faculties. An incessant interaction between the con- 
scious and the unconscious is therefore in constant 
progress. — Of the more specific psychical phenomena 
Beneke describes especially the significance of the relation 
of contrast for the emotions, and the tendency of psy- 
chical elements to extend their impress over the whole 
psychical state ("liquidation"). The distinction between 
the higher and lower levels of consciousness is to be 
explained by the great multiplicity and variety of the 
elements and processes cooperating in the development 
of consciousness {Psychologische Skizzen, 1825-7; J^^^r- 
buck der Psychologie ah Naturwis sense haft, 1833). 

Beneke passes deHberately from psychology to meta- 
physics by means of an analogy: In our inner experience 
we become acquainted with a part of being as it is in 
itself, and we afterwards naturally conceive that part of 
being which we only know as external, objective being 
(material nature), after the analogy of our own self. 
But this analogy does not mislead him into the substitu- 
tion of an ideaHstic interpretation for the mechanical 
explanation of nature {Das Verhdltniss von Seele und 
Leib, 1826). 

According to Beneke ethical judgments arise through 
reflection concerning the kind and manner in which our 
feelings are set in motion by human actions. This view- 
point dominates his youthful essay, Physik der Sitten 
(1822). Strongly influenced by Bentham, he placed greater 
emphasis on the objective side of ethics later on, in the 
fact that he took special account of the way in which the 
actions affect the welfare of Hving beings {Grundlinie der 
Sittenlehre, 1837). 



TRANSITION TO POSITIVISM 213 

D. The Transition from Romanticism to Positivism. 

I. The Dissolution of the Hegelian School. The pro- 
found influence and the wide dissemination of the HegeHan 
philosophy is due more particularly to the supposed 
successful reconciliation of faith and knowledge, of 
ideality and reality. But these alleged results were put 
to the test shortly after HegeVs death. There was some 
doubt whether the behef in a personal God and in a 
personal immortality could be reconciled with Hegelian 
philosophy {Fr. Richter: Die Lehre von den letzten Dingen^ 
1833), ^nd i't was claimed that the logical consequence 
of the Hegelian philosophy of religion was not the Chris- 
tology of the church, but the mythical theory of the 
Person of Christ {D. F. Strauss: Leben Jesu, kritisch 
bearbeitet, 1835). 

The Hegelians divided on this question, and we soon 
hear of a Hegelian right and a Hegelian left. Those on 
the right (represented particularly by Goschel, Rosen- 
karanz and /. E. Erdman) held that the theory of the 
master, properly understood, was in harmony with posi- 
tive faith and mth the doctrine of the Church. Those on 
the left, on the other hand, drew most radical conclu- 
sions from the teaching of the master who was apparently 
so very conservative, both in the department of the philos- 
ophy of religion {Strauss and Feuerbach) and in that of 
the philosophy of law and society (A. Ruge, Karl Marx, 
Ferdinand Lasalle) . 

There were also men however who granted to the 
Hegelian left that Hegelianism was incapable of defending 
theism, but who at the same time thought it possible to 
vindicate theism by the method of pure thought. They 
endeavored to show that all fundamental ideas (cate- 



214 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

gories) finally combine in the idea of personality, and that 
this idea must be accepted as the expression of the highest 
reality. C. H. Weisse {Das philosophische Problem der 
Gegenwart, 1842) and /. H. Fichte, the son of /. G. Fichte 
{Grundzuge zum System der Fhilosophie, 1 833-1 846) were 
the chief representatives of this tendency. Lotze and 
Fechner joined them later so far as pertained to their ideas 
on the philosophy of religion. — ^As we have previously 
observed, the ideas of Schelling had been moving in the 
same direction for a long time already. — ^We find a 
peculiar combination of theistic philosophy of religion 
and humanistic philosophy of law in the voluminous 
writings of Ch. Fr. Krause, of which we can only mention 
Das Urbild der Menschheit (181 1). 

The most thorough criticism of the Hegelian philosophy, 
which is at the same time an important positive contribu- 
tion to the theory of knowledge, is from the pen of the 
judicious and profound thinker, Adolph Trendelenburg, 
in his Logischen Untersuchungen (1840). 

2. Ludwig Feuerbach (i 804-1 866), under the influence 
of Hegel, gave up theology for philosophy. After serving 
in the capacity of Privatdocent at Erlangen for a time, 
he withdrew to the solitude of country Hfe where he 
developed a fruitful activity as an author. In his latter 
years he struggled with poverty and sickness. 

Within the Hegelian school the foremost problem was 
whether religious ideas could be transformed into scien- 
tific concepts without losing their essential meaning. 
Feuerbach, on the other hand, as soon as he had definitely 
renounced the school, assvimed the task of discovering the 
source of religious ideas in human affections and impulses, 
in fear and hope, in yearning and wish. He aims to 
explain the origin of dogmas psychologically, and in so 



FEUERBACH 21^ 

doing he enters upon a line of tliought in whicli Hume 
and — less historically — Kant and S Meier macher were his 
forerunners. He appeals from the official documents of 
religion to the spiritual Hfe which has foimd expression in 
them. His most important work in the sphere of the 
philosophy of religion is Das Wesen des Christenthums 
(1841). He however himself attaches more importance 
to the Theogonie which appeared in 1857. 

The break with the speculative philosophy gave 
Feuerbach occasion to develop an entirely new conception 
of philosophy. After he had even insisted on an *'ana- 
lytico-genetic " philosophy in his elegant treatise on Pierre 
Bayle (1838), he announced a program for the philosophy 
of the future in a brief essay {Grundsdtze der Philosophic 
der Zukunft, 1843) in which he especially emphasized 
the concrete distinction of every particular reality. 
The subject-matter of philosophy has nothing to do with 
the things which transcend experience, but consists 
entirely of man as given in experience and nature as 
furnishing the basis of his existence. He seeks, by pains- 
taking studies in the natural sciences, to determine the 
more intimate relation between man and nature. In his 
last essay {Gott, Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit, 1866) he 
elaborates his view of the relation of the spiritual to the 
material universe. He was occupied during his last years 
with studies in ethics, the results of which unfortunately 
exist only in interesting fragments. Fr. Jodl has pub- 
lished a valuable monograph on Feuerbach (in From- 
mann's Klassikern der Philosophic). 

a. According to Feuerbach the characteristic phenom- 
ena of religion arise from the fact that the impassioned 
aspiration towards the fulfillment of the wishes of the 
heart breaks through the botmdaries fixed by reason. 



2l6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

This explains the anti-rational character which religious 
phenomena assume, especially those of the most exalted 
kind. The wish is the fundamental principle of theogony. 

At the beginning man has no grounds upon which to 
impose limits on his wishes and the ideas conditioned by 
such wishes; he therefore ascribes unqualified validity 
to them. It is in the very nature of the affections to 
etemaHze its object and at the same time always regard 
it as real. Doubt arises only after man has come to 
discover his limitations. He then begins to distinguish 
between the subjective and the objective. 

Religious predicates represent the contents of human 
wishes. Heaven and the attributes of the gods are 
evidences of the things which have occupied the human 
heart: God is personal, i. e. the personal life is valuable, 
*' divine." God is love, i. e. love is valuable, "divine." 
God suffers, i. e. suffering is valuable, "divine." Hence, 
in order to understand religion we must transform its 
predicates into subjects and its subjects into predicates. 
This is most clearly apparent in Christianity. Here 
affection attains an inwardness and an intensity, and at 
the same time moreover a boundlessness, wholly unknown 
to paganism. Both suffering and love are felt more 
profoundly, and they are therefore also projected with 
greater fervency and greater confidence as divine things. 

But no sooner has man transferred everything valuable 
to heaven than he begins to feel the more his own empti- 
ness and insignificance. This accounts for the sense of 
finitude and sinfulness. As long as we hold fast to its 
original forms we find that religion hves and moves in 
these sharp contrasts. The theogonic wish is at its best 
only in these forms; later on it becomes exhausted. 
Hence we must make a distinction especially between 



FEUERBACH 217 

primitive Christianity and ^Hhe dissolute, characterless, 
self-satisfied, helletristlc, coquettish. Epicurean Christianity 
of the modern world.^' 

There is an inverse relationship existing between 
rehgion and civiHzation. They represent two opposite 
methods by which man hopes to reahze his purposes, and 
just in proportion as he confides in the one he is ready to 
siurender the other. The relation of ethics and religion 
is similar. Just in proportion as the distinction between 
God and man is emphasized, the attributes (love, righteous- 
ness, etc.) which are ascribed to God are accordingly used 
in an entirely different sense than when they are applied 
to man, and man must then surrender his natural con- 
science and his natural reason in order to obey the divine 
will even though the latter should command something 
which is in conflict with human love and righteousness. 

No real values are ever lost by the surrender of religious 
faith. The projection is annulled, nothing more. We 
retain in the form of subject what was predicate in 
religion. 

b. In his general conception of philosophy Feuerhach 
approaches the psychologism of Fries and Beneke. His 
conception has likewise certain points of contact with the 
positivism of Comte. He does not as a matter of fact 
expressly treat of the problems of epistemology. But 
notwithstanding this it is impossible to understand his 
attitude towards materialism without the epistemological 
presuppositions. His viewpoint with respect to material- 
ism is analogous to that which he assumed towards 
theology. Just as he would not regard man as a creation 
of God, but inversely the idea of God as a creation of 
man, neither would he regard man as a creation of matter, 
but inversely matter as a concept formed by man. We 



2l8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM 

must, SO he affirms, start with man. Life, sensation, 
thought is something absolutely original, ingenious, in- 
capable of being copied or transferred! Man must be 
conceived of as being at once spiritual and corporeal, 
and the resulting problem is to find an Archimedian 
point between spirituaHsm and materiaHsm. 

c. Feuerbach had forcefully asserted the independence 
of ethics from reHgion already in his Pierre Bayle 
(1838). In The Essence of Christianity he refers to 
himian love as the affection in which the unity of the 
race reveals itself in the individual. Later on he empha- 
sized the individual desire for happiness, not however as 
purpose, but as fundamental principle: only those who 
know from personal experience what it is to suffer need 
and wrong can have sympathy with others. Ethics 
however knows of no striving for happiness in isolation. 
Nature itself has solved the problem of the transition 
from the egoistic desire for happiness to the recognition of 
duties towards others by the relation of the sexes to each 
other. The feeHngs of community and fellowship arise 
by virtue of the fact that the existence of the individual 
is shown to stand in the most intimate relation to the 
existence of other individuals. 



SEVENTH BOOK. 
A. Positivism. 

The two great intellectual tendencies of the nineteenth 
century are romanticism and positivism. The former 
starts with the forms and ideals of the intellect, the latter 
with given facts: ''positive" signifies first of all the 
''actual, established, given." Despite their wide diver- 
gence, even opposition, they both nevertheless indicate, 
each in its own way, a reaction against the century of the 
enlightenment, of criticism, of revolution. The supreme 
aim of both tendencies is to attain a more thorough 
mastery of the profound realities of nature and of history. 
— Positivism did not originate as a reaction against 
romanticism, even though it only came into prominence 
just as the prevalence of romanticism began to decline. 
The roots of both tendencies can be traced back histori- 
cally to the beginning of the nineteenth century. 

Whilst Germany is the home of the romantic philosophy, 
positivism belongs more particularly to France and Eng- 
land. We are here using the term positivism in the 
broad sense, according to which not only Comte, but 
likewise such men as Mill, Spencer, Diihring and Ardigo 
are positivists. 

I. French Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century 
before Comte. 

At the beginning of the nineteenth century we can dis- 
tinguish three philosophical schools in France, one resting 
on the principle of authority, another psychological (' 'ideo- 
logical"), and a third sociological. The first represents 

219 



220 POSITIVISM 

a radical reaction against the eighteenth centiiry; the 
second represents a continuation and correction of the 
French enlightenment; the third represents a new for- 
mation which contains the germ of positivism. 

1. Joseph de Maistre, the most important exponent 
of the principle of authority, assails both philosophy and 
natural science, the moment they presinne to imder- 
take anything beyond wholly specialized investigations. 
And yet he has a philosophy of his own, which is 
closely affiliated with that of Malehranche. Whatever is 
material cannot be a cause; every cause is essentially 
mental and the t37'pe of all causality is given in the im- 
mediate consciousness of volition. Our world theory is 
not to be determined by investigators and thinkers, 
but by the authorities instituted by God in state and 
church. Has not history indeed sufficiently exposed the 
impotence of human reason! The philosophy of the 
eighteenth century was indeed a veritable conspiracy 
against ever3rthing sacred. The only .thing which can 
put an end to human misfortune and establish social 
peace is the acknowledgment of the infaUibiHty of the 
Pope {Les Soirees de St. Peter shourg, written 1809, not 
published until 1821). 

2. Amid the storms of the revolution there was a 
small group of thinkers who remained loyal to philosophi- 
cal investigation. These had been disciples of Condillac, 
but they introduced important corrections into his 
doctrine. Thus, for example, the physician, Cabanis, 
places special emphasis on the influence of the inner 
organic states upon the development of mind. He de- 
scribes vital feeling as something which is only indirectly 
determined by external impressions, and hence forms a 
basis for psychic Hfe which is relatively independent of 



DE MAISTRE 221 

the external world. The instincts which presuppose an 
original motive equipment are intimately related to 
vital feeling. Hence man is not entirely passive in the 
presence of the objeqtive world as Condillac had taught 
{Rapport du physique et du moral de rhomme, 1802). 
There are a number of separate passages in which 
he appears to approach closely to materialism — as, 
e. g., when he says that the brain secretes thought 
like the liver bile. But it was not his intention to 
furnish a metaphysics, and in another treatise, posthu- 
mously published, he rather expressed himself spirit- 
ualistically {Lettre sur les causes premieres). — The Ele- 
ments d' Ideologic (1801) of Destutt de Tracy shows a 
tendency similar to that of Cabanis. By the term ideol- 
ogy he simply means the theory of ideas. Napoleon, 
who found the men of this school the pronounced 
opponents of his despotism, on the other hand used the 
term ''Ideology" sarcastically to describe a visionary 
and abstract idealism. Picavet has written a learned 
monograph on the theoretical and practical significance 
of this whole movement {Les ideologues, 1891). 

Maine de Biran (i 766-1824) at first likewise cooperated 
with Cabanis and Tracy. Biran held high legislative 
and administrative positions under the republic, the em- 
pire and the restoration; but his talents and inclinations 
were directed towards the inner life. Introspection and 
analysis gradually led him to ascribe far greater importance 
to psychical activity than Condillac and the ideologists 
had done. He held that immediate self -consciousness 
(apperception im_mediate) refutes Condillac' s theory of 
passivity. He describes the antithesis of passive states 
and of inner activity by very interesting analyses. His 
native temperament seems to have been peculiarly adapted 



222 POSITIVISM 

to experiences of this kind {Journal intime, by Naville; 
Maine de Biran, sa vie et ses pensees, 1857. — Cf. also 
Rapports du physique et du moral, CEuvres philos.,IV). — 
Maine de Biran takes issue with de Maistre and his 
school as well as with Condillac. According to them 
in the last analysis the soul is Hkewise passive, because 
it receives everything from the authorities (just as, 
according to Condillac, from external objects). 

De Biran discovers both the origin of the categories 
(especially causahty) and the basis of moraHty in the 
consciousness of volitional activity. — Later on his 
psychologism culminated in m3^sticism, on accoimt of 
the fact that he — ^in adherence to Kant's distinction 
between phenomena and thing-in-itself — regarded ''la 
vie de I'esprit " as an immediate participation in something 
which transcends every phenomenon, and places this ' 'life 
of the spirit" above "la vie htimaine/' the active life of 
reason and of will {Xouveaux essais d'anthropologie, 1859). 

The famous physicist, A. M. Ampere (i 775-1836), 
with whose philosophical ideas we are acquainted more 
particularly from his interesting correspondence with 
Biran (published by Barthelemy St. Hilaire in Philos- 
ophie des deux Amperes), was led, by the theory of his 
friend, to investigations concerning the combinations of 
sensations and ideas which are independent of our con- 
scious activity. He distinguishes blending (concretion) and 
association of independent ideas (commemoration) ; to the 
first he ascribes immediate recognition. In epistemol- 
ogy he departs from Bira^t (and Kant) by ascribing 
absolute validity to the relative concepts (causality, 
ntimber, time, space) and discovers in them a bridge from 
phenomena to things-in-themselves {Essai sur la philos- 
ophie des sciences, 1834-43). 



COUSIN 223 

The so-called eclecticism, which was for a long time 
regarded as the official philosophy of France, started 
originally with the psychological school. After Royer 
Collard, with Reid's philosophy of common sense as his 
basis, had attacked the theory of Condillac attheSorbonne, 
Victor Cousin (i 792-1867) began his brilliant professional 
career, in which he first imdertook to combine the theories 
of Reid and Biran, and later offered a popular and rhetor- 
ical exposition of the ideas of Schelling and Eegel. He 
thought it possible to attain to a point by psychological 
observation where universal reason would be evident 
and truth could be directly conceived. He finds it 
possible, by means of this inttdtion, to abstract the true 
and the sound elements in the various systems, each of 
which is one-sided in itself, and organize them into a 
single system {Du vrai, du beau et du bien, 1838). 

3. The origin of positivism must be sought within 
the sociological school founded by Saint Simon (1760- 
1825). The task of Saint Simon was to prepare the way 
for a social reformation. But he thought that the only 
possibility of such a reformation involved the founding of 
a new world-theory which might accomplish for the pres- 
ent age what Christianity had done for the Middle Ages. 
Such a new world-theory, in the opinion of Saint Simon, 
must be constructed on the foundation of an encyclopedia 
of the positive sciences. This is all the more true, 
because it must now transpire that men shall make 
common cause in the exploitation of nature instead of 
the mutual exploitation of each other. The history of 
the sciences reveals the fact that they begin with 
theological presuppositions, but gradually build upon 
purely natural presuppositions. As soon as this develop- 
ment is completed it will be possible to establish the 



2 24 POSITIVISM 

positive philosophy {Doctrine de Saint Simon, par Hip- 
polyte Carnot, 1829). — It was under the influence of 
Saint Simon that Auguste Comte produced his first im- 
portant work: Plan des travaux scientifiques pour reor- 
ganiser le societe (1822). 

B. Auguste Comte (1798-1857). 

Comte was a student at the polytechnic institute in 
Paris. But when this was closed by the Bourbons on 
account of the revolutionary ideas still prevalent there, 
he continued his studies privately, at the same time 
giving them an encyclopedic character, to which his asso- 
ciation with Saint Simon contributed. This association 
came to an end because, according to Comte^s opinion, 
the master wanted to subordinate science too completely 
to his reformator}^ ideas. Comte then carried forward 
his encyclopedic exposition of positive philosophy with 
marvellous energy and concentration. During the latter 
years of his life his reflections assumed a more sub- 
jective and mystical character, so that he regarded him- 
self as the founder of a religion of humanity and even 
instituted a kind of worship. 

a. Our modern civilization is suffering, — and on this 
point Saint Simon and Comte are agreed, — from an 
excess of the critical and revolutionary spirit. There is 
a lack of fellowship in the mode of thought and sentiment, 
and hence also in cooperation towards common ends. 
Society, under the old order of things, had a common 
foundation in theology. Now positive science is the only 
thing which can serve as such a foundation. There must 
be a thought structure erected which can speak with the 
same authority as the special sciences within their respec- 
tive spheres. History reveals the fact that there is an 



COMTE 225 

intimate relation between the evolutional stages of soci- 
ety and the evolutional stages of science. It is this there- 
fore that accounts for the tremendous importance of the 
evolution of the sciences through the three stages, the 
theological, the metaphysical and the positive. In his chief 
work, Cours de philosophie positive (1830-42), Comte 
develops the law of the three stages by furnishing both a 
classification of the sciences and an encyclopedic expo- 
sition of the positive knowledge of his age. 

At the theological stage human knowledge governs but a 
very small portion of experience, and hence the imagina- 
tion plays an important part. The bond which at this 
stage unites the facts for the human mind is the idea of 
gods and spirits. The only way of explaining the events 
which transpire in the universe is by reference to these 
ideas, and the importance of theology in the history of 
civilization rests upon the fact that it was the intellectual 
bond upon this primitive stage of science. It was like- 
wise of practical importance, because morality was essen- 
tially founded on religious authority. Within the theo- 
logical stage the transition from fetichism to polytheism 
is especially significant because, by the removal of divine 
beings from the particular phenomena of nature, it 
became possible to subject these phenomena to an em- 
pirical investigation. 

At the metaphysical stage the explanation of natural 
phenomena is no longer found to consist of personal 
beings, but in universal energies or ideas. There are 
just as many distinct energies postulated as the number 
of distinct groups of phenomena require; thus we speak of 
a chemical energy, a vital energy, etc., and finally we 
postulate the idea of nature (an abstract equivalent of 
the idea of God) for the total aggregate of phenomena. 



226 POSITIVISM 

Speculative reflection has taken the place of religious 
imagination. The advance consists in this, namely, that 
energies or ideas indicate a greater degree of uniformity 
and invariability than was to be expected of deities and 
spirits. But the metaphysical stage is still predomi- 
nantly negative and critical. It destroys the authorities 
and yet fails to attain to a new basis of certitude. It is 
the period of individualism. 

At the positive stage both imagination and reflection are 
subordinated to experience. The only criterion of truth 
consists of the agreement wim the facts. Positivism does 
not however permit the facts to remain in isolation; it 
seeks after the laws, i. e., the constant relations of the 
phenomena. Science builds on the invariability of 
natural law, which was anticipated already by the 
Greeks, but clearly expressed in modem times by Bacon, 
Galileo and Descartes , the real founders of positive philos- 
ophy. — It is impossible to refer the numerous laws to a 
single law. Our knowledge cannot attain objective 
unity, — ^unity is only subjective. Subjective unity con- 
sists in the fact that the same method — the explanation of 
facts by facts — ^is consistently applied everywhere. 
This unity of method furnishes a basis for the fellowship 
of minds, which has not existed since the Middle Ages. 

The point of difference between these stages is partly 
due to the difference in the range of experience, partly 
to the different viewpoints which are postulated in the 
explanation of nature. Before this explanation could 
be found in the facts themselves it was necessary to 
postulate imagination and speculation in the interpreta- 
tion of natiure. 

b. The classification of the sciences coincides with the 
theory of the three stages. It rests first of all upon the 



COMTE 227 

serial order in which the various sciences entered the 
positive stage. Mathematics comes first, which had even 
become positive akeady among the Greeks, then succes- 
sively Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and 
Sociology (theory of society). But this serial order like- 
wise presents a successive passage from the simpHcity of 
the objects considered to their complexity: the simpler 
the objects of a given science, the sooner it will become 
positive. The serial order furthermore reveals a constant 
passage from imiversality to particularity: the laws of 
mathematics are vaHd of all phenomena, whilst the 
astronomical, physical, chemical and biological laws 
apply to an increasingly smaller group, and those of 
sociology to the most circumscribed group of all. Finally 
we likewise find in this serial order a gradual passage 
from the predominance of the deductive method to the 
predominance of induction. — These four principles of 
classification, as may be readily observed, are closely 
related. 

The various departments of experience corresponding 
to the different sciences are not connected in a single 
continuum. Discontinuity manifests itself even within 
one and the same department, as e. g., between the 
various physical energies, between the organic species, 
etc., — Comte was not acquainted with the law of the 
conservation of energy, which however did not receive 
general recognition during his lifetime, and he did not 
survive the appearance of Darwin. 

His classification omits logic and psychology, of which 
the former should be placed before mathematics and the 
latter between biology and sociology. — In his later years 
Comte himself added ethics as a seventh science. Accord- 
ing to his conception, ethics is more specialized than 



2 28 POSITIVISM 

sociology, because it goes more into details, especially in 
the fact that it places special emphasis on the affections, 
which receive but little attention in sociology. 

c. Comte's positivism is not empiricism. As a matter 
of fact the theory of stages presupposes that the facts 
must always be combined; the only question is, whence is 
the combining instrument to be derived. In the positive 
stage the combination can be effected in two ways. We 
associate phenomena which are given simultaneously 
according to their similarity of structure and function. 
We naturally arrange phenomena which follow in succes- 
sion in a temporal series. The former is a static explana- 
tion {par similitude) ; the latter is a dynamic explanation 
(par filiation). We satisfy our mind's native impulse for 
unity by both methods and thus discover the constant in 
the midst of change {Discours sur Vesprit positif, 

1844). 

Of this combining function of the mind, which Comte 
here presupposes, he made no further investigation. His 
works contain no epistemological nor psychological 
analyses. His conception of knowledge is biological. 
Our knowledge is determined by the interaction of our 
organism with the objective world, of our luiderstanding 
with the milieu. The elaboration of the impressions 
received from without follows the laws of our organiza- 
tion, and all knowledge is therefore determined by a 
relation of subject and object. Comte is of the opinion 
that in this biological theory of knowledge he is a fol- 
lower of Kant and Aristotle. — In his later years he came to 
emphasize the subjective character of otir knowledge 
more and more, until he finally proposed a subjective 
system instead of the objective system given in the 
Cours de philosophie positive. 



COMTE 229 

d. The term sociology was formulated by Comte and, 
despite its philological indefiniteness, it has gradually 
come to mean the rights of citizenship in scientific ter- 
minology. In Comte's sense, the term sociology covers 
what has generally been called the philosophy of history, 
and in addition thereto, poHtical economy, ethics and the 
major portion of psychology. Just as in other depart- 
ments of science, so likewise in sociology we must dis- 
tinguish between statics and dynamics. 

Social statics includes the doctrine of the reciprocal 
relation of the factors of society, e. g., ideas, customs and 
institutions. The business of institutions is simply to 
regulate whatever has been evolved in the course of 
unconstrained cooperation. As compared with spon- 
taneous development, law and the state are of subor- 
dinate importance, and the concept of law is subordinate 
to the concept of duty. The concept of duty originates 
from the individual's consciousness of being a member of 
the social whole. And this consciousness arises at the 
moment when the solidarity of the human race is first felt 
and recognized. Mankind spontaneously follows the 
social impulse, and only later discovers the advantages 
which thus accrue. On this point Comte regards Hume 
and Adam Smith as his predecessors. He discovers the 
first germs of solidarity in biology: in the sexual instinct 
and in the instinct to care for offspring. In the realm of 
mankind there is a constant progressive discipline towards 
altruism (which term was likewise formulated by Comte). 
The individual, considered by himself and in isolation, is a 
mere abstraction. The family is the social unit; here we 
have more than a mere association, it is a complete 
union. In larger societies the cooperation of individuals 
towards common ends and imder the inspiration of com- 



230 POSITIVISM 

mon ideas is of pecxiliar importance. The supreme idea 
is the idea of humanity, to which all individual and social 
development should be subservient. — Comte challenges 
the distinction between private and pubHc fimctions. 
This distinction belongs to modem thought; it was un- 
known to the Greeks and to the Middle Ages. It is the 
duty of positive philosophy to develop a sentiment by 
means of which all should be enabled to regard them- 
selves as co-laborers of the one great body of htmianity. 
It is especially important to incorporate the proletariat, 
which has arisen since the abolition of slavery, into the 
social system. 

The law of the three stages, with which we are already 
acquainted, belongs to social dynamics. The various 
stages of intellectual development correspond to definite 
stages of social and poHtical development. MiHtarism 
corresponds with the theological stage. This is the period 
of regulative authority. The control of the jurists 
(''legislators") corresponds with the metaphysical stage; 
their specific task consists in regulating the rights of the 
various classes, particularly the rights of the middle class, 
of the miHtary and of the clergy. IndustriaHsm corre- 
sponds with the positive stage; the distribution of power 
is now determined by productive capacity, and social 
problems take the place of the political problems. 

e. In a later work {Politique positive, 185 1-4) Comte 
undertook to lay the foimdation of a new religion, the 
Religion of Humanity. (The complete title therefore 
reads as follows: Politique positive, ou traite de sociologie 
instituant la religion de Vhumanite.) Whilst in his 
Cours he made the world or nature his starting-point 
and aimed to attain an imderstanding of man on the basis 
of the knowledge of nature, he would now replace this 



PHILOSOPHY BEFORE MILL 23 1 

objective method by a subjective method. Nature as a 
whole miust be construed from the human standpoint and 
humanity described as the highest being {le grand etre). 
The affections and not merely the understanding are 
now to be the final arbiter, and synthesis, i. e., the con- 
ception of unity, is to be regarded as superior to analysis 
and specialization. The new religion is to be a worship 
of humanity, of which we are all members, — those now 
living as well as those who have died and those as yet 
imborn. Every thought and action is to be directed 
towards the development of this Grand etre. The 
constitution of the future is to be a Sociocracyj a social 
community without fixed institutions. The patricians 
direct production, whilst the proletariat represent the 
dynamic, the philosophers the reason, and the women the 
affections of the social body. Public opinion and the right 
of refusal to cooperate will furnish an adequate check 
against any misuse of power on the part of the spiritual 
or temporal authorities. — Thus the founder of positivism 
ends up as a Utopian romanticist. His school divides on 
this point, several of them (as e. g. Littre) maintaining the 
theory of the Cours, whilst others (such as Lafitte and 
Robinet) regarded the Politique positive as the actual 
culmination of the positive philosophy. 

C. English Philosophy in the Nineteenth 
Century before John Stuart Mill. 

Both in Germany and in France the transition from the 
eighteenth to the nineteenth century was effected by a 
revolution — ^in Germany by the romantic revolution 
in the sphere of thought, in France by the political 
revolution. In England on the other hand there were 
a number of energetic philosophic thinkers who endeav- 



232 POSITIVISM 

ored to make a practical application of the principles dis- 
covered by the eighteenth century to the problems of the 
nineteenth century. The EngHsh philosophy of the 
nineteenth century therefore, in its chief representatives, 
bears the stamp of radicahsm and empiricism. Jeremy 
Bentham and James Millj pronounced adherents of the 
radical enlightenment, produced a profound impression 
on the first decades of the century. John Stuart Mill 
afterwards undertook on the one hand a consistent 
development of their principles, and on the other to 
adapt them to the changed setting of the problem, — 
namely, that brought about by the romanticism 
represented by Coleridge and Carlyle and the criticism 
represented by Hamilton and Whewell. 

I. Jeremy Bentham's (1748-183 2) most important 
philosophical writings had appeared already in the 
eighteenth centiury {A Fragment on Government, 1776; 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789). But they 
did not make much of an impression until after the 
dawn of the new century. Bentham, who, as a private 
scholar, devoted himself uninterruptedly to his efforts for 
social and legislative reform, assimied as his chief task 
the reform of Enghsh legislation. He demanded a 
codification of the laws (he formulated the term codifi- 
cation himself), a reduction in the costs of legal processes, 
prison reform and an extension of political franchise. 
Theoretically he assumed the principle of the greatest 
happiness to the greatest number, previously advocated 
by Hutcheson, as the fundamental principle of morality. 
This principle, which to his mind is self-evident, is to 
govern our judgment of every institution, every action, 
every quality and every motive. Bentham attacks the 
so-called natural rights as well as the moraUty which is 



BENTHAM 233 

founded on authority and tradition. He examines the 
intensity, persistence, certainty, intimacy, purity and 
fruitfulness of pleasurable feelings which follow our 
acts and which condition the value of an act. He investi- 
gates the motives of action in order to discover what 
motives should be fostered and what others should be 
restrained. He regards self-interest, properly under- 
stood, as the most reliable motive, because he believed 
that self-interests, properly understood, are harmonious, 
so that the individual must necessarily be interested in 
the general welfare even for prudential considerations. 
This idea is expressed very one-sidely and harshly in a 
work {Deontology) that was published posthimiously, 
and perhaps interpolated by the publisher. 

Bentham's friend, James Mill (17 7 2-1 836), was a 
zealous exponent of the radical application of the principle 
of utility. This energetic man, whose high official 
position in the East India Company excluded him from 
Parliament, acted as counsellor of the radical politicians 
who were working for parliamentary reform, and above all 
else the emancipation of the middle classes. He under- 
took the theoretical task of furnishing a psychological 
basis for Bentham^s ethical theory, the so-called utili- 
tarianism. He discovered such a basis in the Asso- 
ciational psychology founded by Hume and Hartley^ 
which he greatly simplified by referring all combinations 
of ideas to association between such ideas as frequently 
take place together (association by contiguity) {Anal- 
ysis of the Human Mind, 1829). He attaches special 
importance to the fact that the association may be so 
completely subjective that an entirely new totality may 
arise, without containing any traces of the original 
elements whatever. By this method he aims to show, 



234 POSITIVISM 

i. e. to explain, how selfless {^' disinterested^^) feelings 
may arise. Such feelings are secondary; they arise from 
the fact that something which is at first capable of 
exciting pleasure only as a means afterwards becomes an 
end and then acts as a pleasurable stimulus directly. 
This is the psychological explanation of the immediacy 
of conscience. (The best exposition of this theory is given 
by James Mill in appendix B. of his polemical essay, 
Fragment on Mackintosh, 1835.) 

2. Against these enthusiastic advocates of empirical 
and anal3rtical psychology and ethics there arose a roman- 
tic tendency, under German influence, whose most noted 
representatives were Coleridge and Carlyle. 

Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772— 1834) in his early 
youth was an ardent disciple of the associationist psychol- 
ogy. But he later became an opponent of all analysis 
and of every effort to explain mental life by elementary 
principles, and, in adherence to Schelling, he proclaimed 
the awe-inspiring totality of all things as intuitively appre- 
hended, in opposition to the empiricism which breaks 
everything to pieces. He however attaches special im- 
portance to the Kantian antithesis of "understanding" 
and "reason." He charged all religious criticism to the 
account of the pure "understanding," and then refuted it 
by an appeal to the higher court of "reason," the faculty 
of ideas and the theory of totality. He not only hurls his 
polemics against the free-thinkers, but likewise against 
the theology which has degenerated into barren dogmatic 
formulas. His great work which was intended to show 
the agreement of Christianity and philosophy was never 
written. We gather his ideas from his essays on Church 
and State (especially the appendix) and from his Bio- 
graphia Liter aria and his Table Talk. 



CARLYLE 235 

Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) did not care to attain any 
''higher" knowledge. He satirized Coleridge's "tran- 
scendental moonshine.^' He proposed a new basis of faith 
and for the guidance of Hfe to which he was led by the 
study of Goethe and the romantic philosophy. His effort 
was directed towards securing independence from the 
never-ending investigations of science. After having 
extricated himself from materiaHstic theories in his early 
youth, he cherished a romantic aversion towards analysis 
and criticism. His polemic applies especially to the 
"philosophy of cause and effect" and the utilitarian 
ethics. In his profoundest essay, Sartor Res artus (1833), 
he develops a "philosophy of old clothes^'' based on Kant's 
distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself : The 
world is the garment of Deity; natural science examines the 
garment without knowing its wearer. Nature is a mighty 
symbol, a revelation of ideas which no scientific method is 
capable of conceiving. It is the duty of philosophy ever 
and anon to inspire the sense of the mysterious majesty of 
being when men have fallen asleep through famiharity. 
Even our ideas of belief are garments of Deity; — but the 
garment of Deity must be woven anew from time to time. 

Carlyle' s practical view of life reveals two distinct char- 
acteristics. — Everything great takes place qmetly, in 
silence. Great deeds are accomplished without any 
express consciousness of the fact. A full and clear con- 
sciousness makes everything small and mechanical. 
The highest truth, so far as man is concerned, can only 
exist in the form of a symbol: the symbol withholds and 
expresses, obscures and reveals at one and the same time. — 
The highest revelation consists of the great men, the 
heroes {On Heroes and Hero-worship, 1841). They are 
the guides and patterns, the founders of everything that is 



236 POSITIVISM 

good. The hero may appear as prophet, poet or states- 
man; but he always represents great, concentrated energy 
of life, and his words and deeds reveal the hidden ideas of 
the movement of life. Such heroes are especially neces- 
sary for the solution of the social problem. Carlyle was 
one of the first authors, who — ^in opposition to the then 
dominant school of poHtical economy — ^noted the exist- 
ence of this problem. He made no specific investigations. 
Empirical science was too distastefiil to him for that. 

3. In the same year (1829) that James Mill published 
his Analysis, the most important work of the asso- 
ciationist psychology, William Hamilton's profoimd 
treatise on The Philosophy of the Unconditioned likewise 
appeared, in which he severely criticized all philosophy 
that treated the imconditioned as an object of knowledge. 
Hamilton (i 788-1856) spent a ntimber of years in fruitful 
professorial activity at the university of Edinbtirgh. — 
Whatever we apprehend and conceive — by the very fact 
of its apprehension and conception — ^is related to some- 
thing else, by which it is Hmited and conditioned. To 
think is to condition. We neither conceive an absolute 
whole, nor an absolute part; each whole is a part, and 
each part is a whole. We only know the conditioned 
finite. We define whatever we know in terms of space, 
time and degree (extensively, protensively and Intensively) 
and even the law of causality is likewise nothing more than 
a special form of the law of relativity. HamilfonregSLTds the 
principle of causality as the expression of our incapacity to 
conceive an absolute addition of reality. On account of 
this incapacity we try to conceive the new (as effect) as a 
new form of the old (as cause). If cause and effect should 
fail to fully correspond to each other, we should be com- 
pelled to assume an absolute beginning of the new. Hence, 



HAMILTON 237 

according to Hamilton (like Cusanus), philosophy ends in a 
docta ignorantia. Its value consists in its constant seeking, 
by means of which the energies of the mind are exercised. 

Hamilton is nevertheless convinced that faith in the 
unconditioned is necessary in order to establish our 
spiritual existence. The more refined definitions of 
unconditioned being can only be secured by analogy with 
human personality. — This argument was applied to the 
defense of the orthodox faith by Hamilton's disciple, 
Henry Mansel {Limits of Religious Thought, 1858). 

William Whew ell (179 5- 186 6), professor at Cam- 
bridge, demonstrated the principles of the critical philos- 
ophy from another point of view. He endeavored to 
verify Kant's fundamental principles as the necessary 
presuppositions of the inductive sciences {History of 
the Inductive Sciences, 1837; Philosophy of the Inductive 
Sciences, founded on their History; 1840). Induction 
signifies not only a collection of facts, but their arrange- 
ment according to some governing principle. The organ- 
ization of the facts is possible only in case the investi- 
gator brings such a principle with him (as e. g. Kepler 
brought the idea of the ellipse to his studies of the planets). 
We must finally go back to the fundamental concepts 
which express the very principles of our cognitive faculty, 
principles which form the basis of all sense perception and 
all induction. Such fundamental concepts are: time, 
space, cause (in mechanics), end (in biology), and duty (in 
ethics). These cannot be analyzed into simpler concepts. 

D. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). 

John Stuart Mill, the son of James Mill, was trained in 
the ideas of the radical enlightenment, as they had been 
developed by his father and Bentham, and he accepted 



238 POSITIVISM 

them as a veritable gospel. In his very interesting auto- 
biography he describes how the ideas adopted during his 
childhood and youth came into sharp conflict with the 
ideas and moods of a later period which likewise agitated 
his very sotil, and how he was then compelled to struggle 
through a mental crisis. This contradiction not only 
appears in his Hfe but likewise in his works, and the 
inconsistencies which, despite his vigorous intellectual 
effort, his theories reveal, are partly due to this fact. 
There likewise exists an intimate relation between his 
theoretical views and his efforts for social reform. The 
fact that in philosophy he seeks to derive ever\^hing from 
piu'e experience does not rest upon pure theoretical con- 
viction alone, but he likewise regarded it as a weapon 
against the prejudices which impede progress (similar to 
the French philosophers of the eighteenth century). — 
Like his father, Mill was an officer of the India Company; 
after its dissolution he was a member of ParHament for a 
short time. 

a. Stuart Mill's System of Logic (1843) contains the 
answer of the EngHsh school to Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason and at the same time the most radical 
form of empirical epistemology. According to Kant's 
fundamental principle, all real experience contains a ra- 
tional element, which can be discovered by analysis. Mill 
now undertakes to show not only that all knowledge 
proceeds from experience, but that experience itself 
involves no antecedent presuppositions. He would make 
experience the standard of experience. ' ' We make ex- 
perience its own test!" — By experience (like Hume) he 
means a sum of impressions, and his problem consists in 
showing how universal principles can be derived from 
such a stmi. 



MILL 239 

Mill bases his logical investigations partly on histor- 
ical and partly on psychological principles. 

In matters pertaining to the history of thought, as he 
openly acknowledged, he was greatly benefited by 
WhewelVs work on the History of the Inductive Sciences. 
John EerscheVs book On the Study of Natural Philos- 
ophy (1831) was likewise one of his preparatory studies. 
Mill's problem consisted in describing the fundamental 
methods of inductive thought by an analysis of the 
methods of the empirical sciences as these had been de- 
veloped dining the past three centuries, and then to 
examine what presuppositions underlie this thought. — 
He discovers four methods of induction. The method of 
agreement infers, from a series of cases, in which two 
circumstances (A and B) always succeed each other, 
whilst all other circiunstances vary, a causal connection 
between A and B. But this inference is not certain until 
we can at the same time apply the method of difference 
because it shows that B does not appear whenever A is ex- 
cluded, and vice versa. This is the chief inductive method. 
To this is added the method of residues, in which every- 
thing previously explained is eliminated and an inference 
is then drawn concerning the relation of the remaining 
circumstances, and the method of proportional variation, 
in which we have two series of experiences which vary 
proportionally between each other and infer a causal 
relation between them. Mill illustrates these methods 
by striking examples from the history of the sciences. 
He attempted, by this exposition, to substitute a system- 
atization of inductive logic for the Aristotelian system- 
atization of deductive logic; his logic was a continuation 
of Bacon's work. He differs from Bacon not only in 
the wealth and quantity of the examples at his disposal 



240 POSITIVISM 

but likewise by his clearer insight into the necessity of 
forming hypothesis and by the interchange of induction 
and deduction. The deductive method becomes neces- 
sary especially in cases where there are large numbers 
of contributing factors. We must then examine each 
factor separately by induction and then test by deduction 
from the results of these separate investigations whether 
the interplay of all the factors is explainable. 

The final analysis of thought reveals the psychological 
basis of MilVs logic. According to Mill every deduction 
presupposes an induction. For — ^in his opinion — deduc- 
tion starts from a general proposition; but whence can 
this proposition be derived, if not from experience? 
Every general proposition implies a reference to a number 
of experiences. We ultimately come back to the par- 
ticular impressions. The beginning of the whole knowl- 
edge-process consists in the fact that two phenomena take 
place coincidently. Once this has happened frequently, 
the presence of the one phenomenon will arouse an expec- 
tation of the other. This is the fundamental form of 
inference. It does not however start from a general 
proposition, but rather proceeds from particulars to 
particulars. The child withdraws its hand from the 
burning taper, not because of its knowledge of the general 
proposition, that contact with fire is painful, but because 
the sight of fire immediately arouses the idea of pain. 
It is therefore an objective association (association by 
contact) that forms the original basis of all inference: 
all logical principles are eliminated. The transition from 
one idea to another takes place immediately, and, according 
to Mill, this means, without ground. — In the theory of 
causaUty Mill would likewise eHminate all presupposi- 
tions. Mill concedes however that the inductive methods 



MILL 241 

are demonstrable only on the presupposition of the 
causal principle. Notwithstanding the fact that B 
always follows A, and B does not appear in the absence of 
A, nevertheless our only ground of inference to a causal 
relation between A and B is the presupposition that B 
must have a cause. What then is the source of the causal 
principle? Mill answers: the same as all general prop- 
ositions, experience, i. e., induction. — The circumlocution 
which is here apparent in MiWs argument has been 
clearly exposed by Stanley Jevons (in a series of articles 
imder the title, Stuart MiWs Philosophy Tested — (1877- 
1879) — ^reprinted in Pure Logic and other Minor Works), 
Jevons had already demonstrated in his Principles of 
Science (1874) that the principle of identity is presup- 
posed as the basis of all inference, because of the fact 
that the proof of an induction always consists of a deduc- 
tion, which carries its inference back from a hypothetical 
proposition to the given impressions. 

MilVs attempt therefore to furnish a system of logic 
which is wholly inductive did not succeed. This attempt 
forms the counterpart to HegeVs attempt to invent a logic 
which is wholly deductive. Mill tried to spin the forms 
of thought from their content, Hegel the content of 
thought from its forms. It is in these two men that the 
contrast between romanticism and positivism is most 
sharply drawn. 

b. The pyschological presuppositions at the basis of 
MilVs logic come from James MilVs Analysis. They 
were the presuppositions of the *^ Associational Psy- 
chology.^^ When, in his later years (1869), Stuart Mill 
published a new edition of the Analysis, in his appended 
notes he modified his psychological theory. Following 
Alexander Bain (whose chief works are The Senses and the 



242 POSITIVISM 

Intellect, 1856, and The Emotions and the Will, 1859), he 
here shows that the objective association (association by 
contact) constantly presupposes a subjective correlate 
(association by similarity). He had even before that, 
in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy 
(1865), indicated a still more radical change in the ftmda- 
mentals of his psychology. He then saw that such 
phenomena as anticipation and recollection cannot be 
accounted for by the theory of consciousness imderlying 
the ^^ Associational Psychology^' — viz., that of a mere sum 
of elements. The phenomena mentioned prove — so he 
thinks — that the bond by which the psychical elements 
are held together is just as real as the elements them- 
selves, and that it cannot be derived from these elements. 
And the term "Ego" applies to this bond alone. Mill 
therefore once more revives Hume's "uniting principle," 
which had been forgotten in the " Associational Psychol- 
ogy," and as a matter of fact even accorded it a central 
position. Had he then been able to revise his logic, 
the possibilities were present of developing the prin- 
ciples of knowledge as ideaHzed psychical tendencies. — 
The modifications and even the inconsistencies contained 
in Mill's theories bear witness to the indefatigabiHty and 
candor of his investigations. 

c. In ethics even as in psychology Stuart Mill was also 
originally a disciple of his father; here he was Hkewise a 
disciple of Bentham. The objectivity and onesideness of 
Bentham's utilitarianism had however been brought to 
his attention even in his early youth, especially through 
the injfiuence of Coleridge and Carlyle. Nevertheless, he 
never surrendered the presupposition that the ultimate 
criterion for the evaluation of himian actions must be 
sought in their effects on human happiness. The aim is 



MILL 243 

not the greatest possible happiness for the actor himself, 
but the greatest possible happiness for all who are affected 
by the resiilts of the action. Stuart Mill bases this prin- 
ciple, not on the self-interest of the actor properly under- 
stood as Bentham had done, but on the psychological 
nature of the moral sentiment (Utilitarianism, 1863). 
In his theory of this sentiment he adopted the doctrine of 
the metamorphoses of sentiments as developed by Hartley 
and James Mill. The origin of the moral sentiment is due 
to the cooperation of a large number of elements : sympa- 
thy, fear, reverence, experiences of the effects of actions, 
self-esteem and the desire for the esteem of others. It is 
in this complex nature that the cause of the mystical 
character attaching to the idea of moral obligation is to be 
found. The complex may however become so completely 
subjective and perfect that the sentiment itself will 
appear as unitary. Its development ordinarily takes 
place under the influence of social life by which individuals 
are accustomed to regard common interests and to enlist 
united efforts. In this way a sentiment of solidarity and 
unity evolves which may even (as in the case of Comte's 
religion of humanity) assume a religious character. 

But Mill not only modified utilitarianism by the 
emphasis which he placed on the subjective factor, but 
likewise by the assumption of the qualitative differences 
of the sentiments. He thinks *' happiness" must not be 
estimated according to quantity alone, but likewise 
according to quality. He says, like Plato (in the ninth 
book of the Republic), that he alone who knows the 
various qualities of happiness from personal experience 
is in position to furnish a valid estimate of their different 
values. A Socrates dissatisfied is better than a satisfied 
idiot. 



244 POSITIVISM 

These modifications reveal the fact that the ethical 
problem is far more consequential and difficult than the 
older utilitarians ever dreamed. Henry Sidgwick (1838- 
1900), who, in his penetrating work The Method of Ethics 
(1877), distinguishes definitely between two distinct 
kinds of utilitarianism, of which the one is based on self- 
interest, the other on altruism, saw this clearly. He 
likewise shows that the practical ethics (the moraUty of 
common sense) which prevails at the present time rests 
unconsciously upon a utilitarian presupposition. 

d. Mill produced a nimiber of important works in 
the department of social ethics, which made a profound 
impression upon the life of the age. Thus, e. g., in his 
book On Liberty (1859) he asserted the right of the indi- 
vidual to the free development of his native powers, and 
endeavored to establish definite limits for the inter- 
position of legislation and of pubHc opinion. His funda- 
mental principle is that the impulse to everything noble 
and great proceeds from individual geniuses, who are the 
salt of the earth. In his Subjection of Women (1869) he 
makes a peculiar application of the principle of liberty 
to the position of woman. He likewise holds that our 
ideas of the '* nature" of woman have been derived from 
the subordinate and retiring position which woman has 
hitherto occupied, and he anticipates splendid contri- 
butions to human culture after women are enabled to 
develop their faculties just as freely as man has already 
done for ages. In his Considerations on Representative 
Government (1861) he regards the political issue at the 
present time as a conflict between democracy and bureau- 
cracy, which must be brought to an end by the former 
enlisting the services of the latter and only retaining a 
general control. He likewise recommends a proportionate 



MILL 245 

franchise in order to guarantee the rights of the minority. 
Mill's futiire ideal however went beyond a poHtical 
democracy. He is convinced that personal and political 
liberty cannot be secured without great social and economic 
changes {Principles of Political Economy, 1849). Here 
he is confronted by the profound, according to him, 
diametrical antithesis of individualism and socialism, 
and he frankly acknowledges that he is at a loss to know 
how to reconcile them. He holds however that neither 
the individualistic nor the socialistic fundamental principle 
has been theoretically and practically developed in its best 
possible form. Hence, e. g. the right of private property 
might readily be maintained, if the laws would take even 
as much pains to reduce its difficulties as they now take 
in order to increase them. Socialists are wrong when they 
make competition the ground of social evil. The cause 
lies in the fact that labor is subject to capital, and Mill 
expects great things from the trades unions and producers 
unions, especially because they encourage the virtues of 
independence — namely, justice and self-control. 

e. Mill's religious views appear only by way of 
suggestion in the works published by himself. He holds, 
in opposition to Comte (in his book on Comte, 1865), that 
theological and metaphysical theories are not necessarily 
destroyed by the attainment to the positive stage of 
science, but they must not contradict the results of 
scientific investigation. .There are some open questions! 
But he protested vigorously against the teaching of 
Hamilton and Mansel (especially the latter), that the 
concepts (particularly ethical concepts) must be treated 
as having an entirely different content when applied to 
deity than when applied to man. He would refuse to 
call any being good — even if that being were able to 



246 POSITIVISM 

condemn him eternally for so doing — ^who is not what 
we mean when we call a man good. 

He expresses himself more fiilly in his posthumous 
Essays on Religion (1847). ^^ denies that he can infer 
an omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely good Creator 
from the facts of nature. He regards it possible how- 
ever on the other hand to beHeve in a personal God, who, 
in constant conflict with uncreated and persistently 
resistant matter, is seeking to bring about a beneficent 
order of nature. Alan can therefore, by his ovm effort, 
be a co-laborer with God, and, according to Mill, the 
real rehgious attitude consists in the sentiment aroused 
by this fellowship. He attaches great importance to the 
fact that such thoughts and sentiments elevate man above 
the limitations of experience and the prosiness of ordinary 
Hfe. 

E. The Philosophy of Evolution. 

About the middle of the nineteenth century the theory 
of evolution came into vogue and was recognized as an 
essential element of human thought. The romantic 
philosophy had indeed likewise spoken of evolution, but 
they simply meant by this a purely logical or systematic 
relation of the forms and types of being, not a real process, 
taking place in time. The idea of evolution had already 
made itself felt however in various departments of 
thought. Thus, e. g., in the astronomical hypothesis of 
Kant and Laplace, in the theory of epigenesis (i. e. the 
theory of the gradual evolution of the embryo from a 
simple rudiment) as formulated by the anatomist, Caspar 
Wolff, in the psychology of Spinoza, Hartley and James 
Mill, in the eighteenth century beHef in the evolution of 
history, in Comte^s theory of the three stages. Lamarck 



DARWIN 247 

finally announced the theory of a continuous evolution of 
organic species by means of a progressive transformation 
of the organs brought about through the constant exercise 
of its powers. But the evolutionary theory only received 
general recognition as a fundamental principle in wider 
circles after the annoimcement of Darwin's hypothesis of 
the origin of the organic species hy the process of natural 
selection. Herbert Spencer at the same time undertook to 
determine the fundamental forms of evolution by analysis 
of the phenomena in the various departments of experi- 
ence, after having previously shown how characters which 
are unexplainable from the viewpoint of the experience of 
the individual may be explained from the viewpoint of 
race-experience. 

I. The great naturalist, Charles Darwin (1809-1881), 
deserves a place in the history of philosophy, because, 
like Copernicus, Galileo and Newton, he is of profound 
significance in the treatment of philosophical problems, 
not only on account of his results, but likewise on account 
of his theory of science and its sphere. After a tour of 
the world covering three years, upon which he collected 
his large supply of specimens and observations, he lived 
in the solitude of the country as a quiet investigator. 

His effort to explain the origin of the species was in 
complete harmony with the spirit of positivism. He 
referred to a fact which was actually operative in nature: 
namely, the necessity for every living being to possess the 
attributes and equipment essential to the preservation of 
life, or as he expressed it figuratively, the struggle for 
existence. If we persist in saying that the species were 
created, each one independently, this, in the eyes of 
Darwin, is but a pious way of expressing our ignorance. 
The struggle for existence however is not the whole 



248 POSITIVISM 

cause. It presupposes that individual organisms reveal 
variations which may be either more or less favorable to 
their preservation or to the preservation of the species to 
which they belong. Those individuals which show favor- 
able variations would naturally survive in the struggle for 
existence {Origin of Species, 1858). 

Darwin found the proof of his theory in the ^^intelligible 
thread*' by means of which a vast array of facts can be 
combined. He did not regard his theory as a dogma, but 
rather as an instrument of research. He always insisted 
on tracing out the significance which a given character, 
function or organ possessed for the struggle for exist- 
ence. — He regarded the problem concerning the origin of 
the variations by virtue of which natural selection takes 
place as a weakness in his hypothesis. He assimies the 
fact that such variations exist, and for the time being 
calls them "chance-variations," only meaning by this 
however that their causes are unknown. He takes a 
similar attitude to the problem of life in general. 

Darwin's assumption that very small variations fur- 
nish a real advantage in the struggle for existence was 
perhaps an error. Hugo de Vries has quite recently 
undertaken to show that very important variational 
*' leaps" ("mutations") may take place and that a new 
type may thus arise at once, which must then establish 
itself in the struggle for existence. It has become appar- 
ent, furthermore, that these mutational types are very 
tough. The contrast between the types and variations 
consequently becomes even sharper than Darwin, and 
especially the Darwinians, who have frequently been more 
dogmatic than their master, ever supposed. 

Darwin saw no reason for regarding man an exception 
from the general biological laws. In his opinion the 



DARWIN 249 

actual value and the actual dignity of man suffers no 
diminution by regarding him as having evolved from 
lower forms. For the theological and romantic concep- 
tion, which regarded man as a fallen angel, he substituted 
the realistic conception of man as an animal which has 
evolved a spiritual nature {The Descent of Man, 1871). 

Darwin elaborates his views on the problems of moral 
philosophy in the third chapter of his book on the origin 
of man. He sympathizes with the view represented by 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume. He starts with the 
principle that, a group of animals or men among which the 
idea of sjmipathy and mutual helpfulness prevails would be 
favorably situated in the struggle for existence. He thus 
discovers a biological foundation for the moral sentiment. 
According to Darwin this sentiment presupposes, besides 
sociability and sympathy, the faculty of recollection and 
comparison. With these conditions given we have the 
basis for a more or less conscious estimate and judgment 
of actions. After the faculty of language has been 
evolved mutual praise and blame can likewise exert its 
influence. Public opinion can then take form. Habit 
and exercise in efforts for the common welfare would also 
tend to give permanence and strength to the social 
motives and instincts. The characters thus acquired may 
perhaps hkewise be transmitted by inheritance (as 
Lamarck had assumed). 

Touching religion Darwin was still a believer in revela- 
tion when he returned from his famous tour. His views 
changed gradually, without any painful rupture, and he 
finally (in 1876, and published in Life and Letters of 
Charles Darwin, 1887), adopting a form of expression 
introduced by Huxley, declared himself an agnostic, i. e. 
one who knows that the solution of the problem of being 



250 POSITIVISM 

is beyond our powers. That is to say, his philosophy 
ciilminates in a docta ignorantia. He regarded the idea 
that the world is the result of chance (brute force) quite 
as incredible as that it should be the product of conscious 
design. His statement of the problem at this point 
reminds us of that given by Kant in the Critique of Judg- 
ment. 

2. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) gave up a life of prac- 
tical affairs in order to devote himself to philosophical 
investigations. In his early youth he was an engineer, 
but soon acquired an interest in social problems and ideas 
which in turn led him to the study of psychology and 
biology. He was a self-made man. He never attended a 
university and never took an examination. He was 
peculiarly gifted in observing facts which might serve to 
illimiinate general principles. His philosophy sprang 
from the necessity of discovering a governing principle 
which would serve the purpose of organizing a series of 
studies in natural science, psychology and social science 
into a system. He has described the cotirse of his develop- 
ment in his ^ utoUography ( 1 904) . He remained a private 
citizen all his life, occupying himself with his studies and 
his writings. 

Spencer's ideas are expressed in their purest, most 
original form in a series of essays, published in three 
volumes under the title: Essays, Scientific, Political and 
Speculative. From the literary point of view, the Essays 
form the most valuable portion of the Spencerian writings. 
— He had even before this, in his Social Statics (1850), 
applied the idea of evolution to social life. Following 
Coleridge he regarded the complete imfolding of life as a 
divine idea which is to be reaHzed gradually. Later on 
he regarded this conception as too theological. He then 



SPENCER 251 

began to search for a concept of evolution which cotild 
be applied to every sphere of experience. 

According to his conception philosophy is unitary 
knowledge. Its task consists in the discovery of general 
principles under which the particiilar principles postulated 
by the special sciences can be organized. But this 
imitary knowledge can neither be attained by the a 
priori, deductive method, followed by Hegelj nor by the 
simple, encyclopedic collation of facts, as Comte thought. 
Spencer seeks to discover what is common in the special 
principles and laws by means of the comparative method. 
During the course of thirty-six years (i 860-1 896) he 
produced a detailed exposition of his Synthetic Philos- 
ophy filling ten large volumes. The first volume, 
containing the First Principles (1861), furnishes the 
fundamental principles of his world-theory and defines 
the concept of evolution both inductively and deductively 
as the fundamental concept of all science. The remaining 
volumes apply the special forms of this concept to the 
departments of biology, psychology, sociology and ethics. 
— Otto Gaup has published a valuable characterization 
and exposition of Spencer's philosophy (Frommann's 
Klassiker, Herbert Spencer, 1897). 

a. Spencer's theory of knowledge shows the influence 
of both Stuart Mill and William Hamilton (and, through 
the latter, Kant). He challenged pure empiricism, on 
the ground of the fact that perceptions require elaboration 
before knowledge can arise and this elaboration pre- 
supposes both a faculty and a standard. The ultimate ba- 
sis of all knowledge consists of the faculty of distinguish- 
ing the like from the unlike; even radical skepticism must 
presuppose this basal principle. The ultimate standard 
by which truth and error are distinguished consists of the 



252 POSITIVISM 

principle tliat a proposition which is inherently self -con- 
tradictory cannot be true. Truth implies a perfect 
agreement between our ideas (representations of things) 
and our impressions (presentations of things). Every 
inference and every postulate assumes the truth of the 
criterion contained in the principle of contradiction. 
This criterion cannot therefore be derived from mere 
experience: it is a priori. Every individual must possess 
the innate faculty of comparing impressions and 
drawing inferences from impressions, but this faculty 
cannot be derived from the impressions alone. But 
the a priori appertains to the individual alone. 
If we inquire into the origin of this faculty we 
must appeal to the race from which the individual 
has sprung. Empiricism is in error only in so far 
as the particular individual is concerned, not as 
respects the whole race. The experiences acquired by 
the race during the course of countless generations, the 
incessantly recurring influence to which it was subjected, 
evolve dispositions which form the basis upon which 
single individuals begin their course of development. 
That is to sa\^, the single individual possesses in his 
native organization the clear profit of the experiences of 
untold generations. That which is a priori in the case of 
the individual is racially a posteriori. 

Even in the first edition of his psychology (1855) 
Spencer, who had early become an evolutionist, referred 
to the fact that the things which are inexplicable on the 
basis of individual experience might be explained by 
race experience. He imagined that this amoimted to a 
final disposition of the controversy between empiricism 
and a priorism. He nevertheless perceives that in the 
final analysis he concedes the correctness of empiricism, 



SPENCER 253 

and declares himself a disciple of Locke rather than of 
Kant. He extends the scope of the older empiricism by- 
going back of the individual to the race. He failed to 
see however that the actual problem of epistemology is 
not the matter of the factual origin of knowledge, but its 
validity. In the construction of his own theory of the 
factual origin of knowledge he, as a matter of fact, simply 
assumes the criterion of truth! Furthermore, the dis- 
tinction between the race and the individual is not 
fundamental, because the race at any given time is 
represented by definite single individuals. Every gener- 
ation, even as every individual, must possess its own 
a priori faculty. 

Spencer had advanced the hypothesis of the natural 
origin of the species, which in 1885 he applied to psychol- 
ogy, in an essay even as early as 1852. Darwin therefore 
regards him as one of his precursors. At that time how- 
ever he stood closer to Lamarck than to Darwin^ because 
he was not yet acquainted with the idea of the struggle 
for existence in its bearing on the theory of evolu- 
tion. It was impossible for him therefore to con- 
strue knowledge as an instrument in the struggle for 
existence. 

b. According to Spencer the sphere of knowledge is 
determined by the fundamental function of thought, 
which, as a matter of fact, consists in distinguishing like 
from unlike. We can only know such things as can be 
compared with other things, i. e. related to other things. 
Here Spencer adheres closely to William Hamilton, except 
that he dropped the latter's theological viewpoints. The 
things which we presume to know must necessarily be 
relative, i. e. they must bear definite relations and they 
must therefore be limited. The absolute and uncondi- 



2 54 POSITIVISM 

tioned cannot be related to an3i;hing else, neither can it 
be defined in terms of likeness or tmlikeness. 

The absolute, according to Spencer, is nevertheless a 
positive concept. We are always tinder the necessity of 
assuming something which can be defined, marked out, 
compared — something which is independent of the definite 
form ascribed to it by our thought. We represent it to 
otirselves, after the analogy of our own energ}', as a 
universal energy which underHes all objective and sub- 
jective changes and forms the content of our knowl- 
edge — but which cannot itseh be expressed b}' any 
concept. 

Spencer moreover regards this as ofiering a possible 
solution of the controversy between reHgion and science. 
It is the common aim of all rehgions to ftimish knowledge 
of the imiversal energy. But it is still only in its most 
primitive stages that religion pretends to furnish com- 
plete knowledge of the absolute. The higher the develop- 
ment of reHgion, the more readily it concedes the exist- 
ence of an inexplicable mystery. When the evolution of 
reHgion has once been perfected reHgion and science wiU 
join hands in the common acknowledgment that the real 
nature of things is unknowable, and reHgion wiU cease to 
oppose the scientific explanation of phenomena. — Spencer 
is weU aware of the fact that men are loath to surrender 
the weU-defined intuitive ideas of the various rehgions. 
He nevertheless anticipates a progressive development in 
this direction. He fondly hopes that the emotional side of 
reHgion, its musical temper, may be able to sur\4ve, even 
though its dogmas must perish. 

Spencer failed to overcome the discrepancy between the 
so-caUed absolute and relative. Even though, e. g., he 
assumes the appHcabiHty of the concept of evolution to 



SPENCER 255 

every sphere of phenomena, he nevertheless denies that 
this concept appHes to "the Absolute" itself. 

c. Philosophy, as unitary knowledge, is in search of a 
common principle or a general type of all phenomena. 
Spencer discovers such a principle by the method of 
induction and analysis, which he afterwards seeks to 
deduce from a general principle. 

The principle which philosophy has been seeking is the 
principle of evolution. Every phenomenon has come into 
being, so far as we are concerned, by a process of evolution, 
and we understand a phenomenon whenever we know 
its evolution. But what is evolution? There are, according 
to Spencer, three characteristics by which it can be described. 

In its simplest forms evolution consists of concentration, 
a transition from a more attenuated to a more permanent 
state of coherence. The formation of a pile of sand on the 
ocean beach is a simple example. The evolution of the 
solar system (in its primitive phase, as the formation of 
the primeval nebula) and the earth (by its assuming the 
spherical form within the original nebula), the growth of 
an organism by means of assimilating nourishment, the 
origin of a people from its stems and groups, etc., furnish 
examples on a larger scale. — Diferentiation goes hand in 
hand with integration, especially on the higher levels. 
There follows then a transition from a state of greater homo- 
geneity to one of greater heterogeneity. It is not the whole, 
as such, that differentiates itself; different parts within the 
whole differentiate themselves from one another and 
assume definite forms. Thus the various heavenly bodies 
of the sclar system have taken form, and each of the heav- 
enly bodies in turn develop differences between the respec- 
tive parts of their surfaces and their internal structure 
as well as between the parts of the surfaces themselves. 



256 POSITIVISM 

The various organs are developed by the process of spe- 
ciaHzation during the course of the evolution of the 
organism. Organic life on the earth divides into various 
species. And in the sphere of social Hfe we have an 
example in the division of labor. — Whenever differentia- 
tion proceeds one-sidedly, dissolution quickly follows. A 
third characteristic of evolution must therefore be 
added, namely, that it consists of a determination 
which presupposes a definite harmony between integra- 
tion and differentiation. 

The concept of evolution just described applies to 
every particular phenomenon, and to every phenomenal 
sphere (but not, as some have misunderstood Spencery 
to "the universe" as a whole). It has been discovered 
by induction, but it must also be verified by deduction. 
Here Spencer falls back on a principle which he regards 
the foundation of all real science: the principle of the 
persistence of energy. With Spencer this principle (as 
with Hamilton and even Descartes and Spinoza) is really 
identical with the principle of causality. Every ex- 
periment rests upon the assumption of this principle: 
for if energy could originate or be lost dining the course 
of an experiment it would be impossible to draw any 
inference. It foUows therefore that similar elements 
must be similarly affected by similar energies, which 
establishes the principle of integration. It foUows 
further that similar elements must be differently affected 
by different energies; which establishes the principle of 
differentiation. Proof of the necessity of the third 
characteristic determination is lacking. It is not a mere 
accident that Spencer was unable to establish this principle. 
From the viewpoint of experience it is impossible to 
furnish any guarantee for the harmony of integration 



SPENCER 257 

and differentiation, whilst the hypothetical conditions 
demand the presence of both processes. Notwithstanding 
his sublime optimism, Spencer was therefore unable to 
furnish a proof of harmonious evolution. With Hegel 
^'the higher unity'' was a logical necessity; but a final 
deduction is impossible in the case of Spencer 's systematic 
positivism, even though the problem which here arises 
did not clearly occur to him. 

d. The series of works which furnish a detailed 
development of the theories advanced in the First 
Principles contain a gap, due to the fact that Spencer 
failed to furnish a specific treatise on evolution in the 
sphere of inorganic phenomena. On the other hand he 
demonstrates the general forms of evolution in the realms 
of biology, psychology, sociology and ethics in detail. 

Life, according to Spencer, consists of an adjustment of 
internal relations to external relations. Organisms are 
not only directly determined by external factors, but 
there are indirect factors likewise developed from within 
by means of which they are enabled to adjust themselves 
more advantageously to future conditions than in the past. 
That is to say these influences lead to a transposition of the 
organic elements ; the structure changes under the influence 
of function. This gives rise to variations which then 
endeavor to survive in the struggle for existence. Spen- 
cer attaches greater importance to the adaptation resulting 
from the exercise of the functions than to that resulting 
from the loss and death of such forms as are ill-adapted 
by "natural selection" (w^hich Spencer prefers to call 
^^the survival of the fittest''). 

Consciousness is likewise a form of adaptation. As soon 
as the number of objective impressions increases, the 
corresponding subjective states can only adjust themselves 



258 POSITIVISM 

advantageously by arranging them in serial order, and 
such aiTangement is the characteristic function of con- 
sciousness. 

Psychology is a division of biology. We must never- 
theless make a distinction between subjective and objec- 
tive psychology. Objective psychology consists of the 
natural science of the material processes with which the 
phenomena of consciousness are ordinarily associated. 
Subjective psychology rests upon introspection and forms 
the correlate of all the other sciences; with the single 
difference, that it treats of the knowledge process as 
such, whilst all others treat of the objects of knowl- 
edge. 

In the sphere of consciousness we again discover the 
general characteristics of evolution: concentration, dif- 
ferentiation and determination. We rise by gradual 
transitions from reflex movement through instinct and 
memory to reason in a constantly increasing concentra- 
tion, and likewise from the simplest sensory discrimina- 
tions to the most refined distinctions of the intellect. 
And we find that each stage is modified by the necessary 
correspondence with the conditions of life and its relations. 

Spencer seems to be somewhat vacillating on the prob- 
lem of the relation existing between consciousness and 
matter. He at first conceives this relation as a case of 
metamorphosis of nattiral forces according to which 
consciousness bears a relation to the brain process anal- 
ogous to that of heat to motion. Later on however he 
regarded mind and matter as two irreducible empirical 
forms of universal energy. This theory however has not 
been consistently carried out in his works. The task 
which Spencer had set for himself was to discover the 
fundamental principles of the evolutionary theory in 



SPENCER 259 

every department of science, and for this piirpose it was 
really immaterial what psychological theory was sub- 
siimed. He says however — in harmony with his attitude 
towards subjective psychology as compared with all other 
sciences — that if he were to choose between the two 
alternatives of referring psychical phenomena to material 
processes or vice versa, he would regard the latter solution 
as the most acceptable. 

In sociology Spencer lays the chief stress upon its direct 
bearing upon the actual problems of Hfe. The struggle 
for existence is intended to develop human character, and 
hence no social ordinance and no state institution dare be 
interposed between the individual and real Hfe. Because 
of the fact that the whole matter turns on the develop- 
ment of character, evolution progresses slowly and Spencer is 
far less sanguine at this point than Comte and Mill, — His 
pedagogi cal theory is governed by the same h ne of argument . 
The child is to acquire independent experiences as early 
as possible and be under the guidance of authority and 
tradition as little as possible. Otherwise twofold adjust- 
ment would be required, namely, first to the authority and 
then to the actual conditions of life (Education ^ 1861). 

Concentration prevails during the earlier stages of 
social evolution, i. e. the individual is subordinate to the 
whole. It is conditioned by the necessities of common 
protection. It is here that militarism enjoys its classic 
period. Later on — as the individual forges to the front — 
a differentiation takes place. Individuals are then able to 
realize their own ends according to their pleasure, and they 
can advance their mutual interests by the free organiza- 
tion of individual energies. The struggle between 
militarism and industrialism is still in full sway. But 
Spencer anticipates a third stage in which labor for the 



26o POSITIVISM 

sheer necessities of Hfe will no longer occupy the central 
place, but in which devotion to occupations which are 
valuable per se will be far more general than now. 

It is the duty of ethics to develop the content of the 
highest stages of social life. The method of ethics is 
essentially constructive: from the highest principles of 
evolutionary theory it constructs the idea of the perfect 
life as a harmony of concentration and differentiation, a 
complete determination. In the perfect organic type the 
development of the one suffers no limitation save the 
recognition of the corresponding right of the other to 
development, and the indi^idtial is not coerced to tmder- 
take occupations which offer no immediate satisfaction. 
Altruism on the contrary furnishes the indi\idual oppor- 
tunity to develop faculties and dispositions which would 
otherwise remain fallow. The contrast between altruism 
and egoism is thus reconciled. — For the present we are 
still far removed from such an ideal state. For this 
reason we can only have a relative ethics, not an absolute 
system; but the absolute ethics can nevertheless be for- 
mulated and senre as a guide to relative ethics. 

Spencer regards the utiHtarianism of Bentham and Mill 
as too empirical. The highest ethical ideas can be dis- 
covered only by the theory of evolution. But in his ethics 
as in his theory of knowledge, he still differs from his pre- 
cursors only in the matter of having extended the horizon. 

F. Positivism ix Germaxy axd Italy. 

As we have already observed, positivism is by no means 
to be conceived merely as a movement which is opposed to 
romanticism. It is the result of weU-defined intellectual 
motives which are peculiar to it alone. Within the posi- 
tive school (in. its broader sense) we have seen men Hke 



DUHRING 261 

Stuart Mill and Spencer ^ each taking their own course. 
We have likewise found investigators outside of France 
and England, who have become positivists independently. 
Among these we wish to describe Eugen Diihring of Ger- 
many and Roberto Ardigo, the Italian. 

I. Eugen Diihring (bom 1883), despite the fact that he 
became blind early in life, has shown a remarkable activity 
as a teacher and author. His external misfortunes were 
due to his severe opposition to and distrust of academic 
authorities, on account of which he was dismissed from 
his position as a Privatdocent at the University of Berlin. 
He has published a characteristic autobiography under 
the title, Sache, Leben und Feinde Als Hauptwerk und 
Schliissel zu seinen sammtlichen Werken (1882). 

His first work of any consequence was Natural Dia- 
lectic (1865). Here he is still in close touch with the 
critical philosophy, and he distinguishes sharply between 
formal and real science. The intellect is constantly 
striving to discover continuous transitions and to form 
infinite series (i. e. capable of continuation according 
to the same principle). In mathematics, e. g. we have 
the concept of infinity and in logic the principle of suffi-* 
cient reason. But we must not transfer this tendency 
to continuity to the sphere of real being. Here the prin- 
ciple of definite number prevails, as experience shows. 
Astronomy, physics and chemistry show how completely 
the character of natural processes and natural elements 
are governed by the law of definite proportions. Each 
separate series of causes which nature reveals consists 
of a finite number of members. 

Diihring '5 theory of the vital relation between the laws 
of thought and being presents a singular contrast to the 
above distinction. Thought is a continuation of being. 



262 POSITIVISM 

The uniformity revealed in natiire as well as in the 
interplay of nature's forces corresponds to the combi- 
nations and deductions of the intellect; the identical 
nature of particular elements imder varied conditions 
corresponds to the logical principle of identity; the real 
relation of cause and effect corresponds to the logical 
relation of premise and conclusion, etc. The fact that 
man is capable of knowing nature rests upon the fact that 
the laws of human consciousness are hkewise nature's 
laws. 

This latter view is decidedly in the ascendent in Duh- 
ring 's later writings, where he indulges in vigorous polemic 
against the critical philosophy, which makes a distinction 
between our knowledge of things and the things-in-them- 
selves. Duhring here regards this distinction as an , 
attempt to enlist the services of philosophy in the defense 
of transcendental fancies. His positivism vanquishes 
his criticism {Cursus der Philosophie, 1875 — ^rewritten 
under the title Wirklichkeits philosophie, 1895; Logik 
und Wissenchaftslehre, 1878). 

The problem of the philosophy of reaHty consists in 
formulating a "world-scheme," a problem which must 
be solved by the systematization of experience. It is 
evident that the forces of nature constantly act in a 
definite way, and in a way moreover that the results of 
their cooperation invariably show definite totals. This pro- 
vides for the origin of beings which not only exist and 
act, but which are likewise conscious of their existence 
and action and the enjoyment which it produces. The 
possibiHty of such an evolution is due to the combination 
of different forces. The idea of an everlasting conflict 
of forces would be an absurdity, and a universe wholly 
unconscious would represent the anomaly of a half-done 



DUHRING 263 

performance. But nature contains a logic of its own 
which precludes absurdity. True, the antagonism of 
forces likewise plays an important part; but this antag- 
onism is the very condition of the potential discharges of 
motion and experience. The value of life and the 
attainment of its higher planes depend wholly upon the 
differences and rhythms of natiu-e. The profound satis- 
faction which life furnishes would be impossible without 
the cruel, the bitter and the painful {Das Werth des 
Lebens, 1865). 

Duhringy like Comte, finds the germinal principle of the 
moral life in the instinct of sympathy. The sufferings of 
others have a direct effect upon individual feelings, and 
its influence increases with civilization. Moral progress 
however consists both in individuaHzation and social- 
ization. Crude force is still the governing principle 
in existing states, but in the free organizations of the 
future the interest of the individual will be devoted 
directly to his work, not merely to the products of his 
work. The ideal of the future does not consist in social- 
istic concentration, but in the growth of free industrial 
communities. Duhring anchors his hope to a progressive 
evolution by the progressive imf olding and survival of the 
good, and he strongly opposes Darwin's struggle for 
existence and Marx's catastrophe theory. — The contem- 
plation of the majestic order of the tmiverse, which has 
made such an evolution possible, begets a universal 
affection, — the equivalent of the religious sentiment of 
the past {Ersatz der Religion durch VollkommnereSy 
1883). 

2. In Italy a period of depression and lassitude fol- 
lowed the promising mental activity of the period of the 
Renaissance, and the general history of philosophy has 



264 POSITIVISM 

but few names to record that are of any consequence in 
the general trend of the evolution of thought. The 
nineteenth century produced a new Renaissance, which 
at first assumed a romantic speculative form. During 
the first half of the century Rosmini and Gioberti developed 
a kind of Platonism by which they hoped to harmonize 
religion and science. These philosophical efforts were 
intimately associated with political issues, because it 
was generally beHeved that the head of the church would 
lead the movement for political rehabilitation. But the 
hopes of Italy were to be reaHzed by an entirely different 
method. The harmony of religion and science was 
broken — in the first place because the head of the CathoHc 
church sanctioned the scholastic philosophy of the Middle 
Ages as the only one permissible, and, secondly, because 
philosophy assumed a more critical and positive character. 
We shall here treat of Roberto Ardigo (bom 1828), a 
representative of the latter tendency. 

Ardigo became a positivist by a process of gradual 
development. His studies in natural science and philos- 
ophy carried him step by step, without being aware of 
it at the time, away from the scholasticism which he had 
practiced as a Catholic ecclesiastic. The growth of his 
ideas proceeded so smoothly, that, when all of a sudden 
the veil was withdrawn, he thought he had always been 
a positivist. The evolution experienced in his own 
intellectual life became the theme of his philosophizing 
when he accepted the chair of philosophy at Pavia after 
quitting the chtirch. He regarded his own course of 
development as a type which reveals the general character- 
istics .of all development, no matter in what department it 
occurs. Whilst Spencer really started from the analogy 
of organic evolution, Ardigo starts from the analogy of 



ARDIGO 265 

intellectual evolution, — *'this most remarkable of all 
natural formations.'^ He did not become acquainted 
with the French-English positivism until later. He 
calls himself a positivist, but at the same time emphasizes 
that the essential element of positivism consists in its 
empirical starting-point, rather than its systematic 
conclusion. He says: the positivist proceeds step by step, 
with a constantly widening horizon. 

He elaborated his theory of evolution in connection 
with an analysis of the Kant-Laplace theory which he 
regarded a typical example of the scientific method of 
explanation {La formazione naturale nel fatto del sistema 
solar e, 1877). The present state of the solar system 
came into being by a process of separation (distinzione) y 
in which smaller bodies (distinti) were formed within 
larger undifferentiated bodies {indistinto) . The larger 
body is not destroyed by this process. It persists and 
forms the basis of the interaction of the smaller body. 
There exists therefore an inherent continuity between 
the larger body and the smaller bodies which constitute 
its parts. The possibilities potentially contained within 
each of these indistinto (as * ^forze latente or virtuaW) can 
only be developed by interaction with other objects ! Each 
indistinto is therefore in turn a part of a more comprehen- 
sive whole, so that the distinction between indistinto and 
distinti is merely relative. Science is here confronted by 
an infinite series of processes ; but its only task consists in 
explaining the fundamental relation of indistinto and dis- 
tinti in each particular case, because it assumes that all 
differences, no matter where they occur, proceed from 
one whole and are forever comprehended within it. 

The theory of knowledge is but a special case of the 
general theory of evolution. Every explanation consists 



266 posmviSM 

of a differentiation, an analysis; there is nothing jinder- 
stood which is not diSerentiated (indislinto). Thr ::ie : rv 
has a certain tendency to stop with finite eir:r-T:::s 
{distinti finiti); but the ^rlmi^le that every parti ;.u=r is 
part of a whole impssis ::ir :.r:essity of an ----- -^ 

contrnitum. Hence, sin : r i ti: :ii : :. eht is ^mply a s c e :i al 
case of the natural prcitsE, i: is ira^ c^ssible to iTiuie 
tar -^'aie process of nature fr:a: :ii:ariat, TVe ar ^r 
a::aaa a anal term. — ^There is a praalem a: :ais -iiin: 
vriiich Ardigo laile^l to estimate correctly, in tan t aa:-i- 
ea^r is ar rtti'iiiss :ar asaaral process thr: .ui: -iiiia 
aliae - r a:: .are our laai-iia^e of all other ^ro:ossrs c: 
nature. On the other hand he (especially in La Ragiane, 
I S : a drs :ri ;: as the cognitive functions in detail, espedaUy 
ena;aa.sizint :at intimate relationship of recollection and 
ju 1 ti a Tin. z. :\ i hi . ain a once more the relation of indistitOo 
ana : in :ht rh nhnt of synthesis and of analysis. 

PIr iihi—isi Ta:hs the services of E^airf to the morphol- 
or; a ham ledge in this work. And he aater^aras 
enahtnail Kz^.fs theory of the synthetit urhty :: 
ctnsn uEaiEs in iiis chief work L'uniic ::'': ;; h >;:j 
:i :i in s:ih s:r:naer terms. Psychic hit lansists :: 
a ;:n:inu:us s yinheti: ^>!Dcess. There is a tr:: nil 
tentta: in tihnts :: : n sine aH elements snt :un::i as 
in a single s:rftin. This ::nhuence (c^^r-^:^ ::j ' ;::h 
is the only rahsnt in :: :he assodatiin :: iitas. It 
is impossiair t: rahain this uih:y a: ;:n;ti:usness as 
a product of Et:trt:e titintn:s, stiauEi he lay ~ty ~e 
can discover :he eienzems is :y an aa; ni: treeess :: 
thought which already presua roses a aiuen liiiole. 
ArS'p's aainirth :n ::r Kant, whn: he n^hea :' : jndo 
G:':'-: dz'.'z f.'.:::f.z Kei tempi >k: ::' k:. a:as ne: pre- 
vent him from severdy critidzing the theory of the 



ARDIGO 267 

thing-in-itself {V idealismo nella vecchia speculazione, 

1903)- 

Ardigo likewise applies the theory of the indistinto 
and of the distinti to the problem of soul and body. The 
facts given in experience consist of the psychophysical 
reality in its undifferentiated form. But our investigations 
must in this case be divided into psychology and physiol- 
ogy, each of which is obliged to deal with abstractions. 
The psychical and the physical never exist in reality 
apart from each other; one and the same reality {reale 
indistinto) underlies both {La psicologia come scienza 
positiva). — ^As a psychologist Ardigo reveals a remarkable 
faculty of describing both the continuity as well as the 
more refined nuances of psychical phenomena. 

Ardigo 's fundamental viewpoint likewise has a striking 
application to ethics. Each individual is a distinto 
whose real existence is in an indistinto, i. e. in a society. 
Each individual is evolved within a social body (family, 
state, etc.), and thus learns to judge human actions from 
the viewpoint of the whole, which provides for the 
evolution of an anti-egoistic tendency. It is in this that 
what Ardigo calls ^^the social ideality" consists. This 
tendency assumes the form of a holy affection at its 
culminating points, which impels to sacrifice and begets 
a faith in The Eternal despite the tragedy of human life. 



EIGHTH BOOK. 

New Solutions of the Problem of Being on the 
Basis of Realism. 

The romantic philosophy believed it could reform 
natural science. And this notwithstanding the fact 
that at the very time of the origin of this philosophy, the 
closing decades of the eighteenth century, natural science 
was making astounding progress. The traditional convic- 
tion of the persistence of matter throughout all changes 
was experimentally demonstrated by Lavoisier, by means 
of the quantitative method, — ^by weighing, — and the 
fundamental laws governing the material changes in- 
volved in the constitution of plant- and animal life were 
discovered by a number of investigators {Priestley, Saus- 
sure, etc.), and organic life was thus incorporated within 
the majestic cycle of material processes. 

Natural science received a new impetus dimng the 
forties of the nineteenth century, due especially to 
Robert Mayer's discovery of the principle of the conser- 
vation of energy (1842). Ideas which had already been 
suggested by Descartes, Huyghens and Leibnitz now 
received their empirical authentication, because the 
demonstration that there is no dissipation of force, already 
established in pure mechanics, could likewise be demon- 
strated in the interaction of the particular forces of 
nature, because it could be shown that a definite quanti- 
tative relation exists between the potential value (e. g. 
motion) which vanishes and the new potential value 
(e. g. heat) which arises. 

268 



MOLESCHOTT 269 

In addition to this we note Darwin '5 hypothesis of the 
origin of the species announced during the fifties. Natural 
science thus demonstrated the existence of a profound 
vital relationship, where man had previously seen nothing 
more than gaps and fragments, in a brilliant manner. 
The only question was as to what would be the bearing 
of these discoveries on the treatment of philosophic 
problems. The appropriation of the new views came 
most natural to positivism, and we have already seen 
how Herbert Spencer endeavored to incorporate them in 
his evolutional system. 

The new impulse of natural science furnished the 
occasion for a large German literature of a materiaHstic 
trend, which had the effect of disseminating the ideas and 
discoveries of natural science very widely. About the 
middle of the nineteenth century the German material- 
ists were supported in their opposition to dogmatics 
and spirituaHstic speculation — as had been the case with 
their French precursors of the eighteenth century — by 
an ideaHstic movement based upon the interests of 
humanity and progress. It is to be observed that 
idealism is not incongruous with theoretical materiaHsm: 
the materialist can consistently recognize the value of 
mental phenomena and efficiency, even though he does 
regard them as due to mere molecular changes. 

The most noted writer in this movement is the physiol- 
ogist, Jacob MoleschoU (18 2 2-1 893), who was bom in 
Holland, was Docent at Heidelberg in his youth, and, 
after being dismissed there on accotmt of his views, went 
to Zurich and later to Italy, where he enjoyed a long and 
successful career as professor of physiology. In his book, 
Kreislauf des Lebens (1852), he extols chemistry as the 
highest science because it shows how matter — and to- 



270 REALISM 

gether with matter, how life, and with life in turn, how 
thought — accomplishes its sublime cycle. He expounds 
the history of his ideas in his autobiography {An meine 
Freunde, Reminiscences, 1895) and says that as a matter 
of fact his only contention was against duaHsm, and that 
his theory — on account of the inherent relation of force, 
mind and matter — ^might quite as well be called idealism 
as materialism! 

The physician, Louis Biichner (1824-1899), whose Kraft 
und Stof (1855) was for a long time one of the most 
widely read books of the age, similarly goes beyond the 
specific views of materialism, only less clearly, and this 
is likewise the case with Heinrich Czolbe (18 19-1873), 
who, like Biichner and MoleschoU, was also a physician. 
Czolbe directly inverts the proposition that sensation is 
motion, and consequently attains an idealistic theory 
{Die Entstehung des Selbstbewusstseins, 1856). In his 
later works he undertook to establish a new world theory 
by the use of more speculative methods. It is a matter 
of peculiar interest in the case of Czolbe that he is fully 
aware of assuming certain axiomatic principles, namely, 
the theoretical requirement of the perspicuous and 
intuitive nature of thought, and the ethical requirement 
of life and its relations in the present world-order, with 
complete exclusion of everything transcendent. 

A little later the famous zoologist, Ernst Haeckel 
(bom 1834), undertook to organize the latest results 
and hypotheses of natural science into a system of Mo- 
nism. The first work specifically devoted to this purpose 
was his Generalle Morphologic (186 2-1 866), which was 
followed by his more vigorous and more dogmatic Wel- 
trdtzel (1899). He regards everything as animated; 
atoms and cells have souls as well as the brain. These 



THE NEW IDEALISM IN GERMANY 271 

souls may interpose in material processes on the one hand 
just as material processes may be the causes of psychical 
phenomena on the other. The Monism of Haeckel 
therefore combines spirituaHstic and materiaHstic ideas 
in a way that is not altogether clear. But HaeckeVs 
significance, who in this respect shows an affinity to the 
thinkers of the Renaissance, does not consist in his logical 
consistency, but in the tremendous enthusiasm aroused 
by his ideas, and in the fanciful vividness of his expo- 
sitions. 

It appears therefore that dogmatic materialism, ac- 
cording to the testimony of the materiaHstic author 
himself, is no longer possible. The results of criticism 
have therefore not been in vain. 

Another group of thinkers who still adhered to the 
fundamental principles of romanticism, even though 
they clearly saw the necessity of a reconstruction of the 
foundation and a restatement of definitions, elaborated 
the results of modern science in an entirely different way 
from the investigators just mentioned. 

A. The New Idealism in Germany. 

I . Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) began his scholastic career 
as a scientist and as a philosopher contemporaneously, 
but eventually devoted himself wholly to philosophy, in 
which capacity he served the University of Gottingen for 
a nrnnber of years. As a scientist he aimed to treat 
medicine and physiology as pure natural sciences, 
without reference to any appeal to a specific ''vital 
force" such as was then still in vogue. He construes the 
phenomena which characterize organisms as the results 
of the cooperation of material elements according to the 
laws of physics and chemistry (AUgemeine Pathologie 



^272 REALISM 

und Therapie ah mechanische Naturwissenschaften, 1842; 
Allgemeine Physiologie, 1851), He had even previous 
to this given expression to his philosophical ideas (Meta- 
physik, 1840) which were more fiilly elaborated later on 
(Medicinische Psychologic, 1852, and Mikrokosmus, 1864- 
1868), and brought to their conclusion in the Drei Bilcher 
der Logik (1874) and the Drei Bucher der Metaphysik 
(1879). 

Lotze's reflections have a twofold starting-point, the 
mechanical view of modern science, the application of 
which to organic life he insisted on, and the fundamental 
principles of romantic idealism. The resulting problem 
for him therefore was to show how to reconcile these 
two points of view. He was firmly convinced that being 
ca-nnot consist of a mere mechanism, and just as firmly 
that the highest ideas cannot be realized except by the 
method of causal, mechanical processes. He then seeks 
to show, by the analysis of the conception of mechanism 
developed by the modern sciences, how we are led to 
presuppositions which may readily be reconciled with 
idealistic principles. 

The mechanical theory of nature regards all phenomena 
as determined by the interaction of atoms. This con- 
ception follows as the inevitable presupposition of the 
scientific explanation of natural phenomena. But it 
does not follow from this that mechanism should be the 
last word of reflective thought. There are two points at 
which it transcends itself. 

The atoms of natural science are extended, even though 
their extension may be regarded as infinitely small. 
But whatever is extended must consist of parts and cannot 
therefore be regarded as absolutely simple. And exten- 
sion is an attribute, a quality, which, like all other quali- 



LOTZE 273 

ties, demands its explanation, an explanation which — 
according to the principles of science and after the 
analogy of the explanation of colors and tones — can be 
found only in the reciprocity of elements. These elements 
must therefore be still more simple than the atoms 
of natural science. They cannot be extended, but must 
be centers of force by the interactions of which the 
phenomenon which we call extension arises. 

But this interaction would be inconceivable if the 
ultimate elements in themselves were absolutely inde- 
pendent. The only way in which the element A can 
affect the element B requires that A and B are not abso- 
lutely different entities; their respective states must really 
be the states of one and the same principle which com- 
prehends them both: this is the only way of explaining 
the possibility of an inner (immanent) transition from a 
status A to a status B. We are thus driven to the ulti- 
mate concept of an original substance (as above to the 
ultimate concept of centers of force). Beyond this the 
analysis of the concept of mechanism cannot go. 

But there is likewise another source of information on 
this point. Where analysis fails we must resort to 
analogy. Lotze saw that analogy is the only recourse for 
the authentication of metaphysical idealism with a 
clearness nowhere to be found before him except in 
Leibnitz, Fries and Beneke. Is being in its ultimate 
nature spiritual or material? Lotze answers this question 
by saying, that if we wish to explain the unknown by 
reference to the known, we must inevitably construe every- 
thing material as the eternal manifestation of spiritual 
reality. Matter (or better materiality) is only known to 
us as objective, whilst we know the spiritual from our own 
subjectivity, as immediately identical with "our self." 



2 74 REALISM 

The only way of obtaining a comprehensible world-theory 
therefore is by construing the material imiverse after the 
analogy of the spiritual. In which case we construe both 
the elements (centers of force) and the prknary substance 
as spiritual reaHties, the former representing an infinite 
variety of stages of development, the latter as an infinite 
personahty. 

Lotze^s psychology is likewise affected by his meta- 
physics. According to him the relation of soul and body 
is but a single example of interaction in general. Just as 
atoms can transmit impulses from one to another, so can 
the soul and an atom of the nervous system like- 
wise transmit impulses from one to the other. Lotze 
sees no ground therefore in the principle of the conser^'a- 
tion of energy for surrendering the common (Cartesian) 
conception of the interaction of soul and body. He makes 
a thorough stud}' of the diffictdt problem of distinguishing 
between such mental phenomena as find their causes 
within the soul itself, and such as have their causes in the 
influences of the ner\"ous system. Among the former are 
memor}', reflection, the cesthetic and moral feelings, etc.; 
among the latter, sensations, which merely furnish the 
materials of thought. — Of Lofze's more specifically 
psychological theories we must first of all mention his 
ingenious doctrine of "local signs'^ (i. e. the specific sensa- 
tions which furnish the basis of the construction of the 
theory of space), and then also his fine description and 
analysis of the relation of feeHng and idea. 

Although Lotze means to defend the common (Carte- 
sian) theory of the interaction of soul and body, in his 
metaphysics, based on analogy, he has nevertheless made 
some important modifications. The interaction of soul 
and body is no longer (as in Descartes) an interaction of 



HARTMANN 275 

different essences, but an interaction of elements which 
are all of a psychical nature. And now, after finding that 
it is easier to conceive the interaction of soul and body, 
he actually grants that a causal relation is really compre- 
hensible only between Hke elements. 

Lotze's theory therefore culminates in a spiritualistic 

%Monism. He likewise places increasing emphasis on the 

immanence of the elements in primary substance. On 

this latter point he stands much closer to the Spinozistic 

view than he is aware. 

2. Edward von Hartmann (i 842-1 906) gave his chief 
work {Die Philosophic des Unbewussten, 1868) the sub- 
title, Speculative Resultatc nach induktio-wissenschaft- 
lichcr Methode. After his military career was cut 
short by a fall from a horse in which he sustained a 
crippled knee, he finally decided, after some mental 
struggle, to devote himself to philosophy. He then con- 
ceived the plan of a further development of the ideas of 
Ecgcl and Schopenhauer in mutual harmony, and then to 
construe these romantic theories on the basis of empirical 
science. His program reminds us of Lotze. But whilst 
Lotze accepts the mechanical conception of natiu-e with 
frank consistency, and inquires only concerning its pre- 
suppositions, Hartmann seeks to prove inductively that 
this conception of nature is inadequate, and that it 
requires the supplement of a spiritual principle which he 
calls '^The Unconscious,^^ to prevent its being construed 
anthropomorphically. The forces ascribed to atoms must be 
conceived as wills or efforts: they must have an unconscious 
idea of their destiny in order to be able to realize it. Matter 
therefore consists of idea and will. The only explanation 
of the organism is the guidance of its growth by an uncon- 
scious will. Between growth and instinct there is only a 



276 REALISM 

difference of degree. The association of ideas likewise 
presupposes that the unconscious within us selects the 
ideas which are most closely related or possess an affinity 
for the stock of ideas on hand. In the process of history 
the unconscious operates in such a way that individuals, 
whilst seeming to themselves to be striving for their own 
conscious ends, serve the higher purposes of the univers^ 
as a whole. — The activity of the unconscious is thus 
everjrwhere manifest — from atom to world-process. This 
principle is not personal, but rather super-personal. 
Hartmann nevertheless regards himself in agreement, 
barring several modifications, with the speculative theism 
of Schelling, Weisse and Lotze. 

Hartmann's philosophy did not originate from pure 
induction. It rests on the subsumption of a psychology co- 
historical apergu: namely, the observation on the one 
hand of the prejudicial view of mere reflection and 
analysis, the onesided attitude of criticism, and the 
tremendous importance of the immediate, the instinctive 
and ingenious on the other. Consciousness, according 
to Hartmann, is predominantly analytical, critical and 
negative; it is only the unconscious that furnishes the 
grand total and provides for the new insertions. Starting 
from this theoretical motive, suggesting the influence of 
Rousseau, and Romanticism, Hartmann finally ascribes a 
mystic-metaphysical character to the unconscious which 
is active everywhere in nature and in history — and which, 
in Hartmann's view, explains everything. 

Replying to his opponents, in an anon5mious self- 
criticism {Das Unbewusste vom Standpunkte der Physiologie 
und der Descendenzlehre, 1872), he demonstrates his 
mastery of the methods and results of the natural sciences. 
He had the satisfaction of seeing this work regarded as the 



HARTMANN 277 

refutation of his views. — But it is the more remarkable 
therefore that he could still adhere to his romantic method 
of explanation. 

How then is the universe, in which the unconscious 
operates, constituted? According to Hartmann, the 
"inductive method" shows that there is more misery 
than happiness in the world. The recognition of the 
world's wretchedness is of course not yet fully developed, 
but it is growing. Men at first expected to find happiness 
in this present earthly life; then they hoped to be able to 
attain it in a future, immortal life; and when this faith 
likewise finally vanished, hope was centered on the hap- 
piness of future generations here upon earth. The illusion 
of happiness is imtenable in all three of these forms. 
But if this is the case, the unconscious, which is every- 
where active, cannot be a purely rational principle. The 
explanation of evil and misery can only be found in the 
fact that the volitional element of the unconscious has, 
as blind impulse, severed all relation with the ideational 
element and instituted the world process as the sheer 
^^will to live J ^ — Hartmann is here using the ideas of 
Bohme, Schelling and Schopenhauer. The world-process 
consists in a constant strife between these two elements. 
Here man can enter the lists as a rival. It is his business 
to attack the illusions, not only directly, but likewise 
indirectly in his efforts towards civilization. The greater 
the advancement in civilization, the more evident the 
illusory character of happiness becomes, for civilization 
and happiness are absolute opposites. The highest aim 
is the redemption of the suffering of deity by the consum- 
mation of pessimism. As soon as the will-to-live is 
anntdled, the world-process introduced by the Fall within 
the unconscious, referred to above, will be at an end. 



278 REALISM 

But this lies in the distant future. For the present 
therefore pessimism can feel quite at ease and at home in 
the world! 

Besides his masterpiece, Eartmann has written a num- 
ber of important works in the departments of ethics, the 
philosophy of reHgion and cesthetics, as he was, generally 
speaking, a rather voluminous author. Arthur Drews has 
pubHshed a detailed and qtiite s^Tiipathetic exposition of 
his whole acti\dty {Eartmann^ s Philosophical System in 
Outlines, 2d ed., 1906). 

3. Gustav Theodore Fechner (1801-1 88 7) was originally 
a physicist. But along with his scientific investigations 
his mind dwelt on a world of speculation and poetic 
imagination in which the ideas of romanticism are 
peculiarly prominent, — this was especially the case after 
the objective world was closed to him through failure of 
eyesight. By the method of the most daring analogies, 
he construed the universe (in the highly fanciful book 
Zendavesta, 185 1, and later in the Seelenfrage, 1861) as an 
animated whole within which every possible degree of 
ps^^chic life is manifest, — in the form of plant and animal 
souls, human souls, the souls of the heavenly bodies, etc. 
When Fechner began to reflect on the problem of the 
relation of the psychical side of the universe to its physical 
side he came upon the fundamental idea of his masterpiece, 
Elemente der Psychophysik (i860). Like Kepler, with 
whom he shows a striking mental sympath}^, he took 
fantastic speculations for b's starting-point, but by 
dihgent reflection he finally discovered principles which 
could be verified in experience. He was convinced from 
the beginning that the relation of spirit and matter could 
not be objective, as if they were different entities. Later 
on he defends this view (in the fifth chapter of the Ele- 



FECHNER 279 

menle der Psychophysik) by appealing to the principle of 
the conservation of physical energy, and he is the first 
to have applied this principle to the relation of soul and 
body. He thinks that the brain and nervous system, 
like all matter, must come under this principle, and that 
the ordinary assumption of a real interaction of spirit and 
matter cannot therefore be correct, because in that case 
physical energy would begin and cease. The relation is 
rather one of identity, and the distinction depends on the 
viewpoint of the observer. Just as the observer standing 
on the external surface of a sphere sees nothing but con- 
vexity, and one standing on the internal surface sees only 
concavity, so the materialist sees nothing but matter 
and the ideahst only spirit — and both are right, each 
from his own viewpoint. — The resulting problem then is, 
what quantitative relations do the psychical phenomena 
sustain to their corresponding material phenomena? 
Fechner thinks that this relation cannot be one of direct 
proportion, but that it must be logarithmic, i. e. the 
psychical changes correspond quantitatively to the 
relation of the increase of its corresponding material 
process and the process already present. Fechner thus 
assumes that the relation between the external stimulus 
and the brain process to which it gives rise is directly 
proportional, because both are material events, but the 
relation between the psychical process of sensation and 
the brain process on the other hand must be logarithmic. 
He regarded Weber's Law (so called in honor of his pre- 
cursor, the physiologist E. H. Weber) , which he assumed 
and verified experimentally, as an expression of the rela- 
tion of spirit and matter in general. Upon the basis of 
experiments of his own as well as of others, on the relation 
of sensation and stimulus, he found that his law applied 



28o REALISM 

within certain limits. This problem gave rise to a long 
controversy. Fechner foimded experimental psychology 
by means of this hypothesis. He participated in this 
controversy with a ntimber of articles even into his old 
age, but always in a serious and chivalrous spirit. But it 
has become more and more apparent that Feckner^s law, 
so far as it applies at aU, expresses the relation of the 
psychical process (sensation) and the external stimulus, 
but not the relation of the psychical process and the 
brain process, which is apparently much more directly 
proportional. This conception would also agree better 
with Fechner^s hypothesis of identity (and with his 
excellent illustrations). 

In addition to his famous masterpiece Fechner pro- 
duced two more scientific works of importance: Uber die 
physikalische und pMlosophische Atomenlehre (1855), in 
which he assumes a position similar to that of Lotze with 
respect to the atom-concept, and Vorsckule der Msthetik 
(1876), in which he treats a number of aesthetic problems 
empirically. 

W. Wundt has written an excellent essay on the inherent 
consistency of Fechner^ s intellectual labors {Gustav Theo- 
dor Fechner, Rede zur Feier seines hundertjahrigen Geburts- 
stages, 1 901). 

4. William Wundt (bom 1832, professor of physiology 
at Heidelberg, afterwards professor of philosophy at 
Zurich and since then, 1874, at Leipzig) passed to 
philosophy from physiology, induced partly by psycho- 
logical and partly by epistemological motives. After 
he had made the change, new motives impressed him, 
especially the effort to elaborate a theory of the imiverse 
and of Ufe at once satisfying to the affections and the 
intellect. Wundt's final theory, according to his own 



WTJNDT 281 

conception, is closely related to the philosophy of roman- 
ticism. But WundVs idealism has been attained by the 
method of scientific investigation even to a greater extent 
than in the case of Lotze, Hartmann and Fechner. 

The psychological motives to philosophizing sprang 
from Wundt^s investigations of the physiolog}^ of the 
senses. He recognized the fact that the theory of space 
could only arise from primary sensations by means of a 
creative s^Tithesis, a synthesis whose product possesses 
other attributes than the elements, considered by them- 
selves. Afterv^^ards, while investigating the temporal 
progress of ideas, he came upon the problem of psychical 
integration (which he later called Apperception). This 
completed the foimdation for the ftmdamental theories 
of his psychology. His Grundziige der physiologischen 
Psychologic (1874, 6th ed., 1908) treats the psychological 
problems which can be elucidated physiologically and 
experimentally with great thoroughness, and describes 
the methods and instruments of experimentation. Wundt 
assimies the paralleHsm of the physical and the psychical 
as a preHminary hypothesis; the difference is only a 
difference of viewpoint. But in its ultimate analysis he 
regards the psychical viewpoint as fimdamental. And in 
his view the only necessity for assuming physiological 
correlates is due to the individual psychical elements 
which constitute the content of psychical life, not for the 
forms or the combinations of the elements, nor for experi- 
ences of value. 

Wundt construes psychical life as pure activity. The 
assumption of a psychical *' substance" involves the 
application of materialistic ideas to the sphere of spiritual 
reality. Psychical activity is especially e\ddent in the 
form of apperception in its fimction of attention, assoda- 



282 REALISM 

tion, feeling and volition. Here we have the soul as an 
organized whole; the whole antecedent history of con- 
sciousness expresses itself in the acts of apperception. — 
Wundt places increasing emphasis upon this activity in 
his later writings, and the concept of volition becomes his 
fundamental psychological concept so that (borrowing an 
expression of Paulsen's) he can describe his theory as 
voluntarism. 

The epistemological motive which induced Wundt to 
enter the field of philosophy resulted from his recognition 
of the fact that all natural science rests upon certain pre- 
suppositions which condition all our knowledge (Die 
physikalischen Axiome und ihre Beziehung zum Kausal- 
prinzip, 1866). Later on he elaborated his theory of 
knowledge partly in his Logik (i 880-1 883) and partly in 
his System der PhilosopMe (1887). Knowledge always 
begins with the conviction of the reality of our ideas. 
This naive realism breaks down however even by the 
necessity of distinguishing between sense perception, 
memory and imagination, and still more by scientific 
reflection, until it gradually yields to critical realism 
which substitutes object concepts which remain constant 
for the changing content of direct perception. In the 
sphere of sense perception the laws of space and time are 
elaborated as the expression of constant forms; in the 
sphere of intellectual knowledge the qualities immediately 
given are replaced by the concept of the object in the 
form of quantitative distinctions alone (spatial and 
temporal), whilst the psychical processes are referred to a 
fundamental spiritual activity. But rational knowledge, 
which demands a completion of knowledge by the idea 
of totality, carries us even farther than this. Such con- 
clusion assumes the character of materialism whenever 



WUNDT 283 

the ideas of natural science are taken into account alone, 
the character of idealism whenever the psychological 
ideas are taken alone. It is possible however to attain 
a higher view by combining the two groups of ideas, in 
which case being is construed as a totaUty of striving and 
willing entities whose objective phenomenal form con- 
stitutes material nature. Wundt agrees with Lotze that 
we are obliged to choose between a material and a spiritual 
unity; we must either make mind the basis of matter or 
vice versa; there is no third alternative! But he fails to 
see as clearly as Lotze that our only recourse at this point 
is to the argument from analogy. 

In his ethics (Ethik, eine Untersuchung der Tatsachen 
und Gesetze des sittlichen Lebens, 1886) Wundt shows 
marked sympathy with German speculation, especially 
with Hegel, He construes the individual will as an ele- 
ment of the total will whence both its motives and its 
ideals arise. The isolated individual does not exist. 
And the highest ends are only found in the total will. 
Even where individuals seem to be laboring for their own 
individual ends, they may still produce something which 
will extend beyond their horizon and in turn give rise to 
new motives. This shifting process, which Wundt calls 
the heterogeny of ends, is the most important evolutional 
process of the moral consciousness. But this likewise 
impUes that we cannot be conscious of the ultimate ends 
of the whole coirrse of historical evolution. We are co- 
laborers in a subHme tmdertaking whose absolute content 
we can never know. At this point ethics becomes religion. 
Whilst the positive religions express themselves in con- 
crete symbols, philosophy can only express the general 
principle that all spiritual products possess an absolute 
or imperishable value. 



284 REALISM 

In addition to the works mentioned Wundt has published 
a valuable Einleitung in die Philosophie (1901), and he is 
at present engaged on a comprehensively planned Volker- 
psychologic J the content of which consists of investigations 
concerning Language, Myth and Custom. 

B. Modern Idealism in England and France. 

I. Francis Herbert Bradley (born 1846, Fellow of 

Merton College, Oxford) is the most important English 
representative of the tendency which may be described as 
the New Idealism. He is particularly influenced by Kant 
and Hegel. Coleridge, Carlyle and Hamilton were already 
opposed to the classical English school as it appears in the 
line of thinkers from Locke to Spencer and Sidgwick. 
The critical turn which Sidgwick introduced into utilita- 
rianism and the broadening of the horizon of empiricism 
by Spencer brought the old school to a point which re- 
quired new instruments of thought. Of the two great 
English universities Oxford in particular represents the 
opposition to the classical English school. The ideas of 
Kant and Hegel have affected English thought particularly 
through the labors of T. H. Green and Edward Caird. 
Against the tendency of the older school to reduce psy- 
chical life to physical atoms and thus to apply the concept 
of mechanism without further qualification to the sphere 
of mind present-day thinkers propose the "organic" 
conception and the idea of totahty. This conception is 
keenly apparent in Bradley^ s Ethical Studies (1876). 
The unity of consciousness is the condition without 
which we could not even perceive oiu"selves. Bradley 
thus takes for his starting-point (without noting the fact) 
the view with which Stuart Mill concluded in the later 
editions of his Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy. 



BRADLEY 28$ 

Bradley makes the ethical standard consist of the degree 
to which we have developed the unity which is so deeply 
imbedded in our nature so as to combine a rich content 
with inner harmony. And the metaphysical principle 
forms an analogy with the psychological and ethical 
principles: being must he conceived as a coherent and 
consistent whole. 

Bradley's chief work bears the title Appearance and 
Reality (1893). It consists of an investigation of the 
criterion by which we are enabled to distinguish true 
reality from mere appearance. Although Bradley him- 
self (along with many of his critics) thinks that his 
position is closely identical with Eegel, and notwith- 
standing the fact that *Hhe Absolute" in the Spinozistic 
and Hegelian sense, as of an objective final statement, 
appears in the background of his thought, his reflections 
are nevertheless more epistemological than metaphysical. 
Like Kant, he makes the concept of experience funda- 
mental. True reality can only exist where complete 
and perfect experience — ^i. e. all-inclusive perception — and 
an absolutely mutual relation of the contents of percep- 
tion — is present. This is an ideal which finite beings can 
approach only approximately. Neither the natural nor the 
mental sciences satisfy this ideal. Such concepts as 
matter, space, time, and energy are appHcable whenever 
it is necessary to express the relation of finite appearances ; 
they are working ideas, — but they can never describe 
the absolute nature of being. And the same is true of 
the psychological concepts. As a matter of course we 
find a more vital relationship between unity and multi- 
plicity in the sphere of mind than in physical nature, 
and psychological experience therefore constitutes our 
highest experience. But antitheses and disharmonies 



286 REALISM 

take place within the psychical processes; the soul is 
subject to changes as a whole; and the concept of the 
soul — Hke its correlative concept, the body — ^is formed 
only by abstraction. Psychological concepts can there- 
fore no more express absolute reaHty than the concepts 
of natural science. 

When Bradley insists on the idea of the absolute, even 
though there is no concept that can give it adequate 
expression, he appears at once as a mystic and a sceptic. 
The unifying bond of these two sides of his nature lies 
in the idea of a constant striving which is the lot of 
all finite beings. Our thought, says Bradley, is always 
striving for something which is more than thought, — 
our personality for something which is more than person- 
ality, — our morality for something which is more than 
morality! The only thing which philosophy can do for 
us is to fiimish us a criterion to serve as a guide whenever 
we distinguish between higher and lower degrees of 
reality. Religion can do no more at this point than 
philosophy. It too must express the highest by means 
of ideas which have their source in the sphere of the 
finite. The advantage of religion consists in the fact 
that it is capable of allowing the recognition of a highest 
reality to permeate our entire being. 

Bradley has no points of contact with the special 
sciences, as is the case with Fechner, Lotze and Wundt. 
He has no interest in piirely empirical considerations. 
He is completely absorbed in the idea of his ideal criterion. 
This gives energy and depth to his mode of thought, but 
it likewise frequently makes him unjust towards other 
viewpoints, even such as he could really appropriate 
with advantage. When, e. g., he calls the viewpoints and 
hypotheses of the special sciences ''useless fictions" and 



FOUILLEE 287 

^'mere practical compromises,^' he is inconsistent with 
the importance which he ascribes to them as ' ' working 
ideas. " As a matter of fact according to his conception 
every finite experience, i. e. every experience which it 
is possible for us to have, is a working idea. And, 
according to Bradley's own principles, that which he calls 
*Hhe Absolute'' must be present in all our working ideas, 
like Spinoza's Substance in all the Attributes and in all 
the Modes. 

2. In France Alfred Fouillee (bom 1838, professor at 
Bordeaux, afterwards in Paris, now (1906) living in 
southern France) assumes a position which may justly 
be described as ideahsm on a realistic basis. Greek 
philosophy, especially Plato, forms the subject-matter of 
his earHest studies; later on he regarded it his peculiar 
task * ' to bring back the ideas of Plato from heaven to earth 
and thus reconcile idealism and naturalism." His funda- 
mental principle is the original and natural relation of 
thought and motion {idee-force) . His precursor in this 
view is Taine, whose De l' intelligence (1870) attaches 
great importance to the motive tendencies primarily 
combined with all ideas which only assume the purely 
theoretical character of ideas through increasing mental 
development. Fouillee constructs his concept of idee- 
force from a physiologico-psychological fact, which he 
then in turn discovers by the method of analogy in the 
lower stages of nature. His chief work, La psychologie des 
idees-forces (1893), is a classic in voluntaristic psychology. 
Psychical phenomena always consist of the manifestations 
of an impulse or dCvSire (appetition) which is attended by 
pleasure or pain according as it is fostered or inhibited. 
Discernment and preference are primarily one and the 
same thing, as e. g. the discernment of an animal between 



288 REALISM 

the edible and the non-edible. Sensation is originally 
limited to such things as are of practical importance in 
the struggle for existence; it is the will (in the broadest 
sense of the term) that impels the sensations to new 
differentiations. And just as in the case of sensation 
so it is with knowledge in general. Every thought, every 
idea describes a more or less conscious and definite 
tendency of life. 

Fouillee regards the application of the analogy of mental 
life, the most immediate experience which we possess, 
as furnishing the possibility of a metaphysics. Our 
knowledge of mental Hfe however does not rest upon 
psychology alone, but Hkewise upon sociology; the 
individual and the social, Hberty and solidarity are 
inseparable. This theory which Fouillee applied to the 
sphere of sociology and ethics (La science sociale contem- 
poraine, 1880; Critique des systemes de morale content- 
poraine, 1883) Hkewise acquires cosmological significance 
for him. The universe must be conceived as a grand 
total, a commimity of striving energies. But in this 
sphere we cannot attain anything more than a hypo- 
thetical scheme, for the synthesis which forms the com- 
pletion of our knowledge cannot be carried out positively — 
as in the cases of the finite synthesis of the special depart- 
ments of phenomena. But this nevertheless furnishes 
us a criterion by which to judge the various metaphysical 
systems: such a system is complete in proportion as both 
multipUcity as well as unity, analysis as well as sjmthe- 
sis, receive due recognition {Uavenir de la Metaphysique^ 
1889). 



NINTH BOOK. 

New Theories of the Problems of Knowledge 
AND OF Value. 

A. The Problem of Knowledge. 

I. German Neo-Kantianism. 

With the declining influence of the speculative philoso- 
phy and the growing demand for a scientific world theory 
following it again making itself felt, partly in positivism, 
partly in materialism, partly in the new ideaHsm, it was 
but natural that the problem of knowledge — as was the 
case in the period of Hume and Kant — should again 
assume a position of prominence. It raised the inevitable 
question of the ability of the htmian intellect, from its 
inherent nature, to construct such a world-theory, and of 
the limitations to which it is subject. It was evident that 
the reaction against Kant, in both its positivistic and its 
romantic aspects, had overreached itself, an. ^ the study 
of Kant was again resumed for the purpose of orientation. 
As we have observed, there was a critical undercurrent 
constantly making itself felt during the first half of the 
century (cf . Fries and Beneke, as well as Herbart, Schleier- 
macher and Schopenhauer). This now becomes the 
dominant current for a time, supported by the revival 
of a thorough study of the master both philologically and 
historically. 

In his Geschichte des M aterialismus (1865) Friederich 
Albert Lange (1828-1875), who was professor of philosophy 
at Zurich and later at Marburg, opposes the epistemolog- 

289 



290 PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 

ical method to both the romantic speculation and the 
materiaHstic conception of nature. Like Fechner, he 
conceives the whole of material nature — ^including the 
brains of men and of animals — as explainable by means of 
continuously active material energies. So far as method 
is concerned, materialism is right. But the phenomena 
of consciousness are not to be construed as members of 
the material series; they are subjective experiences whose 
objective correlates constitute the brain processes. — 
That is to say, Lange, like Fechner and Wundt, accepts the 
Spinozistic hypothesis. He furthermore combines with 
this the Kantian point of view. For even if we should 
assume that our sensations and ideas are products of 
material processes, these material processes themselves 
would still be nothing more than objects of consciousness, 
ideas formed by us according to the laws of otir mind. 
As a matter of fact, it may readily be that even the Kant- 
ian distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself 
is a product of our mental organization (Lange offers 
this suggestion in a letter published in EUisen's Biographic 
Lange' s, see p. 258 ff., published letters.) 

In addition to natural science and epistemology, Lange 
likewise finds room for speculative and religious ideas. 
But he does not regard such ideas as having any theoretical 
and objective significance. They are subjective supple- 
ments of empirical reality, proceeding from the needs of 
the spirit. They must be understood from the view- 
point of their value to human life, and not from the view- 
point of their foundation and their origin. Lange here 
combines a liberal practical idealism with theoretical 
idealism. But it can only be expressed in figurative or 
symbolical form. Lange insists that criticism should 
place more stress on the ideal and psychologically valuable 



LANGE 291 

elements of positive faith, instead of directly attacking 
the dogmas of popular religion. In this way the general 
public would not dissipate its energy in useless dogmatic 
controversies. 

Lange elaborated his ideal and critical theory of the 
social problem in his essay on Die Arbeiterfrage (1865). 
The central thought of this essay is this, namely, that the 
chief duty of human society consists in seeking to put an 
end to the struggle for existence. 

Lange is the most influential of the German Neo-Kant- 
ians. His masterly work affects wide circles both by the 
excellence of its form as by the richness of its content 
and its profound statement of the problem. He was 
however the herald of a new school which, with various 
nuances, strove to renew the Kantian theory of knowledge. 
Hermann Cohen's works are specifically devoted to an 
elaboration of the rationalistic elements in Kant's philos- 
ophy, whilst Alois Riehl inclines more towards positivism. 
Frederick Paulsen, whose general views are closely related 
to those of Fechner and Wundt, in his exposition of 
Kant, has directed special attention to Kant's metaphysi- 
cal assimiptions which are unaffected by the Critique of 
Reason. Windelband and Rickert conceive genuine crit- 
icism as the theory of eternal values, in which the stand- 
ard of the true, the good and the beautiful is found, and 
they lay great stress on the distinction between the 
method of concept-formation practiced by the natural 
sciences as compared with that of the historical sciences, 
which are related to each other as generalization and 
individualization. 

Criticism has become a vital factor both in the state- 
ment and in the treatment of the problems in German 
thought through the labors of this group of scholars. 



292 problem of knowledge 

2. French Criticism and the Philosophy 
OF Discontinuity. 

In France, after the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the critical school is represented by the vigorous thinker 
Charles Renouvier (181 5-1903), who in the name of logic 
and ethics attacks all ideaHstic and realistic attempts to 
construe being as a continuous totahty. He directed 
his polemics with particular force against the concept of 
actual infinity, which he regarded as a logical contradiction 
and an empirical falsehood. For an infinite which is at 
the same time regarded as a determinate whole is a con- 
tradiction, and experience teaches us that the principle of 
definite number apphes to ever3i;hing. With actual 
infinity continuity is likewise destroyed, — for continuity 
must indeed presuppose infinitely many gradations, — 
and with continuity necessity. In opposition to Kanfs 
attempt to prove the principle of causaHty, Renouvier 
returns to Hume's position and thus attains a radical 
philosophy of discontinuity. He regards every distinc- 
tion as a discontinuity. And as a matter of fact it is not 
only in our knowledge of nature that we are constantly 
compelled to recognize leaps. The first principles of our 
knowledge are postulated by a leap, i. e. by an act of 
choice. Renouvier was profoundly influenced by Kanfs 
antinomies; it is his opinion however that, if we wish to 
retain the principles of logic, we are obliged to accept 
the theses and reject the antitheses. 

Renouvier has pubHshed a sketch of his philosoph- 
ical development in an exceedingly interesting essay 
found in Equisse d'une classification des systemes philo- 
sophiques (1885) {Comment je suis arrive a cette con- 
clusion, ibid., II, pp. 355-405). — For the various phases 



RENOUVIER 293 

of Renouvier's philosophy I must refer the reader to 
Gabriel Seailles: La philosophic de Charles Renouvier, 
1905. 

The choice of first principles determines the world- 
theory, and in this connection Renouvier in his latter 
years {Les dilemmes de la metaphysique^ 1901) empha- 
sized more and more the antithesis of thing and personal- 
ity. If we remember that things always exist only as 
objects for personaUties, our world-view must necessarily 
assume the character of monadology or of personalism. 
(See particularly Renouvier's last essay, L'Personalisme, 
1903.) In this way he passes from criticism and the 
theory of discontinuity to spirituaHstic metaphysics. 
As a critical philosopher he seeks to show that the universe 
must have a beginning — because of the principle of 
definite nimiber — as a personalist he explains this begin- 
ning as the act of a god who (on account of the existence 
of evil) is not however to be regarded as absolute or 
almighty. Renouvier constantly insists on the epistemo- 
logical principle of relativity {la loi de relation): our 
knowledge aims to discover the relations which things 
bear to each other; each object represents to us a system 
of relations; our knowledge itself consists of a relation of 
things to us and hence all objects are only phenomena. 
Religious postulates alone can transcend phenomena — 
but even these postulates, as acts of thought, are governed 
by the principle, or, more correctly, the method of rela- 
tivity {la methode des relations). 

This vigorous and profound thinker remained busily 
occupied with his philosophy even on his death-bed. 
He experienced a sense of incompleteness, and he did not 
wish to die until he had given his ideas a definite form. 
A close friend has preserved his last words and exposi- 



294 PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 

tions {Ch. Renouvier: Les derniers entretiens. Recueil- 
lis par L. Prat), 

The philosophy of Emile Boutroux (born 1845, erst- 
while professor at the Sorbonne, now directeur de la 
fondation Thiers) belongs to a tendency originating from 
Maine de Biran. In his criticism of the principle of 
causaUty he approaches Renouvier; but it is not so much 
the theory of continuity that he opposes, as the attempts 
to conceive everything as identical or homogeneous and 
to reduce the individual to the imiversal {De la contin- 
gence des lois de la nature, 1875; De Videe de la lot naturelle 
dans la science et la philosophie contemporaine, 1895). 
Like Comte he insists that every new field of experience 
requires new principles which cannot be deduced from the 
principles which apply to other fields. The more con- 
crete principles cannot be reduced to abstract principles. 
The more we enter into the concrete, so much the more 
does the dynamic gain transcendence over the mechanical, 
the quaHtative over the quantitative. It is possible 
furthermore for new beginnings to take place in nattire 
which cannot be derived from their antecedents. As a 
matter of fact the whole uniform system of nature 
revealed to us by science is nothing more than the river 
bed which is formed by an inherent spontaneous evolu- 
tion, and which may be changed by variations of this 
evolution. The spontaneous variations {les variations 
contingentes) bear witness to the freedom which con- 
stitutes the inner nature of things. — Epistemologically 
considered the so-called laws of nature are nothing more 
than a simmiary of the methods appHed in the effort to 
understand things {assimiler les c^ioses a notre intelligence). 

Henri Bergson (bom 1859, professor at the College de 
France) carries forward the movement begun by Renou- 



BERGSON 295 

vier and Boutroux in a manner which is quite tinique and 
characteristic. He regards the quantitative method of 
explanation as merely the technical instrument employed 
by us for the purpose of understanding what is actually 
and immediately given in experience, which is always 
qualitative and continuous. Even language, and the 
scientific method of explanation still more so, casts our 
experiences in atomic form, as if they sustained the same 
objective relations to each other as positions in space. 
The inner stream of spiritual phenomena are thus trans- 
formed into a mechanically arranged mass. This is how 
it happens that the inner, dynamic, free and continuous 
activity is denied. The indeterminists are here guilty 
of the same error as the determinists, because they like- 
wise isolate the individual moments of psychical evolu- 
tion. The whole problem of freedom has arisen through 
a misunderstanding. Spontaneous evolution has its origin 
in the soul as a whole and there is no analysis that can 
do it justice {Les donnees immediates de la conscience, 1888). 
Bergson criticizes the fundamental presupposition of 
science. It is only by a process of analytic and dis- 
tinguishing definition that we are enabled to discover the 
elements between which the laws prevail. It is a matter 
of profound importance that the difference between the 
given continuity and the scientific distinctions be insisted 
on. This is the only way that thought can conform to 
life. Bergson hopes however to realize a higher science, 
a metaphysics, by means of the fact that he reverts 
from differentiation to integration, from analysis to 
intuition — and thus to true empiricism {Introduction a la 
Metaphysique, Revue de la Metaphysique et Morale, 
1903). At this point Bergson reminds us of Bradley. 
The real problem would be whether "metaphysics," or 



296 PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 

even any intelligent comprehension of the world whatever, 
is possible without a dissolution of the intuitions. Anal- 
ysis is therefore an indispensable instrument of thought, 
even though, as Bergson has so effectively insisted, it 
must be practiced with critical precaution. 

Bergson develops his concept of the soul as consisting 
of a memory synthesis in detail in his book Matiere et 
Memoir e (1897). It is only sensation, not memory, that 
requires a material organ. Bergson thus substitutes a 
sort of dualism of sensation and memory for the usual 
distinction of soul and body, which is scarcely recon- 
cilable with his theory of the continuity of psychical 
life. That is to say, he ascribes a practical significance to 
sensations, and hence, according to him, the whole body 
of natural science with its atomic theories and its similar 
spaces and times constitutes a great system of instru^ 
ments by means of which we are enabled to assert our 
mastery over material nature. — 

Philosophical discussion in France has in recent years 
been quite vigorous and significant. The Bulletin de la 
societe frangaise de philosophie furnishes the opportunity 
of following the progress of the refined and profound, at 
once personal and chivalrous, discussions of the younger 
French philosophers. Adolphus Levi: V indeierminismo 
nella filosofia francese contemporanea (1905), furnishes a 
valuable comprehensive treatment of the whole move- 
ment in French philosophy in its relation to the concepts 
of causality and continuity. 

3. The Economico-biological Theory of Knowledge. 

The critical philosophy had already to a certain degree 
regarded knowledge from the economico-biological view- 
point. Viewed from the standpoint of analytical method, 



PRAGNATISM 297 

which Kant himself applied in his Prolegomena, the 
problem of Kant's Critique of Reason may be thus for- 
mulated: What presuppositions must I postulate in 
order to secure an exact empirical science? — Hence all 
thought is to be regarded as means to an end, at least to 
the intellectual end of understanding. We are confronted 
by similar lines of thought in recent philosophical Htera- 
ture from various quarters. 

Noted natural scientists, reflecting upon the principles 
of their science, have observed that the definitions of the 
concepts and the presuppositions of science must seek 
their justification in the fact that they furnish the possi- 
bility of an intellectual elaboration and interpretation of 
the facts. Their necessity rests upon this fact alone, 
which however is not apodictic until the possibility of 
other concepts and presuppositions than those now in 
use, serving the same purpose quite as well, is excluded. 
Maxwell expressed this view in 1885, Ernst Mach in 1863. 

Avenarius, from 1876 onward, developed his natural 
history of the problems from a purely psychological view- 
point: because of the fact that consciousness does not 
possess an infinite ideational capacity it is obliged to 
introduce economy into its thought, which gives rise to 
the problem of construing what is given in experience with 
the least possible subjective addition. 

Pragmatism so called shows a similar tendency. This 
term was first introduced by the American mathema- 
tician and philosopher Peirce (1878), and afterwards 
appropriated by his fellow countryman, William James 
(1898), who combines it with a whole psychological and 
philosophical system. Pragmatism establishes the con- 
cepts and presuppositions by the practical consequences 
involved in the experiences to which they lead. If we 



298 PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 

were wholly indifferent to the consequences of our pre- 
suppositions we would not postulate them, we would at 
least draw no conclusion from them. 

I. James Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879), the noted 
physicist who was a professor at Cambridge, was a 
student of philosophy imder William Hamilton, of whom 
he reminds us by his emphasis of the dynamic character 
of knowledge. He regards the mind as an organ, whose 
use may be valuable in itself, even though its practical 
significance consists in the results of its functional activity. 
The progress of the exact sciences rests upon the fact that 
we are able to elaborate ideas, in which all particular 
facts are represented and from which exact, mathe- 
matical conclusions can be deduced. In this respect the 
formation of number series has been singularly important: 
we are thus enabled to conceive physical variations after 
the analogy of the relations in the number series, accord- 
ing to the laws of numbers. This analogy can likewise 
be carried through most readily in its application to 
changes of position, and the natural science of the last 
three centuries has therefore aimed as far as possible to 
Gonstrue all phenomena as processes of motion. The 
theory of atoms rests upon a comprehensive analogy be- 
tween the quaHtative changes of matter and the move- 
ments of material points in space. As a matter of fact 
even geometry is really a theory of motion: a geometrical 
line is the path of a motion from one point to another. — 
The justification of the presuppositions Hes in the fact 
that they lead to fruitful tasks and problems. Thus, e. g., 
the principle of the conservation of energy raises very 
definite questions in connection with every new phenom- 
enon: whence does the energy here expended originate, 
and into what new form is it transformed, when the 



MACH 299 

phenomenon ceases? — (MaxwelVs epistemological treatises 
are found in the second volume of his Scientific Papers.) 

Ernst Mack (born 1838, professor at Vienna) was led to 
the problems of epistemology by the study of the history 
of natural science. The following are his chief works: 
Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung (4th ed., 1901), Die 
Analyse der Empfindungen (4th ed., 1903, Erkenntniss und 
Irrtum (1905). 

Mach made an attempt early in life to discover a point 
of view which he would not be obliged to surrender when 
passing from the subject of physics to that of psychology. 
He found such a viewpoint in the priority of sensation to 
all concepts of atoms and souls. The concepts, formu- 
lated by scientific thought, are conditioned by the necessity 
of an adaptation to the given. Thought — both in its 
syntheses as well as in its analyses — ^is a case of biological 
adaptation. Because of the fact then that quantitative 
arrangements are simpler and more comprehensive than 
qualitative arrangements, and because they simplify the 
view of large groups of experiences, we apply them 
wherever possible, and to this end such concepts as 
energy, mass and atom are formulated; concepts, there- 
fore, which have no metaphysical significance. The en- 
tire mechanical explanation of nature rests upon a sublime 
analogy between the movements of masses in space and 
the qualitative changes of things (in temperature, electri- 
cal conditions, etc.). But we have no right to construe the 
universe as a pure mechanism. The immediately given 
consists of nothing more than complexes of sensation, 
which physics, by the help of its fruitful analogies, 
interprets as movements. 

2. Richard Avenarius (1843-1896), a professor at 
Zurich, was prepared for his later theories by his studies of 



300 PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 

Spinoza {Uher die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozistischen 
Pantheizmus, 1868), for the theory of identity is a splendid 
example of the reduction of all ideas to a single idea. 
The title of a later treatise {PhilosopHie ah Denken der 
Welt nach dem Prinzip des kleinsten Kraftmasses, 1876) 
gives definite expression to the economic theory, and his 
chief work {Kritik der reinen Erfahrungy 1890) consists of 
an investigation of the physiological and psychological 
conditions of the origin and the evanescence of problems. 
In his last essay {Der menschliche Welthegrif, 1891) he 
seeks to sift out the last vestige of animism, the reading of 
subjective elements into actual experience, completely. 

A problem presupposes a ^^ vital difference,'' i. e. a state 
of tension between the individual and the environment. 
Such a state of tension arises whenever the stimuH pro- 
ceeding from the objective world demand a greater or 
smaller expenditure of energy than the individual is 
capable of furnishing. 

Whenever the stimulus (R) and the energy on hand (E) 
balance eacn other (so that R = E), we have a vital maxi- 
mtim of preservation: Recognition is possible; the indi- 
vidual feels at home and has confidence in his ideas and 
perceptions. 

But if a greater effort is required than the individual 
is capable of putting forward (i. e. R>E), the individual 
discovers contradictions, deviations and exceptions in the 
given; it appears strange and recognition is impossible. 
Every extension of the circle of experience, every 
enlargement of the horizon, is liable to bring with it 
new problems. The advance of civilization increases 
the problems. 

Conversely, if the energy is greater than the demand 
(so that R<E), a desire to transcend the given will arise. 



AVENARIUS 301 

The result will be a practical idealism or a romantic 
yearning. 

Avenarius made a special study of the case of R>E. 
The solution involves three stages — ^need, effort, dis- 
charge — and the problem disappears. Avenarius regards 
these three stages of problematization and deproblemat- 
ization essentially as symptoms of certain physiological 
processes in the brain. His theory is physiological rather 
than psychological — even though as a matter of fact he 
constantly deduces the correlative physiological processes 
from the psychological "symptoms." 

The result of the process, the deproblematization, does 
not always constitute a real solution. A tentative or 
purely individual viewpoint may be attained, without 
excluding the possibility of a new state of tension, a new 
problematization. Deproblematization is definite and 
imiversal only whenever a perfect adaptation has taken 
place, from which all subjective and tentative elements 
have been eHminated. This is reaHzed whenever knowl- 
edge essentially consists in a quantitative description, 
and a description furthermore in which the consequent 
is always the equivalent of the antecedent. We have 
then realized the viewpoint of pure experience. 

Avenarius differs from Maxwell and Mach, especially 
from the fact that he failed to see the relation between 
economy and symbolism (analogizing), as he underesti- 
mates the significance and the necessity of analogy in 
general. 

3. William James (bom 1842), the Harvard professor, 
in an article pubHshed in 1898 {The Pragmatic Method y 
reprinted in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and 
Scientific Methods, 1904) laid the foimdation of a theory 
of knowledge by which he wished at once to review and 



302 PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 

correct the classical English philosophy. He has elabo- 
rated his theory more fully in a series of articles which 
appeared in the above-mentioned periodical during the 
years 1904 and 1905. He had already placed great stress 
on the continmty of psychic life in his Principles of Psy- 
chology (1890), by insisting that what is actually given in 
psychical experience consists of an incessant ^^ stream of 
thought, ^^ and he has applied this conception to the special 
problems of psychology with telling effect. He calls this 
original flux of Hfe ^^ pure experienced^ (an expression which 
he uses more consistently than Avenarius). It is only for 
practical reasons that we depart from the original flux of 
Hfe: distinctions, definitions, and axioms are postulated 
for the purpose of reaHzing certain ends. This conception 
of knowledge is what constitutes pragmatism, whilst 
rationaHsm, which accords the highest place to abstract 
thought, regards those intellectual instruments of thought 
as immediate revelations of the absolute. If we estabhsh 
the elements, which we carve out of this continuous 
stream for the purposes of solving our problems concep- 
tually, they may be interchanged, and operations with 
these elements enable us to attain results similar to those 
of actual experience. But this is not the case with aU 
the elements however. There is more discontinuity in 
the universe than we ordinarily suppose and we cannot 
always combine one part of our experience with another 
or substitute it for another. 

Just as pragmatism leads to empiricism, so, according to 
James, does empiricism also lead to pluralism. James 
has stated this clearly in his preface to the collection of 
essays pubHshed \inder the title The Will to Believe 
(1897). Pure experience really presents nothing more 
than factual transitions, no "intellectual" transitions. 



JAMES 303 

Our knowledge consists of combinations made by con- 
tinuous transition, we know no absolute and rational 
unity. In addition to combinations there are as a matter 
of fact disparate phenomena : new facts arise in the world 
and there is an absolute beginning. The unity of nature 
is a matter which is only coming to pass gradually, i. e. 
in proportion as we verify our ideas. — 

It is an open question whether such a radical pluralism 
as James adopts is possible. According to James the 
combination is quite as much a matter of fact as the mani- 
fold variety of phenomena, and the unity of the universe 
is construed as in process of realization. In addition to 
this James assumes the possibility of substitutions; but 
these presuppose the existence of something more than 
mere differences. (The author of this text -book has 
developed this critical suggestion more fully in an article 
which appeared in the Journal of Philosophy ^ Psychology 
and Scientific Methods (1905) under the title A Philo- 
sophical Confession.) 

We shall have occasion to refer to James* philosophy of 
religion in the following section. 

B. The Problem of Values. 

It is one of the signs of the times that the problem of 
values occupies such a prominent place in philosophical 
discussion at present, and that, as compared with other 
problems, it is coming forward with greater independence 
than formerly. There is a growing conviction that the 
final word on the value of existence cannot be established 
purely theoretically. Here however there will always 
remain at least a philosophical problem; the investigation 
of the psychological basis and the inherent consistency 
of efforts at evaluation. 



304 PROBLEM or VALUES 

This point presents three t^rpes. — Guyau and Nietzsche 
expect new forms of life to arise, ar.d they base their 
expectation upon the fact that the overnovring fuUness of 
\ital energ\' ia our present experience and our present 
conditions of hfe cannot find an adequate outlet. Like 
Rousseau the\- insist on the right of spontaneous, instinc- 
tive life as against anal}1;ic reflection. The formula 
R<E finds its appHcation here. — Rudolph Eucken Hkewise 
makes the contradiction between the capacity and the 
actual status of men his starting-point. The life of 
every-day experience is incoherent, without any center of 
gravity, and suffers from the contrast between nature and 
value. The only possibility of a true culture is through 
a new concentration which lays hold of a ^'spirittial sub- 
stance" beyond the confines of experience, — "a spiritual 
existence" in which what has been already acquired is 
preser\'ed and from which new constructions proceed. — 
William James treats religious problems purely psycho- 
logically. He seeks to examine religion as it manifests 
itself at first hand in individual men, — "personal reUgion" 
(as against "institutional reHgion"), which is a result of 
the individual's life-experiences, the experiences which 
determine his fundamental attitude and his method of 
reacting towards the fact of Hfe. This fundamental 
attitude or this reaction constitutes religion whenever on 
account of contrasts and conflicts they acquire a tran- 
scendent character. 

I. Jean Maria Guyau (i 854-1888) exemplifies a rare 
combination of subjective emotion with indefatigable 
reflection. He feels the profound difficulty of the prob- 
lems and the illusion of the majority of the solutions, 
but he holds that the illusions are valuable if only they 
are fruitful, i. e. if they excite the acti\ity of the intellect 



GTJYAU 305 

and the will. (See the poem, Illusion feconde, in Vers 
dhm Fhilosophie.) — Guyau enjoyed a home-life which 
was pectdiarly favorable to his activity as a student and 
author. Early in Hfe however he fell a victim to an 
incurable disease of the chest, but this did not suppress 
the energy of his intellect and his vital courage. 

His first literary attempt was a criticism of English 
utilitarianism and evolutionism {La morale Anglaise 
contemporaine, 1879). Here he takes the ground that 
English moral philosophy must inevitably lead to the 
imcertainty and illusoriness of the moral feeHngs them- 
selves due to their psychologico-genetic explanation of 
these feelings: i. e. if conscience is evolved from more 
elementary feelings it is really nothing more than a pure 
elementary feeHng itself! There exists an immediate im- 
pulse however towards self-development, an impulse 
which may assimie the character of devotion, of altruism, 
without the assistance of any association of ideas and 
evolution ! — In his own theories he endeavors to avoid the 
difficulties which he charges against the English school 
(Esquisse d' une morale sans obligation ni sanction, 1885). 
The development of Hfe is the goal which nature has set 
for itself, and ethics is the theory of the ways and means 
by which the highest and fiillest development of hfe 
may be reaHzed. It is necessar^^ to maintain and develop 
both the subjective and the objective phases of Hfe, and 
the S3rmpathetic emotions and social life are of the highest 
importance for both phases, because isolation and egoism 
restrict the horizon and the efficiency of the individual. 
The highest virtue — the attribute of character which 
makes for the highest development of Hfe — ^is therefore 
generosity. Reflection and analysis are thus not con- 
strued as hostile powers (as under the presuppositions of 



306 PROBLEM OF VALUES 

the English school). For the expansive energy which 
forms the basis of life begets hope and courage and 
makes possible what would otherwise be impossible. 
The only sanction which the ethics of the future will 
require is that of the subjective satisfaction which cor- 
responds to the greatness of the risk {le plaisir de risque). 

Guyau likewise bases his philosophy of rehgion on the 
impulse of expansion (L' irreligion de Vavenir, 1887). The 
day of religion is past. Religion consists essentially 
of man's feeling of fellowship with the personal director 
of the covirse of the universe. It finds its characteristic 
expression in the mythological explanation of nature, in a 
form of worship with magic rites and in a body of dogmas 
which are regarded as absolute truths. Rehgion is in 
process of complete dissolution in every one of these 
directions. What is best in religious life will be able to 
survive; the impulse to transcend the bare facts of 
experience and to discover a higher imity will not vanish 
with rehgion. As a matter of fact this impulse is only now 
finding room for free development, since the rigid, dog- 
matic forms no longer impose obstacles. Everyone wiU 
express his sense of fellowship with existence — the ideal 
sociology of existence — ^in his own way. The disharmo- 
nies of the imiverse will be felt more profoimdly than 
before, but the fundamental note wiU assume the charac- 
ter of sublimity, and the world will be one of hope and of 
courage for life and for death. 

2. Friedrich Nietzsche (i 844-1 900) builds on the same 
fimdamental principle as Guyau, only that in him the 
conflict between the poet and the philosopher is even 
more pronoimced than in the case of the Frenchman. 
Both Guyau and Nietzsche oppose an emphatic afl&rmative 
to the negations of pessimism. But whilst Guyau guards 



NIETZSCHE 307 

his subjective disposition and his melancholy resignation 
against the change and the evanescence of values, 
Nietzsche assumes an attitude of disdain and contempt 
for both past and present, and his hope for a glorious 
futirre constantly assumes a more imtractable and spas- 
modic character. 

As a youth Nietzsche, along with philosophical studies, 
devoted himself zealously to classical philology, and 
became professor in this department at Basle at the age 
of twenty-fotir. Owing to ill-health and his comprehen- 
sive Hterary plans he afterwards resigned his position 
and thereafter Hved mostly in Engadine and Northern 
Italy, until insanity made it necessary for him to rettun 
to his German home and be cared for by his mother and 
sister. 

Nietzsche's chief aim is to establish a new, positive 
estimate of life on the basis of the historical facts of 
civilization. The clearest statement of his purpose is 
found in the essay written in his youth. The Birth of 
Tragedy (1872). He contrasts the tragic-poetic view of 
life, symbolized in Dionysius and Apollo, with that of 
the intellectual optimism represented by Socrates. It is 
Nietzsche's purpose, as he said later on, to consider science 
from the viewpoint of art, and art from the viewpoint of 
life. Dionysius is consequently — i. e. the superabundant 
hfe, life absorbing and vanquishing pain and death — 
superior to Apollo, and Apollo is superior to Socrates. 

This view leads to a severe criticism of Strauss, the 
optimistic free-thinker, and a glorification of Schopen- 
hauer and Richard Wagner, given in Unzeitgemdssen 
Betrachtungen (187 3- 187 6). He soon finds however that 
he must go farther than both these ''educators." He 
famiHarizes himself with the latest scientific and philo- 



308 PROBLEM OF VALUES 

sophical theories, and thenceforward we find a struggle 
between a more reaUstic and a purely subjective ten- 
dency. In addition to this he was horrified at pessimism, 
not only as he found it in Schopenhauer^ but likewise as he 
found it in Richard Wagner. He then assailed his own 
old deities. Diu"ing the whole of the remaining period 
in which he was still able to do anything he labored 
towards the discovery of an adequate, decisive expression 
of his opposition to every form of pessimism, to every 
form of depreciation of life, to all levelling processes. 
He particularly challenges the theories of morality which 
have been prevalent hitherto and insisted on^^ an inversion 
of all values y The most characteristic statements of 
this polemic are foimd in Jenseits von Gut und Bose 
(1886) and in the Geneaologie der Moral (1887). Here 
he develops the ideas advanced in the essays of his youth 
more rigidly, and the fundamental theory becomes a 
radical aristocratism, which leads to a social dualism. 
The goal of history is not in the infinitely distant future, 
but it is realized in the world's great men. The great 
mass of mankind is nothing more than an instrument, 
obstacle or copy. A higher, ruhng caste is necessary, 
which exists for its own sake, — which is an end in itself, 
not at the same time an instrument. Corruption begins 
just as soon as the aristocracy no longer beHeve in their 
right to live, to rule and to treat the great masses as 
their laboring cy clops. Aristocracy must show the value 
of life by the mere fact of their existence. It is impos- 
sible to develop the highest virtues among the great 
masses. They are only capable of religion and civic 
morality. But, as history proves, the great masses have 
repeatedly been able to claim that their morality is the 
highest. The true estimate of life, as the sense of energy 



NIETZSCHE 309 

and might {Nietzsche later calls it Der Wills zur Macht) 
has frequently been overthrown by the uprising of the 
moral slaves — in Buddhism^ in Socrates, in Christianity^ 
in modem humanism. Even the tendency of natural 
science is in this direction: it even makes a democracy of 
nature by its principle of general uniformity! 

Nietzsche frequently expresses himself as if he would 
abolish all morality. But he really demands nothing 
more than an inversion which has been necessitated by 
the domination of the morality of slavery. As he ob- 
serves in one of his essays published posthumously {Der 
Wille zur Macht), he wishes to introduce a moral natural- 
ism. He must however also have a standard for his 
** inversion." He discovers such a standard in the prin- 
ciple of the affirmation of life and of the increase of vital 
energy. From this point of view he wanted to elaborate 
a ^^ number and measurement scale of energy, ^^ by which all 
values could be systematized scientifically. There is no 
kind of vital energy or vital pleasure which could here be 
excluded. Here Nietzsche appears as a utilitarian of the 
first rank. And he finally renounces his social dualism 
definitively, and then proposes as the end, not the happi- 
ness of the individual but the vigorous development of 
''the total life:' 

This change of attitude is still more prominent in the 
poetic elaboration of his ideas. The real tragedy and 
contradiction of his life consisted in his wasting so much 
time and energy in the effort to set forth his antipathy 
and contempt for things in general, whilst he failed to 
describe fully and clearly the tremendous positive con- 
ception of life which constituted his central idea. The 
poetic-philosophic treatise, Also sprach Zarathusthra 
1 883-1 891), was left unfinished. Here he elaborates his 



3IO PROBLEM OF VALUES 

ideas on the super-man: The aim of the present struggle 
is to evolve a new human type, related to the man of the 
present as man is related to the ape. This is the common 
aim of the whole human race. The period of duahsm 
and of animosity should be relegated to the past. Zara- 
thusthra, the seer and guide, hates his own hatred. And 
Nietzsche paradoxically advocates the affirmation of Hfe 
in the strongest terms, life of every form and on every 
plane. The idea that the cycle of the universe must 
repeat itself became a controlling idea with him. Accord- 
ing to his view the universe consists of a finite sum of 
elements, and hence the number of combinations of these 
elements must likewise be finite. It follows therefore 
that when the number of combinations has been exhausted 
the same course of evolution must begin anew. This 
idea of repetition or recurrence at first horrified Nietzsche^ 
and he had a severe struggle before he covild reconcile 
himself to it. Zarathusthra reveals to man the blessed 
gospel of the coming of the super-man — but on the con- 
dition that man wishes to choose and emulate life despite 
its repetition. Just as all mankind yield their assent 
to this proposition, Zarathusthra dies for joy. 

In this way according to Nietzsche the sublime expan- 
sion of the vital impulse vanquishes all disharmonies and 
all doubt. He is therefore admitted to a place in the 
history of philosophy, not because of his scientific treat- 
ment of its problems, but because of his experience 
of the profound antitheses of life, and because of 
his effort to elaborate these experiences in ideas 
and symbols. 

3. Rudolph Eucken (bom 1846), professor at Jena, the 
original seat of metaphysical idealism, following a series of 
preliminary treatises (Die Einheit des Geisteslebens, 1888; 



EUCKEN 311 

Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, 1896) has 
elaborated the reHgious problem of our age in his work on 
Der W ahrheitsgehalt der Religion (1901). 

The aim of this work is to show that religion harmonizes 
with the innermost ground of our being. If this is true, 
it must follow that every attack and every criticism will 
serve only to bring out the eternal principle of religion 
with increasing clearness. 

The civilization of the ancients over-estimated the 
form and culminated in the barrenness of plastic art; 
the civilization introduced by the renaissance over-esti- 
mated the energy and culminated in a restless striving 
without any absolute aim. The Church, as a matter of 
course, furnishes a total view of the useful life in its 
perfection, but it over-estimates the historical forms, in 
which the total view was once expressed, and it therefore 
regards all truth as imitation and repetition, whilst on the 
other hand it isolates the highest realities from actual, 
every-day life. Critical philosophy has contrasted the 
realm of value with the realm of reality. But there still 
remains the task of construing the valuable as the most 
truly real. A new metaphysic will avail nothing at this 
point. The only way to attain the goal is through living 
experience. Eucken applies the term Noology to the 
effort to affirm the absolute reality of the spiritual world, 
on the ground that it would otherwise be impossible to 
maintain the absolute obligations and the superiority of 
spiritual values. The noological view would direct its 
attention to the permanent, the free and the rational, as 
manifested in experience. Particularly in the case of the 
beginning of a new form of experience — organic, psychical 
and the higher spiritual life, — ^noology will discover pro- 
found motives. The noological view cannot justify itself 



312 PROBLEM OF VALUES 

by proofs; its basis consists of a spiritual impulse, which is 
aroused by the experience of the disharmonies of life, and 
which not only leads to indefinite religious ideas, to a 
^^ universal religion, ^^ but at its culmination can lead to a 
^^characteristic religion'' with definitely formed general 
symbols. The great symbols formulated by the founders 
of the positive religions bear witness to the presence of a 
divine energy in spiritual evolution. N oology therefore 
culminates in metaphysics. 

\. Whilst Eucken regards a purely psychological and 
epistemological treatment of the problem of religion 
inadequate, this method of treatment has nevertheless 
been quite prominent in recent years. A number of 
American investigators have made valuable individual 
contributions (Stanley Hall, Leuba, Coe, etc.). James' 
book on Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of 
Human Nature (1902) here takes first rank. 

According to James the study of reHgious phenomena 
reveals how scant a portion of our spiritual life can be 
clearly explained. Consciousness shades off through a 
large number of degrees into the unconscious or subcon- 
scious, and it frequently happens that the fundamental 
presuppositions of our conscious ideas proceed from the 
''subliminal'^ (or "submarginal") region. Conscious 
arguments frequently affect only the surface of our 
nature, and a spontaneous and immediate conviction is 
the deep thing in us. James is incHned to regard the 
influences which issue from that deeper region as the 
means by which a higher order of things works in us. 
Every attempt to define this order more precisely is of 
course an interpretation; any single experience may be 
the subject of various religious interpretations. The 
majority of people are lacking in critical insight and care, 



EUCKEN 313 

not in faith; they are too prone to base a dogmatic 
beHef on every vivid idea. 

Every emotion may, imder given circumstances, ac- 
quire a religious character. This character manifests 
itself by the fact that man sums up his vital experiences 
which give rise to a total attitude, which determine his 
entire attitude towards hfe. Spiritual life thus acquires a 
unity and harmony which are otherwise sought for in vain. 
In some natures this unity of life is the result of profound 
spiritual struggles, and can only be realized by a crisis, a 
" conversion '\' in other natures however it arises by suc- 
cessive growth or spontaneous unfolding. This repre- 
sents the difference, between religious leaders : the differ- 
ence between the healthy and the sick souls, or, better 
still, between the once-born and the twice-born. But in 
both classes the goal cannot be attained without the inflow 
of energy from unconscious sources. How this fact shall 
be interpreted is a private matter for each individual. 
James is himself convinced of the fact that new powers 
and starting-points may proceed from those dark sources, 
and he thinks that in academic circles we dismiss this 
possibihty all too quickly. Religion rests upon a cosmo- 
logical hypothesis, which cannot however be formulated 
dogmatically. The religious consciousness can never 
accept the tragedies and shipwrecks of Hfe as the final 
word concerning existence. 

Oin* judgment of the value of religion must Hkewise be 
based on experience. We judge religious phenomena by 
their fruits, and as a matter of fact this has always been 
the case. The principle of pragmatism is likewise 
applicable here= Reverence for deity ceases whenever 
it fails to affect the heart, and whenever it conflicts, in 
its whole character, with something the value of which we 



314 PROBLEM OF VALUES 

have experienced and do not wish to deny. Mankind 
retains the gods which it can use, and whose command- 
ments substantiate the requirements which they make of 
themselves and of others. We constantly apply human 
standards. 

James assumes a sympathetic attitude towards rehgion. 
He is convinced that the best fruits of religious experience 
are the best things in history. The inner life here mani- 
fests a fer\^or and an energ\^, a subjecti\dty and a concen- 
tration which lifts us into a higher atmosphere. — James 
does not discuss the intimate relation which exists be- 
tween '^personal" and "institutional" reb'gion. His 
treatise however suggests points of \dew which are Yery 
fmitful from which to consider the problem of religion — 
or, if we prefer, the problem of an equivalent of rehgion. 



CHRONOLOGY OF THE CHIEF WORKS 
IN PHILOSOPHY. 

-'1440. Cusanus: De docta ignorantia. 

15 13. Machiavelli: II principe. 

15 16. Pomponazzi: De immortalitate animae. 

1538. Vives: De anima et vita. 

1540. Melanchthon: De anima. 

1543. Copernicus: De revolutionibus orbium coelestium. 

1554. Ramus: Institutiones dialecticae. 

1565. Telesio: De rerum natura. 

1577. Bodin: La r6publique. 

1580. Montaigne: Essais. 

1 58 1. Sanchez: Quod nihil scitur. 
■v^i582. Bruno: De umbris idearum. 

1584. " Cena delle ceneri. 

1584. " De r infinito universe et mondi. 

1584. " De la causa, principio, et uno. 

1585. " De gl'heroici furori. 
1 59 1. " De triplici minimo. 
1 59 1. " De immense. 

1597. Kepler: Mysterium cosmographlcum. 

1603. Althusius: Politica methodice digesta. 

1609. Kepler: Astronomia nova. 

1612. Bohme: Aurora. 

1620. Bacon: Novum Organum. (Eng. trans.) 
1623. " De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum. 
(Eng. trans.) 

1623. Galileo: II saggiatore. 

1624. Cherbury: De veritate. 

1625. Grotius: De jure belli et pacis. 

1632. Galileo: Dialogo sopra i due massimi systemi del mondo. 

1637. Descartes: Discours de la methode. 

1638. Galileo: Discorsi. 

-'1 640. Hobbes: Elements of Law. 

1641. Descartes: Meditationes. (Eng. trans.) 

315 



3l6 CHRONOLOGY 

1642. Hobbes: De cive. 

■^1644. Descartes: Principia Phllosophiae. (Eng. trans.) 

1 65 1 . Hobbes : Leviathan. 

1655. " De corpore. 

1658. " De homine. 

1658. Gassendi: Opera omnia. 

1665. Geulincx: De virtute. (Vollstandig 1675 unter dem 
Titel Ethica.) 

1669. Pascal: Pens6es. (Eng. trans.) 

^1670. Spinoza: Tractatus theologico-politicus. (Eng. trans.) 

1674. Malebranche: Recherche de la v6nt6. 

1677. Spinoza: Ethica. (Eng. trans.) 

-'leSs. Leibnitz: Petit discours m^taphysique. (Eng. trans.) 

1687. Newton: Principia. 

»i689. Locke: On Government. 

1690. " Essay on Human Understanding. 

1695. " Reasonableness of Christianity. 

1695. Leibnitz: Systeme nouveau de la nature et de la communi- 
cation des substance. 

1695. Bayle: Dictionnaire historique et critique. 

1704. Toland: Letters to Serena. 

1705. Mandeville: The Fable of the Bees. 

1709. Berkeley: Theory of Vision. 

1 710. Leibnitz: Theodicee. 

■i 1 7 10. Berkeley: Principles of Knowledge. ^ 

171 1. Shaftesbury: Characteristics (I). 

1 7 14. Leibnitz: Monadologie. (Eng. trans.) 

1720. Wolff: Vernunftige Gedanken. 

1725. Hutcheson: Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. 

1726. Butler: Sermons. 

1734. Voltaire: Lettres sur les Anglais. 

1739 (-1740). Hume: Treatise on Human Nature. 

1745. Crusius: Entwurf der notwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten. 

1748. Montesquieu: Esprit des lois. (Eng. trans.) 

1748. La Mettrie: L'homme machine. 

1748. Hartley: Observations on Man. 

1749. Hume: Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding. 

1750. Rousseau: Discours sur les sciences et les arts. 

1 75 1. Hume: Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. 
1754. Condillac: Traite des sensations. 



CHRONOLOGY 317 

1754. Diderot: Interpretation de la nature. 

1755- Rousseau: Discours sur I'origine de I'in^galite parmi les 
hommes. 

1755. Mendelssohn: Briefe uber die Empfindungen. 

>j' 1 755. Kant : Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des HImmels. 

1757. Hume: Natural History of Religion. 

1758. Helvetius: De I'esprit. 

1762. Rousseau: Emile. (Eng. trans.) 
1762. " Contrat social. 

1762. Kant: Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grossen in die 

Weltweisheit einzufiihren. 

1763. Reid: Inquiry into the Human Mind. 

1764. Voltaire: Dictionnaire philosophique portatif. 

1764. Lambert: Neues Organum. 

1765. Leibnitz: Nouveaux essais. (Eng. trans.) 

1766. Kant: Traume eines Geistersehers. (Eng. trans.) 
1766. Voltaire: Le philosophe ignorant. 

1770. Holbach: Syst^me de la nature. ^ 

1770. Kant: De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et 
principiis. 

1776. Smith: Wealth of Nations. 

1777. Tetens: Versuche uber die menschliche Natur. 

1778. Lessing: Duplik. 

1779. Hume: Dialogues on Natural Religion. 

'^1781. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. (Eng. trans.) 

1783. " Prolegomena zu jeder kiinftigen Metaphysik. (Eng, 

trans.) 

1784. " Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte. 

1784 (-1791). Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der 
Menschheit. 

1785. Kant: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. (Eng. 

trans.) 

1786. Kant: Mutmasslicher Anfang des Menschengeschlechts. 

1786. Mendelssohn: Morgenstunden. 

1787. Jacobi: David Hume uber den Glauben, oder Idealismus 

und Realismus. 

1788. Kant: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. (Eng. trans.) 

1789. Reinhold: Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen 

Vorstellungsvermogens. 
1789. Bentham: Principles of Morals and Legislation. 



3l8 CHRONOLOGY 

^1790. Kant: Kritik der Urtheilskraft. (Eng. trans.) 
1790. Maimon: Versuch uber die Transzendental philosophic. 
1793. Kant: Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Ver- 
nunft. (Eng. trans.) 

1793. Schiller: Ueber Anmuth und Wurde. 

1794. Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslchrc. 

(Eng. trans.) 
1797. Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. (Eng. 

trans.) 
1799. Schleiermachcr: Reden uber die Religion. (Eng. trans.) 
1 802. Cabanis : Des rapports du physique et du moral de rhomme. 
1806. Fichte: Grundziige des gegenwartigen Zeitalters. 
1806. Fries: Neue Kritik der Vemunft. 
^ 1807. Hegel: Phanomenologie des Geistes. (Eng. trans.) 

1808. Herbart: Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik. 

1809. de Maistre: Soirees de St. Petersbourg. 
V1809. Schelling: Ueber den Menschlichen Willen. 

1 8 12. Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik. (Eng. trans.) 

1 8 13. Saint-Simon: M^moire sur la science de I'homme. 

Nj 18 13. Schopenhauer: Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom Zureich- 
enden Grunde. (Eng. trans.) 
1817. Hegel: Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. 

1819. Schopenhauer: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. (Eng. 

trans.) 

1820. Fries: Psychische Anthropologic. 

182 1. Hegel: Philosophie des Rechts. (Eng. trans, in part.) 
1 82 1. Schleiermachcr: Der christliche Glaube. 

1824. Herbart: Psychologic als Wissenschaft. (Eng. trans.) 

1825 (-1827). Beneke: Psychologische Skizzen. 

1829. W. Hamilton: Philosophy of the Unconditioned. 

1829. James Mill: Analysis of the Human Mind. 

1830 (-1842). A. Comte: Cours de philosophie positive. (Eng. 

trans.) 
1833. Carlyle: Sartor Resartus. 
1835. Strauss: Leben Jesu. 

1840. Trendelenburg: Logische Untersuchungen. 
^1841. Schopenhauer: Grundprobleme der Ethik. 

1841. Feuerbach: Das Wesen des Christentimis. 

1842. Robert Mayer: Bemerkungen uber die Krafte der unbeleb- 

ten Natur. 



CHRONOLOGY 319 

1843. Feuerbach: Gnindsatze der Phllosophie der Znkunft. 
''1 843. Stuart Mill: System of Logic. 

1843 (-1846). Kierkegaard's Hauptschriften. 

1844. Schopenhauer: Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, (Eng. 

trans.) 

1 85 1. Lotze: Allgemeine Physiologie. 

1852. Moleschott: Der Kreislauf des Lebens. 

1854 (-1864). Renouvier: Essais de critique gen^rale. 
1855. Biichner: Kraft und Stoff. (Eng. trans.) 

1855. Spencer: Principles of Psychology (I). 

1856. Lotze: Mikrokosmus (I). (Eng. trans.) 

1858. Darwin: Origin of Species. 

1859. Stuart Mill: On Liberty. 

i860. Fechner: Elemente der Psychophysik. 
1 86 1. Spencer: First Principles. 

1864. Jevons: Pure Logic, or the Logic of Quality apart from 

Quantity. 

1865. Diihring: Natiirliche Dialektik. 

1865. Lange: Geschichte des Materialismus. (Eng. trans.) 

1866. Wundt: Die physikalischen Axiome. 

1869. Hartmann: Die Philosophie des Unbewussten (Eng. 

trans.) 
1 871. Darwin: Descent of Man. 

1 87 1. Cohen: Kants Theorie der Erfahmng. 

1872. Nietzsche: Die Geburt der Tragodie. 

1874. Wundt: Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologic. 

1875. Boutroux: De la contingence des lois de la nature. 

1876. Bradley: Ethical Studies. 

1876. Avenarius: Philosophie als Denken der Welt. 

1876. Riehl: Der philosophische Kritizismus (I). (Eng. trans.) 

1877. Ardig5: La formazione naturale. 

1879. Guyau: La Morale Anglaise contemporaine. 

1882. Diihring: Sache, Leben und Feinde. 

1883. Nietzsche: Also sprach Zarathustra (I). (Eng. trans.) 

1884. Windelband: Praludien. 

1885. Renouvier: Classification des syst^mes philosophiques. 

1885. Guyau: Esquisse d' une morale. 

1886. Mach: Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen. (Eng. 

trans.) 
1886. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Bose. (Eng. trans.) 



320 CHRONOLOGY 

1887. Wundt: System der Philosophle. 

1887. Guyau: L'irreligion de Tavenir. 

1888. Avenarius: Kritik der reinen Erfahmng (I). 

1888. Bergson: Les doiin6es immediates de la conscience. 

1889. Paulsen: System der Ethik. (Eng. trans.) 

1890. James: Principles of Psychology. 

1892. Paulsen: Einleitung in die Philosophie. (Eng. trans.) 

1893. Fouillee: La psychologic des idees-forces. 
1893. Bradley: Appearance and Reality. 

1896. Rickert: Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaf tlichen Begriffs- 

bildung. 

1897. James: The Will to Believe. 

1898. Ardigb: L'xmita della coscienza. 
^^898. James: The Pragmatic Method. 

1 90 1. Renouvier: Les dilemmes de la m^taphysique pure. 

1 90 1. Eucken: Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion. (Eng. trans.) 

1902. James: Varieties of Religious Experience. 

1904. Cohen: Die Ethik des reinen Willens. 

1905. Mach: Erkenntnis und Irrtum. 



INDEX 



Abstraction, 93, 99. 

Agnostics, 250. 

Althusius, 9. 

Ampere, 222. 

Analogy, 18, 81 fE., loi, 180, 202 

237, 275. 
Apperception, 84, 144. 
Ardigb, 219, 266. 
Associational Psychology, 114 f.; 

233,242, 284 f. 
Atom, 34, 272. 
Attribute, 72. 
Avenarius, 297. 

Bacon, 17. 

Bain, 242. 

Bayle, 58, 87 f. 

Being, Problem of, 2, 44, 90, 

170, 246. 
Beneke, 211. 
Bentham, 232. 
Bergson, 294. 
Berkeley, 98. 
Bodin, 12, 13. 
Bohme, 13, 181. 
Bostrom, 200. 
Boutroux, 294. 
Boyle, 93. 
Bradley, 284. 
Bruno, 29. 
Buchner, 270. 
Burckhardt, 4. 
Butler, 104. 



Cabanis, 220. 
Caird, 284. 
Carlyle, 234, 236. 
Category, 143, 145, 147. 
CausaHty, 46, 55, 57, 71, 94, 

108, 142, 144, 240, 297. 
Cherbury, 12. 
Clarke, 98. 
Cohen, 291. 
Coleridge, 234, 236. 
Comte, 224, 230. 
Condillac, 120. 
Continuity, 79, 123, 135, 145, 

261. 
Copernicus, 27. 
Cosmological problem, 2, 44, 90, 

170, 246. 
Cousin, 222. 
Critical Philosophy, 137 f., 189, 

205, 289. 
Crusius, 134. 
Culture, Problem of, 103, 124, 

154, 167, 307. 
Cusanus, 22. 
Czolbe, 270. 

Darwin, Charles, 247, 268. 
Darwin, Erasmus, 115. 
Deduction, 37, 39, 51, 74, 185 f., 

239. 
Descartes, 444. 
Destutt de Tracy, 221. 
Dialectic, 185, 190 f. 
Diderot, 122. 



321 



322 



INDEX 



Docta ignorantia, 23, 36, 250, 

262, 267. 
Dogmatism, 44, 90, 117, 121, 

138, 171. 
Duhring, 219, 261. 

Edelmami, 134. 
Encyclopedists, 123. 
Energy, Concept of, 80. 
Energy, Constancy of, 80, 268. 
Energy, Principle of, 37, 50, 268. 
Enlightenment, 117, 140. 
Erdmann, J. E., 213. 
Evolution, 51 f., 121, 123, 140, 

246. 
Ethical problem, 2, 90, 102 f., 

no, 153 ff., 215, 248, 284 f. 
Eucken, 304, 310. 
Experience, 108, 146, 147 f., 285. 

Fechner, 278. 
Feuerbach, 213, 214. 
Fichte, J. G., 171. 
Fichte, J. H., 214. 
Force, Concept of, 80. 
Fries, 205. 
Fouill^e, 287. 

Galileo, 39. 
Gassendi, 59. 
Geijer, 200. 
Genlincx, 55. 
Gioberti, 264. 
Glanvil, 57. 
Goschel, 213. 
Green, 284. 
Grotius, II. 
Guyau, 303 f. 



Haeckel, 270. 

Hamann, 162. 

Hamilton, 236, 256, 298. 

Hartley, 114. 

Hartmann, 275. 

Hegel, 182. 

Hegelian school, 213, 284. 

Helvetius, 122. 

Herbart, 207. 

Herder, 163. 

Hobbes, 59. 

Hoijer, 200. 

Holbach, 121. 

Hume, 106. 

Hutcheson, 104. 

Idea, 33, 92, 144, 149, 150. 
Idealism, 81, 170, 171, 272, 284. 
Identity, Principle of, 85. 
Ideology, 224, 229. 
Idola mentis, 17. 
Induction, 20, 39, 237, 238 f. 
Inertia, Principle of, 24, 37, 
39, 53. 

Jacobi, 149, 164 f. 
James, 301, 312. 
Jevons, 241. 

Kant, 132, 137. 

Kepler, 37. 

Kierkegaard, 201. 

Knowledge, Problem of, 2, 90, 

105 f., 138 ff., 238 f., 240 f., 

289. 
Kj-ause, 214. 

Lambert, 135. 
LaMettrie, 120. 
Lange, F. A., 289. 



INDEX 



323 



Lasalle, 213. 
Lavoisier, 268. 
Leibnitz, 44, 83. 
Leonardo, 36. 
Lessing, 135. 
Locke, 91. 
Lotze, 272. 

Mach, 299. 

Machiavelli, 5. 

Maimon, 166. 

Maine de Biran, 221. 

Maistre, 220. 

Malebranche, 55 f. 

Mandeville, 105. 

Mansel, 237. 

Marx, 213. 

Materialism, 63, 120, 269. 

Matter, 37, 50, 72 f., 81, 99 f. 

Maxwell, 298. 

Mayer, Robert, 268. 

Mechanical conception of na- 
ture, 41 f., 43 f., 49, 51, 59, 
83 ff., 177 f., 272 f., 289, 298. 

Melanchthon, 8. 

Mendelssohn, 133, 134. 

Metaphysical idealism, 82, 102, 
196, 212, 272 ff. 

Metaphysical problem, 2, 44, 
90, 170, 246. 

Mill, James, 232, 233. 

Mill, John Stuart, 224, 232, 237. 

Modus, 72. 

Monad, 3, 33, 81, 292. 

Monism, 32, 71 f., 83, 270, 275. 

Montaigne, 6. 

Montesquieu, 119. 

Motion, Constancy of, 50, 80. 

Mutation, 248. 



Natura (naturans, naturata) 7, 

47, 72. 
Natural right, 9, 66, 95. 
Natural religion, 12, 47, 95, 119. 
Nature and culture, 103, 124, 

154, 167, 307. 
Neo-Kantianism, 289. 
Newton, 64, 96. 
Nietzsche, 304, 306. 

Occasionalism, 54. 

Ontological argument, 47, 109, 

134, 153. 
Optimism, 87 f., 102, 113, 306 ff. 

Pantheism, 72, 95. 

Pascal, 57. 

Paulsen, 281, 292. 

Pessimism, 57, 105, 198 f., 277. 

Pluralism, 83, 302. 

Pomponazzi, 4. 

Positivism, 224. 

Pragmatism, 297, 302. 

Priestley, 115. 

Primary and secondary quali- 
ties, 92. 

Principle of sufficient reason, 
81, 82, 87, 194 f. 

Problems, 1-3, 42 f. 

Psychological problem, i, 107 f., 
114 f., 127 f., 241, 284 f. 

Quality and quantity, 38 f., 
49 f., 272 f., 294 f., 298 f. 

Ramus, 16. 
Reid, 115. 
Reimarus, 138. 
Reinhold, 165. 



324 



INDEX 



Relativity, 24, 27, 28, 62, 64, 
142 f., 166, 236, 250 f., 294. 

Religious problem, 2, 12-14, I05» 
no f., 129, 158, 204, 214 f., 
245, 306, 311 ff. 

Renouvier, 292. 

Richter, 213. 

Rickert, 292. 

Riehl, 292. 

Romanticism, 169, 219. 

Rosenkranz, 213. 

Rosmini, 264. 

Rousseau, 123. 

Royer CoUard, 222. 

Ruge, 219. 

Saint Simon, 223. 
Sanchez, 16. 
Schelling, 177. 
Schiller, 167. 
Schleiermacher, 189. 
Schopenhauer, 194. 
Schultze, 165. 
Shaftesbury, 102. 
Sibbem, 200. 
Sidgwick, 244. 
Smith, 113 
Sociology, 228, 258. 
Spencer, 250. 
Spinoza, 67, 80. 
Spiritualism, 52, 121, 274 f. 
Strauss, 213. 

Subjectivity of qualities, 42, 
49 f., 60, 92. 



Substance, 49, 52, 53, 69, 71, 

81, 93f., 109. 
Sufficient reason. Principle of, 

81, 82, 87, 194 i- 
Sulzer, 133. 
Synthesis, 147 f., 150, 241, 284 f. 

Taine, 287. 

Teleology, 50 f., 79 f., 87, 112, 
119, 140, 151 f., 161,250. 

Telesius, 24. 

Tetens, 133, 135. 

Theism, 219 f., 274. 

Theodicy, 87 f. 

Toland, 96. 

Trendelenberg, 214. 

Tycho Brahe, 31, 38. 

Truth, 49, 69, 74 f., 185, 296 ff. 

Utilitarianism, 232, 243, 259. 

Values, Problem of, 2, 87 f., 90, 

104, 198 f., 277, 303. 
Vives, 7. 
Voltaire, 118. 
Voluntarism, 282. 
Vries, 248. 

Weisse, 214. 

Whewell, 237. 

Windelband, 292. 

Welfare, Principle of, 104, 232. 

Wol£E, 132. 

Wundt, 280. 



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